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PART 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The first part of this thesis introduces the background and focus of our study. It elaborates 
on research questions, and outlines the structure of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 1  Context and Focus 
 
In this chapter, we sketch the context of global software projects, and elaborate on 
challenges reported in literature. The section outlines how our research contributes to 
understanding these challenges. It elaborates on our focus and research questions.  
 
§ 1.1  Background of the Research 
 
Around early 1990s, firms in countries like the US, Canada, Western Europe and 
Singapore started to outsource software projects to offshore vendors in India, China, 
Ireland and the Philippines. In the former countries, an increasing number of IT projects 
was initiated to streamline international business processes and infrastructures. Enterprise 
Resource Planning software (ERP) became popular as a tool for standardization and 
integration across functions and locations. Also, firms were eager to ensure on time 
readiness for the Y2K problem,1 and they started to implement new web-based e-
commerce solutions. All this boosted demand for IT services beyond supply. Average 
wages for IT professionals started to soar, pushing IT project costs up.  
IT industry in offshore countries - especially India - benefited from this trend. They could 
source from a considerable pool of local IT professionals who worked at comparatively 
low wages. Gradually, with local government assistance, high-tech centers emerged around 
cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad (Heeks, 1996). Vendors based in these centers - Tata, 
IMR, and Wipro - evolved into huge IT service firms with presence throughout the world. 
They organized and improved business processes according to international quality 
standards (ISO, CMM) to built trust with customers in North America and Western 
Europe. This enabled top-tier vendors from India to shift their strategic focus towards high 
added value work and long term partnerships (Shekar, 1999). Multinational firms from the 
US and Europe were eager to tap into these evolving resource centers. They include IT 
                                                 
1 Many systems in the 70s were coded with only 2 digits for programming a year. For 
instance, only 80 for 1980. This was done to economize on memory usage. The Y2K - 
Year 2000 - problem is that in that year 00 could also mean 1900. Therefore, systems that 
depend on annual dates - like financial systems - could be disrupted and become unstable. 
Concerns with the consequences of this problem led to huge investments in checking 
software codes for the annual digits and replacing these with 4 digits (so that e.g. 1990 and 
2000 are distinguished). Many firms translated the  problem into an opportunity. They 
implemented new systems like ERP that are Y2K ready.  
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multinationals (Microsoft,2 Oracle, SAP, and IBM), and software divisions of companies 
operating in other industries (GE, Philips, Northern Telecom, KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines).3 These firms have different ways to benefit from India’s IT industry: they 
outsourced ad-hoc projects to Indian vendors, or established their own local presence in 
India. Or they developed sustainable partnerships with local firms (Offshore Development 
Centers4).  
 
Offshore software projects drew the interest of professional and academic researchers 
(Krepchin, 1993; Kumar & Willcocks, 1996; Meadows, 1996a; Millar, 1999; 
Ravichandran & Ahmed, 1993). Early research efforts revealed many issues in these 
projects, like delays, difficulty with time zones, and quality concerns. For instance, in 1995 
K. Kumar (Florida International University, and Erasmus University) and L.P. Willcocks 
(Warwick Business School) conducted a study at Holiday Inn in Atlanta, GA (Kumar & 
Willcocks, 1996). They were interested in an Information Technology (IT) project that was 
partially outsourced to a vendor company in India. Initially, vendor staff worked onsite in 
Atlanta, together with people from Holiday Inn. A local team of vendor and Holiday Inn 
staff emerged with its own way of collaborating. This process was interrupted when visas 
were not renewed for the Indian team members. They returned to Bangalore, India with the 
intention to continue their participation in the project from offshore. Things turned out 
differently: collaboration became less predictable and frequent. In India, members of the 
original team were replaced by novices. Mistakes were made that were unthinkable when 
the whole team was in Atlanta (Kumar & Willcocks, 1996).  
 
From this initial stream of research, a number of interesting questions emerged: Why was 
the period of remote collaboration so different from the preceding period on-site? Why was 
it more difficult and less successful? How does global distributedness of team members 
impact the effectiveness and success of a project?5 In order to answer these questions, they 
decided to start new research. In 1996, K. Kumar setup a 4-year study at the Department of 
Decision and Information Sciences at Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus 
University in the Netherlands. He hired and worked jointly with the author to explore the 
uniqueness and challenges of globally distributed collaboration. This thesis publication 
reports on that study.  
 
                                                 
2 Commercial names for products and organizations are used throughout the text, like 
Oracle, Lotus Notes. The author acknowledges the property rights of the respective 
organizations.  
3 Some firms started to fly in Indian software professionals, a form of insourcing 
(Hirschheim & Lacity, 2000). This results in a collocated team of client-vendor staff. Since 
our focus is on remote collaboration, we do not elaborate on this phenomenon as such.  
4 These centers are owned by Indian vendor firms like Wipro but operate exclusively for 
customers, sometimes from physically separate locations.  
5 In this thesis, distributedness implies that people are located at different sites. 
Distributedness and dispersion are used interchangeably. Global refers to the earth, so 
global distributedness and global dispersion mean two or more sites on this planet.  
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§ 1.2  Phenomenon 
 
In fact, onshore-offshore collaboration, or more in general globally distributed 
collaboration is not really new.6 Remote collaboration, even across the globe, has been 
around for ages. Rome’s political, military, and religious system stretched from Africa’s 
north coast to northern Europe, and from England to Germanic areas. Huge countries like 
the United States, Canada and China have always required connectivity across vast 
distances. Commercial examples abound too. Around the 16th and 17th century, 
representatives from Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands roamed South American and 
Pacific coasts to establish local presence and trading connections. Similarly, multinational 
corporations like the Hudson’s Bay Company managed large numbers of dispersed sites 
(O'Leary, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2002).  
 
Still, today’s examples of globally distributed collaboration are different.  
 
Back then, sites were connected, but they did not collaborate on a day-to-day basis. 
Sustaining cohesion relied more on carefully selected representatives that roamed the 
network of sites to maintain commitment and standards (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). 
Rotating these people ensured some consistency and control. In addition, messengers and 
messages connected sites with infrequent, regular intervals (O'Leary, Orlikowski, & Yates, 
2002). These communication means relied on basic transportation technology like walking, 
animals (camels, horses, the Pony Express), smoke signals (native North Americans), fire 
signals at night (Middle East), and ships. Later, the invention of engines led to ships, trains 
and vehicles to transport messengers or messages more frequently. 
 
The invention of electricity and various applied technologies promised a new level of 
remote ‘togetherness’. Subsequent inventions like telegraph, telephone, radio, television, 
satellite, and computer networks made the suggestion of distant connectivity more realistic 
and convincing. Each wave of new technologies enhanced the affordability, reliability, 
interactivity, and richness of remote communication. This changed (1) the nature and 
scope of remote collaboration, and (2) its role in today’s societies.  
 
§ 1.2.1  Nature and Scope of Remote Collaboration  
Changes in nature and scope are illustrated with the two dimensions depicted in Table 1. 
We developed this matrix that shows the intensity of collaboration across the rows. 
                                                 
6 Globally distributed refers to vast spatial separation of two or more actors on the globe - 
planet earth. We focus only on distributed collaboration between human beings. Remote 
interaction between human beings and a system, artifact, or robot is therefore not the 
principal focus of this study. 
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Second, the columns depict the scope of collaboration, i.e., geographical dispersion: 
collocation, regional distance dispersion, and global distance dispersion.7  
 
Table 1 - Collaboration and dispersion 
 
 
Intense 
 
 
Local projects 
 
 
 
Regional projects 
 
Global projects 
 
 
 
(1) Nature of 
collaboration  
Loose 
 
 
 
Local, loosely coupled 
collaboration 
 
Regional, loosely 
coupled collaboration 
 
Global, loosely coupled 
collaboration 
  Collocation Regional distance 
dispersion 
Global distance 
dispersion 
  (2) Geographical dispersion 
 
The first dimension includes loose collaboration implies that the work of two or more 
actors is connected, but only to a limited extent (Orton & Weick, 1990). Intense 
collaboration, on the other hand, means that tasks are closely intertwined (Van de Ven, 
Delbecq, & Koenig Jr, 1976). An example of close collaboration is a project - or temporary 
system8 - which requires frequent communication and adjustment (Goodman, 1981). Our 
research focuses on projects as forms of intense collaboration (the first row). The second 
dimension refers to the level of geographical dispersion, i.e., the number of miles of 
kilometers between sites on planet earth. This is a continuum: from collocation up to 
maximally the other end of the globe. We give here as an example three points on that 
range: collocation, regional distance dispersion, and global distance dispersion. 
 
Collocation implies that two or more actors work mostly on the same site, like a traditional 
office environment (Davenport & Pearlson, 1998). With regional distance dispersion, 
people collaborate within a country, or across borders of neighboring countries. Examples 
include projects within the European Union (Airbus), or the United States (NASA). 
Finally, global distance dispersion indicates inter-continental collaboration, and situations 
where people are separated by vast distances and time zones. The earlier mentioned 
Holiday Inn project is an example of globally dispersed project collaboration. People 
collaborated from Atlanta, GA and Bangalore, India. This study focuses on the right upper 
cell (shaded gray in Table 1).  
 
                                                 
7 Global distance dispersion refers here only to geographical distance. We refer to global 
dispersion as a broader concept that includes other possible dimensions of dispersed 
collaboration like cultural and infrastructural differences. 
8 The terms project and temporary systems are used interchangeably (Bryman, Bresnen, 
Beardsworth, Ford, & Keil, 1987). Our focus is on civil, non-military projects. 
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The scope of dispersed projects has been extended beyond two or more sites on the surface 
of planet earth. Remote collaboration9 may also include projects with below-surface sites 
(mining, deep sea exploration). And aerospace projects, like the International Space 
Station that requires collaboration between multiple spacecraft and ground control sites. 
With current technologies, people may be located in any of these dimensions. They can 
collaborate within the same spatial dimension (like two sites on the surface of planet earth, 
or communication between two aircraft). Or their counterparts can be located in another 
spatial dimension, e.g., ground control and manned spacecraft, or Air Traffic Control.10  
 
§ 1.2.2  Importance of Globally Dispersed Projects 
Global projects exemplify the shift towards an international, networked economy 
(Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996) and virtual workplace (Davenport & Pearlson, 1998; 
Nemiro, 2000). Multinational firms have started to connect local operations in a more 
intense fashion than was common so far (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). International 
connectivity enables them to leverage knowledge and other local resources on a global 
scale (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). Examples include industries and activities like car 
manufacturing (Andres, 1992; O'Cinneide, 1993), packaged software development 
(Carmel & Zettl-Schaffer, 1997), oil (Siddal, Willey, & Tavares, 1992), financial 
transaction processing (HBS, 1995), new product design (Kunz, Christiansen, Cohen, Jin, 
& Levitt, 1998), rocket design (Majchrzak, Rice, King, Malhotra, & Ba, 2000a), human 
resource management (Sparrow & Daniels, 1999), training (Filipczal, 1997), computer 
design (Hamlin, 1994), implementation of packaged software (Kay, 1998; Markus, Tanis, 
& van Fenema, 2000), and software development and IT management (Lee & Palvia, 
1996; Meadows, 1996a).  
These examples of project globalization often include some form of outsourcing. Remote 
vendor staff participates in and contributes to projects, like the Holiday Inn example shows 
(Kumar & Willcocks, 1996). Offshore IT outsourcing is a good example, and the focus of 
this study. Early 1990s, firms started to outsource many services - like IT - to reduce costs 
and focus on core competencies (Lacity, Willcocks, & Feeny, 1996; Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990). On top of that, from mid-1990s onwards, there was a huge shortage of IT 
professionals in North America, Europe, and some Asian countries like Singapore 
(Krepchin, 1993). The urgency of Y2K and e-commerce projects encouraged firms to look 
at developing countries like India, China, and Ireland, where large numbers of IT 
professionals were willing to contribute at lower costs (Millar, 1999; Smith, Mitra, & 
                                                 
9 This study focuses only on inter-human collaboration, not between human beings and a 
robot. 
10 A definition issue emerges here. Usually, geographically distributed projects refer to 
projects with sites on the surface of planet earth. Globally distributed projects are a subset 
of these, referring to projects with intercontinental distances, and situations where people 
are separated by vast distances and time zones (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; Maznevski & 
Chudoba, 2000). The term ‘global’ usually refers to planet earth. New terminology is 
required for projects with people scattered across different spatial dimensions (like space 
and planet earth surface), for instance ‘spatially dispersed’.  
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Narasimhan, 1996). These opportunities resulted in rapid growth of software industries in 
developing countries, especially India (Meadows, 1996b; Nidumolu & Goodman, 1993).  
 
The overall implication is that globally dispersed collaboration in projects has become 
widespread. Global projects are a vital tool for achieving economies of scale (Chiesa, 
1995), and leveraging resources like knowledge and IT (O'Hara & Johansen, 1994). 
Successful management of global projects is important for reducing cycle times 
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995), and standardize operations (Kay, 1998; Markus et al., 2000). 
Global projects are also important for attracting and retaining a pool of talented 
professionals (Sparrow & Daniels, 1999).  
 
§ 1.3  Challenges 
 
As people have started to collaborate in projects across global distances, new challenges 
have emerged (Rajkumar & Dawley, 1997). Some of these were mentioned in the Holiday 
Inn case, like less frequent and predictable collaboration. And loss of social contact 
between the teams in Atlanta, GA and Bangalore, India. Other researchers have also 
pointed at numerous issues that surfaced in their research on distributed, remote 
collaboration. We drew from research areas that appeared relevant for understanding 
globally distributed collaboration, such as offshore outsourcing, teleworking, virtual teams, 
groupware.  
 
As we further elaborate in the theory section, some of the issues and challenges include:  
 
 Challenges to manage the requirements analysis process with remote sites (Meadows, 
1996b) 
 Complexity of connecting people across sites, including channeling of 
communications (Meadows, 1996b) 
 Difficulty to ensure deliverables from people at counterpart sites 
 Role of on-site visits and liaison (Millar, 1999) 
 Lack of informal, direct communications that are more common in collocated work 
settings 
 Working around time zone differences (Meadows, 1996b) 
 New skills and attitudes that are required for using electronic media successfully 
(Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998) 
 Lack of understanding of counterpart’s context (Cramton, 1997)  
 Using documents in a multi-site environment 
 Delays in distributed collaborative work processes (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998)11 
 Difficulty to divide work, and manage interdependencies in global projects (Meadows, 
1996a) 
 Infrastructural challenges 
                                                 
11 The assumption that global distributedness enables nonstop and therefore faster work 
cycles - e.g., 3x8 hours - appears not realistic in many cases. 
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 The role of groupware (Majchrzak et al., 2000a) 
 Managing/ leading people in remote locations (Kurland & Egan, 1999) 
 
Starting around mid-1990s, these studies offer a first and fascinating view on 
geographically distributed collaboration as a new phenomenon for scientific research. At 
the same time, the initial stage of the present research implies of course many remaining 
limitations and challenges. Many of the studies are exploratory in nature. They are not 
clearly rooted in existing literature of the organization sciences. Nor do they expand on the 
background of the issues listed above. Individual researchers have adopted their own - 
often grounded - perspective on the new phenomenon, without clearly embedding their 
view in others’ current or past research. Many research projects rely on experiments or 
student projects instead of ‘real-life’ distributed projects. Important areas of inter-personal 
collaboration and project management - like as coordination and control - are not yet 
thoroughly investigated. Dimensions of global distributedness have not been clearly 
defined. Most research has focused on geographical dispersion without considering other 
dimensions of dispersion, like time zone and governance differences. And finally, 
researchers adopt a unit of analysis in line with traditional mainstream organization science 
literature, i.e., industrial networks (virtual networks), organizations (virtual organizations), 
and teams (virtual teams). However, geographical distributedness changes the relevance of 
these two constructs since many definitional parameters do no longer apply (DeSanctis & 
Fulk (Eds), 1999; Fulk & DeSanctis, 1995; Meyerson et al., 1996).  
 
The combination of these research challenges and the import role of global projects have 
motivated our research. We explain in the next section our research focus and contribution.  
 
§ 1.4  Research Focus 
 
This study is focused along the following dimensions.  
 
First, our research concentrates on temporary systems (or projects) as unit of analysis. 
Goodman (1981: 2) defines temporary systems as “(…) a set of diversely skilled people 
working jointly on a task of some complexity over a limited time period”. Earlier, Bennis 
(1965) defined projects by contrasting them with bureaucratic organization: “Adaptive, 
problem-solving temporary systems of diverse specialists, linked together by coordinating 
and task evaluating specialists in an organic flux - that is the organizational form that will 
gradually replace bureaucracy as we know it” (Bennis, 1965: 35). In professional project 
management literature, Lock (1996) defines projects as an interrelated set of activities 
whose combined performance within a limited period accomplishes certain desired 
objectives”. 
 
Some researchers of distributed collaboration have adopted the team as their unit of 
analysis. They refer to people involved in the same project from different sites as a ‘virtual 
team’, e.g., (Hinds & Bailey, 2000; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; Majchrzak et al., 2000a). 
A concern with this unit of analysis is that parameters of the traditional team definition 
may not apply to a distributed setting. Our research continues a tradition in the 
organization sciences that is more focused on work or tasks (Barley & Kunda, 2001), 
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particularly here temporary systems (Bryman et al., 1987; Goodman, 1981; Meyerson et 
al., 1996).  
 
Second, with respect to the temporal dimension, this research focuses on temporary work. 
Projects are temporary systems with a task-related objective (Goodman, 1981). 
Furthermore, we look at projects in the late 1990s. Our main viewpoint is people’s current 
experiences in global software projects at the time of our empirical research. As an 
extension, we take into account what people have learned while working on their current or 
recently completed global projects (see also Table 2). 
 
Third, our study focuses on geographically dispersed projects. ‘Geographical dispersion’ 
refers here to situations where collocated collaboration - under normal conditions - is 
unfeasible on a frequent basis. People must collaborate from locations on the surface of 
planet earth that are separated by vast distances. Instead of face-to-face interactions, they 
rely on other means to coordinate their work like electronic media, procedures and 
occasional visits.  
 
Geographical dispersion defines the category of projects we focus on. It provides a 
minimum demarcation of the research object. Our content perspective - the impact of 
global distributedness - is broader since it includes other dimensions of distributedness, 
like cultural differences, time zone differences and so on. These other dimensions - we 
show some of them below - may coincide with geographical dispersion, but not 
necessarily. They cannot therefore define our research object per se (O'Leary, 2001). 
Examples of those dimensions and some possible relationships to geographical dispersion 
include:  
 
 Time zone differences - people can be paired from South Africa and Europe, or South 
America and North America without any time zone differences, but huge spatial 
distances. 
 Countries - single countries sometimes span vast distances, like USA, Canada, Russia, 
India, China, and Australia. Our definition would include projects that include 
multiple sites within such countries, like multiple sites in the US (Majchrzak et al., 
2000a). International projects do not capture therefore the quintessence of our focus: 
geographically distributed over vast distances. Project sites may be located at two 
sides of a nation’s border, making it an international project without significant 
geographical distance. 
 Cultural or functional diversity - while geographical dispersion may make it more 
likely that people have different cultural backgrounds, and functional expertise, this is 
not necessarily the case. People in the Apache group for instance share many interests 
and insights while working from different sites (Fielding, 1999). On the other hand, 
companies in international urban areas like New York and London may hire a more 
diverse workforce that works collocated.  
 Organizational boundaries - a single multinational corporation operates a network of 
offices, plants and research labs (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996), while in the same area 
companies may outsource business processes and work across organizational 
boundaries. 
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 The number of people per site - our definition or geographical dispersion does not 
refer to the relative distribution of people across sites. Some sites may accommodate 
more people than others. 
 
Fourth, the object of our investigation is real-life software projects, in a civil context 
(government and business, not military). We focus on Information Systems (IS) 
development and/ or implementation projects.  
 
Finally, our main content focus is coordination and control processes in distributed 
projects. This ties in with a long standing tradition in the organization sciences (Crowston 
& Kammerer, 1998; Ezzamel & Willmott, 1998; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b; Litterer, 
1965; Mintzberg, 1979; Van de Ven et al., 1976), and some research on temporary systems 
(Bryman et al., 1987; Goodman, 1981). A more elaborate motivation for this content focus 
is found at the start of the theory section.  
We focus on the way people coordinate and control their work accomplishments. 
Technology is viewed here as a supporting tool for coordination and control processes. 
Thus, our main focus is not on human-computer interaction or the role of technology per 
se. 
Specifically, our primary focus is on remote coordination and control, that is, how people 
connect their work across sites. Local modes of coordination and control are of interest to 
the extent that they relate to inter-site practices. 
 
§ 1.5  Research Objective and Questions 
 
With this focus, our objective is to understand the impact of global distributedness on the 
way people coordinate and control their work. We want to understand the issues and 
constraints people experience when they collaborate across global distances in a software 
project. We seek to investigate the background of these issues, and want to know whether 
and how people must adapt their coordination and control modes.  
 
Our overall research question then becomes:  
 
How does global distributedness impact the way people coordinate and control their work 
in global software projects? 
 
At the core, this concerns an explanatory relationships between two constructs: 
geographical distributedness, and coordination and control modes in temporary systems 
(Hedrick, Bickman, & Rog, 1993; Yin, 1994).  
 
The research question leads to a number of sub questions (see Figure 1). First, a 
definitional and explanatory question: 
 
1. What are coordination and control modes, and what determines the use of 
particular modes? 
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Before investigating the impact of geographical distributedness, it is desirable to 
understand the different modes of coordination and control. And also, to gain insight in the 
factors, conditions, and situations that determine usage of particular mechanisms. 
 
Second, a definitional question to understand the concept of global distributedness: 
 
2. What is global distributedness? 
We use pointers in existing research to explore the concept of global distributedness. As it 
appears, other dimensions than spatial separation over vast distances should be included, 
like time zone differences, and cultural diversity.  
 
Third, from the main research question one can derive a more exploratory and descriptive 
sub question of the “what” type (Hedrick et al., 1993; Yin, 1994):  
 
3a. What is the impact of global distributedness on the way people coordinate and 
control their work in global software projects? 
This question seeks to explore and describe the effects of global distributedness. It then 
analyzes and attempts to find generic impacts on coordination and control modes, see 
Figure 1.  
 
The final and main question is explanatory:  
 
3b. How does global distributedness impact the way people coordinate and control 
their work in global software projects? 
This question goes beyond sub question 3a. It focuses not only on exploring and describing 
effects an sich, but seeks to understand a more causal pattern of impacts. We seek to build 
a theory that explains the process of impacting, the impacts themselves (i.e., effects), and 
how people respond to these impacts (Figure 1). In a sense, global distributedness can be 
perceived as a new contingency or determinant of coordination and control modes. It may 
interact with determinants currently recognized in coordination and control theory (Kirsch, 
1996; Van de Ven et al., 1976) (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1 - Explanatory research question 
 
Process of 
impacting
Impact Adaptation
Coordination & control of temporary systems
Global distributedness
Determinants, drivers
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§ 1.6  Nature of Research Questions 
 
The main research question is explanatory in nature as it seeks to understand a pattern of 
relationships and impacts (Hedrick et al., 1993; Yin, 1994). To support this question, the 
first two sub questions are definitional, somewhat exploratory. The third sub question (a 
and b) is exploratory and descriptive, oriented towards making an inventory of effects.  
 
The study is aimed at current projects, i.e., those that are pending during the research 
process, or just finished. Its main temporal focus is therefore a current situation, shown as 
a gray column in Table 2.  
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§ 1.7  Relevance of the Research 
A research project that costs about € 90.000 or US$ 80,000 to tax payers should have clear 
relevance. Two main groups are targeted with this study: practitioners and academics. 
First, practitioners have puzzled by the unfamiliarity of global projects. Obviously, a wide 
range of prescriptive, professional-oriented literature is available for those needing a quick 
scan and an initial grasp on the new phenomenon. Discerning professionals and 
consultants, however, may want a more solid understanding of what this new workplace 
means, and what it requires to be successful. They may want a more comprehensive look at 
the different strategies for coordinating and controlling global projects in order to build 
sustainable capabilities in this area. This research is targeted at that group through current 
and planned publications, collaborative projects, and presentations. 
 
Second, from an academic point of view, globally distributed projects challenge many 
existing perspectives, theories, and approaches. Areas that are challenged include for 
instance (1) unit of analysis, (2) empirical research methodologies, and (3) content 
theories. This study attempts to contribute to some of these challenges through peer 
networking, journal publications, conference presentations, and research collaboration.  
Ad (1) over the 20th century, organization theory has relied on assumptions with respect to 
the unit of analysis. Research has been built around individuals, groups, organizations, 
industries, and macro-level phenomena. Distributed collaboration turns many of these 
assumptions upside down. A more complex object of analysis is emerging where people 
contribute in temporary configurations that span multiple departments, organizations, 
industries, and locations (Meyerson et al., 1996). Our research attempts to address these 
challenges by focusing on temporary systems as a manifestation of work (Barley & Kunda, 
2001).  
Ad (2) studying distributed collaboration challenges existing methodologies that focus on a 
fairly homogeneous, collocated object of study. Within resource constraints, researchers 
must find a way to connect to this more diverse, dispersed environment. Our study offers 
an example of this environment. We traveled to research sites, contacted interviewees 
remotely, and worked with people who observed for us at another site.  
Finally, ad (3) global distributedness calls for re-assessing many content theories related to 
the process of organizing and managing work that have assumed collocated of their 
research object. Our research focuses on a small but important area: coordination and 
control theory. It provides a starting points for researchers working on these and adjacent 
areas. 
 
§ 1.8  Thesis Setup 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. In the next chapter, we conclude Part 1 with an 
explanation of our research approach. Parts 2 and 3 contain the theoretical and empirical 
body of our study (Figure 2). 
 
Part 2 - the Theory Section - explains the motivation and methodology for our theory 
building efforts (chapter 3). It continues with theory reviews and integration along two 
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lines. First, we discuss theories on work coordination and control (chapter 4), and develop 
an integrated theory of that field (chapter 5). This answers our first research question on 
coordination and control (see dotted arrow in Figure 2 towards sub question 1).  
The second line of inquiry focuses on polycontextual and geographically distributed 
collaboration. We review contributions on this topic in chapter 6. In the seventh chapter, 
we use this review to develop our conceptual lens. In the same chapter, we use the lens to 
analyze and summarize current literature. All this answers sub question 2, and in part also 
sub question 3 (see dotted lines towards the sub questions in Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 - Thesis setup and research questions 
 
The third Part is devoted to empirical research to answer sub questions 3 and 4. After 
chapter 8 (empirical research methodology), a number of cases are described and analyzed 
(chapter 9). Chapter 10 concludes this Part with a meta analysis of the case studies that 
completes the answers to sub question 3 (Figure 2).  
Part 4 concludes the thesis (chapter 11) and identifies contributions, limitations and future 
research (chapter 12).  
(1) Review literature on 
coordination & control 
(2) Review literature on 
distributed work
Integrated view on 
coordination & control
Conceptual Lens & Framing 
literature on distributed work
Theory Section
Case study
Cross-case analysis
Empirical Research
Main research question
Sub question 1 Sub question 2 Sub questions 3a, 3b
Case study
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Chapter 2  Research Approach 
 
This study’s objective and questions point towards understanding and explaining the 
impact of global distributedness on project coordination and control. Having established 
the research content and type of study, our next step is to outline the research approach.  
 
We start with the research cycle (Marshall & Rossman, 1995) to identify major steps and 
components. Next, we explain the philosophical perspective adopted for conducting the 
research (Lee, 1991), and our empirical research methodology (Marshall & Rossman, 
1995; Yin, 1994). The section is then concluded with a description of the research process, 
and attention for the quality of this study (Kirk & Miller, 1986). Here, we provide an 
overview of our research approach. This is extended in the theoretical and empirical 
section of the thesis. There we discuss motivation for content areas we have focused on, as 
well as methodological choices.  
 
§ 2.1  Research Design 
 
Research design is concerned with the overall purpose of a research study (Maxwell, 
1996). It details components that relate in a logical and efficient manner. One could - in 
analogy with literature on new product design (Henderson & Clark, 1990) - distinguish 
between (1) the architectural or system level, and (2) the component level. A well-accepted 
approach that combines these two levels is the research cycle Figure 3 (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1995).  
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Adopted from (Marshall & Rossman, 1995: 17)  and modified 
 
Figure 3 - Research cycle 
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This cycle - also referred to as the “wheel of science” - describes multiple sequential steps. 
All these related to the research question and focus (see center of Figure 3). According to 
Marshall and Rossman (1995: 16), a researcher may start at any point of the cycle, for 
instance with an initial theory (top of cycle) to explain the question (center). Next, 
following the cycle to the right, models and concepts are developed for guiding empirical 
research. The development of research tools then precedes empirical observation (bottom 
of cycle), which leads to analysis and explanation. The final stage translates newly 
acquired understanding into policies and practice. 
 
What the figure does not clearly show, is the relationships between two dimensions: the 
empirical, social reality (Kirk & Miller, 1986), and theories. The first dimension consists 
of people’s physical and social reality, including problems and challenges they experience 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Researcher may enter and empirically observe this area. 
The second dimension refers to conceptual analysis and understanding. Researchers 
develop, test, and modify theories to recognize and explain empirical situations (Yin, 
1994). Figure 4 shows the two dimensions - empirical and theoretical.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Research dimensions 
 
The researcher seeks for ways to connect the two levels and enhance their reciprocal added 
value. On the one hand, he develops familiarity with an empirical setting to fuel theory 
development (Figure 4 from empirical to theoretical). On the other hand, conceptual 
development enables him to recognize, understand and perhaps alter an empirical situation.  
 
Connecting the two dimensions is an important challenge for applied social research (Lee, 
1991; Schutz, 1973). It requires a philosophical perspective and methodology for 
conducting empirical and theoretical research (Cooper, 1984; Klein & Myers, 1999). 
Figure 5 includes such a third layer. The figure combines the research cycle (Figure 3) 
with the two dimensions (Figure 4), resulting in a grand research design (Maxwell, 1996). 
The third dimension - Research design and methodology - connects empirical research and 
theory.  
 
We discuss the grand design for problem-solving in applied social research of which this 
study is an example. Starting with a problem in the empirical world (top left in Figure 5), 
Problems,
Empirical observations
Theory Development
Empirical Dimension Theoretical Dimension
Empiricism contributes to 
theory development
Theory development contributes 
to empirical understanding
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the researcher develops research questions and an overall research design. Next, existing 
theory is investigated and integrated according to a theory development methodology 
(dotted box). This is followed by a conceptual lens12 that frames the empirical research. 
The second dotted box - empirical research methodology - structures from the empirical 
research design a methodological point of view.  
 
A researcher can enter the empirical dimension and conduct his observations there. His 
empirical data requires management to ensure accessibility and efficiency in the analysis 
phase (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Moving back to the theory dimension, the researcher 
analyzes data based on the conceptual lens while allowing for novel findings (Yin, 1994). 
His conceptual analysis leads to possible modification of theory (see dotted arrow between 
theory extension and existing theory). It also translates into understanding of the empirical 
reality investigated, and possible prescriptions. This leads to a second dotted feedback loop 
between the ‘understanding & prescriptions’ box, and the original problem.  
 
                                                 
12 A conceptual lens defines the way a researcher enters and looks at an empirical situation. 
It is less formal than a research model with dependent and independent variables 
commonly used in quantitatively oriented research (Yin, 1994). 
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Figure 5 - Grand research design 
 
For our study, methodologies are elaborated in respectively the theory and empirical 
research sections. We expand in the next section on the philosophical perspective and to 
some extent on the empirical research methodology.  
 
§ 2.2  Research Philosophy and Empirical Research Methodology 
 
Klein and Myers (1999) and Myers (2001) emphasize the distinction between a 
researcher’s philosophical perspective and his empirical research methodology. For an 
overview see Table 3. We discuss both dimensions and their relationships in the next two 
sections. 
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Table 3 - Philosophical perspective & empirical research methodology 
 
Philosophical perspective & epistemology Empirical research methodology 
Guba and Lincoln (1994): 
 positivism 
 post-positivism 
 critical theory 
 constructivism 
 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991): 
 positivist 
 interpretive  
 critical 
 
Triangulations, e.g., (Lee, 1991) 
 
Myers (2001): 
 Quantitative research methods (Examples: 
survey methods, laboratory experiments, 
formal methods and numerical methods 
such as mathematical modeling) - versus - 
 Qualitative research methods (Examples: 
action research, case study research, 
ethnography and grounded theory)  
 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 
 Objective - versus - 
 Subjective research methods  
 
Triangulations, e.g., (Markus, 1994) 
 
§ 2.2.1  Research Philosophy 
First, the philosophical perspective applies to the research study as a whole. It consists of 
the researcher’s paradigm, assumptions, worldview, as well as his view on knowledge and 
knowledge acquisition (epistemology) (Myers, 2001). Different philosophical perspectives 
have been distinguished (Table 1, top row) (Klein & Myers, 1999). Guba and Lincoln 
(1994) propose positivism, post-positivism, and critical theory. Orlikowski and Baroudi 
(1991) identify positivist, interpretive and critical perspectives. The latter is commonly 
used in IS research, and therefore also here.  
 
First, Klein and Myers (1999: 69) refer to research as being positivist “(...) if there is 
evidence of formal propositions, quantifiable measures of variables, hypothesis testing, and 
the drawing of inferences about a phenomenon from a representative sample to a stated 
population”. Positivists draw upon logical positivism and the natural science model. With 
this approach, theory leads to hypotheses that are logically related and empirically tested 
for falsification (Lee, 1991). Scholars refer to this approach as etic, objective, outside 
oriented (Burell & Morgan, 1979). Luthans and Davis (1982) describe it as nomothetic, 
i.e., focused on the discovery of general laws. Stake (1994) refers to instrumental research, 
that is, empirical research is used as an instrument for e.g. validating theory. 
 
Second, studies are considered interpretive “(…) if it is assumed that our knowledge of 
reality is gained only through social constructions such a language, consciousness, shared 
meanings, documents, tools and other artifacts” (Klein & Myers, 1999: 69). Interpretivist 
researchers acknowledge that people have individual, different experiences, even with 
inclusion in the same context. These scholars seek to connect closely to diverse actors in a 
setting to gain a grasp on their perspectives. This is commonly referred to as an emic, 
subjective, or insider viewpoint (Burell & Morgan, 1979). It is also called idiographic, i.e., 
looking at the uniqueness of a particular situation, or the specific nature of a context (Klein 
& Myers, 1999; Luthans & Davis, 1982). Stake (1994, 1995) calls this intrinsic research: 
an empirical investigation is undertaken for gaining intimate understanding of just that 
particular setting. 
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Third and finally, critical research is mainly focused on “(…) social critique, whereby the 
restrictive and alienating conditions of the status quo are brought to light” (Klein & Myers, 
1999: 69). 
 
Since our research objective is not to critique a phenomenon, we further focus on positivist 
and interpretive views. Some researchers have argued to combine these two philosophical 
perspectives, i.e., triangulation (Lee, 1991; Myers, 2001). Lee (1991) explains that both 
perspectives have their own pros and cons. We use Figure 6 to show this dilemma. 
Individual actors 1 through 4 are involved in a collaborative experience (e.g., a project 
team), each having their own experience.  
 
First, positivism is strong in terms of theoretical logic and generalizability, but lacks the 
dense connection to empirical reality. Related to Figure 6, this implies that a general theory 
is used to develop hypotheses, which are tested on this population. Intersubjective 
differences or novel insights are not captured.  
 
Second, interpretivism runs the risk of focusing exclusively on individual subjectivity 
without coming to generalizable, conceptual understanding. Using Figure 6, the 
interpretive researcher connects extremely well to individual experiences of actors 1 
through 4. He may elicit inter-subjective communications and understanding. While he 
acquires new insight in the uniqueness of this context, his research is weaker in terms of 
generating generalizable concepts. I.e., those that enable understanding and perhaps 
improvement of comparable settings and situations.  
 
 
3
9
  
F
ig
u
re
 6
 - P
o
s
itiv
is
m
 a
n
d
 in
te
rp
re
tiv
is
m
 
In
ter-
su
b
jectiv
e 
u
n
d
erstan
d
in
g
A
c
to
r 4
A
c
to
r 4
E
xp
erien
ce A
cto
r 4
A
c
to
r 1
A
c
to
r 1
E
xp
erien
ce A
cto
r 1
G
en
eralized
, 
co
n
cep
tu
al  
u
n
d
erstan
d
in
g
A
c
to
r 2
A
c
to
r 2
E
xp
erien
ce A
cto
r 2
A
c
to
r 3
A
c
to
r 3
E
xp
erien
ce A
cto
r 3
 40
Looking at these two perspectives, what seems to remain is “(…) a continuous dialectical 
tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structures in 
such a way as to bring them into simultaneous view” (Geertz, 1983: 69). Lee (1991) - 
extending earlier work by Schutz (1973) - expresses his concern with perceiving 
positivism and interpretivism as opposing viewpoints (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In his 
mind, they can be used mutually supportive. He proposes three levels of understanding that 
relate to our earlier distinction of empirical research and theory: 
 
A. Subjective understanding of observed human subjects. This refers to people in the 
physical and social reality (Kirk & Miller, 1986) that constitutes the researcher’s 
empirical domain.13 
B. Interpretive understanding of organizational researcher, meaning his initial connection 
to and perception of people researched.  
C. Positivist understanding of organizational researcher, that is, his generalized concepts 
on a theoretical level.  
 
Lee (1991) outlines steps for connecting the three levels and thus connect interpretivist and 
positivist approaches to organizational research (Figure 7). Starting point is the Subjective 
understanding of observed human subjects (A). Connecting to this insight generates the 
researcher’s interpretive understanding (B). A feedback loop ensures quality of this first 
step. Next, interpretive understanding enables evolution of positivist understanding (C). 
For instance, analysis of multiple interviews may lead to new theories for positivist 
research. Feedback again reinforces the quality of that link. Step 5 and 6 then seek to 
(dis)confirm hypotheses based on positivist research. Dotted lines represent the feedback 
loops.  
 
                                                 
13 As far as we know, inter-subjective understanding amongst observed human subjects is 
not included in this work, but presumably part of level 1. 
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Adopted from Lee (1991), and modified 
 
Figure 7 - Positivist and interpretivist approaches to organizational research 
 
Our research objective is to enhance our generalizable understanding of the way global 
distributedness impacts project coordination and control. Since the research field we work 
in is in its early stages, we also needed a lot of interpretive understanding, based on 
subjective understanding. Therefore, we adopted Lee’s (1991) approach within feasibility 
constraints. Usually, it is not possible within a single study to follow the complete scheme, 
or do all steps elaborate (Eisenhardt, 1989b, 1991). In our study, for instance, we worked 
for a couple of weeks with the ‘observed human subjects’, trying to get insight into their 
subjective understanding. This is less elaborate than an extensive ethnographic study or 
action research project. But it seemed sufficient for enhancing our interpretive 
understanding, and translate that into logic theory. In the next section we expand on the 
empirical research methodology as far as related to the overall research approach. The 
empirical research section explains in closer detail methodological choices. 
 
§ 2.2.2  Empirical Research Methodology 
A study’s empirical research methodology is closely related to the researcher’s 
philosophical perspective. Myers (2001) categorizes research methods into quantitative 
and qualitative ones (see Table 3). Quantitative methods include formal, numerical 
research modes like surveys and experiments. Examples of qualitative research are action 
research, case study research, and ethnography. Others refer to objective versus subjective 
methods (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Some studies have combined qualitative and 
quantitative methods, like Markus (1994) study of managerial e-mail usage.  
 
For this study, we adopted a qualitative approach for empirical research, more specifically 
the case study method. We chose qualitative methods because our main research questions 
 
A. Subjective 
d di
B. Interpretive 
d di
C. Positivist understanding
3. Basis for
6. (Dis)confirmation
5. Feedback
1. Basis for
2. Feedback
4. Feedback
 42
are explanatory in nature (Maxwell, 1996; Yin, 1994). As Miles and Huberman (1984: 
132) stress: “(...) much recent research supports a claim that we wish to make here: that 
field research is far better than solely quantified approaches at developing explanations 
(...)”. Qualitative methods are recommended for investigating complex phenomena when it 
is desirable to adopt an open conceptual approach and to develop “thick” descriptions 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1995).  
 
The case study was chosen because our research question is exploratory and a “how” 
question (Yin, 1994). For reasons of feasibility, action research and ethnography were not 
adopted. A grounded theory approach would not fit with the theory already available. In 
the section on empirical research we explain in more detail our empirical design for case 
study research. 
 
§ 2.3  Research Process 
 
An overview of our research process is depicted in Figure 8.14 We started in Fall 1996 with 
an identification of the research problem and questions. We collected and analyzed 
extensive literature on topics related to our study. An initial integration of literature was 
completed Winter 1996 - Spring 1997. Around that time, we had the opportunity to work 
with Ms Amanda Cijntje, a student at that time at the Department of Decision and 
Information Sciences at Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University in the 
Netherlands. For an internship she participated in a global software project at CarCo.15 We 
combined efforts and developed an initial research design to collect data for the CarCo 
case (Cijntje, 1997). In the process we modified our theory, leading to a refined conceptual 
lens and empirical research design. A second wave of case studies in Singapore in 1999 
complemented the CarCo case (Figure 8). Of these only the DiskCo case is reported here. 
For the other ones a limited data set was collected. Data of all the case studies was 
analyzed in 1999/ 2000 and led to a re-assessment and write-up of our earlier theoretical 
work in 2000. In 2001 the remaining parts of the thesis were completed.  
 
                                                 
14 While the process appears sequentially in this figure, the reality of research is obviously 
more messy. This ‘messiness’ includes frequent feedback cycles, revisiting parts of the 
study completed at an earlier stage, and reinterpretations. 
15 All names in our case studies have been disguised to maintain confidentiality.  
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Figure 8 - Research process 
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§ 2.4  Quality of the Research 
 
“Quality, according to ISO 8402, is the totality of features and characteristics of a 
product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs” (Zineldin, 
1999: 720) 
 
Following this quote and principles of Total Quality Management (TQM), quality is here 
perceived as something that touches all aspects of a research endeavor. The main objective 
of quality management is to satisfy customers of a product or service. In our case, this 
audience consists of professionals, and academic research communities. Specifically, we 
focus on people in these communities who work - or struggle with - global software 
projects, virtual teams and similar topics. While we do not know exactly their needs as a 
population, we can approximate these based on our own research process and existing 
resources (Cascio, 2000; Pfeffer, 1981; Van de Ven, 1989).  
First, Professionals - managers, consultants, team members - look for appealing and 
relevant concepts to make them successful in their business context - global projects in our 
case (Cairncross, 2001).  
Second, academics look for interesting work that is connected to existing research. It 
should offer new insights and venues for future research (Sutton & Staw, 1995; Weick, 
1989). In our topic domain, this work is related to geographically distributed processes of 
collaboration, organization and communication (Cramton, 2001; Malhotra, Majchrzak, 
Carman, & Lott, 2001). For theory development work like our study, Weick (1989) points 
to a couple of ‘quality’ criteria: 
 
 That’s Interesting - Research should evoke interest by disconfirming assumptions. 
This challenges academics to move beyond their present-day understanding  
 That’s Obvious - In social sciences, obviousness refers to the process of making 
explicit what people assume already (Homans, 1964) 
 That’s Connected - Research should point at connections between events that evoke 
scholarly interest 
 That’s Believable - Conjectures should be likely to scholars, and coherent  
 That’s Beautiful - Quality research models and conceptual insights may trigger an 
aesthetic experience 
 That’s Real - A study should relate closely to ‘real-life’ phenomena, and should be 
relevant 
 
We have tried to approximate these criteria as we show here and in two separate sections 
(theory development and empirical research methodology).  
 
Weick’s (1989) criteria can be perceived as quality standards for research output (Figure 
9). We can look even broader at research quality by using a cybernetic system as a 
metaphor (Figure 9). A research study then comprises inputs, processes, outputs, and 
overall research integration. Quality criteria may apply to all facets of a research endeavor, 
see black triangles  in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9 - Research quality 
 
First, inputs consist of the research context in which we operated, as well as resources, and 
relationships. We have benefited from quality in all these areas. The Rotterdam School of 
Management is among the top schools in Europe, with extensive resources available for 
research. Resources include academic networking, IT infrastructure, and financial 
resources for e.g. visiting conferences and workshops. From a relationship point of view, 
we have worked on the scope and quality of our network (Zineldin, 1999). Through 
publications and other activities like participating in conferences, we have connected to 
researchers and professionals working in relevant areas (see also acknowledgements). In 
addition to the supervisor K. Kumar, they have contributed in an invaluable manner to the 
process and outcome.  
 
Second, process refers to the creation and refinement of research design, theory, and 
empirical research methodology. For theory and empirical research we elaborate on 
methodologies in the respective sections (e.g., reliability and validity issues). One 
important process is discussion with academics and professionals. We have worked on 
opportunities for discussion within and outside the Rotterdam School of Management, and 
on an international scale.  
 
Third, the output includes books, articles, presentations and the like. We have published a 
number of articles and book chapters to show intermediate results of our study and receive 
feedback (see also feedback loops in Figure 9). The seminality of research output depends 
on a longer term snowball effect where people use and cite research publications.  
 
Finally, there are feedback loops from outputs to process and inputs as well as integration - 
an overall process of embedding and adjusting components and phases of the study to 
create a coherent outcome (Maxwell, 1996; Zineldin, 1999). This is in a sense the 
architectural level of a research undertaking (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Like for a watch 
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or other man-made artifacts, quality depends on the overall design, and the way 
components fit in this grand picture. The integrative level is important to ensure internal 
logic and quality of the study, as well as external attractiveness of the outcome for relevant 
audiences. For the integration level of our study, discussions with professionals and 
academics (promoter, academic networking) have been of paramount importance. We have 
also relied on written resources from the social sciences (Marshall & Rossman, 1995; 
Maxwell, 1996).  
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PART 2  THEORY SECTION 
 
This part presents the results of our theory review and integration process in two areas of 
inquiry. First, general coordination and control theory (Part 1); and second, coordination 
and control of polycontextual, distributed work settings (Part 2). The results are presented 
after explaining the motivation and theory development methodology.  
 
 
Chapter 3  Motivation and Methodology for Theory Building  
 
In this chapter we outline our motivation for the literature reviews, and we indicate the 
methodology used for conducting these.  
 
§ 3.1  Motivation for Literature Reviews and Theory Building 
 
Current studies on distributed (IT project) work are scarce. This applies in particular to 
those that focus on coordination and control. Most research could be described as 
including coordination and control as some of the themes. But they do not explicitly refer 
to these processes, or connect to underlying theories of coordination and control.  
 
In part, this lack of research is due to the novelty of distributed work as an object of 
inquiry. But it also reveals a more fundamental theoretical problem. Studying coordination 
and control of distributed work is a specialization and an application of coordination and 
control theory. Yet as an applied area, it cannot rely on a solid, coherent reference theory. 
A closer look at coordination and control theory reveals that it consists of multiple streams 
of thought that have evolved over time. The richness of the field is represented by the 
streams of thought that have evolved over time. Even though not all contributing theories 
(as reviewed in the next section) refer explicitly to the twin constructs, the statements from 
these theories directly connect to coordination and control.  
 
At the same time, however, a lack of integration characterizes the part of organization 
theory that could be referred to as coordination and control theory. This applies to the 
theories around each construct. It also concerns the theoretical bridges between the two 
constructs. Quite recently, coordination theory was defined as the still-developing body of 
theories about how coordination can occur in diverse kinds of systems (Crowston, 1997; 
Malone & Crowston, 1994). Apart from Malone and Crowston’s (1994) initial steps, Grant 
(1996b: 113) recently remarked that “[a]lthough widely addressed, organization theory 
lacks a rigorous integrated, well-developed and widely agreed theory of coordination”. 
Similarly, theories on work control lack an integrated analysis along commonly accepted 
dimensions (Flamholtz, Das, & Tsui, 1985; Merchant, 1988).  
 
Integration between the twin constructs relies on a few contributions. McCann and 
Galbraith (1981) proposed a model that summarized research on interdepartmental 
coordination and control. Eisenhardt (1985) analyzed the relationship between agency 
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theory and organizational approaches to control. Ghoshal and Moran (1996) engaged in a 
discussion with Williamson (1996) on assumptions and contingencies underlying 
Transaction-cost Economics. While these contributions initiated exchanges and reflection 
among theorists on coordination and control theory as a field, more work needs to be done. 
Larsson and Bowen (1989) express their concern that almost a decade after McCann and 
Galbraith’s (1981) integrative review, “[t]heir call for more research on the selection 
process of these mechanisms has been left mainly unheeded”.  
 
Integrating theories on work coordination and control theory as separate and interlocked 
entities becomes even timelier for two reasons.  
First, new views on coordination and control are emerging, like distributed cognition 
(Hutchins, 1991), collective mind (Crowston & Kammerer, 1998), semi-structure (Brown 
& Eisenhardt, 1997) and High Reliability Organizations (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 
1999). Leveraging their intellectual contribution requires both development of these 
perspectives and an integrative discussion that connects them to more traditional theories.  
 
Second, as firms become more connected in the emerging network economy (Meyerson et 
al., 1996), they collaborate across organizational (Smith, Caroll, & Ashford, 1995) and 
geographic (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996) boundaries. At the same time, the role of 
technology has changed from basic physical automation to advanced information and 
communication support (Weick, 1990). In this international and information-intensive 
environment, coordination and control remain pivotal constructs to make sense of 
emerging work arrangements (DeSanctis & Fulk (Eds), 1999; Maruca, 1998). But their 
role has changed in a profound manner that remains ill understood (Armstrong & Cole, 
1995).  
 
Addressing this backlog of conceptual integration in coordination and control theory is 
important since it determines the quality of applied research. This study attempts to 
contribute to the process of enhancing integration of current and emergent streams of 
coordination and control theory (chapter 4, 5). It then applies this understanding to 
polycontextual, distributed collaboration (chapter 6, 7).  
Figure 10 depicts our steps (an extension of the theoretical part in Figure 2). We review 
and analyze contributing theories (chapter 4) in order to build an integrative theory of 
coordination and control mechanisms as separate fields. The study rounds up the first part 
of the theory section by proposing an integrated theory of work coordination and control 
that relies on task contingencies (chapter 5). This first line of inquiry answers sub question 
1.  
We then develop our second line of inquiry around polycontextual, distributed 
collaboration. Taking on the integrated coordination and control theory, we select and 
analyze research on distributed work that emphasizes coordination and control processes 
(chapter 6). We complete the theory section with the development of the concept of gaps, a 
conceptual lens, and a structured summary of the literature on polycontextual, distributed 
collaboration (chapter 7). The gaps concept answers sub question 1. The rest of chapter 7 
addresses in part sub questions 3a and 3b. It also provides the basis for empirically 
investigating coordination and control of distributed work  
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Figure 10 - Overview of theory building process 
 
§ 3.2  Theory Development Methodology 
 
‘Theory’ suggests a statement of relationships between constructs or variables (Bacharach, 
1989: 3). In one of its basic forms, it explains variation of dependent constructs (or 
variables) in relation to a set of independent constructs (or variables) (Mullins, 1971). 
Theory is the fruit of an analytical process that thrives on the logic of past conceptual work 
and/ or empirical observation (Weick, 1989). A debate has evolved on the nature of this 
process, as epitomized in special issues of Academy of Management Review in 1989 and 
1999, and Administrative Science Quarterly in 1995. In the broader literature, some 
scholars propose a lockstep process that uses matrices to cross-analyze past work 
(Salipante, Notz, & Bigelow, 1982). This strategy seems to fit homogeneous, bounded 
research areas with an agreed-upon vocabulary (Cooper, 1984). Other areas in organization 
theory, coordination and control theory, are more diverse and lack a common jargon. 
These are still recognizable fields where many scholars have contributed to, but 
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methodologies for advancing them rely more on typologies (Doty & Glick, 1994), 
imagination (Weick, 1989), paradoxes (Scott Poole & Van de Ven, 1989), and multi-
dimension approaches (Mintzberg, 1998b; Morgan, 1997).  
The design of our review of coordination and control theory takes the present level of 
integration into account. The scarcity of integrative reviews and connections so far made 
us decide on a four stages.  
First, we started cross-analyzing organization theories for definitions of coordination and 
control. The review traced back to the end of the 19th century covering major organization 
theory journals and books. It relied on database searches, networking, and snowball 
effects, and was documented in a chronologically organized table.  
 
For the second part of this review, we used taxonomies as a theory building methodology 
to surface coordination and control mechanisms from these theories (Doty & Glick, 1994). 
The mechanisms were analyzed and condensed to taxonomies to be presented in two 
sections later in this paper.  
 
Third, a variance theory perspective (Mohr, 1982) was adopted to elicit causal structures 
across the theories we reviewed (Cooper, 1984). That is, the relationship between 
independent variables and coordination and control mechanisms (Bacharach, 1989). So far, 
the review concentrated on coordination and control theory as distinct areas.  
 
The fourth stage then uses the previous ones to reveal linkages between coordination and 
control theory. It assesses definitions of coordination and control to define relationships 
between the constructs. And it compared the taxonomies of mechanisms and causal 
structures.  
 
Finally, the emerging structure of coordination and control theory is used for analyzing and 
framing literature on distributed work. This results in a conceptual lens and insight in the 
current status of literature on distributed collaboration.  
 
Quality of the overall review and integration effort was ensured by the following means: 
 Maintaining a focus on our sub research questions, thus ensuring consistency 
 Using quality resources to structure the literature reviews (Cooper, 1984) 
 Sharing and discussing our approach and progress with K. Kumar and other academics 
 Electronic documenting and interlinking our process, content and deliverables  
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Chapter 4  Work Coordination and Control: Literature Review 
 
The first part of the theory section focuses on the coordination and control of work. The 
section starts with a review of theories from organization science and organizational 
economics. It focuses on (1) the types of coordination and control mechanisms proposed in 
literature. And (2) the determinants - or contingencies - of these portfolios of mechanisms. 
Together with chapter 5, we answer here sub question 1. 
 
§ 4.1  Classic Organization Theory 
 
“Nothing is particularly hard if you divide it into small jobs.” - Henry Ford 
 
In fact, classic organization theory started with Adam Smith’s (1793) discussion of work 
division as a means to increase efficiency. Using the example of a needle manufacturer, 
Smith proposed an alternative to traditional work division where each individual actor 
performs all the steps required to produce an output. Instead, he suggested specialization 
for each small step in the manufacturing process, to be performed by individual actors. 
This increases productivity since each actor becomes highly skilled in accomplishing the 
same task.  
While efficiency was Smith’s main focus, his ideas change dependence and work 
coordination as well. Figure 11 shows how work has traditionally been divided, probably 
used since the medieval guilds or even classics era. Each individual actor is responsible for 
all the steps required for an output. Sequential dependence between the steps is simply 
coordinated by the same person.  
 
 
Figure 11 - Traditional division of work 
 
Specialization according to Smith (1793) results in a turnaround as illustrated in Figure 12. 
Actors concentrate on one specific step and hand their results over to the next person in 
line.  
 
Actor 1
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Output
Actor 2
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Output
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Figure 12 - Work division based on specialization 
 
The assignment of steps to different actors implies that their work becomes interdependent. 
Their work needs to be coordinated and controlled to yield the same output as before:  
 
“(...) a piece of work cannot be subdivided into the obvious components without great 
danger that the central design, the operating relationships, the imprisoned idea, will 
be lost. When one man builds a house alone he plans as he works; he decides what to 
do first and what next, that is, he ‘co-ordinates the work’. (...) It is self-evident that the 
more the work is subdivided, the greater is the danger of confusion, and the greater is 
the need for overall supervision and co-ordination” (Gulick, 1937: 3).  
 
Classic theorists proposed a number of coordination mechanisms. At the basis is a 
hierarchical design of authority relationships (Barnard, 1938). A set of rules defines formal 
positions and their interrelationships, independent of the persons enacting the structure 
(Weber, 1946). Second, managers within that authority structure are supposed to conceive 
work division and integration in advance. In this process they formulate plans and 
standards (Barnard, 1938; Fayol, 1949). Planning is connected to managerial authority as 
Lichtner (1924) claims: “Planning is the managerial function of working out the best 
combination of procedures through coordinating the requirements with the facilities for 
carrying out the work of the division.” Third, different persons are responsible for planning 
and executing the work: the plan must be transmitted from the former to the latter. This 
relies on communication: “(...) Communication relates to the formulation of purpose and 
the transmission of coordinating prescriptions for action and so rests upon the ability to 
communicate with those willing to cooperate (Barnard, 1938: 184).  
Finally, managers could shape the minds and attitudes of workers such that they can 
coordinate their own activities. This anchors the coordination process at a work floor level 
as it is achieved: “(…) by the dominance of an idea, that is, the development of intelligent 
singleness of purpose in the minds and wills of those who are working together as a group, 
so that each worker will of his own accord fit his task into the whole with skill and 
enthusiasm” (Gulick, 1937: 3).  
 
Control follows the coordination process described above. Its purpose is to ensure 
execution of the plan: “Control is the examination of results. To control is to make sure 
that all operations at all times are carried out in accordance with the plan adopted - with the 
orders given and with the principles laid down” (Fayol, 1937). Implicit in this view is a 
cybernetic view process (to be elaborated in the section on control theory). Actions and 
results are observed and compared to a priori defined standards; deviations from the plan 
lead to measures. “For control to be effective, monitoring must be constant, be followed up 
Actor 1
Step 1
Step 1
Step 2
Step 2
Actor 2
Etc
Etc
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by corrective actions, and, where appropriate, must carry sanctions” (Fayol, 1949). Moving 
from coordination to control also means a shift in the manager’s role. Having created the 
plan, he16 becomes responsible for the control cycle as a controller (Barnard, 1938).  
 
Classic theorists emphasized the linkage between coordination and control. Both 
dimensions are by definition intertwined: “(...) We get control through coordination” 
(Parker Follett, 1927: 171). The linkage becomes most apparent with coordination by plan: 
“Planning is of little value unless there is subsequent control to make certain that the plans 
are carried out” (Cornell, 1930: 212).  
 
§ 4.2  Contingency and Information Processing Theory  
 
Contingency theorists perceive the organization as an open system that interacts with its 
environment (Scott, 1992). This interaction implies vulnerability for uncertainty in the 
environment. Organizations experience uncertainty when they pull inputs from the 
environment, and face fluctuation in the demand for their outputs (Argote, 1982; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1994). Galbraith (1973: 5) defines uncertainty as “(…) the difference between the 
amount of information required to perform the task and the amount of information already 
possessed by the organization.” Contingency theory proposes that uncertainty changes the 
mechanisms used by an organization for coordinating its operations (Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967b; Thompson, 1967). Information processing theory further clarifies this relationship. 
In their view, uncertainty increases the need for information processing. Since coordination 
mechanisms differ in their capacity to process information, the use of them should change 
to match environmental demands (Tushman & Nadler, 1978). Galbraith (1973) claimed 
that an increased need for processing information shifts coordination modes from rules and 
standards, to hierarchical communication and goal setting. More uncertainty requires either 
reduction of information processing needs by means of slack resources or autonomous 
work units, or increasing the capability to process information, by investing in information 
systems or direct lateral contact between work units.  
Research on the effects of uncertainty usually employs a distinction made by Perrow 
(1967). He pointed at two dimensions of the construct: the number of exceptional cases 
actors face, also referred to as task variability (Van de Ven et al., 1976). And the 
analyzability of uncertain events, also called information equivocality (Daft & Macintosh, 
1981). Task variety determines the amount of information processing. Task analyzability 
implies that actors lack a more fundamental understanding of cause-effect relationships, 
and do not know how to respond (Fry & Slocum, 1984).  
 
Apart from uncertainty, contingency theorists have theorized and conducted empirical 
research on other factors as well. First, Thompson (1967) was among the first to recognize 
the role of dependencies (McCann and Ferry, 1979). Based on systems theory, he 
introduced a typology for physical workflows. He used pooled interdependence for 
                                                 
16 For reading comfort, general references to a person are masculine (he, him, his). This 
includes, and could equally well be feminine. 
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describing situations where parts render a discrete contribution to the whole (Thompson, 
1967: 54). Sequential dependence exists where one actor passes his work on to another one 
for continuing the transformation process. And reciprocal interdependence indicates 
situations in which outputs of each actor become inputs for others (Thompson, 1967: 54). 
Van de Ven et al (1976) extended the latter form with team interdependence where actors 
work jointly and simultaneously. These forms of interdependence become increasingly 
difficult and costly to coordinate (Thompson, 1967). Pooled interdependence does not 
require extensive coordination behaviors but may rely on a plan to schedules actors 
demand for a resource. But team interdependence means that people work simultaneously 
on the same task, like during a surgery. They watch each other closely and interact to blend 
their efforts. In addition to these commonly recognized dependencies, Galbraith (1973) 
identified in his case study at Boeing that activities or components require integration at 
some point in time. Since he did not introduce a dedicated term, we refer to this form as 
integration interdependence. 
A second contingency factor is complexity. It refers to the intricate connectivity among 
multiple tasks and actors. It means that a “(…) problem is not easily amenable to clearly 
parceling out individual jobs or discrete tasks” (Goodman, 1981: 3). Complexity is the 
result of differentiating large tasks and assigning subtasks to multiple interrelated units 
(McCann & Galbraith, 1981). As a contingency factor, it extends and combines 
interdependence, uncertainty and work unit size. Complexity refers to the number of 
elements that are connected, and the number and type of relationships among these 
(Haeckel & Nolan, 1993). Hence, task complexity always includes an element of 
interdependence, but not necessarily uncertainty. Even when all the necessary information 
is available (Galbraith, 1973), tasks can represent a complex problem. Haeckel’s (1993) 
definition clarifies the relationship between complexity and size of a work unit or task (like 
programming software (Kiesler, Wholey, & Carley, 1994)). As size increases, the number 
of elements and relationships among these grow as well.  
A third factor is functional diversity among people involved in the same process or project. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967: 11) used the term ‘differentiation’ not to describe work 
division, but differences “(…) in cognitive and emotional orientation among managers in 
different functional departments.” Functional diversity means that people approach a 
common problem domain from diverse angles. Dougherty (1992) reports on inter-
departmental differences in a firm that develops new products. She describes how each 
unit has its own ‘thought world,’ that is “(…) a distinct system of meaning which colors its 
interpretation of the same information, selectively filters technology-market issues, and 
produces a qualitatively different understanding of product innovation” (Dougherty, 1990: 
195). Functional diversity increases information processing needs. It makes interpersonal 
coordination mechanisms more important, such as working relationships (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967b).  
A final contingency factor is work unit size, indicating the number of actors involved in or 
contributing to an aggregated task (Van de Ven et al., 1976). The effect of size is contrary 
to those triggered by the previously discussed contingencies. Uncertainty, interdependence 
and complexity imply a shift from programmed coordination (like plans and standards) to 
inter-personal mechanisms like mutual adjustment (Thompson, 1967) and group meetings 
(Van de Ven et al., 1976). By contrast, increased size of work units shows a reverse 
relationship. Actors shift to more formalized mechanisms and information systems as a 
 55
substitute for interpersonal exchanges that are unfeasible in large scale systems (Pennings 
& Woiceshyn, 1987; Van de Ven et al., 1976).  
 
§ 4.3  Control Theory 
 
Classic theorists perceived coordination and control as closely intertwined (Parker Follett, 
1927). But since that era, control theory has become a somewhat independent stream of 
research. In the 50s and 60s, systems theory and cybernetics contributed to basic 
understanding of control cycles (Wiener, 1954). Their perspective on the control of 
electro-mechanical systems (like a thermostat) became a model for understanding control 
in human organizations (Litterer, 1981). A starting point for cybernetic control is the 
definition of a standard as a point of reference for preferred values of system inputs, 
processes, and outputs. The actual operation of a system is observed, measured and 
compared to this standard. In case of deviation, corrective measures are undertaken to 
ensure equilibrium (Beer, 1959; von Bertalanffy, 1968). Figure 13 shows cybernetic 
control cycles for input, process and outputs of an activity.  
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Figure 13 - Cybernetic control cycles 
 
Application of this idea on social systems led to rational control approaches in the tradition 
of classic organization theory (Anthony, 1965). Managers plan and define desirable 
performance measures, and they observe behaviors and/ or outputs to make sure their plans 
are realized (Brech, 1965). Ouchi (1978) remarked that this control mode relies on an 
understanding of cause-effect relationships (for behavioral control), or outputs (for output 
control). He further pointed to differences between behavioral control - where a manager 
observes subordinates’ actions-, and output control, where only results are noticed. The 
former control mode is rich but difficult to transmit across an organization’s reporting 
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3. Comparison
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structure. Since output control is often quantifiable, exchange of measurements is easier 
and more comparable across an organization (Ouchi, 1978).  
Scholars have proposed alternatives for hierarchical behavior and output control. 
Organizations that lack complete understanding of their environment and internal task 
structure can opt for two directions. One is to rely on agents outside a firm’s boundary, like 
customers whose judgments reflect the performance of workers (Smith, 1997). Or 
professional associations that train and update employees (Stinchcombe, 1990). A second 
direction is to rely on control modes that focus on workers rather than their work (Kirsch, 
1996). An example of this approach is clan control where individual actors are selected, 
socialized and promoted according to their capacity and internalized commitment to 
organizational goals (Ouchi, 1979). Individual workers may even control their own efforts, 
or they contribute to small, self-controlling groups (Barker, 1993; Hage, Aiken, & Marrett, 
1971). Self-control implies that observation by someone else than the worker (be it 
manager or an entity outside the organization) is substituted for non-differentiated, 
internalized control. The controllee becomes his or her own controller.  
Underlying these control modes is the same cybernetic cycle of defining standards, 
measuring actual work, comparing and effectuating in case of deviations (Manz & Angle, 
1986). People-based control modes differ however on a couple of other dimensions. First, 
the definition of expectations is less formal and explicit. Self-managing groups may 
develop implicit norms for collaboration and acceptable performance that are enforced in 
fluid group processes (Barker, 1993; Schein, 1992). Second, programmed control modes 
are associated with an assumption of goal incongruence between organization and 
employee. The risk of malperforming actors is overcome by specifying work in advance, 
and monitoring behaviors or outputs. People-based control modes relax this assumption 
(Eisenhardt, 1985). Internalized commitment and competence justify (or even require) de-
differentiation of control roles where actors define, measure and modify their own actions 
(Grant, 1996b).  
 
§ 4.4  Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theorizes on the governance of business transactions. 
The choice for a particular governance mode intends to minimize the total costs of a 
transaction. “The overall objective (…) essentially comes down to this: for each abstract 
description of a transaction, identify the most economical governance structure - where by 
governance structure I refer to the institutional framework within which the integrity of a 
transaction is described (Williamson, 1979: 233). The total costs of a transaction are a 
combination of production costs and transaction costs. The latter consists of “(…) the ex 
ante costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement and, more especially, 
the ex post costs of maladaptation and adjustment that arise when contract execution is 
misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated disturbances” 
(Williamson, 1994: 102). The interplay of environmental and behavioral factors explains 
variation of transaction costs. Environmental factors include uncertainty in the transaction 
context, and small numbers exchange (Williamson, 1985). Behavioral factors refer to 
bounded rationality and an opportunistic attitude. Williamson (1975: chapter 1) 
emphasizes two combinations of these contingencies. First, small-numbers exchange 
relations and opportunism: “Opportunism refers to a lack of candor or honesty in 
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transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile. (...) many transactions that at the 
outset involve a large number of qualified bidders are transformed in the process of 
contract execution, so that a small-numbers supply condition effectively obtains at the 
contract renewal interval”. Second, uncertainty and bounded rationality: “The capacity of 
the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared 
with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in 
the real world (Simon, 1957)”.  
 
Drawing from economics (Coase, 1937) and law (Macneil, 1978), Williamson (1975) 
considers classical contracts as an ideal form for governing transactions. These contracts 
are “sharp in by clear by agreement; sharp out by clear performance” (Macneil, 1974: 
738). Classical transactions are characterized by transparency. Contractual stipulations 
define mutual dependencies between buyer and seller comprehensively in advance. In its 
basic form, transactions introduce two dependencies: the buyer depends on the seller for 
receiving goods or services, and the seller depends on the buyer for receiving value in 
return. The contract that formalizes these expectations allows actors to check ex post 
whether commitments have been realized (Williamson, 1985). In sum, coordination of the 
ideal form of transactions relies on the ex ante specification of work outputs as agreed 
upon by contractual parties. Control is achieved by a differentiated cybernetic cycle where 
buyer and seller take on controller and controllee roles. Each compares the counterpart’s 
performance with contractual specifications. An assumption underlying this ‘rational’ 
approach to coordination and control is that “(…) it is feasible to measure, with reasonable 
precision, the performance that is desired” (Ouchi, 1979). This measurement depends, in 
turn, on perfect understanding of the inputs, behaviors and outputs that constitute the 
transaction (Williamson, 1991).  
  
The combination of behavioral and environmental factors earlier mentioned undermines 
this governance process. Uncertainty means that actors - bounded in their rationality - 
cannot predict and specify reciprocal performances in advance. Small-numbers exchange 
and opportunisms make behaviors after contract closure unpredictable (Williamson, 1975). 
Incomplete ex ante understanding translates into incomplete contracts. These leave room 
for different interpretations and an evolutionary path by which the transaction unfolds 
(Williamson, 1994). More relevant here, the factors call for a change in the portfolio of 
coordination and control mechanisms used: “Not every transaction fits comfortably into 
the classical-contracting scheme. In particular, long-term contracts executed under 
conditions of uncertainty are ones for which complete presentation is apt to be 
prohibitively costly if not impossible” (Williamson, 1979: 237).  
 
Relying on contract law (Macneil, 1974, 1978), Williamson (1991) suggested that actors 
move from classical contract law to neo-classical or relational contract law. With neo-
classical contract law, reciprocal performances remain incompletely specified in order to 
leave room for adaptation during contract execution (Williamson, 1991). Parties engage in 
a flexible process of mutual adjustment and “(…) require special adaptive mechanisms to 
effect realignment and restore efficiency when beset by unanticipated disturbances” 
(Williamson, 1991: 272). Coordination and control of ideal transactions thus change. 
Reduced comprehensiveness of work specification is complemented with mutual 
adjustment to coordinate the exchange (Thompson, 1967). Control still relies on the 
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contract, but also on norms for interpreting original intentions that were incompletely 
outlined in advance (Llewellyn, 1931).  
 
Relational contracts imply a further shift away from classical contracts. Increased 
uncertainty of the work undertaken makes the identity of both parties and their relationship 
even more important (Ben-Porath, 1980). MacNeil (1978) emphasized the importance of 
role integrity, supra-contractual norms, and the reciprocal commitment of parties to 
preserve the relationship. Ben-Porath (1980: 7) distinguished two types of transactions in 
which identity and relationship are important: (1) “Transactions in which, because of 
imperfect information, there is uncertainty about the quality of the object of exchange or 
the terms of the transaction. The identity of the seller can reduce this uncertainty: a 
producer’s identity can be a signal of the quality of what is produced, and a worker’s 
identity a signal of the quality of his services.” And (2) “Transactions that are not 
consummated instantaneously, and that involve obligations or consequences that extend 
over time.”  
 
As actors move from classical to neoclassical and relational contracts, the nature of their 
dependence changes. In turn, this alters coordination and control processes. Increased 
uncertainty implies that specification of work becomes less comprehensive (Williamson, 
1994). As a more adaptive form of coordination is required, specifications are 
complemented with mutual adjustment and, eventually, working relationships (Rousseau 
& McLean Parks, 1993). Uncertainty also means that control cannot rely on comparison of 
work with detailed specifications (Ouchi, 1979). Rather, iterative feedback cycles (with 
neo-classical contracts), and behavioral norms (with relational contracts) ensure that 
expectations are met in an adaptive manner (Williamson, 1991).  
 
At the outset of TCE, the shift in type of contract has been attached to organizational 
boundary questions. Williamson (1975, 1985) suggested that increased uncertainty implies 
a shift from market-based transactions with independent buyers and sellers, to transactions 
within the boundaries of a firm. Compared to market-based governance, Williamson 
emphasized the advantages of firms in terms of coordination and control. The coordination 
advantage of an organization builds on the jargon that is shared within its boundaries and 
allows for more efficient and informal communications (Williamson, 1975). Moreover, 
“(…) adaptations to consequential disturbances are less costly within firms because (...) 
information that is deeply impacted can more easily be accessed and more accurately 
assessed (...)” (Williamson, 1991: 279). Organizations have also an advantage to control 
ill-specified transactions. Their appraisal and reward system is more extensive and refined 
than control in the market place (Williamson, 1975). And within their boundaries, groups 
can work in what Williamson (1975) calls an atmosphere that is less calculative. Groups of 
closely collaborating actors develop working relationships and norms that fine-tune and 
enforce acceptable behaviors. This phenomenon also allows groups to carefully select new 
members as a form of input control (Williamson, 1975).  
 
TCE has led to discussions among scholars in organization science and sociology. Ghoshal 
and Moran (1996) debated assumptions underlying TCE such as opportunism. Research 
has shows that relational governance modes also occur between firms. Networks of small 
firms in a confined geographic region develop bonds and sustainable patterns of 
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collaboration (Lazerson, 1995). Transactions between these firms do not rely on 
contractual specifications per se, but mutual orientation: “(…) parties develop knowledge 
regarding one another and they draw on that knowledge to communicate and resolve 
problems (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994: 384). Other research has further refined the 
traditional distinction in TCE between market and hierarchy-based governance. Bradach 
(1989) suggests that price, authority and trust can be combined as independent modes for 
governing transactions. These combinations do not relate to organizational boundaries in a 
single way. For example, price-based governance may occur within firm boundaries. 
Organizations can also combine governance modes, like franchising restaurant chains that 
have hierarchical relationships with their own restaurants, and relational contracts with 
franchisees (Bradach, 1997). For coordination and control theory, this implies that multiple 
types of coordination and control mechanisms may be selected to suit a particular situation. 
The challenge becomes to define a more comprehensive taxonomy of these mechanisms, 
and to gain insight in the factors that drive the selection process.  
 
§ 4.5  Inter-firm Coordination and Control 
 
In geographically distributed IS projects, portions of the work are often contracted out or 
even subcontracted to offshore vendors (Rajkumar & Dawley, 1997). This makes it 
important to understand coordination and control across organizational boundaries. Yet 
most literature on coordination and control focuses on collaboration within a single 
organization, like between departments (McCann & Galbraith, 1981). An exception is 
Transaction-cost economics that theorizes on the efficient governance of transactions 
(Williamson, 1979, 1994). This theory proposes contingencies that explain choice for a 
particular governance mode, like market-based contract, intra-organizational hierarchy, or 
clan (Ouchi, 1979). TCE and its more recent extensions (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Powell, 
1990) thus concentrate on a generic decision process. They do not elaborate on the actual 
coordination and control mechanisms that materialize governance modes (Grandori, 1998). 
As far as intra-organizational integration is concerned, TCE is complemented with 
contingency theory as earlier discussed. Coordination and control of inter-firm transactions 
requires other literature that is introduced in this section. 
 
First, Bryman et al. (1987) investigated inter-firm collaboration in construction projects. 
His research showed that supervising managers of the main contractor emphasized the 
need for familiarity in working with both clients and the web of subcontractors they relied 
upon. “With regard to clients, considerable attention was directed (by contracts managers) 
to both the level of familiarity with clients’ methods and procedures and the personal 
characteristics of the individuals involved: “You have to get to know the strengths and 
weaknesses, the likes and dislikes of the particular client if you’re to cover their 
requirements in greater depths”.” (Bryman et al., 1987: 263).  
In the construction industry, multiple subcontractors are usually involved to take care of 
the activities that match their particular specialization. This fragments work across 
multiple firms and makes coordination and control more intricate. In addition, the short 
time frame of projects leaves the main contractor little room to assess and influence the 
subcontractor’s operations. Hence, in Bryman et al.’s (1987) research, supervising 
contracts managers “(…) stressed the value of working with a “known” site manager and a 
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familiar “team” on whom they are able to rely” (Bryman et al., 1987: 262). When firms 
contract out parts of the project, they create lateral relationships across organizational 
boundaries. These transactions lack the ‘incentive and control machinery’ common to an 
intra-organizational hierarchy (Williamson, 1975). Instead, Bryman et al. (1987) argues, 
contractors rely on selection and continuous relationships with subcontractors. “Such a 
focus stems in large part from the lack of time within a temporary system for probation and 
socialization into the organization. (...) It has been noted elsewhere that the selection of 
individuals acts as a control device (...). Such a process may be no less relevant, and 
perhaps even more so, in the context of a temporary system” (Bryman et al., 1987: 263).  
As a coordination mechanism, selection of known subcontractors implies leveraging 
mutual knowledge acquired on prior occasions (Krauss & Fussell, 1990). “Individual 
subcontractors who depend on one or a few main contracting organizations for the bulk of 
their work are more readily “tuned in” to the culture, methods, and practices of the main 
contracting organization” (Bryman et al., 1987: 267).  
 
Second, Bradach (1997) conducted research on restaurant chains which have both 
company-owned restaurants and franchising contracts. His study compares the way 
corporate headquarters manages both forms and achieves adaptation across all restaurants. 
It therefore sheds light on inter-firm coordination and control. First, company-owned 
restaurants are part of a bureaucratic hierarchy with structured planning and control 
practices (Williamson, 1975). This is leveraged to ensure consistency and implement 
adaptation of restaurant operations. “The company arrangement focuses on control: a 
multitude of structures and systems ensures adherence to the standards and preserves 
uniformity” (Bradach, 1997: 277).  
The company’s relationship with franchisees is different since it lacks this authority 
structure. Instead, it is founded on a relational contract that specifies reciprocal obligations 
(Bradach, 1997). The contract is complemented with lateral contacts between headquarters 
and franchisees (Macneil, 1978). Implementing the same adaptation of franchisee 
operations requires mutual adjustment in the context of these working relationships 
(Bradach, 1998). As two respondents in Bradach’s (1997: 288) research explained: “We 
have no authority, so we must be able to convince the entrepreneur (...). On the company 
side, we can put restrictions on people. In contrast, with franchisees we suggest, nurture, 
and prod to achieve our goals. Relationships are crucial and when they deteriorate it 
becomes extremely frustrating to try to get the company’s goals across.”  
 
Third, Grandori and Soda (1995) point at the lack of precision in TCE and network theory 
in explaining inter-firm coordination modes. This concerns both the absence of a taxonomy 
of coordination mechanisms, as well as insight in the determinants of these coordination 
modes. To fill this gap, Grandori and Soda (1995) and Grandori (1997) reviewed 
organizational economics and contingency theory. They propose a set of inter-firm 
coordination mechanisms that can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Communication, decision and negotiation mechanisms - firm representatives interact 
to establish and foster exchange between their organizations.  
 Group problem solving - organizations may establish formal or informal committees 
with representatives from the partners involved to discuss issues concerning the 
exchange relationship (Grandori, 1997; Van de Ven et al., 1976). 
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 Social coordination and control - inter-firm collaboration relies on working 
relationships and collective norms for interaction (Ouchi, 1979) 
 Integration and linking-pin roles and units - organization design structures like liaison 
roles and linking pins were originally proposed for inter-departmental collaboration 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967a). According to Grandori (1995), firms may establish 
similar roles for handling inter-organizational exchange.  
 Common staff - assigning dedicated staff to coordinate between firms becomes 
necessary if the scope of inter-firm collaboration becomes wider, or the number of 
cooperating firms increases (Grandori & Soda, 1995).  
 Hierarchy and authority relations - although inter-firm linkages are usually lateral, 
vertical relationships may emerge, like in case of consortia.  
 Planning and control systems - inter-firm collaboration may consist of interrelated 
workflows that require planning and control, like with franchise organizations. 
 Routines, rules and procedures - interaction between firms may rely on formal and 
informal rules for handling interlocked operations (Grandori, 1997). 
 Incentive systems and property rights - aligning interests of two or more firms relies 
on incentives that are tied to behavioral patterns of the actor involved.  
 Selection system - firms develop and apply rules for selecting a partner organization 
suited for the form of cooperation they want to become engaged in. “In fact, a 
powerful means of enhancing the likelihood of achieving a coordinated action among 
firms is the selection of partners on the basis of some good predictors of relevant 
behaviors for the cooperation” (Grandori & Soda, 1995: 196).  
 Information systems - traditionally, information systems have been used within firms 
to support vertical communications for planning and reporting (Galbraith, 1973). The 
deployment of IT for inter-firm collaboration facilitates and economizes lateral 
exchange patterns and may even automate interlocked workflows (Grandori & Soda, 
1995).  
 Public support and infrastructure - public agencies may increase the feasibility of 
inter-firm collaboration (like R&D) with infrastructure and incentives. 
 
Grandori and Soda (1995) and Grandori (1997) propose several contingencies that explain 
selection of coordination mechanisms, like interdependence, complexity, and uncertainty. 
With respect to interdependence, Grandori (1997) integrates contingency and TCE 
approaches to distinguish collective action and transaction dependencies. Collective action 
indicates that firms collaborate and act jointly to capture an opportunity. It includes pooled 
and intensive17 interdependence (Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). Transaction 
interdependence refers to situations where firms merely exchange resources rather than 
cooperate. It encompasses sequential and reciprocal dependence (Thompson, 1967). 
Grandori (1997) theorizes on the linkages between these types of dependence and the 
coordination mechanisms earlier introduced. She groups the mechanisms as summarized in 
Table 4.  
 
                                                 
17 Since intensive interdependence is characterized by real-time coordination, it closely 
resembles team interdependence (Van de Ven et al., 1976).  
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Table 4 - Types of interdependence and effective coordination mechanisms (1) 
 
Pooled: 
 Communication and decision procedures 
 Mutual monitoring or supervisory hierarchy 
 
Intensive: 
 Group decision making 
 Mutual monitoring or supervisory hierarchy 
Sequential: 
 Programming 
 Hierarchical decision making for inter-unit 
adjustment 
Reciprocal: 
 Integration and liaison roles 
 Authority by exception and residual 
arbitration 
Adopted from Grandori (1997: 909) 
 
Finally, Kumar and Van Dissel’s (1996) elaborate on the use of inter-organizational 
systems (IOS) to support inter-firm coordination. They apply Thompson’s (1967) 
workflow dependencies (pooled, sequential, reciprocal) to inter-organizational 
collaboration. The resulting taxonomy (Table 5) provides the basis for discussing 
coordination mechanisms, potential for conflict, and types of IOS.  
 
Table 5 - Types of interdependence and effective coordination mechanisms (2) 
 
Type of 
Interdependence 
Pooled 
interdependency 
Sequential 
interdependency 
Reciprocal 
interdependency 
Coordination 
mechanisms 
Standards & rules Standards & rules, 
Schedules & plans 
Standards & rules, 
Schedules & plans, 
Mutual adjustment 
Technologies Mediating Long-linked Intensive 
Structurability High Medium Low 
Potential for conflict Low Medium High 
Type of IOS Pooled information 
resource IOS 
Value/ supply-chain IOS Networked IOS 
Examples of 
implementation 
technologies and 
applications 
Shared databases 
Networks 
Applications 
Electronic markets 
EDI applications 
Voice mail 
Facsimile 
 
CAD/CASE data 
interchange 
Central repositories 
Desk-top sharing 
Video-conferencing 
 Adopted from Kumar and Van Dissel (1996: 287) 
 
Moving from pooled to sequential and reciprocal dependence, the structurability of tasks 
decreases. Structurability refers to the ability or potential to specify the structure of an 
inter-organizational relationship (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996: 285). A consequence of more 
intensively linked workflows and less structurability is that firms will complement 
standards and rules with schedules, plans and mutual adjustment to coordinate their 
exchanges (Van de Ven et al., 1976). This requires a corresponding shift in the type of IOS 
deployed. Pooled information systems (like databases) are extended to EDI and 
collaboration tools to cater for increased information processing needs. 
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§ 4.6  Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory is the second major stream of thought in organizational economics, apart 
from TCE (Barney & Hesterley, 1996). The theory studies “(...) the ubiquitous 
relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who 
performs that work” (Eisenhardt, 1989a: 58). Delegation means that an agent works for his 
or her principal (Ross, 1973); he or she does not collaborate with him like with the other 
forms of dependence. While the principal may remain responsible, the actual work is 
carried out by someone else.  
Like any form of interdependence, agency relationships - which could be referred to as 
delegation interdependence - requires coordination and control. Agency theorists 
emphasize the control part. Coming from an economic perspective, they assume that both 
principal and agent are primarily interested in maximizing their own utility (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1986). Hence, monitoring the agent is important to avoid unsatisfying 
performance from the principal’s point of view (Ross, 1973). This observation 
complements contractual stipulations that reward or punish an agent’s behaviors depending 
on its utility for the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
The principal’s enforcement repertoire is contingent on his ability to observe the agent’s 
work in terms of behaviors or outcomes. If the principal can observe the agent’s behavior, 
he should use a behavior-based contract to enforce performance in his interest. Behavior 
that is not observable for the principal implies information asymmetry between principal 
and agent. This may be caused by the fact that principal and agent do not work in the same 
space (like sales persons on the move). Or because of teamwork, where individual 
contributions are not easily recognized (Barney & Hesterley, 1996). Assuming self-
interest, incomplete observation is an opportunity for the agent to work in his own 
interests. Yet a behavior based contract could still be used if the principal invests in 
information systems (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). Alternatively, the principal can base 
the contract on work outcomes and observe these (Eisenhardt, 1985). This occurs only 
“when the cost of measuring behaviors exceed the cost of transferring risk to their agents” 
(Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990).  
Scholars in organization theory have linked agency theory to control and contingency 
theory in two ways. First, scholars have suggested conceiving observability and 
uncertainty -- knowledge of cause-effect relationships (Thompson, 1967) -- as two separate 
dimensions. Agency theory proposes that uncertain work is by definition hard and costly to 
observe (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). But organization theorists suggest that even if the 
principal can observe work, he may not be able to understand if he lacks appropriate know-
how (Kirsch, 1996). Second, situations may occur where both behaviors and outcomes are 
unobservable or uncertain. In this case, the principal can attempt to minimize goal 
divergence, rather than investing in information systems at high costs (Eisenhardt, 1985). 
By doing so, a clan mode of control emerges that substitutes for external behavior and 
output control. Internalized values encourage the agent to work in the principal’s interest 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
Agency theory is helpful to understand control in distributed work settings. Monitoring 
behaviors or even outcomes can be difficult if principal and agent are geographically 
separated. This theme is elaborated in later sections.  
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§ 4.7  Temporary Systems 
 
Temporary systems is the field of study in organization science that is directed towards 
projects and the management of projects (both terms are used interchangeably). Even 
though prescriptive literature intended for professional audiences abounds, few scholars 
have theorized on the nature and problems of projects (Bryman et al., 1987). Fortunately, 
their publications have direct relevance for understanding coordination and control of 
projects.  
 
§ 4.7.1  Organic Perspectives 
Early approaches conceived projects as temporary forms of collaboration that involve 
people who have never worked before nor will work together on afterwards (Bennis, 
1965). Temporary systems were characterized as organic systems where members have 
imprecisely described roles. They rely mainly on mutual adjustment and ad-hoc 
improvisation, rather than programmed means of coordination (Bennis, 1965; Burns & 
Stalker, 1961). Goodman and Goodman (1976) confirmed that view. They related the need 
for adaptive coordination to the complex and interdependent nature of project work: “The 
members must keep interrelating with one another in trying to arrive at viable solutions” 
(Goodman & Goodman, 1976: 495). In this spirit, practitioner-oriented writers suggest that 
project contributors should form a close-knit group (team) to collectively face subsequent 
challenges (Thamhain, 1988).  
In sum, the organic view proposes that temporary systems rely on mutual adjustment 
between project contributors to shape the project. This is promotes in a lateral, team-based 
organization design where role definitions are incomplete and overlapping. As participants 
interact, they control each other’s efforts in an implicit manner (Barker, 1993).  
 
§ 4.7.2  Mechanistic Management 
Scholars also point at a contrasting, mechanistic view on temporary systems. This 
perspective emphasizes the formulation of a detailed plan by the apex of the project 
organization (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Work-breakdown structures define work packages 
that are assigned to project participants (Globerson, 1994). The plan is vertically 
communicated to them and clearly demarcates roles: “For instance, in both theatre and 
construction, one can see an organizational approach in which role clarity is preeminent. 
(...) Each person knows what he or she can and cannot do” (Goodman, 1981: 5). Detailed 
planning also facilitates monitoring work progress on a regular and formal basis (Bent, 
1988).  
The mechanistic approach promotes consistency since actions are shaped in accordance 
with the master plan. It reduces interaction needs among contributors and thus facilitates 
the coordination of control of large projects (Brooks, 1975). A key assumption, however, 
is that project work can be defined in detail in advance.  
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§ 4.7.3  Beyond the Dichotomy 
Since the early 60s, the distinction between mechanistic and organic systems has 
permeated organization theory (Burns & Stalker, 1961). It provides a clear taxonomy that 
groups particular coordination and control mechanisms, and relates them to contingencies 
like task uncertainty. At the same time, however, this perspective does not cater for 
alternative, hybrid means for organizing (temporary) systems. Currently, an alternative 
view seems to emerge in organization theory: semi-structure or improvisation. 
 
This alternative concerns the proposition that systems are either structured (mechanistic 
systems) or unstructured (organic systems). Traditionally, unstructured systems are 
supposed to thrive in uncertain environments where adaptation is a conditio sine qua non 
for survival (Burns & Stalker, 1961). But Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995: 93) “(…) call into 
question the traditional link between organic processes and uncertain situations (Burns & 
Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b; March, 1988). Burns and Stalker (1961) 
characterized organic processes as lacking structure. (…) But playful, fluid organic 
processes fail to capture the importance of focus and structure that emerges here. Fast 
processes in uncertain situations may not be organic, but they are improvisational in that 
they combine real-time learning through design iterations and testing with the focus and 
discipline of milestones and powerful leaders.”  
According to Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995), uncertain work calls for a combination of 
structure (but not as detailed as with mechanistic systems) and inter-personal coordination. 
This hybrid form has been referred to as semi-structure. “By semi structures we mean 
organizations in which some features are prescribed or determined (e.g., responsibilities, 
project priorities, time intervals between projects), but other aspects are not. Semi 
structures exhibit partial order, and they lie between the extremes of very rigid and highly 
chaotic organization (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997: 28).  
A related stream of research draws from literature on improvisation and uses jazz as a 
metaphor to describe forms of collaboration that are both adaptive and structured (Hatch, 
1999; Weick, 1998). As an example of semi-structure, improvisation by a jazz-combo 
relies on a variety of structured and inter-personal coordination mechanisms. It forges 
unique collective behaviors from fixed codes of conduct and mutual orientation (Barrett, 
1998). “Jazz improvisation involves creating music on the spot without a prescribed score 
or plan. However, jazz is guided by a non-negotiable framework that constrains what the 
soloist can play. This structure provides the necessary backdrop to coordinate action and 
organize choice of notes” (Barrett & Peplowski, 1998: 558).  
Semi-structure and improvisation enhance the repertoire for understanding forms of 
collaboration that lie between mechanistic and organic approaches (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995; Weick, 1998). It extends the dichotomous choice of structuring predictable projects 
extensively, and promoting group meetings and mutual adjustment for uncertain ones. In 
particular the latter type of projects may benefit from structure that defines (minimal) 
structure for collaboration, and capitalizes on previous experiences and routines (Bryman 
et al., 1987). This applies especially to geographically distributed temporary systems that 
cannot rely on the spontaneous, unstructured forms of collaboration possible in a 
collocated project setting (Cramton, 1997).  
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§ 4.8  Information Systems Projects 
 
Information systems projects are a subset of temporary systems in general. They are 
probably among the most challenging project endeavors people engage in. As far as 
coordination and control are concerned, most literature focuses on IS development 
projects. The difficulty of managing IS projects is caused by their scale and uncertainty 
(Kraut & Streeter, 1995). First, the scale of information systems is often large with many 
subsystems and interconnected routines. This reflects on the project organization as well: 
work is divided and assigned to multiple specialists. Fred Brooks (1975: 35) in his famous 
exposé on the development of the IBM System/360, explains that information systems can 
no longer be the product of one mind. Their size requires architectural design as far as the 
system is concerned. And organization of the people contributing to the system: “The 
purpose of organization is to reduce the amount of communication and coordination 
necessary; hence organization is a radical attack on the communication problems treated 
above. The means by which communication is obviated are division of labor and 
specialization of functions” (Brooks, 1975). Second, IS projects are uncertain, not only 
because their size makes them difficult to grasp. Since they often concern the application 
of new technologies, project members lack experience and examples to build on (Kraut & 
Streeter, 1995). In addition, requirements for building the system are difficult to elicit from 
users, and may change over the course of the project.  
What makes IS projects interesting is the fact that these factors - scale and uncertainty - are 
combined with the need for extreme precision. Numerous lines of codes need to interact 
appropriately to ensure reliable operation of the eventual system. This led IS scholars to 
investigate the coordination and control of IS projects (Kiesler et al., 1994; Kirsch, 1997; 
Nidumolu, 1995). Their research draws mainly on organization theory and organizational 
economics. Coordination mechanisms used in IS projects include, first of all, the way work 
is divided. Modularization of the system (object-oriented programming) and project 
organization simplifies the overall structure and need for coordination (Kraut & Streeter, 
1995). Second, selection and training of IS professionals based on commitment and past 
experience (Kiesler et al., 1994). Third, formalization of project management by means of 
specifying task decomposition, authority structures, work planning, and standard operating 
procedures (Kiesler et al., 1994). Fourth, hierarchical and lateral direct communications 
between interdependent actors (Nidumolu, 1996; Thompson, 1967). These include formal 
communications to handle routine work demands, and informal communications to address 
unpredicted events and ad-hoc concerns (Kraut & Streeter, 1995). Finally, technology 
itself supports the coordination process by facilitating communications among project 
members, and automating certain aspects of their coordination needs like interface design 
and testing.  
Research on control in IS projects assessed the employment of control mechanisms. 
Henderson and Lee (1992) made a distinction between managerial (hierarchical) control 
and team member self control. Both may relate to behaviors or outputs. Incomplete 
understanding of transformation processes makes it more likely that self-control modes are 
used (Henderson & Lee, 1992). Kirsch (1996, 1997) studied IS projects adopting 
Eisenhardt’s (1985) integrative review on control theory. She distinguished formal and 
informal control modes. Formal control indicates explicit specification of desirable 
behaviors or outcomes. Informal control is based on social or people strategies, and 
includes clan control (Ouchi, 1980) or self control (Kirsch, 1996; Manz, Mossholder, & 
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Luthans, 1987). The use of output control depends on the measurability of results; 
behavior-based control depends on the controller’s ability to observe behaviors and 
understanding these. Finally, technology itself plays a role to support IS projects, like 
CASE tools, groupware or configuration management tools. These systems ensure 
performance of individuals, and the consistency of their efforts in the project as a whole 
(Ciborra et al., 1996; Orlikowski, 1991).  
 
§ 4.9  ISD Methodologies 
 
Developing information systems requires a multiplicity of tasks to be performed by 
multiple actors (Kraut & Streeter, 1995). The structure of this process usually relies on a 
guiding set of principles or methodology that defines roles, tasks, and their 
interrelationships over time (Beath & Orlikowski, 1994). Adoption of a methodology has 
implications for the way development work is divided and integrated (Kraut & Streeter, 
1995). Different methodologies are therefore assessed here from a coordination and control 
point of view.  
Traditionally, ISD projects have been organized according to the waterfall approach, built 
around separate phases for analyzing, specifying and building the system (Trevor, 1994). 
This methodology follows a linear pattern and is time-intensive since user requirements 
must be specified in detail before starting the design and programming work (Hanna, 
1995). The increasing complexity of current information systems, combined with the 
demand for shorter project cycle time has therefore led to alternative approaches (Glen, 
1993). First, instead of organizing tasks in a linear sequence, they can be organized in an 
overlapping mode, or in parallel (Terwiesch & Loch, 1999). A second extension is the 
emergence of participatory methods that encourage stronger involvement of users in the 
development process (Hirschheim & Klein, 1994). They also advocate the use of 
prototypes to build a system in an evolutionary mode, rather than capturing user 
requirements upfront (Hanna, 1995). Examples of these methodologies include 
prototyping, Rapid Application Development (RAD), and Joint Application Development 
(JAD) (Beynon-Davies, Carne, Mackay, & Tudhope, 1999; Glen, 1993).  
In the following sections, the waterfall methodology and two extensions are discussed with 
an emphasis on coordination and control. 
 
§ 4.9.1  Waterfall  
 
“In that traditional (waterfall) method, system analysts meet with users at the start of a 
project to determine user needs and agree on a written product requirements 
specification, and they then work isolated from further user contact until the final 
product is delivered (...).” (von Hippel, 1994: 435). 
 
The waterfall approach was developed in the 70s to structure ISD projects (Trevor, 1994). 
It prescribes a series of phases for analysis and design that must be completed in a linear 
fashion (Glen, 1993). At the start of a project, system analysts work with users to define 
requirements. These are formally specified and signed off by users. System analysts then 
elaborate the system design system, and provide programmers with detailed instructions 
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for building the application. Figure 14 illustrates this process, using dimensions proposed 
by Crowston (1997) except for the ‘individuals’ dimension. The symbols refer to common 
practice in structured analysis (Gane & Sarson, 1979). Users A, B, C, and D work with 
system analysts E and F on the requirements analysis. These result in specifications that 
are signed off and handed to programmers G, H, I, and J for programming the system.  
 
Figure 14 - The waterfall methodology 
 
From a coordination and control theory perspective, the waterfall methodology requires 
inter-personal coordination mechanisms like mutual adjustment and group meetings in the 
project’s initial phase (Van de Ven et al., 1976). System analysts then translate results in 
specifications with a number of coordination and control functions. First, users need to 
sign-off specifications to indicate their satisfaction. To this end, they compare them with 
their requirements and point at any deviations (Reeves & Woodward, 1970). Once users 
have signed, the specifications become a means for system analysts and programmers to 
control further user requests. Second, from the programmers’ point of view, specifications 
are the primary means to coordinate their work with user expectations. Specification is a 
form of programmed coordination that must reflect the requirements in a comprehensive 
manner (Perrow, 1967). Third, specifications enable users to compare ex-post the actual 
system with their initial requirements (Adler & Borys, 1996).  
Building comprehensive specifications is challenging when projects become more 
complex, and requirements are unstable. In fact, these two factors are related. Capturing 
intricate requirements in a comprehensive manner is time consuming. At the same time, a 
lengthier analysis phase makes it more likely that requirements have changed (Hanna, 
1995).  
In a geographically distributed setting, the waterfall method suggests that system analysts 
and users have a series of - probably collocated - meetings to analyze and document 
requirements. Then, system analysts prepare specifications and provide these to a - 
possibly remote - team of programmers.  
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§ 4.9.2  Parallelization 
A first departure from the waterfall approach concerns the sequencing of tasks. The 
waterfall approach prescribes tasks to be arranged in a linear order. Upon completing a 
task, results are locked and handed over to actors involved in the next one (Figure 15).  
 
 
Figure 15 - Task sequencing in the waterfall methodology 
 
As an alternative, parallelization or concurrency implies that tasks overlap to some extent. 
A subsequent task is already started before the preceding one has been finished (Figure 
16). Parallelization is a time-compression strategy that reduces the cycle of development 
projects (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). At the same time, it changes the way sequentially 
dependent tasks are coordinated and controlled (Kunz et al., 1998). 
 
 
Figure 16 - Task sequencing with parallelization 
 
Tasks use results from preceding ones as input. When they are started before these have 
been finished, input uncertainty increases (Argote, 1982). Contingency theory predicts that 
uncertainty implies increased information processing needs, and therefore substitution of 
work specifications for mutual adjustment (Tushman & Nadler, 1978). Individuals cannot 
consider output from preceding tasks as fixed inputs. They must interact to keep updated 
on the completion of that task, and adjust their own work accordingly (Loch & Terwiesch, 
1998).  
Task overlaps also mean that workers cannot check outputs from preceding tasks and 
compare these to standards (Melcher, 1976). As a substitute for this form of input control, 
they become more dependent on internalized competence and commitment of contributors 
to preceding tasks. While interacting during the final phase of task 1 (respectively task 2) 
which resembles the initial phase of task 2 (respectively task 3), a type of clan control 
emerges that is built on mutual confidence (Ouchi, 1979).  
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Parallelization could also change the way tasks are dependent, another contingency of 
coordination mechanisms (Van de Ven et al., 1976). The waterfall model resembles a 
linear, sequential type of task interdependence (Glen, 1993). After pooled dependence, 
literature suggests that this form is relatively straightforward to coordinate (Thompson, 
1967). Says Grant (1996b: 115): “Probably the simplest means by which individuals can 
integrate their specialist knowledge while minimizing communication and continuous 
coordination is to organize production activities in time-patterned sequence such that each 
specialist’s input occurs independently through being assigned a separate time slot.”  
Parallelization potentially complicates the form of dependence if preceding tasks are taking 
into account they way subsequent tasks are accomplished (Loch & Terwiesch, 1998). 
Taking task 1 and 2, contributors to task 2 may propose modifications to task 1 since 
output is not yet fixed. This would imply that contributors to task 1 and 2 pass work back 
and forth, or even work simultaneously. Literature refers to this as reciprocal and team 
interdependence (Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). In turn, this further 
encourages a shift to mutual adjustment and group meetings as coordination mode (Gupta, 
Dirsmith, & Fogarty, 1994).  
In globally distributed projects, a possibility is that tasks are assigned to teams on different 
locations. Parallelization implies that coordination between these teams shifts to inter-
personal modes in the form of extensive remote communications or visits.  
  
§ 4.9.3  Rapid Application Development 
 
“The visual tools have had a dramatic effect on how work gets done. They let people 
see what they need through prototypes, rather than by reading through textual 
descriptions of the system.” (Hanna, 1995: 46)  
 
Rapid Application Development (RAD) is a second, more fundamental change to the 
waterfall method. It represents a punctuated set of meetings between users and developers 
around a prototype that evolves in the eventual system (Beynon-Davies et al., 1999). Initial 
analysis of user requirements - not as comprehensive as with the waterfall method - is used 
to build a prototype that simulates functionality. Users provide feedback during cross-
functional meetings with developers. This is used to improve the prototype for the next 
meeting. This cycle continues until users are satisfied with the resulting system (von 
Hippel, 1994). Figure 17 illustrates RAD. 
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Figure 17 - The RAD methodology 
 
Focusing on coordination and control, RAD differs considerably from the waterfall 
method. First, the latter defines separate roles for system analysts and programmers. 
System analysts function as a buffer between users and programmers. They absorb 
business requirements and translate these into system specifications. With RAD, 
programmers work with system analysts jointly. They participate in user-IT meetings 
throughout the project to incorporate feedback in the prototype. Second, the user role 
changes. The waterfall model prescribes comprehensive involvement upfront in the project 
to work with system analysts. RAD implies that they remain involved throughout 
development cycle to provide feedback (Beath & Orlikowski, 1994). Third, the waterfall 
method depends on comprehensive analysis upfront, resulting in specifications to be used 
by programmers for building the system (Trevor, 1994). With RAD, results from the initial 
analysis are used to build a prototype of the system. This becomes a central resource in 
subsequent meetings to elicit user feedback (von Hippel, 1994).  
The combination RAD and global distributedness is interesting to consider. With RAD, 
system specifications are incomplete. They need to be supplemented with direct and 
recurrent interactions between users and programmers concerning the prototype. This 
suggests that RAD implies extensive remote communications or visits for feedback 
sessions.  
 
 
§ 4.10  Coordination Theory (MIT’s Center for Coordination Science) 
 
The Center for Coordination Science at MIT (http://ccs.mit.edu/ccsmain.html) was 
founded by Thomas W. Malone in the late 80s. One of its major projects has been the 
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development of an application to configure organizational processes (Malone, Crowston, 
Lee, & Pentland, 1999). This software partly relies on coordination theory as developed by 
Thomas W. Malone and one of his PhD students Kevin Crowston. They define 
coordination theory as “the still-developing body of theories about how coordination can 
occur in diverse kinds of systems” (Crowston, 1997; Malone & Crowston, 1994).  
Malone and Crowston conducted an extensive, interdisciplinary review of literature 
relevant to understanding coordination processes (Malone & Crowston, 1994). Their 
summarizing framework proposes a fine-grained taxonomy of interdependencies. The 
research distinguishes actors, tasks and resources as main constructs for understanding 
dependencies. Actors are the people involved in accomplishing work. Tasks include both 
achieving goals and performing activities. And resources refer to anything used or affected 
by activities (Crowston, 1997).  
The three constructs can be combined in multiple ways to identify dependencies. In their 
research, Malone and Crowston propose a taxonomy that focuses mainly on task-task and 
task-resource relationships. For example, a task may use or produce a resource. Or 
multiple tasks require or produce a resource. (When they produce a resource, a form of 
interdependence emerges that we called integration interdependence.) Crowston (1997) 
points out that these dependencies surface coordination problems that need to be resolved. 
In his own words, “(…) to overcome these coordination problems, actors must perform 
additional activities, which compose what Malone and Crowston call coordination 
mechanisms” (Crowston, 1997: 159).  
Malone and Crowston point first of all to generic decision making steps to coordinate 
dependencies (Crowston, 1996). For a task using a resource, this decision process includes: 
identification of resources needed, identification of available resources, choosing 
resources, and assigning the resource. The mechanisms chosen for effectuating these steps 
draw upon three coordination modes: market, hierarchy and network (Crowston, 1996). 
Crowston (1997) used coordination theory for empirical research on a software bug fixing 
process. The theory has also been used to develop tools that support the design of 
interdependencies and business processes (Malone et al., 1999).  
 
§ 4.11  The Role of Technology 
 
Technology has changed the opportunities for coordinating and controlling work. This 
applies to collocated situations where technology is deployed to communicate between 
floors of the same building. Or someone leaves a message for a person accidentally not 
available to respond to a call (Rice & Shook, 1990). But of particular importance here is 
the role of technology to support projects where time zone differences and distance make 
real-time and collocated interaction costly in terms of time, costs and effort.  
Technology is viewed here in the sense of tools used to accomplish work (Gutek, 1990).18 
It is investigated here in terms of its functions, and how these are connected to the 
                                                 
18 As Gutek (1990) explains, this perspective is commonly adopted in IS research. It differs 
from the broader definition adopted by organization theorists that views technology as the 
entire process of accomplishing work (Pennings, 1992).   
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coordination and control of work. In the review of literature on distributed collaboration, 
we expand on the use of electronic media. 
 
§ 4.11.1  Functions of Technology 
Traditionally, technology has supported communication between individuals not located in 
the same location. This started probably with Indians using smoke signals, or the 
messenger-by-horse in the classics era and Middle Age. With inventions like controlled 
electricity and wire, the possibility to communicate over larger distances with reduced 
human involvement became possible. For instance, the telegraph eventually supported 
coast-to-coast communication in the United States with Morse code. This facilitated the 
evolution of nationwide railway operations.  
In essence, technology as a communication tool combines and links a number of functions. 
First, it captures individuals’ communicative actions by means of input devices. A 
microphone records a person’s voice or other sound, and a camera captures visual 
phenomena. Other input devices are tied to computers, like a keyboard, mouse, and 
barcode scanners. Second, if analogue signals are received (e.g., sound or vision), 
technology transforms these into digital data. This makes it possible to store 
communicative actions. It also implies, as a third function, that these actions can be 
transmitted to other spots using telephony, radio, infrared, or satellite communication. 
Fourth, once received, technology can inform recipients that someone else want to 
communicate (phone). It can also store data for later retrieval (v(oice) mail, e(lectronic) 
mail, video mail). Finally, data is transformed into a format that allows recipients to 
perceive original communications by means of output devices like a speaker, screen, or 
monitor. This perception makes use of recipients’ senses and their insight in the sender’s 
possible intentions (Krauss & Fussell, 1990).  
Obviously, the same functions can be fulfilled in reverse order and real-time (phone, 
audio-conference, video-conference). Asynchronous communication relies on the 
availability of technology independent of human wake/ sleep cycles. This allows 
individuals to have their communications sent and stored for retrieval at the recipient’s 
convenience. Traditional technologies like telegraph, telex, and fax support one-to-one 
communications. This role has been extended by more advanced technologies like radio, 
TV, and internet that make it possible to transmit the same data to multiple recipients. 
Email, multi-point audio/ videoconferencing and web broadcasts illustrate this 
phenomenon.  
The invention of the transistor and computer chip has extended the abovementioned 
repertoire of technology. It has resulted in new technologies that are able to compute 
according to a pre-programmed set of rules. Communications between humans are 
complemented with human-computer interaction where human commands trigger 
computational loops that result in a particular output. In addition, computers can operate 
independently and process signals from their environment according to their given rule set. 
The integration between the computer and communication technologies enables remote 
communication between respectively humans, human and computers, and computers.  
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§ 4.11.2  Technology for Coordination 
Coordination has been defined as additional activities required to integrate tasks performed 
by multiple actors (Crowston, 1996). These activities rely on coordination mechanisms to 
link interdependent task accomplishment. From our discussion on contingency theory, at 
least two types of mechanisms emerged (Van de Ven et al., 1976). First, coordination by 
programming, which refers to the use of standards, rules, and plans to shape task 
performance. Second, inter-personal coordination that relies on mutual adjustment, 
feedback and group meetings to adjust individuals’ actions. The way technology supports 
coordination can be illustrated for both mechanisms.  
 
§ 4.11.2.1  Programmed Coordination 
Coordination by program means that actors conceive appropriate inputs, behaviors and 
outputs in advance. They format expectations in standards, plans, and operating procedures 
that guide work accomplishment. For example, a project plan conceives which tasks 
should be performed, how they are interdependent, and when they should be performed.  
Technology affects the use of programmed coordination mechanisms in several ways. 
First, it facilitates the collection, analysis and storage of accumulated know-how and 
decision rules (Jelinek, 1979; Walsh & Ungson, 1991). In addition to mere textual 
descriptions of decision rules, it can simulate practices that comply with standards and 
incorporate accumulated experience (Adler & Borys, 1996). For example, software that 
shows how a particular action should be performed. Technology may also embed decision 
rules. Like traffic control systems that warn for conflicting movement patterns. Another 
example is expert systems that propose actions based on human input (von Hippel, 1994). 
Or groupware and workflow systems that automatically schedule and route work (Koch, 
Smalec, Reiner, & Skura, 1999). A final example is configuration management tools that 
automate coordination of pooled dependence (simultaneous access to the same code) 
between programmers. When technology embeds decision rules, it takes on a more 
proactive role than merely representing coordinative rules. It also substitutes for more 
traditional situations where human decision makers used rules to decide themselves. 
Second, technology facilitates customization of programs to individual roles and tasks. 
Login to databases, expert systems or groupware provides a tailor made environment that 
sorts and presents relevant dimensions of the program.  
Finally, technology stores programs in digital format, and makes them accessible through 
communication infrastructure. Besides remote access through intranet or internet, 
technology can automatically replicate programs to multiple sites, and update them. 
Technology enables workers to pull programs independent of their location and time of 
working. They have access to plans, standards, operating rules, and simulation 
environments (Adler & Borys, 1996). When they participate in a distributed groupware 
environment, the system coordinates their actions without the (real-time) involvement of 
other contributors.  
 
§ 4.11.2.2  Inter-personal Coordination 
Technology supports inter-human coordination processes that rely on mutual adjustment 
and group meetings (DeSanctis & Jackson, 1994; Kraut & Streeter, 1995). It connects a 
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portfolio of devices, network facilities, and software to support inter-personal 
communication in a number of ways. First, it makes contact information available in a pre-
communication phase. Information on people’s current role, background, contact modes, 
and agenda is made accessible through the internet, intranet, and groupware. Software 
recognizes a communication recipient’s profile from prior sessions and automatically 
configures devices to connect to the same person. Second, in the same preceding phase, 
technology informs a recipient that someone wants to communicate. Making an audio 
conference call triggers audio and visual signals; voice mail and email have similar 
indicators. Third, technology enables actors to transmit communicative actions 
asynchronously. If working hours or wake/ sleep patterns do not match, people can still 
leave and receive messages.  
Fourth, replication and storage technology makes asynchronous one-to-many 
communications possible. Email in particular facilitates inclusion of multiple recipients.  
Informing them through the same message promotes coordination of large-scale systems. 
Fifth, technology connects actors remotely in a synchronous mode. This includes - with 
increasing bandwidth - chatting, phone, audio conference and videoconferencing. These 
technologies connect two or more sites (e.g., multi-point conferencing). They allow people 
to send communications and perceive a representation of their recipient’s actions (Abel, 
1990; Egido, 1990). This process of capturing, transforming and transmitting 
communications was earlier described in this section. Sixth, advanced technologies 
combine multiple channels at the same time. In addition to remote audio-visual 
representation, actors can share application and shift control back and forth. Seventh, 
technology provides access to resources that relate to a particular communication session. 
Groupware like Lotus Notes includes links to local or remote at multiple databases. This 
facilitates coordinated response as actors participate in an environment that links past and 
current know-how. Finally, technologies may shape and structure inter-personal 
communication. They can enforce the use of particular rules or jargon (Hutchins, 1991). 
Group support systems (GSS) facilitate interaction among multiple actors in a decision 
making process (Ching, Holsapple, & Whinston, 1992). These systems structure, collect, 
analyze and disseminate participants’ inputs according to a pre-specified rules set 
(Nagasundaram & Bostrom, 1994). They can also be designed to support reflection on 
diverse interpretations of a situation (Boland, Tenkasi, & Te'eni, 1994).  
 
§ 4.11.3  Technology for Control 
Control is the cybernetic process that defines, evaluates and sanctions the accomplishment 
of work (Edwards, 1981). Task performance is observed and compared with a priori 
defined expectations to assess its appropriateness and eventual need for correction. 
(Haberstroh, 1968). Literature points to various roles of technology in this process. First, 
physical technology may embed control mechanisms (Adler & Borys, 1996; Edwards, 
1981). The assembly line is an example of technology that enforces a particular speed of 
working. And moulds incorporate dimensional standards for achieving consistency.  
Second, expectations in the form of rules and standards are programmed in information 
systems as earlier described for technical coordination. Actors’ interaction with the system 
is configured and confined by the system. For instance, configuration management and 
CASE tools pre-define the way multiple individuals interact with resources (Orlikowski, 
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1991). Information systems like in groupware also monitor, store, and report behaviors and 
outcomes. Work progress thus becomes transparent for executives (Ciborra et al., 1996).  
Third, technology supports forms of social control, similar to the inter-personal 
coordination mechanisms earlier described. Communication technologies enable actors to 
report work accomplishment remotely. Also more informally, communications allow them 
to gain some impression of the situation at a remote site.  
 
§ 4.12  High Reliability Organizations, Collective mind and Distributed Cognition 
 
Starting in the 80s, researchers have started to investigate organizations engaged in 
activities that are potentially dangerous, and require responsive and reliable collaboration 
among multiple actors. Some research is related to disasters or near disasters with space 
shuttles (Vaughan, 1990), oil tankers (Roberts & Moore, 1993), nuclear reactors (Perrow, 
1984), aircraft (Weick, 1993b), or fire accidents (Weick, 1993a). Some of the research falls 
under the umbrella of High Reliability Organization (HRO) theory (Roberts & Moore, 
1993; Weick et al., 1999). Other work concerned regular collaboration of navigation teams 
on ships (Hutchins, 1990) or in airlines cockpits (Hutchins & Klausen, 1996). A common 
theme throughout this research is the relationship between on the one hand the need for 
unified, reliable and adaptive performance. And on the other hand the realization that this 
collective task accomplishment is anchored in individual behaviors and the way these are 
linked (Weick & Roberts, 1993). We discuss here some of the research most relevant to 
advancing our understanding of coordination and control processes.  
Hutchins (1990) explored how navigation staff collaborates on large ships. Their work is 
first of all defined around six positions that are tied together by procedures for interacting 
and responding. Hutchins defines a procedure as “a plan of sequential action” where “the 
task performer is expected to learn the procedure and use it as a guide in organizing his 
actions” (Hutchins, 1990: 207). The navigation team uses technology to represent 
problems of calculating current and intended positions of the ship. Yet the design of roles, 
specification of work and technology are not sufficient to coordinate in fluid 
circumstances. “When the navigation task is performed by the team, the coordination 
among the actions of the members of the team is not achieved by following a master 
procedure. Instead it emerges from the interactions among the members of the team” 
(Hutchins, 1990: 207). Collective response is the result of connecting distributed, 
individual awareness (Hutchins, 1991). In turn, this connectivity process is facilitated by 
overlapping knowledge among role occupants in the navigation team. Job rotation in the 
past enables actors to identify with the positions of peers in team they currently participate 
in (Hutchins, 1990: 213). 
Weick (1993) investigated the Mann Gulch disaster, an occasion where smoke jumpers got 
caught in a fire while attempting to extinguish it. In general, the roles of smoke jumpers 
are interlocked in a form of pooled interdependence. “The job of each one is to clear the 
adjacent portions of a perimeter area around a blaze so that the fire stops for lack of fuel. 
Individual efforts to clear away debris are pooled and form a fire line” (Weick, 1993a: 
647). Coordination among crewmembers relies on the task at hand, rather than working 
relationships, also because the composition of crews changes each time. “Simply acting in 
concert was enough, and there was no need to know each other well in addition” (Weick, 
1993a: 647). This form of relating has been called ‘nondisclosive intimacy’ that is 
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characterized by “coordination of action over alignment of cognitions, mutual respect over 
agreement, trust over empathy, diversity over homogeneity, loose over tight coupling, and 
strategic communication over unrestricted candor” (Eisenberg, 1990: 160).  
The Mann Gulch event, however, did not represent a routine fire-fighting event. Its quickly 
changing nature surprised crewmembers, and required closer forms of social coordination 
than they were used to. In particular, stronger awareness of the position and needs of other 
actors, and flexibility in role fulfillment. “Nondisclosive intimacy is a sufficient ground for 
relating as long as the task stays constant and the environment remains stable” (Weick, 
1993a: 647).  
 
Weick and Roberts (1993) investigated collaboration on US Navy aircraft carriers. Their 
analysis starts with an illustrative quote of the phenomenon under study:  
 
“Imagine that it’s a busy day, and you shrink San Francisco Airport to only one short 
runway and one ramp and one gate. Make planes take off and land at the same time, 
at half the present time interval, rock the runway from side to side, and require that 
everyone who leaves in the morning returns the same day. Make sure the equipment 
is so close to the edge of the envelope that it’s fragile. Then turn off the radar to avoid 
detection, impose strict controls on radios, fuel the aircraft in place with their engines 
running, put an enemy in the air, and scatter live bombs and rockets around. Now wet 
the whole thing down with sea water and oil, and man it with 20-year-olds, half of 
whom have never seen an airplane close-up. Oh and by the way, try not to kill 
anyone” (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987: 78). 
 
Weick and Roberts (1993) research deals with the preparation, release, and return of 
multiple fighters from aircraft carriers. Their work complements and integrates earlier 
views on work coordination, like contingency theory (Thompson, 1967), cognitive 
approaches (Hutchins, 1990, 1991; Ryle, 1949), and social psychology (Asch, 1952). 
Using ‘collective mind’ as a metaphor, their research explores the interrelationship 
between collective, multi-actor performance and role fulfillment by individuals. If one re-
builds their argument from the individual level of analysis, collective performance starts 
with individuals’ willingness and skills to interact. These micro-level behaviors enable 
dense interaction patterns along pre-structured communication channels. This enables 
individuals to combine observation and analysis of peers with their own insights. Since 
multiple actors engage in the same process, each one empowers and is empowered to 
construct a representation of their collective situation beyond what they could achieve as 
individuals. This is referred to as distributed representation, and resembles mutually shared 
fields (Asch, 1952), holographic forms of organizing (Morgan, 1997), and knowledge 
redundancy (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). This phenomenon implies that contributors fuel 
their individual behaviors and the way they connect with resources from other members. 
This systemic awareness on a distributed level translates directly into coherence of 
collective performance: 
 
“The collective mind that emerges during the interrelating of an activity system is more 
developed and more capable of intelligent action the more heedfully the interrelating 
is done” (Weick & Roberts, 1993: 365). 
 
Other studies echoed the importance of communications and heedful relating in HRO. 
Weick (1993) investigated remote interaction between Air Traffic Control and cockpit 
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crew in the Tenerife disaster. His analysis revealed the importance of a common jargon for 
describing positions, events, and positions. This shared language is defined by separate 
authorities. It provides consistency on a meta-communication level that makes actual 
exchanges more transparent (Watzlawick, Beavin Bavelas, & Jackson, 1967). In general, 
Weick (1993: 194) made the following observation on communication: “What our analysis 
of Tenerife has uncovered is the possibility that with communication a complex system 
becomes more understandable (you learn some missing pieces that make sense of your 
experience) and more linear, predictable, controllable”.  
In their research on the Exxon Valdez disaster, Roberts and Moore (1993) emphasized 
attentive interaction and feedback loops among crew members on the oil tanker: “Both the 
ship handling requirements and the nature of the environment prescribed the use of a more 
tightly coupled system in which players in various organizations recognize their 
interdependence with one another. (...) Tight interconnections would have been 
represented by continuous feedback and checking with one another about the meaning of 
orders, placement of warning lights (...)” (Roberts & Moore, 1993: 245). Eisenhardt (1993) 
assessed the implications of high velocity environments on the operation of high reliability 
organizations. High velocity characterizes an environment “in which there is a rapid and 
discontinuous change in demand, competitors, technology and/or regulation, such that 
information is often inaccurate, unavailable or obsolete” (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988: 
816). Organizations like nuclear power plants, aircraft carriers, and microcomputer firms 
that operate in these environments must combine reliability, speed, and flexibility all at the 
same time. Eisenhardt’s (1993) research revealed the importance of establishing direct 
contact between workers involved in the same task. Moreover, workers should dispose 
over multiple channels to increase the richness and timeliness of communications. The 
resulting dense web of communication enables actors to response in an agile, collective 
manner (Eisenhardt, 1993). 
 
Other scholars - not directly connected to the HRO stream of research - explored work 
division and integration from a knowledge management point of view. They point out that 
work division brings about specialization and distributedness of know-how. “The 
distribution of knowledge in an organization, or in society as a whole, reflects the social 
division of labor. As Adam Smith insightfully explained, the division of labor is a great 
source of dynamism and efficiency. (…) From the organizational standpoint, however, this 
knowledge is as divided as the labor that produced it” (Brown & Duguid, 1998: 98). Grant 
(1996b) further suggests that specialization is a consequence of bounded rationality. Since 
humans have limited capacity to acquire and store knowledge and skills, they have to 
specialize in a particular area (Simon, 1991).  
 
Grant (1996b) continues with the proposition that firms exist to integrate knowledge. 
“Given the efficiency gains of specialization, the fundamental task of organization is to 
coordinate the efforts of many specialists” (Grant, 1996b: 113). A central question then 
becomes how firms integrate distributed knowledge. Clearly, transferring knowledge from 
actor A to actor B and vice versa is a costly method that contradicts the original advantages 
of knowledge specialization (Grant, 1996b). This applies in particular to tacit know-how 
that resides in individuals’ brains and remains unformulated (Polanyi, 1967). “Transferring 
knowledge is not an efficient approach to integrating knowledge. If production requires the 
integration of many people’s specialist knowledge, the key to efficiency is to achieve 
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effective integration while minimizing knowledge transfer through cross-learning by 
organizational members” (Grant, 1996b: 114).  
Grant proposes four modes for coordinating multiple specialists other than transferring 
their knowledge. First, impersonal mechanisms like rules, directives, and standardized 
information and communication systems (Van de Ven et al., 1976). These programs make 
tacit knowledge explicit and thus accessible to specialists in other domains (Demsetz, 
1991). Second, Grant (1996b) proposes that contributions can be sequenced to minimize 
coordination needs (Thompson, 1967). Third, actors may rely on routines to integrate their 
efforts. An organizational routines is defined as a “relatively complex pattern of behavior 
(...) triggered by a relatively small number of initiating signals or choices and functioning 
as recognizable unit in a relatively automatic fashion” (Winter, 1986: 165). Traditionally, 
routines were perceived as constituting a fixed set of internalized behaviors (Simon, 1950). 
But they may also provide flexibility in possible response behaviors in the sense of 
‘grammars of action’ (Pentland & Rueter, 1994). Fourth and finally, specialists mutually 
adjust their contributions in group meetings (Van de Ven et al., 1976). This integration 
mode - which is resource intensive compared to the previous three - is reserved for 
uncertain and complex tasks (Grant, 1996b).  
 
Grant (1996b) then claims that all of the four integration modes depend on common 
knowledge, the extent to which actors’ domains of expertise overlap. Common knowledge 
enables actors to “integrate aspects of knowledge which are not common between them” 
(Grant, 1996b: 115). The more actors’ knowledge domains overlap, the more efficient 
integration is supposed to be. Grant (1996b) distinguishes different types of common 
knowledge. First, language and other forms of symbolic communication as basic enables 
of interaction between specialists. Second, the extent to which diverse knowledge domains 
contain similar elements. Third, shared meaning or understanding. Since exchange requires 
conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit communicative actions, individuals need 
similar frames of reference to interpret these (Grant, 1996b). A final form to integrate 
specialized know-how is individuals’ awareness of what others know. “Such mutual 
recognition permits successful coordination even in novel situations” (Grant, 1996b: 116).  
 
§ 4.13  Working Relationships and Trust 
 
Literature considers working relationships and trust important ingredients of a coordination 
and control portfolio, especially for uncertain tasks.  
On a group level, relationships between individuals foster mutual adaptation and 
improvisational behaviors (Pasmore, 1998). They also increase the reliability of collective 
performance, and actors’ ability to engage in intricately connected work (Weick, 1993a; 
Weick & Roberts, 1993). According to Schein (1992: 70): “If a group is to accomplish a 
task that enable it to adapt to its external environment, it must be able to develop and 
maintain a set of internal relationships among its members.”  
On an organizational level, ‘good’ working relationships between departments equips them 
to take on innovative, cross-disciplinary tasks (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b). Dougherty’s 
(1990: 75) analysis of new product development revealed that successful projects relied on 
inter-departmental relationships that were “creative, interactive, and participatory (…), 
tightly coupled and well executed, not ‘loose.’” To Pennings and Woiceshyn (1987), “trust 
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in organizations is a mode of control that is inherent in the relationship among 
interdependent individuals.” Trust allows organizations to ensure performance even if task 
uncertainty makes planning and monitoring less feasible and useful (Ghoshal & Moran, 
1996; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996).  
On an inter-firm level, relationships and trust are considered important for dealing with 
transactions that are uncertain (Ben-Porath, 1980), incompletely specified (Macneil, 1978), 
or should be accomplished in a short time frame (Bryman et al., 1987).  
 
Most research proposes working relationships and trust as mechanisms for coordinating 
and controlling work without elaborating on the constructs themselves. This is because 
they theorize on choosing between alternative mechanisms, rather than exploring the 
properties of these in detail (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Yet some researchers have probed 
for a better understanding of the construct themselves, and their role as coordination and 
control mechanisms. Grandori and Soda (1995) argue that trust is not a coordination 
mechanism per se, but rather an outcome of evolving relationships. This implies that a 
better understanding of trust and its role for coordination and control calls for an 
exploration of the working relationships construct.  
Gabarro (1990: 81) defines working relationships as “(…) an interpersonal relationship 
that is task-based, non-trivial, and of continuing duration”. His review of literature on 
working relationships revealed a common set of dimensions along which they evolve over 
time (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Levinger & Snoek, 1972). “Although scholars differ in their 
definition of a developed relationship, there is a remarkable degree of convergence in the 
literature on the dimensions that characterize the development of relationships” (Gabarro, 
1990: 82). A selection of dimensions relevant to (remote) work coordination and control is 
listed in Table 6. Gabarro (1990) points out that evolution of working relationships along 
these dimensions is associated with increased efficiency of collaboration. The development 
of relationships becomes more desirable when individuals’ tasks are highly interdependent.  
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Table 6 - Working relationships and their evolutionary pattern 
 
Evolutionary pattern  
Dimensions: From: To: 
Openness and self-
disclosure 
 limited to “safe,” socially 
acceptable topics 
 disclosure goes far beyond 
safe areas to include 
personal sensitive, private, 
and controversial topics 
and aspects of self 
Knowledge of each 
other 
 surface, “biographic” 
knowledge; impressionistic in 
nature  
 knowledge is multifaceted 
and extends to core 
aspects of personality, 
needs, and style 
Predictability of other’s 
reactions and responses 
 limited to socially expected or 
role-related responses, and 
those based on first impressions 
or repeated surface encounters 
 predictability of other’s 
reactions extends beyond 
stereotypical exchange and 
includes a knowledge of the 
contingencies affecting the 
other’s reactions 
Uniqueness of 
interaction 
 exchanges are stereotypical, 
guided by prevailing social 
norms or role expectations 
 exchanges are idiosyncratic 
to the two people, guided 
by norms that are unique to 
the relationship 
Multimodality of 
communication 
largely limited to verbal channels of 
communication and stereotypical or 
unintended nonverbal channels 
includes multiple modalities of 
communication, including 
nonverbal and verbal 
“shorthand” specific to the 
relationship or the individuals 
involved 
Substitutability of 
communication 
little substitution among alternative 
modes of communication 
possession of and ability to use 
alternative modes of 
communication to convey the 
same message 
Capacity for conflict and 
evaluation 
limited capacity for conflict to readiness and ability to 
express conflict and make 
positive or negative evaluations 
Synchronization and 
pacing 
except for stereotyped modes of 
response, limited dyadic synchrony 
occurs 
speech and nonverbal 
responses become 
synchronized; flow of interaction 
is smooth; cues are quickly and 
accurately interpreted 
Efficiency of 
communication 
communication of intended meanings 
sometimes requires extensive 
discussion; misunderstandings occur 
unless statements are qualified or 
elaborated 
intended meanings are 
transmitted and understood 
rapidly, accurately, and with 
sensitivity to nuance 
Adopted from Gabarro (1990: 83-84) 
 
For geographically distributed projects, some dimensions seem of particular relevance, 
assuming that distance and time zone differences increase reliance on electronic media as a 
substitute for collocated interaction. First, remotely collaborating actors can use knowledge 
of each other (second dimension in Table 6) to anticipate reciprocal communication needs. 
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As Krauss (1990: 112) explains, “(…) any communicative act rests on a base of mutual 
knowledge (...). Mutual knowledge is knowledge that the communicating parties both 
share and know they share.” This knowledge may be derived from previous collaboration 
and facilitate remote exchanges (Hollingshead, 1998). According to Gabarro (1990: 84), 
“(…) the more extensive this knowledge base, the easier it is for each party to anticipate 
the other’s responses and reactions correctly.” Second, substitutability of communication 
(sixth dimension in Table 6) facilitates substitution of face-to-face exchange for the use of 
electronic media. Moreover, they can use different types of electronic media (like email, 
vmail, phone, videoconferencing) to communicate the same message. Third, stronger 
working relationships between individuals working remotely increase the efficiency of 
communication (ninth dimension in Table 6). This implies that the transfer of meaning 
does not require extensive interaction for clarification. A later section on electronic 
communication further expands on theories that explain the use of electronic media.  
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Chapter 5  Work Coordination and Control: Theory Integration 
 
This chapter builds on the theories from the previous chapter. It works towards an 
integrated theory of work coordination and control. To this end, we take the following 
steps. First, we integrate coordination mechanism from the various theories and integrate 
these into a coherent set. Second, a similar approach is adopted for control mechanisms. 
Third, the relationships between coordination and control is discussed as Siamese twins. 
Fourth, contingencies of coordination and control mechanisms are discussed and 
integrated. The chapter concludes with a brief model that integrates the contingencies and 
coordination and control mechanisms and thus answers sub question 1. 
 
§ 5.1  Coordination mechanisms: An Integrative View  
 
Coordination structures or mechanisms are needed to coordinate differentiated work 
(Mintzberg, 1979). Nidumolu (1996) defines coordination structures as “the set of 
mechanisms used to coordinate activities among individuals”. From an organization theory 
perspective, mechanisms “cover all devices or procedures used as stimuli for action in 
respect of either people or machines.” Furthermore, “mechanisms, as opposed to random 
orders or ad hoc prescriptions, are necessary in any organization that functions as a system 
and has to cope with repetition of action” (Reeves & Woodward, 1970).  
As the literature study revealed, a repertoire of coordination mechanisms exists for 
achieving concerted action (McCann & Galbraith, 1981; Thompson, 1967). These are 
grouped in four categories: work-based coordination, coordination by organization design, 
inter-personal coordination, and technology-based coordination. Figure 18 summarizes the 
mechanisms for each category. They are used for coordinating activities within and 
between firms (Grandori, 1997; Kumar & van Dissel, 1996).  
 
§ 5.1.1  Work-based Coordination 
As early as 1924, Lichtner (1924: 5-6) proposed planning and procedures as a means for 
coordinating divided work. The process of conceiving and formalizing interlocked work 
activities has been referred to as ‘programming’ (March & Simon, 1958). It may take the 
form of standards, blueprints, or plans (Van de Ven et al., 1976) that specify work inputs, 
behaviors, or outputs. Within organizations, role descriptions and reporting structures are 
formalized (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Between organizations, reciprocal expectations are 
spelled out in advance in contracts (Ouchi, 1979). Programmed mechanisms result in a 
form of embedded coordination: actual work that follows the program is automatically 
integrated (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). 
Recent advances in system development methodologies and technologies have extended 
work-based coordination beyond planning and specifications. Prototyping and simulation 
enables people to visualize the system in preliminary stages (von Hippel, 1994). Work is 
not specified, but represented in a more accessible format as it evolves over time (Schmitz, 
2000).  
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§ 5.1.2  Coordination by Organization Design 
Since work is eventually accomplished by individual actors, programming relates to role 
descriptions and the relationship between these. Traditionally, hierarchical structures have 
been proposed to divide and connect work (Simon, 1950). Activities are delegated to 
subsequent layers of functionally specialized units that report back on the progress of their 
actions (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Hart & Moore, 1999). Galbraith (1973) proposed that 
uncertainty overloads hierarchical communications. He suggested that lateral contacts and 
integrative roles alleviate vertical coordination. Under conditions of extensive coordination 
needs, he proposed teams with representatives from different departments.  
Organizational structure also substantiates transactions between firms: liaison roles at both 
sides channel intra-firm communications that relate to the counterpart organization 
(Grandori, 1997).  
 
§ 5.1.3  Inter-personal Coordination 
Another extension of programming points to interpersonal mechanisms for coordinating 
work (Van de Ven et al., 1976). Instead of specifying work upfront, actors mutually adjust 
their efforts through interactive feedback (Thompson, 1967). More recent literature refines 
the set of interpersonal coordination mechanisms with three forms: common knowledge, 
mutual orientation, and working relationships (Grant, 1996b; Krauss & Fussell, 1990). In 
the order presented, they may be interpreted as forming a Guttman-type scale, where 
subsequent forms incorporate preceding ones. That is, mutual orientation supposes some 
level of common knowledge, and working relationships rely on common knowledge and 
mutual orientation (Gabarro, 1990). First, common knowledge refers to experiential and 
educational background two or more actors share (Krauss & Fussell, 1990) that becomes 
apparent when actors meet for the first time, or engage in novel tasks. It depends on the 
extent to which they have participated in social systems that are the same or similar, 
including their country, educational institutions, and social categories (Krauss & Fussell, 
1990). This results in overlapping backgrounds, taking the form of language and other 
basic communication frameworks for describing and clarifying the world around us (Grant, 
1996b). From an occupational perspective, it includes a common jargon, and set of 
principles and insights that shape an individual’s outlook and social behaviors (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). It may result from similar roles and affiliations in the past. Organizations 
are believed to develop their own internal code and jargon (Arrow, 1974; Williamson, 
1975), supported by a socialization and training policies (Hage et al., 1971). This implies 
that inclusion in the same organizational context equips individuals with commonality that 
“(…) permits idiosyncratic conditions to be communicated with little difficulty” 
(Williamson, 1975: 29). Common knowledge brings about efficiency in exchanges since it 
reduces the need for communication on the communication process itself (Watzlawick et 
al., 1967). Actors experience limited equivocality in the sense of differences in the way 
they shape and interpret communicative actions (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). Rather, their 
exchanges become focused on the coordinative requirements of their tasks (Schein, 1992: 
70).  
Mutual orientation consists of insight one actor has in the functioning of other actors 
(Hutchins, 1990). From a behavioral perspective, it relates to the heedfulness of actors vis-
à-vis others involved in the same work (Weick & Roberts, 1993). The definition provided 
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here suggests both a cognitive and behavioral side to mutual orientation.19 The cognitive 
side refers to knowledge that is distributed (Morgan, 1997), but also to some extent 
overlapping (Hutchins, 1990), and redundant (Grant, 1996a; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
This happens in particular when jobs are not comprehensively defined and demarcated but 
interweave with adjacent fields of responsibility (Burns & Stalker, 1961) and induce actors 
to know more than their individual task and specialization (Grant, 1996b). The behavior 
side reflects actors’ awareness of the way their role is embedded in a larger purposeful 
system (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Heedfulness achieves flexibility of the system: changes 
are processed and absorbed through sustainable connectivity among members (Barrett, 
1998). Mutual orientation thus enables a group of actors to face unpredictable events and 
engage in novel activities that require tight interconnections (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; 
Roberts & Moore, 1993). Lack of it may imply disaster if a group tries to face challenges 
beyond simply linked activities (Weick, 1993a).  
Working relationships are the most intimate form of inter-personal coordination 
mechanisms. They grow as individuals (Altman & Taylor, 1973), departments (Lawrence 
& Lorsch, 1967b), or organizations (Bryman et al., 1987) collaborate over an extended 
period of time. Working relationships thrive on task-related dependencies and collocation 
(McCann & Galbraith, 1981). They change the way actors interact and coordinate 
interlocked activities. As earlier reviewed, Gabarro (1990: 81) summarizes literature on the 
effects of working relationships on a number of dimensions. Evolution of working 
relationships increases predictability of each actor’s performance (Ben-Porath, 1980), thus 
facilitating coordinative behaviors (Simon, 1950: 124). Past experience translates into trust 
that substitutes for detailed specification and monitoring of the counterpart’s work 
(Pennings & Woiceshyn, 1987). In a sense, relationships thus economize on coordination 
expenses (Williamson, 1975). They also seem to promote effectiveness of collaboration 
across organizational (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994) and departmental boundaries 
(Dougherty, 1990). With respect to working relationships in groups, Simon (1950: 124) 
describes the natural and flexible way tasks are coordinated:  
 
“In the behavior of organized human groups we often find a unity and co-ordination of 
behavior so striking that it has led many social thinkers to draw an analogy between 
the group and the individual, and even to postulate a “group mind”. The mechanism 
whereby this co-ordination is achieved is not easily perceived (...).  
Coordination then results when the behavior of the individual is guided by his 
expectations of the behavior of the other members of the group. In the simplest case, 
as we have seen, this adaptation may be self-induced. (...) The mental processes 
involved are seldom entirely deliberate or conscious. Most of the behaviors resulting 
in coordination are in large part habitual and reflexive” (Simon, 1950: 124). 
 
Finally, people may be selected on the basis of the abovementioned inter-personal 
coordination mechanisms: common knowledge, mutual orientation, and working 
relationships (Pfeffer, 1997). For instance, people are selected for having similar 
experiences and proficiency in a language. Or they have collaborated on prior occasions, 
                                                 
19 The dimensions do not necessarily coincide. Strangers lacking mutual knowledge may 
act heedfully to understand each other’s backgrounds. On the other hand, spies attempt to 
acquire insight in the operation of other actors without acting heedfully.  
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which may leverage their mutual knowledge (Krauss & Fussell, 1990). Similarly, for inter-
firm coordination, counterparts are selected on the basis of criteria like reliability, 
competence and prior experience (Grandori & Soda, 1995).  
 
§ 5.1.4  Technology-based Coordination 
Finally, coordination is achieved by technology in the form of information systems 
(Galbraith, 1973), or physical structures (Edwards, 1981). Technology facilitates remote or 
asynchronous interaction between individuals. It makes work related information available 
to actors facing similar responsibilities at different locations or moments (Adler & Borys, 
1996; Levitt & March, 1988). Information systems may also embed rules for coordinative 
decision making that allow them to coordinate activities in response to inputs from their 
environment (Orlikowski, 1991). In Chapter 6  we elaborate on this coordination mode in 
the context of distributed collaboration. We list in Figure 18 the types of technologies 
earlier discussed.  
 
§ 5.1.5  Integrative view on Coordination Mechanisms 
Together, the four categories of coordination mechanisms represent a portfolio, as depicted 
in Figure 18 (McCann & Galbraith, 1981). Literature suggests that mechanisms 
complement and substitute each other (Lawler III, 1989; Mintzberg, 1979). For instance, 
technologies support inter-personal coordination through communication media. 
Technology also enables work-based coordination by representing and replicating 
information across sites. They categories are therefore connected, as depicted in the figure.  
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Figure 18 - Coordination mechanisms: an integrative view 
 
The possibility to configure and adapt a portfolio of mechanisms calls for insight in the 
determinants of that decision making process (March & Simon, 1958). Scholars have 
proposed a set of contingencies that condition this choice, such as work unit size, 
interdependence, and uncertainty (Tushman, 1979; Van de Ven et al., 1976). For example, 
pre-specifying work becomes less feasible when uncertainty increases. Instead, actors 
mutually adjust their actions as they engage in nonroutine events (substitution of 
programmed for inter-personal mechanism) (Thompson, 1967). In a later section we 
expand on the relationship between contingencies and coordination and control 
mechanisms.  
 
 
§ 5.2  Control Mechanisms: An Integrative View 
 
While designing coordination involves the selection of mechanisms for integrating work, 
control mechanisms ensure that concerted action is achieved (Kirsch, 1996; Thompson, 
1967). The roots of control in organization theory trace back to classic organization 
theorists like Fayol (1949) and cybernetics and system theory (Beer, 1959; Wiener, 1954). 
According to this perspective control consists of four activities: establishing a set of 
expectations or standards for work, observing actual task accomplishment, comparing 
these observations to expectations, and finally allowing for adaptation in case of deviation 
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between observed and expected work. Initially, these principles were developed for 
controlling technology-driven processes. But subsequently, social scientists adopted these 
principles for analyzing control of social systems (Parsons, Bales, & Shils, 1981). In its 
rudimentary application, scholars proposed bureaucratic control where work is formally 
specified and monitored by supervisors. Their observation fuels corrective actions in case 
actual task accomplishment does not comply with standards (Blau & Scott, 1962). These 
programmed modes of control relate to work behaviors and outputs and allow 
organizations to deal with incongruence between individual and organizational goals 
(Ouchi, 1979).  
The recognition of uncertainty in contingency theory has led to insights in other forms of 
control. Uncertainty and intricate dependencies make it difficult to conceive work in 
advance (Anthony, 1965). Expectations are necessarily incomplete, and rather emerge as 
work evolves. Hence, scholars proposed alternative modes of control that emphasize more 
the actors involved in the work process. Their commitment and relationships provide a 
means for controlling even ill understood work. Examples include clan control (Ouchi, 
1979), internal or self control (Hage et al., 1971), trust-based control (Pennings & 
Woiceshyn, 1987), and input control (Flamholtz, 1979; Snell, 1992). Input control refers to 
selection and training of dedicated and competent individuals. In these person-oriented 
control modes, the controller is not necessarily a hierarchical boss or supervisor, but could 
include peers (Barker, 1993), or the workers themselves (Manz & Sims, 1980). Other 
pointed at the role of technology (Orlikowski, 1991), and proposed that actors outside an 
organization have a role in controlling intra-organizational performance (Peterson, 1984). 
For example, professional organizations (Kerr & Slocum, 1981) or customers (Smith, 
1997) observe an organization’s accomplishments and provide feedback. Independent third 
parties may check and certify a firm’s activities, a ubiquitous phenomenon in trading 
relationships.  
While these extensions of control modes have complemented our understanding of control 
modes, they have also complicated the field. Most of them rely on the same cybernetic 
principles of defining, observing, comparing and evaluating work (Manz & Angle, 1986). 
But little agreement exists on a taxonomy for relating and comparing the mechanism 
(Jaworski, 1988). Some researchers loosely divide the mechanisms in formal modes 
(output and behavior control), and informal modes (clan control, self control) (Kirsch, 
1996). Or they conceive relationship and team based control modes as an add-on to 
Edward’s (1981) taxonomy of simple control (supervision-based), technological control 
(control is embedded in technology), and bureaucratic control (control is embedded in the 
organization) (Barker, 1993; Simpson, 1985).  
Enhancing control theory as a field of inquiry requires also reflection on the relationships 
between these traditional and more recent control modes (Flamholtz, 1996). Such an 
analytical process requires dimensions to compare the modes, and develop a taxonomy of 
control mechanisms. Tannenbaum (1956) proposed two dimensions: controller (or subject) 
and an object of control (something or someone). This complements Ouchi’s (1979) 
distinction based on only the object of control, namely behavior or output. Using earlier 
work on input control (Snell, 1992) or ex ante control (Flamholtz, 1979), the object of 
control consists of inputs, behaviors and outputs (Litterer, 1965). The subject of control 
(controller) can be derived from the preceding discussion as including hierarchical 
supervisors (Blau & Scott, 1962), co-workers (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985), technology 
(Pennings & Woiceshyn, 1987), or the workers themselves (Hage et al., 1971). And also 
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contractual partners (Ouchi, 1979) or third parties (like a notary) (Peterson, 1984). Table 7 
combines these dimensions in order to propose a taxonomy for categorizing control modes.  
 
Table 7 - Control mechanisms: an integrative view 
 
Objects of control:  
Controllers: Input Transformation process Output 
Hierarchical 
supervision 
Hierarchical selection 
of inputs 
Supervision of process Hierarchical checking 
of outputs 
Co-workers (clan) Ballotage Observation of peer 
behaviors 
Co-workers outputs 
control 
Technology
  
Technical monitoring of 
inputs 
Technical monitoring of 
transformation process 
Technical monitoring of 
outputs 
Self Self selection Monitoring of controller’s 
own behaviors 
Controller’s 
assessment of own 
outputs 
Contractual party Selection of contractual 
party 
Direct monitoring of 
counterpart’s behaviors 
Contractual party 
assessment of 
counterpart’s output 
Third party Third party input 
control 
Third party observation 
of process 
Third party control of 
outputs 
 
Like the portfolio of coordination mechanisms, the control modes complement and 
substitute each other. Many of the contingencies that explain this process are similar to 
those found in coordination theory: interdependence, work unit size, uncertainty. A 
separate section proceeds on this topic. Substitution and complementation of control 
modes occur both across the columns (object of control), and the rows (subject of control). 
For example, uncertainty of a transformation process may result in a focus on selection of 
actors (input control), or the outputs of their work. Alternatively, hierarchical control of the 
transformation process may be substituted for peer control where co-workers provide 
feedback on each other’s work. Not only are the contingencies in control theory similar to 
those in coordination theory. The mechanisms or modes themselves are also related. In the 
next section this connection is further elaborated.  
 
 
§ 5.3  Coordination and Control as Siamese Twins 
 
“In fact, the two [coordination and control] are more closely connected than is always 
recognized.” (Parker Follett, 1927: 168).  
 
The portfolios of coordination and control strategies suggest overlaps and mutual 
dependence of the mechanisms. For example, hierarchical structures can be used for 
coordination among differentiated sub-units as well as control by managerial supervision. 
Programs for coordinating work become a mirror that reveals appropriateness of individual 
efforts ex post (Orlikowski, 1991). As a contractual specification or bureaucratic plan, 
programs make deviations apparent, and enforce consistency and predictability of 
performance (Adler & Borys, 1996; March & Simon, 1958). Working relationships used 
 91
for coordinating interdependent actions provide a basis for trust based control modes 
between peers or manager and subordinate (Pennings & Woiceshyn, 1987).  
The relationship between coordination and control mechanisms is important because it 
constitutes one of the main connections between the two theories. So far, the discussion on 
this topic relies on a small number of organization theorists proposing different 
viewpoints. Some scholars refer to the similarity of the concepts, like Mintzberg (1979) 
referring to Litterer’s (1965) remark that “Recent developments in the area of control, or 
cybernetics, have shown [control and coordination] to be the same in principle. Others 
point at the different role and nature of the two concepts: “Coordination and control have 
typically been employed to handle two different analytical problems. Coordination is the 
task of integrating each part of the organization so that it contributes to the overall 
objective (...) Control is more concerned with the meeting of a standard. If coordination 
brings together the different departments of the organization, control is concerned with 
how well each department does its set of tasks. Control implies evaluation; coordination 
implies integration” (Hage, 1980: 350-351).  
In line with Parker Follet (1927), Reeves and Woodward (1970) extend this perspective by 
emphasizing the mutually dependent nature of the constructs. Coordination refers to the 
process of defining expectations and integrating differentiated actions (Thompson, 1967). 
Control is aimed at ensuring compliance of actual work to expectations, and integration of 
work (Child, 1984). And the two are related: coordination mechanisms are a prerequisite 
for control: “(...) planning, setting standards and issuing prescriptions for action, are all 
prerequisites of control. Without some concept of what should be done, it is impossible to 
make any assessment of what has in fact been done” (Reeves & Woodward, 1970). In turn, 
control ensures and materializes coordination.  
The examples provided above suggest a perspective close to this line of reasoning. Like a 
Siamese twin, coordination and control are two different constructs but they complement 
each other. The same mechanisms may be used for achieving both coordination and 
control (Adler & Borys, 1996; Orlikowski, 1991). The following section on contingencies 
further explores this symbiosis. 
 
§ 5.4  Contingencies 
 
This section summarizes and elaborates on contingencies of coordination and control 
mechanisms. Contingencies explain the conditions for choosing from portfolios of 
coordination on control mechanisms (Van de Ven et al., 1976). From the contributive 
theories earlier introduced, the following contingencies were distilled: interdependence, 
uncertainty, observability, complexity, work unit size, and functional diversity. As far as 
control theory is concerned, goal incongruence is an additional construct that intertwines 
with interdependence and uncertainty. The following review assesses contingencies’ 
relationship to coordination and control mechanisms. Terminology from the integrative 
view on coordination and control mechanisms is used to depict theory statements. The 
figures are structured in three columns: contingencies, coordination and control. In tune 
with organization theory practices, positive relationships between two constructs are 
depicted with a “+”, negative ones with a “-”. Relationships between constructs are 
numbered to facilitate referencing in later sections.  
 
 92
§ 5.4.1  Interdependence 
The types of work dependencies earlier introduced (pooled, sequential, reciprocal, team, 
integrative) are often ranked in terms of intricacy, or the extent to which they are 
intertwined. Simple and loosely coupled dependencies include pooled and sequential 
dependence. On the other hand, reciprocal and team dependence represent dense and 
tightly coupled activities. Integrative interdependence could fit between these two ends of 
the spectrum. Thompson (1967) proposed that more complex forms increase the difficulty 
and costs of coordination (Relationship (1) Figure 19). With simple dependencies, 
programmed coordination suffices since actors are comprehensively instructed in advance, 
(2) Figure 19 (Grant, 1996b). But tight coupling implies that collective output is not an 
accumulation of individual contributions. It rather blends these (Dougherty, 1996). As 
tasks become more contingent upon each other, actors need to connect and know more 
about each other (Gabarro, 1990). Inter-personal coordination mechanisms like mutual 
adjustment and working relationship become important to integrate adaptively as the work 
unfolds, (3) Figure 19 (Weick & Roberts, 1993).  
 
 
Figure 19 - Interdependence and coordination 
 
Complex interdependence also affects the control process. Individual efforts are not easily 
recognized throughout the transformation process, paving the road for free-riders, (5) 
Figure 20 (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Complex dependence thus shifts the locus of 
control as self-managing groups are held accountable for their results, (6) Figure 20 (Manz 
et al., 1987). Within these teams, social norms and tacit observation govern participating 
individuals (Barker, 1993; Wageman, 1995). Self-control implies that task performers 
control their own accomplishments, as a substitute for external observation and 
adjustments. This is considered appropriate for autonomous tasks that are uncertain and 
require professional skills (Stinchcombe, 1990). At the same time, absence of external 
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control may hinder coordination of work that is interdependent and perhaps unstructured, 
(7) and (8) Figure 20 (Manz & Stewart, 1997: 62-63). 
 
 
Figure 20 - Interdependence and control 
 
Until recently, the type of interdependence was considered an inherent property of an 
organization’s task environment (Thompson, 1967), and thus a static determinant of 
coordination and control modes (Van de Ven et al., 1976). Recent insights extend this 
view: actors may construct and modify dependencies. They can change the sequencing of 
work from linear to overlapping to parallel (Grant, 1996b). While parallelization reduces 
the amount of time spent on the aggregated work, research shows that it also increases 
uncertainty and intricacy of work dependencies, (4) Figure 19 (Loch & Terwiesch, 1998). 
In turn, this makes coordination and control demands more intricate, (1) Figure 19 .  
 
§ 5.4.2  Uncertainty 
A second contingency is uncertainty: the lack of information or know-how concerning the 
work actors are supposed to do (Galbraith, 1973). In its most simple form, transformation 
processes are stable but actors may experience variability in the demand for their outputs 
(Perrow, 1967). Or the input they depend on from other actors is unpredictable (Argote, 
1982). This basic form of uncertainty has been referred to as variability (Van de Ven & 
Delbecq, 1974), or computational complexity (Grandori, 1997). Uncertainty supposes 
flexibility in the way actors response to the demands of their environment. Having a 
portfolio of routines at their disposal, they must accommodate to situational expectations 
(Pentland & Rueter, 1994).  
Uncertainty may also indicate that actors have difficulty analyzing the situation (Perrow, 
1967) and lack a mode for acting upon expectations (Kogut & Zander, 1992). This implies 
problems of equivocality, analyzability (Daft & Macintosh, 1981), and cognitional 
complexity (Grandori, 1997). They cannot instantly choose a mode for interpreting and 
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processing signals received from the broader system in which they operate (Daft & 
Macintosh, 1981; Purser & Montuori, 1995). In all of these cases, uncertainty is defined by 
the interplay between task characteristics, task environment, and actors involved (Scott, 
1990; Tushman, 1979). Tasks and work environment may prove unpredictable and beyond 
the control of an individual or group (Nohria & Gulati, 1994).  
Uncertainty affects the mode for coordinating and controlling work. Stable, predictable 
work relies on programmed coordination, (9) Figure 21 (Van de Ven et al., 1976). Once 
followed, programs like standard operating procedures or output specifications connect 
workers’ actions without their deliberate attention and interaction (Gupta et al., 1994). In 
fact, programs differentiate and integrate work at the same time: coordination is embedded 
in the specification of partial contributions (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). Structured 
coordination relies on separation of responsibilities for specifying, executing and 
supervising work, (10) Figure 21 (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Grant, 1996b). Knowledge of 
cause-effect relationships is centralized and not necessarily embodied in the actors 
eventually executing the program (Blau & Scott, 1962). Communications in the sense of 
revealing expectations and reporting progress rely on layered channels and formal 
exchange modes, (11) Figure 21, linked to (10) in the same figure (Galbraith, 1973). This 
suffices in predictable situations: since coordination is embedded in the program, actors do 
not experience the tissue of dependencies that exists (March & Simon, 1958). Yet 
uncertainty ‘awakens’ interdependencies because changes in one part of the work trigger 
responses in related components, (12) Figure 21 (von Hippel, 1990). The tighter actors are 
coupled, the stronger this effect is experienced since their actions are not relatively isolated 
and buffered like in loosely coupled systems (Weick, 1993b). Uncertainty triggers a shift 
to inter-personal and direct, non-hierarchical coordination modes (Galbraith, 1973). It 
requires direct exchanges between actors and outgoing attitudes to handle novel events, 
(13) Figure 21 (McCann & Galbraith, 1981; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Actors cannot take 
the embeddedness of their actions for granted, but instead must connect externally and 
acquire knowledge of adjacent responsibilities (Ancona, 1992; Hutchins, 1990). When 
work is delegated, uncertainty moves principal and agent from a classical ‘hands-off’ 
contract, to reciprocal involvement and division of work (Macneil, 1978). Still, work-based 
coordination has a role with uncertain tasks. It provides minimal structures - like 
prototypes (von Hippel, 1994) - that channel inter-personal adaptation (Barrett, 1998).  
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Figure 21 - Uncertainty and coordination 
 
Uncertainty also alters control modes. In fact, control theory is closely intertwined with the 
contingency perspective on uncertainty. Both Thompson (1967 chapter 7) and Galbraith 
(1973: 12-13) relate control modes to ‘understanding of cause-effect relationships’. Lack 
of understanding implies that a priori programming of behaviors and outputs for ex post 
assessment is not possible, (9) from Figure 21, and (14) Figure 22 (Anthony, 1965). The 
standards do not exist or are difficult to define. Instead, inter-personal forms of control like 
selection and socialization are employed to achieve reliable performance, (15) Figure 22 
(Hage et al., 1971; Snell, 1992). This means a temporal shift to the initial phase of the 
work, which, in turn, enables denser interaction processes during task accomplishment, 
(13) from Figure 21, and (16) Figure 22 (Pfeffer, 1978).  
 
Figure 22 - Uncertainty and control 
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§ 5.4.3  Uncertainty and Goal Incongruence 
As an organizational economist, Ouchi (1980) proposed a trade-off between specifiability 
of work and goal incongruence between controller and controllee. Goal divergence 
increases the risk that the controllee’s behaviors and outputs deviate from the controller’s 
interests (Ouchi, 1980). In response, work expectations are spelled-out in advance and 
closely monitored. Expectations concerning reciprocal behaviors are defined and explicitly 
aligned through resource incentives and penalties (Jensen & Meckling, 1986). Hierarchies 
and classic contracts enable this control mode that relies on programmed coordination 
(Williamson, 1991). Uncertainty changes the role of goal incongruence since work 
specification is no longer possible. Apart from intermediate solutions like the controller 
using information systems to monitor the controllee (Kirsch, 1996), scholars point at 
interpersonal control mechanisms like trust (Weick & Roberts, 1993: 378) and relational 
contracts (Macneil, 1978). In fact, trust and clan-based mechanisms change the premise of 
goal divergence as the relationship between controller-controllee is rooted in careful 
selection, and mutual support (Ouchi, 1979). 
 
§ 5.4.4  Joint Effect of Interdependence and Uncertainty 
Task dependence and uncertainty - or predictability, structurability - may affect 
simultaneously the need for information processing, and the choice of coordination 
mechanisms. Interaction between the two variables is depicted in Table 8. The first cell 1 
implies that two or more units accomplish structured tasks in an autonomous fashion. This 
is extended to cell 2 with unpredictable work, and cell 3 with tasks that are both tightly 
coupled and structured. The fourth cell refers to tightly coupled work that is unpredictable 
at the same time.  
 
Table 8 - Interdependence and predictability of work 
 
 Predictable work Unpredictable work 
 
Interdependence 
low 
 
 
Cell 1. Structured, loosely 
coupled work 
 
 
Cell 2. Unpredictable, 
loosely coupled work 
 
Interdependence 
tight 
 
 
Cell 3. Fixed pattern of 
interdependence 
 
 
Cell 4. Tightly coupled, 
unpredictable work 
 
The effect of uncertainty - a shift to interpersonal coordination modes (Van de Ven et al., 
1976) - is exacerbated by the tight form of dependence. This reinforces the need for 
coordination across units involved, a combination of (1) and (3) Figure 19, and (13) Figure 
21. As March and Simon (1958: 169) already noted:  
 
“Interdependence does not by itself cause difficulty if the pattern of interdependence 
is stable and fixed (i.e., cell 3 - author). For in this case, each subprogram can be 
designed to take into account all of the other subprograms with which it interacts. 
Difficulties arise only if program execution rests on contingencies that cannot be 
predicted perfectly in advance (i.e., cell 4 - author). In this case, coordinating activity 
is required to secure agreement on estimates that will be used as the basis for action, 
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or to provide information to each subprogram unit about the relevant activities of the 
others. Hence, we arrive at the proposition that the more repetitive and predictable the 
situation, the greater the tolerance for interdependence. Conversely, the greater the 
elements of variability and contingency, the greater is the burden of coordinating 
activities that are specialized by process.” 
 
Literature on HRO further extends this insights. It explains the risk of tight connectivity 
among units that may fail in the execution of their work:  
 
“Normally, individual failures stay separate and unlinked if they occur in a linear 
transformation system (cell 2 - author) where they affect only one adjacent step and if 
they occur in a loosely coupled system where that effect may be indeterminate (...). If 
the couplings become tighter (cell 4 - author) (...) then more failures can occur and 
they can affect a greater number of additional events” (Weick, 1993b: 190-191).  
 
The combination of close dependence and unpredictable work calls for intensive 
coordination efforts. Uncertainty implies that the form and intensity of interdependence is 
not fixed. Insight therein evolves as the work itself unfolds. In this process, units should 
keep each other therefore updated on intended action patterns at a frequent pace (Roberts 
& Moore, 1993).  
 
§ 5.4.5  Observability 
Supposing that an external control mode is chosen (controller and controllee are not the 
same persons), task uncertainty - the “understanding of cause-effect relationships” 
(Thompson, 1967) - implies that desirable accomplishments cannot be defined in advance. 
This undermines the cybernetic control cycle as work standards do not exist for assessing 
the actual execution of activities (see Figure 13). But even if controllers know their 
expectations, problems of observability (the second activity in the cybernetic cycle, see 
same figure) hinder their control efforts (Scott, Mitchell, & Peery, 1981). Agents may 
work remotely or with clients, like salespersons (Staples, 1997). Their behaviors remain 
outside the controllers’ scope and become in a sense uncertain for them.  
As a consequence, literature proposes that controllers focus on agents’ outputs rather than 
their behaviors (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). Reports and successful contracts are 
examples of outputs a controller can review to assess the controllee’s accomplishments 
(Cooper, 1992; Olson, 1982; Perin, 1991). As an alternative, agency theory proposes that 
controllers can still attempt to control agents’ behaviors if they invest in information 
systems (Kirsch, 1996).20 They purchase remote observation as a substitute for direct 
supervision. Observations on the controllees’ behaviors are transmitted to the controller to 
resume a cybernetic control cycle. Figure 23 shows the adapted cycle for controlling a 
process with direct versus transmitted observation. In fact, apart from deploying 
technology, the controller can achieve a similar control mode by commissioning local 
representatives to observe the controllee’s behaviors.  
 
                                                 
20 An example of a remote (security) observation systems is watching people and/ or 
material objects by means of a web cam and permanent internet link. 
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Figure 23 - Remote cybernetic control cycles 
 
§ 5.4.6  Work Unit Size 
Work unit size - the number of people involved in a single job - may increase for various 
reasons. With agency relationships, size increases when the principal delegates the work to 
multiple agents, or when one of the agents sub-delegates work to others (Hart & Moore, 
1999; Penrose, 1959). Size also increases when work is differentiated for reasons of 
efficiency (Smith, 1793) or knowledge specialization (Grant, 1996b; Purser & Montuori, 
1995). As more actors become involved, the scope of their work contacts decreases. 
Assuming that the total amount of time they spend for connecting with peers remains about 
the same, they can either maintain a large number of superficial contacts. Or they interact 
closely with a limited segment of the network, (17) Figure 24 (Galbraith, 1973). As the 
denseness of interactions in the system decreases, size adds to the risk of confusion 
(Gulick, 1937). Actors lack overview and representation that characterize smaller groups 
(Brooks, 1975; Weick & Roberts, 1993). This absence of ‘global transparency’ (Adler & 
Borys, 1996) translates into poor perception of their individual embeddedness (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). Size reduces awareness of dependencies between the multiple tasks and 
people involved (Brooks, 1975). Instead of mutual adjustment and small group meetings 
(Van de Ven et al., 1976), scholars have proposed alternative means for achieving 
integration.  
First, formal coordination modes like plans and standards, (18) Figure 24 (Mintzberg, 
1979). The thought process that precedes these blueprints coordinates large-scale activity 
in advance. Once completed, specification of expected behaviors and outputs provides an 
embedded form of coordination that substitutes for mutual adjustment (Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996). Second, information systems increase the capacity of the system as a 
whole to communicate, (19) Figure 24 (Galbraith, 1973). They enable actors to organize 
and disseminate articulated knowledge relating to the group’s past, present and future 
(Walsh & Ungson, 1991). Third, larger groups can be split apart in smaller units that 
maintain forms of interactive collaboration, (20) and (21) Figure 24 (Dougherty, 1996). 
Links between units are facilitated by group representatives, integrators (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967b), liaisons (Galbraith, 1973) or gatekeepers, (22) Figure 24 (Allen, 1984). 
Hence, a structure emerges of interconnected nodes that channel inter-unit communications 
3. Transmitted 
observation
Process
2. Direct 
observation
4. Comparison
5. Correction1. Standard
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(Burt, 1992). Intelligence on a system level becomes depend on the reliability and capacity 
of these linking pins to connect with other integrators, while retaining inclusion in their 
respective subunits.  
 
 
Figure 24 - Work unit size and coordination 
 
Size also affects the mode of control, both differentiated (external) and self control modes. 
Differentiated control refers to the situation that controller and controllee are not the same 
person, the former being a customer, manager, or colleague (Smith, 1997). Their direct 
observation of an actor’s behavior constitutes a rich form of assessment (Ouchi, 1978). But 
since their span of control and resources are limited (Penrose, 1959), the number of actors 
they can observe is limited, (23) Figure 25. Size makes it also difficult for actors 
controlling their own work. Their insight on an aggregated level is contingent upon the 
opportunity they have to connect to other contributors. As indicated, size reduces the 
ramification or depth of their networking efforts. As a result, they have reduced insight in 
the broader work context, and the embeddedness of their role, (24) Figure 25 (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995).  
Literature points to alternative means for ensuring performance in large-scale systems. 
First, the larger system can be broken apart in multiple smaller units, replicating control 
forms common to smaller entities, see also (20) Figure 24. These entities require additional 
supervisory roles (Penrose, 1959), or members steer their own efforts, (25) Figure 25 
(Manz et al., 1987). Second, direct observation of behaviors is substituted for simpler 
representation of actors’ work (Cooper, 1992), like output measures, (26) Figure 25. 
Observation of output is easier to transmit, especially when quantifiable (Ouchi, 1978). “In 
a large organization (…) output measurement is necessary even if means-ends relations are 
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well understood, because the subunits must have a simple measure of performance, which 
can be readily understood by others in the organization” (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975). 
Information systems facilitate this approach by capturing and disseminating performance 
metrics to controllers, (27) Figure 25 (Orlikowski, 1991).  
 
 
Figure 25 - Work unit size and control 
 
§ 5.4.7  Complexity 
Complexity refers to the number of elements that are connected, and the number and type 
of relationships among these (Haeckel & Nolan, 1993). As earlier indicated, it applies to 
situations or tasks that are intricately dependent, and possibly uncertain. Complexity 
increases when project become larger (Kirsch, 2000), or more people are involved 
(Brooks, 1975). It affects coordination and control modes although literature does not 
specify a uniform response pattern.  
A common approach is to formalize and centralize the way work is divided, coordinated 
and controlled, (28) and (29) Figure 26. “Projects that are high in complexity demand 
formal and detailed planning and control in order to track and integrate all of the separate 
pieces” (Kirsch, 2000: 299). Others emphasize the difficulty of connecting different parts 
of a larger task. They suggest to promote interpersonal exchanges to surpass intricate task 
demands, (30) and (31) Figure 26. “Somehow, all of the participants must continue to 
External behavior 
control
Control
Work unit size
Contingencies Coordination
+
(27)
Differentiation into
sub units
+  (20)
+
(25)
Information Systems
+ 
(19)
Inter-personal coordination:
-Mutual adjustment
-Common knowledge
-Mutual orientation
-Working relationships
–
(23)
–
(17)
Autonomous, 
self control
–
(24)
+
(26)
Simplified 
external control
 101
interrelate with other participants as they jointly struggle to arrive at viable solutions” 
(Goodman, 1981: 3).  
A final perspective combines elements of the two approaches. Complexity - possibly 
combined with uncertainty - may prove formalization unfeasible. Yet exclusive reliance on 
mutual adjustment may provide too little structure, especially with large work unit size. As 
an alternative, people may define and formalize the overall structure of tasks - architectural 
design (Henderson & Clark, 1990) - and define standards for interfaces between subunits 
and tasks (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). Detailed elaboration of subtasks remains 
unspecified but should adhere to the (minimal) level of structure imposed (von Hippel, 
1990). 
 
  
Figure 26 - Complexity, coordination and control 
 
 
§ 5.4.8  Functional Differences 
Functional diversity means that two or more units working on the same task have different 
outlooks, perceptions, and work procedures, (32) Figure 27 (Dougherty, 1990; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967b). These differences may constitute barriers that hinder cross-unit contact 
and work coordination (Tushman, 1979). Lack of commonality and interest reduces 
information processing capacity and effectiveness, (33) Figure 27 (Krauss & Fussell, 
1990). This becomes especially apparent when units undertake a joint that task is uncertain 
and requires interlocked contributions (Dougherty, 1992).  
Under these conditions, extensive communications are necessary to generate reciprocal 
insight in perceptions and work patterns, (34) Figure 27. This is rooted in what Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967) call ‘good relations.’ The stronger functional differences are, the more 
important good contacts become. Dougherty (1990) came to similar conclusions in her 
research on interdepartmental collaboration in new product development. “Expertise alone 
is not enough. Interdepartmental relationships that were creative, interactive, and 
participatory in order to blend this expertise were also important to comprehensive market 
understanding. These relationships were also tightly coupled and well executed, not 
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‘loose’” (Dougherty, 1990: 75). Working relationships and frequent exchanges enhance 
awareness at both sides. This becomes especially relevant when task are intertwined and 
innovative, (35) Figure 27. “(…) (T)o coordinate such highly interdependent activities, 
innovators must understand the constraints in other functions, anticipate others’ needs, and 
use dense, two-way communication to process fragmentary information” (Dougherty, 
1996).  
Fostering collaboration across different units also relies on transferring people to become 
locally immersed (Edström & Galbraith, 1977), and extend their specialized knowledge 
base (Grant, 1996b). Alternatively, representatives bridge the diverse units as linking pins, 
(36) Figure 27 (Galbraith, 1973). Instead of direct contact, a layered form of coordination 
emerges as with large work unit size, (20) and (22) Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 27 - Functional diversity and coordination 
 
 
§ 5.5  Towards an Integrated Theory of Work Coordination and Control 
 
“(...) (I)n my argument (…) a science of organization is in progress in which law, 
economics, and organization are joined” (Williamson, 1994: 77). 
 
Williamson’s (1994) quote (see above) implies a considerable challenge to organization 
theory in general. Here, a contribution to that endeavor is made as far as coordination and 
control are concerned. The constructs and relationships elicited from literature constitute 
the initial material for an integrated theory of work coordination and control. They are 
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elicited from theories in organization sciences and organizational economics. Figure 28 
shows the relationships among the contingencies and portfolios of coordination and control 
mechanisms on an overview level.  
  
 
Figure 28 - Integrated model of work coordination and control 
 
The model starts with work differentiation and delegation. Differentiation means that work 
is partitioned, and more people become involved to accomplish the large task (Smith, 
1793; Thompson, 1967). Delegation is derived from agency theory, and implies that one 
person (the principal) asks another person (the agent) to perform a task (Eisenhardt, 
1989a). Both result in interdependence among the people involved in the single task or 
request for accomplishing a task.  
Interdependence is one of the contingencies - or determinants - of coordination and control 
mechanisms (Van de Ven et al., 1976). Others include functional differences, uncertainty, 
complexity, work unit size and observability. Together, they explain the choice, use and 
effectiveness of coordination and control mechanisms, including substitution patterns. This 
is depicted by the arrows that connect the contingencies to the portfolios of coordination 
and control. The nature of these causal patterns was earlier explained. In line with 
literature, some contingencies affect either coordination or control, others have an impact 
on both. Goal incongruence has a mediating effect on contingencies of control 
mechanisms. The portfolios of coordination and control mechanisms are linked like 
Siamese twins, as depicted by the bi-directional arrow in between.  
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Chapter 6  Polycontextual, Distributed Collaboration: Literature Review 
 
“Please sign up!  At least email me back a "Hello" so I know you're still interested and 
not tired of all my emails! ” - Coordinator of volunteer work at non-profit organization in 
Miami, FL to group of (occasional) volunteers, including the author (e-mail message). 
 
The second part of the theory section extends insights in coordination and control theory to 
settings where people contribute from different activity contexts and/or geographically 
distributed sites. We seek to provide an initial answer to sub question 3a and 3b.  
 
The chapter features a gradual build-up. It starts with research on activity environments 
that are polycontextual yet collocated. We discuss research on crossing the boundaries of 
multiple activity contexts. We then move on to electronic media and teleworking as 
examples of technical linkages and settings where people work from regionally dispersed 
locations. The chapter continues with a detailed analysis of studies on distributed 
communications and the role of groupware. Finally, we discuss and analyze two pieces of 
research on global software projects in detail (Meadows, 1996b; Millar, 1999).  
The chapter’s broader focus ensures that insights from research on other forms of 
distributed working (like regional teleworking) are incorporated. To date, only a limited 
number of empirical studies exist on distributed working, managing and collaboration 
processes. Those available often have research questions and theories that are (slightly) 
different from our focus. Hence, these studies are extensively analyzed, where possible 
using interview excepts, with an emphasis on the effects of distributedness on work 
coordination and control. The analysis of literature on distributed work is used to develop a 
model for empirical research in the next chapter.  
 
§ 6.1  Polycontextuality and boundary spanning 
 
A promising debate has emerged in organization theory on ‘boundary spanning’. The 
phenomenon starts with the recognition that multiple communities - possibly but not 
necessarily cross-functional and geographically separated - contribute to a single 
aggregated work outcome. As their efforts become interdependent, boundary spanning 
provides a framework for studying coordination modes. Contributors to this emerging field 
come from areas as diverse as social cognitive theory (Star & Griesemer, 1989), 
technology management (Henderson, 1998; Tyre & von Hippel, 1997), information 
management (Karsten, Lyytinen, Hurskainen, & Koskelainen, 1999), Cockpit Resource 
Management (CRM) (Chute & Wiener, 1995, 1996), activity theory (Engeström, 
Engeström, & Kärkkäinen, 1995). Here, the papers by Engeström (1995), Karsten et al. 
(1999) and Chute and Wiener (1995, 1996) are discussed and linked to our research.  
 
§ 6.1.1  Engeström et al. (1995) 
Engeström et al. (1995) combine cognitive science and activity theory in their research on 
boundary spanning. Specifically, their work connects to literature on expertise. In that 
field, most researchers adopt a so-called vertical perspective to study expertise, usually in a 
single area of specialization. Engeström et al. (1995) intend to complement this angle with 
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a horizontal view. As they explain: “In their work, experts operate in and move between 
multiple parallel activity contexts. These multiple contexts demand and afford different, 
complementary but also conflicting cognitive tools, rules, and patterns of social 
interaction” (Engeström et al., 1995: 319). Their research addresses the challenge experts 
face to bridge multiple communities or contexts, also referred to as polycontextuality. For 
instance, different departments or locations that are involved in the same work endeavor.  
 
Crossing boundaries of multiple contexts may take different forms. First, Engeström et al. 
(1995) point to an example where engineers travel as boundary crossers and 
representatives between a firm’s plant and laboratory to resolve manufacturing problems 
(Tyre & von Hippel, 1997)  
 
Second, actors from different context may develop common mental models, vocabulary 
and standards to connect distributed activities (Engeström et al., 1995: 322). This form of 
common knowledge may include ‘boundary objects’, i.e., physical artifacts representing 
work that is accomplished in a polycontextual environment (Star & Griesemer, 1989). 
  
Third, members of different contexts can directly engage with each other in dialogue and 
argumentation. Contexts are more broadly connected than with representatives. An 
example is participatory development methodologies where users and system analysts 
iteratively interact to define requirements and design the system. 
 
The three forms of bridging are related to the (inter-organizational) coordination 
mechanisms earlier discussed (Galbraith, 1973; Grandori, 1997).  
 
Engeström et al. (1995) illustrate the role of these forms of boundary crossing with three 
case studies. The first case concerns collaboration between specialist and lay inhabitants of 
a municipal welfare and health center. Since the size of the groups involved was rather 
large, boundary crossing relied on representatives that participated in meetings. This 
attempt was not successful, partly because of the way representatives from the lay 
inhabitants connected to the group they represented. “The meetings were attended by 
representatives, not by those whose problems were the initial motivation of the project” 
(Engeström et al., 1995: 325). A second case deals with the relationship between two small 
groups of teachers at an elementary school, each aimed at developing a new curriculum 
model. Boundary crossing was accomplished by joint meetings that fostered presentation 
of group perspectives and dialogue. A final case deals with an industrial manufacturer, in 
particular interaction between a parts production and assembly hall. Boundary spanning is 
triggered when parts do not comply to specifications and cause problems in the assembly 
process. It was accomplished by representatives from both halls who met and discussed 
problems. Their dialogue benefited from common knowledge about the production 
process. People also used the semi-finished product that caused the problem as a point of 
reference or boundary object.  
 
The work by Engeström et al. (1995) can be interpreted in the light of this research and 
organization literature. Their proposed forms of boundary crossing closely resemble 
coordination modes. First, the use of representatives to connect larger groups (form 
possibly different locations) is similar to contingency theory’s liaison and integrator roles 
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(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b). Engeström et al. (1995) complement this view by focusing 
on problems occurring in the relationship between representatives and their groups. 
Second, the last case illustrates the role of standards and boundary spanning objects to 
achieve coordination across multiple contexts (Mintzberg, 1979). Finally, Engeström et al. 
(1995) point at more people-oriented means for linking communities. Meetings between 
members or representatives of groups facilitate exchange of views and coordinate 
distributed activities. Commonality of jargon and knowledge across communities 
facilitates this approach.  
 
§ 6.1.2  Chute and Wiener (1995, 1996): Collocated Polycontextuality 
The papers by Chute and Wiener (1995, 1996) are part of a distinct research area called 
Cockpit Resource Management (CRM). Wiener was one of the founders of this field of 
inquiry that is part of Human Factors research in aviation (Wiener, Kanki, & Helmreich, 
1993). It focuses on communication relationships in aviation that define safety. That is, 
communication between pilots, between pilots and Air Traffic Control, and between pilots 
and cabin crew. The papers of interest here contribute to the latter area. It focuses on issues 
emerging in the interaction process between cockpit and cabin crew. This is important 
since the quality of that process drives flight safety, especially when nonroutine conditions 
arise.  
Chute and Wiener’s (1995, 1996) research addresses concerns with cockpit-cabin 
collaboration. In the period preceding their research, a number of accidents have happened 
that points towards problems in cockpit-cabin collaborative relationships. We interpret and 
re-analyze their studies here from the perspective of our research.  
 
Chute and Wiener (1995, 1996) mention several gaps that exist between cockpit and cabin 
contexts. Together with other basic issues these lead to behavioral collaboration problems. 
Their papers conclude with recommendations to address these concerns and enhance flight 
safety.  
 
First of all, Chute and Wiener (1995, 1996) distinguish a number of ‘gaps’ that exist 
between the cockpit and cabin context. A primary gap is physical (Figure 29). Even though 
both areas are adjacent and as such not truly physically distributed, they are still separate. 
The research shows that crews experience the cockpit door as a barrier to communications. 
Physical separateness leads to lack of visual contact, awareness and understanding between 
the two contexts. People do not know what is going on in the other crew’s area and what 
their duties are.  
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Figure 29 - Polycontextuality: cockpit and cabin
21
 
 
A second gap is cultural. On average, members of cockpit and cabin crews have different 
attitudes, preferences, and gender. Pilots are often male, technically oriented, and used to a 
strict hierarchy, while people in the cabin are predominantly female, service oriented, and 
egalitarian. 
Third, technical differences exist between both contexts.  
Fourth, people from cabin and cockpit often work for different organizational entities. This 
creates walls in their experience and inhibits collaboration (Chute & Wiener, 1995, 1996).  
 
On top of these gaps, the research points to several basic issues that inhibit cross-context 
collaboration. 
First, at both sides lack knowledge of the counterpart context. They do not know standards, 
usances, terminology even on a basic level. This contributes to misunderstanding and 
distrust among the crews. 
Second, in the US the Federal Aviation Authority has regulations that seek to promote a 
‘clean cockpit’ (i.e., no disturbances for the pilots). This makes cabin crew hesitant to 
contact cockpit crew members either directly or through on-board communication systems. 
Third, workload in the cockpit and cabin make it difficult to spend common time before or 
during a flight.  
Finally, cabin and cockpit crews often collaborate for only a limited number of flights or 
flight legs. This implies that they have limited opportunity for building working 
relationships. 
 
Apart from these basic issues, Chute and Wiener’s (1995, 1996) research mentions 
behavioral concerns that further constrain effective collaboration. Before flights, there are 
no interpersonal introductions and ‘ice breakers’. This increases the likelihood of 
misunderstandings and coordination problems later on. During flights, communications 
between the crews are insufficient and ineffective. A consequence is that people have 
unrealistic expectations of other people’s job performance. They are misinformed and 
cannot tune in precisely. Different viewpoints exist without people being aware of them. 
                                                 
21 Interior of Boeing 777-200/-200ER. Source: Boeing site, July 2001, 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/777-200/int.html. Copyright © 2001 The Boeing 
Company. Graphics adapted for the purpose of this study. 
Context 1
Cockpit
Context 2
Cabin
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All in all, this constrains teamwork that is particularly important in abnormal situations 
when safety might be at risk.  
 
Chute and Wiener’s (1995, 1996) conclude their studies with some suggestions for 
adapting current practices. These recommendations were in part from cockpit and cabin 
crew members participating in the research. They are intended to enhance co-operation, 
and prepare crews for safety emergencies.22  
First, people should display a more proactive boundary-crossing attitude. They should take 
the initiative in an organized manner to contact their counterparts.  
Second, the authors suggest to merge the crews’ organizational entities into a single unit. 
This facilitates common objectives and consistency in training, policies, and procedures. It 
also clarifies the chain of command across both contexts. 
Third, pilots and flight attendants should be kept on the same schedule for some time. This 
way, people get to know each other, and build trust. Collaboration thus becomes more 
routine and predictable.  
Fourth, knowledge of other people’s job should be encouraged. When flight attendants 
have knowledge of aircraft parts and terminology, they can communicate appropriately 
with the cockpit. Similarly, the more pilots know about cabin operations, the better they 
can fine-tune interactions with cabin crew. Overall, enhancing reciprocal knowledge is 
believed to reduce misperceptions and distrust. One way to accomplish this is to have joint 
cabin and cockpit crew training. Another approach is to provide opportunities for jump 
seat rides in the cockpit for cabin crew members. This immersion in the cockpit 
environment enables cabin crew members to “familiarize themselves with the normal 
procedures and workload and to learn more about the operation of the aircraft” (Chute & 
Wiener, 1995: 273). A captain summarizes the issue at stake as follows:  
 
“I think the more we know about the jobs each of us are asked to do, the better we are 
able to communicate with each other. I also think it would be valuable to have some 
common training time. I realize, in general, what the flight attendants’ responsibilities 
are in emergencies, but I have not actually seen what they do” (Chute & Wiener, 1996: 
229). 
 
Fifth, before flights, cabin and cockpit crew should introduce themselves briefly to each 
other. This improves working relationships and later communications. As people become 
more familiar with their counterparts, they know more accurately expectations at both 
sides and communication styles. During flights when the need for swift communication 
may arise, people benefit from easier communications.  
Finally, communications in flight should be channeled through one linking pin - probably 
lead flight attendant - instead of random contacts between cockpit and cabin. On this 
measure, one pilot remarked: “I believe that action alone would solve 90% of the 
coordination problems” (Chute & Wiener, 1996: 221).  
In sum, Chute & Wiener highlight the role of linking pins as boundary crossers in 
collocated polycontextual work environment. In later sections we expand on other 
                                                 
22 Novel policies in the US and abroad that have been implemented after September 11, 
2001 may have changed some of these findings.  
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researchers’ investigation of linking pins in globally distributed projects (Meadows, 
1996b; Millar, 1999). 
 
§ 6.1.3  Boundary Objects 
Karsten, Lyytinen et al. (1999) expanded on the role of boundary objects to integrate 
communities of actors involved in the same project. They studied the design of huge paper 
machines that are semi-custom built by a Finnish company. Groups involved in such a 
project include various departments from the main company, customers, and 
subcontractors (Karsten et al., 1999). The research focuses on interaction between these 
groups, in particular by means of technical specifications. These are conceived as 
boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) and conscription devices (Henderson, 1998). 
Specifications reflect group viewpoints and require these to be explicitated (Boland & 
Tenkasi, 1995). They evolve with the project and become a ‘cascade’ of boundary objects 
that documents and integrates past contributions (Henderson, 1991).  
Karsten, Lyytinen et al. (1999) join earlier research (Davenport, 1998; Henderson, 1991) 
that points at the challenge to formalize and automate coordination of multiple diverse 
contexts while retaining flexibility. Communities may have autonomous and dynamic 
expectations and thus become connected in a reciprocal, unpredictable manner. This 
constrains the capability of a single information boundary object - like groupware, ERP - 
to promote coherence and transparency. “The fluidity and flexibility that is part of the 
loose structure of boundary objects was paralyzed by the fact that the whole system was 
computerized. (…) The huge size and complexity of the interlocking systems intimidated 
people” (Henderson, 1991: 464). 
An implication for geographically distributed projects is that sites need autonomy when 
their work is linked in a complex and unstructured manner. Remote coordination and 
control may not benefit from extensive specification and representation of local efforts, but 
require an alternative portfolio.  
 
§ 6.2  Theories on Electronic Media Use 
 
Theorizing on the generic use of electronic media (for both collocated and remote 
communications) started with social presence theory (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976) 
and especially Media Richness Theory (MRT) (Daft & Lengel, 1986). MRT has led to a 
considerable stream of research that explains media choice (Rice & Gattiker, 2000). 
However, application of the theory on advanced media like email and vmail led to 
inconsistent findings that called for complementary theorizing and empirical research 
(Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Lee, 1994; Markus, 1994; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). This 
section presents MRT and examples of these more recent approaches.  
 
§ 6.2.1  Media Richness Theory 
MRT emerged in the early 80s in the tradition of contingency and information processing 
theory (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Trevino, Lengel, & Daft, 1987). It 
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asserts that organization design should match information processing requirements and 
capabilities.  
First, information processing requirements are defined in terms of uncertainty - lack of 
information - and/ or equivocality, a “messy, unclear field” (Daft & Lengel, 1986: 554) - 
(Perrow, 1967). Each of these result from an organization’s technology (work processes), 
interdepartmental relationships, and the environment. Second, capabilities to process 
information depend on a set of structural mechanisms. These include mechanisms 
traditionally proposed in contingency theory, like rules, plans, information systems, direct 
managerial contact (Galbraith, 1973), integrators, and group meetings (Tushman, 1979; 
Van de Ven et al., 1976). Daft and Lengel (1986) extend this repertoire by considering 
communication media. They suggest that communication media differ in their capacity to 
process rich information (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). Richness of media depends on their 
capacity to provide immediate feedback, the number of cues and channels used, 
personalization, and language variety (Daft & Lengel, 1986: 560). The richest medium is 
face-to-face that contact provides immediate feedback, multiple cues, and the opportunity 
to use natural language. Shifting to alternative media reduces richness, in the sequence 
telephone, personal documents for communications (letters, memos), and impersonal 
documentation like forms. Table 9 pairs structural mechanisms and communication media, 
and shows their capacity to reduce equivocality and/ or uncertainty.  
 
Table 9 - Structural mechanisms & media to reduce uncertainty & equivocality  
 
 Structural mechanisms Communication media  
Group meetings Face-to-face (FTF) 
Integrator FTF, telephone 
Direct contact
23
 FTF, telephone, letters 
Planning Documentation 
Special reports Documentation 
Formal IS Documentation 
Structure facilitates 
rich, personal 
media 
 
 
 
Structure facilitates 
less rich, 
impersonal media Rules and regulations Documentation 
Equivocality 
reduction 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty 
reduction 
Adopted with modifications from Daft and Lengel (1986: 561) 
 
Daft and Lengel (1986) elaborate on sources of uncertainty and equivocality. First, 
organizational technology (work processes) is characterized by task variety and task 
analyzability (Perrow, 1967). The former determines uncertainty, the latter equivocality. 
Daft and Lengel (1986) propose a matrix that combines the two dimensions of technology 
to define matching structural mechanisms and communication media. Second, 
interdepartmental relationships are defined by work dependencies (Thompson, 1967), and 
differentiation. Dependence increases uncertainty and information processing needs (Van 
de Ven et al., 1976). Differentiation refers to interdepartmental differences in terms of 
functional specialization, time horizon, goals, frame of reference and jargon (Lawrence & 
                                                 
23 Direct contact refers to lateral interaction between department heads. Unlike group 
meetings, department members are not directly involved (Daft & Lengel, 1986: 561; 
Galbraith, 1977). 
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Lorsch, 1967b) - (Daft & Lengel, 1986: 564). Greater differentiation implies absence of a 
common perspective and experience. It is therefore associated with equivocality and richer 
media. Finally, the environment affects information processing needs in two ways. 
Equivocality depends on analyzability of cause-effect relationships (Thompson, 1967), 
while uncertainty relates to an organization’s efforts to collect data on its environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
Since MRT was developed in the early 80s, it does not cover advanced communication 
media like videoconferencing, email, and groupware. More recent work has extended their 
framework to these media (Trevino, Daft, & Lengel, 1990). DeSanctis and Jackson (1994) 
propose an integrative typology derived from research on lateral coordination of a 
multinational’s geographically distributed IT function. Electronic media - ranging from 
simple to complex - include (DeSanctis & Jackson, 1994): 
 
 Document sharing systems allow people to share textual messages or visual and audio 
objects. 
 Electronic mail, bulletin board, and conferencing systems enable more complex forms 
of (remote) interaction. 
 Electronic meeting systems support and structure group meetings. 
 Discussion databases allow people to interact asynchronously or synchronously.  
 
MRT has implications for globally distributed projects. Media availability and choice 
depends on properties of the task at hand and project environment (Meadows, 1996b). 
Complex, unstructured projects require extensive investments in teleconferencing 
conversations, phone calls, and videoconferencing. For structured work email, fax and 
basic groupware functionality suffice.  
 
A common characteristic of MRT and more recent work like DeSanctis and Jackson 
(1994) is their focus on inherent properties of electronic media. These include the 
possibility to provide immediate feedback, and the number of cues transmitted (Daft & 
Macintosh, 1981). Media properties define their capability to represent people or objects 
remotely (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). And the choice of electronic media depends on their 
matching with task-related determinants, like uncertainty and interdependence (Daft & 
Macintosh, 1981). Criticisms and extensions of MRT suggest that media choice is a more 
complex process than MRT proposes (Rice & Gattiker, 2000). In particular, they criticize 
MRT for not incorporating the role of people using electronic media. Media are not 
inherently rich or lean, but actors’ use of media and their perception of media richness 
counts (Lee, 1994). In turn, this relates to the context in which media are used, people’s 
prior experience with the messaging topic and media, and their working relationships 
(Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Markus, 1994).  
 
§ 6.2.2  Markus (1994) 
Markus (1994) investigated managerial use of email by contrasting MRT with alternative 
theories. Recent extensions of MRT rank email between telephone and nonelectronic 
written communications based on MRT’s original criteria for defining richness (Markus, 
1994). Email is therefore not a rich medium, and not a likely choice for managers 
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commonly engaged in equivocal tasks (Daft & Lewin, 1984). Markus (1994) argues that 
MRT is an individual level, rational choice theory. It does not satisfactorily explain how 
people choose between face-to-face communication and various electronic media for two 
reasons. First, MRT uses face-to-face communications as reference point for defining 
criteria of media richness. It does not consider new attributes of advanced media that may 
‘enrich’ supposedly lean media (Markus, 1994). Such capabilities include multiple 
addressability (broadcasting a message to multiple recipients), and the fact that messages 
are stored and searchable on a computer (Sproull & Kiesler, 1991). Second, Markus (1994) 
points out that interpersonal communications - including mediated ones - represent a social 
phenomenon that cannot be explained with individual choice theory - like MRT - alone. 
She proposes alternative theories that take social dimensions of media use into account: 
critical mass theory and social definition theories. Critical mass theory emphasizes the role 
of widespread availability of electronic media, and individual responsiveness in using 
them. Social definition theories argue that media use is gradually institutionalized in an 
organization, and reinforced through collective norms and social control (Markus, 1994).  
Markus (1994) conducted empirical research on managerial perception and use of email in 
a single company. She used a survey, analyzed email messages of a single day, and 
interviewed managers and administrative assistants. Results showed that managers did 
consider email a lean medium as MRT claims. However, they appeared to use it not only 
for straightforward messages, but also for discussing equivocal issues, contrary to what 
MRT would predict. Markus’ (1994) qualitative data revealed additional themes on media 
use.  
 
 Documentation - Respondents emphasized their use of email’s documenting and 
archiving properties (Markus, 1994). First, preceding a phone call, they sent extensive 
basic information on a topic by email. This reduced the length of subsequent real-time 
interactions. Markus (1994) reports on one managers receiving a lengthy email from 
his subordinate before placing a call: “He (a subordinate - author) had the whole thing 
written down (…) before he called. That way, when he called, he didn’t have to 
explain it all to me. We were able to take care of it in just a few minutes. If it weren’t 
for the (email) message, we might have wasted 20 minutes on the phone” (Markus, 
1994: 517).  
Second, email messages make communications explicit and storable. People saved 
messages to proof past communications if need be. “E-mail is invaluable as a source/ 
follow-up tool to having made necessary requests (…). The printout can be placed 
directly into a backup file and is there for later reference (…). When a project is held 
up due to lack of response from another area, it is easy to document one’s efforts to 
attain the information and to properly place blame for any deadlines not met” 
(Markus, 1994: 522). In fact, documented messages thus become part of a control 
cycle, whereas the first mentioned use of email was more coordination oriented.  
 
 Broadcasting and prior message inclusion - functionality of email applications 
allow people to send or forward messages to multiple recipients. With forwarding, 
past communications are often automatically included in the new message. A chain of 
interrelated exchanges emerges that represents the historical evolution of a topic. This 
facilitates updating people directly or indirectly involved, or even those joining later: 
“(…) they created “mosaic messages” - complex message chains that not only 
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documented the evolving consensus but also made it possible to add newcomers easily 
to the conversation at a later point of time” (Markus, 1994: 518). 
 
 Media alternation - since email transmits only textual messages, its capacity to 
sustain fine-tuned contact appeared limited compared to the phone. A regional vice 
president complemented email with phone conversations to maintain “the personal 
connection” (Markus, 1994: 520): “We (each of my direct subordinates and I) talk (on 
the telephone) once a week whether we need it or not (i.e., for work-related issues). 
We talk for different reasons than we message. We talk for the personal connection 
(…). Mail messages don’t work if it goes on too long (without telephone or face-to-
face interaction). We have to talk once a week or it gets impersonal.” The phrase 
“whether we need it or not” coincides with results from Meadows’ (1996) research 
where respondents also emphasized regular contact even if there was no apparent 
work-related need.  
 
For geographically distributed projects, Markus’ (1994) research has important 
implications, especially for intra-organizational remote collaboration. It shows that email 
can even be used for equivocal tasks, and facilitates documentation and broadcasting of 
messages. The research makes it also likely that phone calls or possibly visits are needed at 
a regular pace to maintain remote contact.  
 
§ 6.2.3  Channel Expansion Theory 
Another extension of MRT is channel expansion theory (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). Carlson 
and Zmud (1999) argue that MRT fails to explain results from empirical research on new 
media (email, vmail). Even more recent approaches that take social factors into account do 
not produce consistent findings. Channel expansion theory provides an alternative 
explanatory model that relates perception of media richness to four categories of 
experiences: experience with the channel, experience with the messaging topic, experience 
with the organizational context, and experience with communication co participants 
(Carlson & Zmud, 1999: 155). More experience in these categories equips people with 
“(…) knowledge bases that may be used to more effectively encode and decode rich 
messages on a channel” (Carlson & Zmud, 1999: 155). Knowledge bases make people 
perceive channels as rich, since they are able to exploit minimal cues.  
 
Carlson and Zmud (1999) empirically tested channel expansion theory with a survey on 
email usage. Their findings seemed to support the main hypotheses, and explain some 
inconsistencies in earlier research with respect to email (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). Channel 
expansion theory remains in the tradition of MRT; it does not raise fundamental questions 
on perceived richness and social dimensions of media use like Markus (1994). Rather, the 
theory suggests that common experience bases cause an upward shift of a curve that relates 
media cues and perceived richness. That is, people perceive the same media as being 
richer.  
 
Channel expansion theory combines and updates portions of contingency theory and MRT 
(Daft & Lengel, 1986; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b), TCE (Williamson, 1975), and 
literature on working relationships (Gabarro, 1990), common knowledge (Grant, 1996b), 
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and mutual knowledge (Krauss & Fussell, 1990). Contingency theorists and MRT argue 
that functional diversity between departments increases equivocality and information 
processing needs (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b). More differences in 
attitude and behavior require stronger integration efforts, such as good working 
relationships (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b). TCE proposes that people operating in the 
same organizational entity develop a common jargon and economize on exchanges 
(Williamson, 1975). Literature on working relationships, common knowledge and mutual 
knowledge suggests that knowing more of a communication partner, and sharing similar 
knowledge economizes on interactions (Gabarro, 1990; Krauss & Fussell, 1990).  
 
For geographically distributed projects, channel expansion theory points at the importance 
of common knowledge bases across sites. It suggests that effective remote collaboration 
requires selection, socialization or training of participants to ensure experience across the 
categories mentioned. Shared experience allows them to use lean media in a rich mode, 
and engage in equivocal tasks.24  
An implication of common task-related expertise is that cross-functional remote 
collaboration seems more difficult than between specialists in the same field. Experience 
with organizational context implies that people in the same (albeit distributed) organization 
have an advantage over offshore outsourced projects. They can leverage shared experience 
with organizational procedures and technology. And they can capitalize on working 
relationships established on prior occasions. 
 
§ 6.3  Teleworking 
 
“So what if he beats me for a few hours - I know by the quality of his final report 
whether he’s doing the job” (Perin, 1991: 254) 
 
Research on teleworking - also referred to as telecommuting - offers insight in a form of 
remote collaboration where managers, subordinates and peers work (temporarily) out of 
office. This seems relevant for understanding globally dispersed projects where people 
connect remotely most of the time. Even though teleworking usually occurs within the 
same country and region, teleworkers still experience the effects of distance. They 
substitute face-to-face interactions for electronic media to remain connected with 
counterparts. This section focuses on empirical research. It concludes with a reflection on 
remote control - a recurrent theme in teleworking studies.  
 
§ 6.3.1  Staples (1997) 
Staples (1997) investigated remote management - the situation where manager and 
subordinate work from physically separate locations -, and the role of information 
technology as a potential enabler thereof. Physical separation includes teleworking from 
                                                 
24 This contrasts with Media Richness Theory which predicts that increasing information 
processing capacity demands richer communication media (Table 9).   
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home, but also subordinates stationed at customer sites, or working from other (mobile) 
locations. In an exploratory phase of the research, Staples (1997) conducted focus group 
meetings with people from five organizations in Canada. Their experiences with remote 
working and management were discussed and summarized in lists of key issues. Staples 
(1997) grouped issues around categories. Two of the most relevant are elaborated below.  
 
 Communications - First, compared to collocated office settings, remote workers 
participate in less informal communications. Distance seems to increase the barrier to 
contact people outside formal meetings or apparent task-driven communications needs 
(Kraut & Galegher, 1990). As a consequence, remote workers remain somewhat 
uninformed and outside the main stream of work as it unfolds in the office (Cramton, 
1997). When their tasks relate to work in the office, this incompleteness of insight 
may result in uncoordinated actions (Vaughan, 1997).  
Second, the use of electronic media for remote exchanges requires special skills and 
attitudes, since cues common to face-to-face contact are absent. Skills and attitudes 
include making intended communications explicit, and responding quickly to 
messages received (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). Electronic media seem less suitable 
for sensitive communications like negative feedback (Meadows, 1996b; Millar, 1999). 
 
 Technology - Remote working increases the importance of technology since it 
becomes the primary means for maintaining contact (Cramton, 1997; Meadows, 
1996b; Millar, 1999). As the focus groups indicate, this includes advanced, reliable 
technical infrastructure as well as training and support. 
 
The focus groups also pointed at directions for improving remote management. Their 
suggestions for communications and information technology issues are analyzed below.  
 
 Communications - distant collaboration has the potential of miscommunications and 
leaving people under informed. Avoiding these effects requires deliberate attention to 
maintain frequent and effective remote contact: “(…) frequent communications are 
necessary to maintain a feeling of being informed and part of the organization for an 
isolated worker” (Staples, 1997: 40). Physical separation makes basic technology for 
document sharing more important (Majchrzak et al., 2000a), as well as provision of 
connectivity information (like people’s agenda). It requires explicitness of 
expectations, and formal planning to substitute for the loss of informal contact 
(Markus, 1994; Meadows, 1996b). Especially synchronous interactions like 
teleconferences require careful role assignment, preparation and documentation 
(Meadows, 1996b). Remote exchanges depends on particular skills to deal with the 
limited functionality and set of cues electronic media provide. Conveying a message 
requires providing elaborate context; recipients must quickly respond (with 
asynchronous media) and actively probe for clarification where needed. Remote 
management should be alternated with visits from both manager and subordinate. 
Millar (1999) also pointed at the role of reciprocal visits to gain insight in local 
contexts. This facilitates subsequent remote contact by electronic means, since people 
expand their knowledge base in the categories mentioned by channel expansion theory 
(Carlson & Zmud, 1999). 
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 Technology - remoteness increases dependence on information technology, which 
should therefore be highly reliable. A variety of technologies is often used to 
collaborate remotely (Knoll & Jarvenpaa, 1998), possibly including a shared network, 
groupware, and videoconferencing. Distributedness demands standardization of 
information technology to shape a homogeneous environment (Dickson, DeSanctis, 
Scott Poole, & Jackson, 1997). This avoids incompatibility issues, and thus reduces 
behavioral costs of connecting remotely (Kraut & Galegher, 1990). 
 
§ 6.3.2  Kurland and Egan (1999) 
Kurland and Egan (1999) refer to three forms of telecommuting (or teleworking) in their 
study: satellite work centers (a dedicated corporate facility convenient for employees or 
customers), neighborhood work centers (similar to the satellite center but accommodating 
employees from multiple firms), and working from home. Apart from telecommuting 
advantages - like flexibility, autonomy and cost reduction - Kurland and Egan (1999) cite 
two major concerns from literature. First, from a managers’ point of view, physical 
separation from subordinates interferes with traditional managerial processes of 
communication, coordination and control (Mintzberg, 1998a). “How do you measure 
productivity, build trust, and manage people who are physically out of sight?” (Mason, 
1993). As they cannot observe staff behaviors remotely, research suggests that managers 
become output oriented (Olson, 1982). In general, literature proposes that output control is 
appropriate for representing and transmitting workers’ accomplishments, albeit in a less 
flexible and rich mode than behavioral control (Cooper, 1992; Ouchi, 1978).  
Second, employees working away from the main office may feel isolated, both socially 
(lack of informal exchanges), and professionally (out of sight is out of the organization’s 
mind). This study includes only professional isolation, also referred to as organizational 
justice. It reflects telecommuters’ concern of being involved in organizational decision 
making processes, and being fairly assessed and rewarded for their efforts.  
Kurland and Egan (1999) conducted a survey and semi-structured interviews with 
managers and telecommuting staff to explore the relationship between telecommuting, 
managerial monitoring strategies, and staff perceptions of organizational justice. As far as 
relevant for the focus of our research, the study yielded the following results.  
First, distance increases the risk that people are not updated and aware of what happens at 
a remote site (Cramton, 1997; Vaughan, 1997), in this study referred to as professional 
isolation (Kurland & Egan, 1999). This problem surfaces when distributed people are 
involved in a task that is unstructured and closely interlocked (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
Incomplete participation of a remote workers becomes even more apparent with tasks that 
are accomplished under time pressure:  
 
 “(A) project . . . I was working on . . . was a real fire storm project. There were people 
working all hours of the day and night to get this thing out and some key decisions 
(were made) . . . (y)ou come to a point (when a decision has to be made) and they 
have to be made whether you were there or not and so you could be working on 
something at home and then the whole tenor of the project changed when you came 
back in; it’s like, “Okay so I just wasted six hours, fine yeah.” That kind of thing . . . 
(So) you have to sort of be there because it’s sort of happening really quickly and if 
you’re telecommuting, even though there are things like e-mail and voice mail and 
other(s), things are happening really quickly. People don’t think to call you up and tell 
you this is happening or to ask your opinion on that” (Kurland & Egan, 1999: 510). 
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Similar to findings from other researchers (Majchrzak et al., 2000a; Sia et al., 1998), 
distance seems to reduce information processing capacity. This conflicts with information 
processing needs when task uncertainty and tight interdependence occur simultaneously 
(March & Simon, 1958), see Table 8.  
Second, one manager explains that physical separation of subordinates implies more 
deliberate effort from both sides to keep each other updated. Distance implies that 
manager-subordinate processes of coordination and control are less self-explanatory and 
impromptu. Criticality of tasks is associated with intensification of efforts to communicate 
remotely.  
 
“I would say ..., on the average, (I communicate with the tele-commuter compared to 
the nontelecommuters) a little bit more . . . (S)uppose she’s doing something and that 
particular thing is on the critical path. Because I can’t simply count on her being at her 
desk to check to see how something’s going all the time, I always want to be very 
proactive about making sure that I know how things are going, where she’s going to 
be at, and that things are going okay.  
And if any key communication needs to happen, that they’re going to be happening on 
schedule. So what I would do is, it would take a little bit more effort on my part, 
communicat(e) with her and kind of mak(e) sure that we (keep) each other comprised 
of where each other are (sic) and so forth—that we always know how things are going 
and that it’s (sic) going smoothly” (Kurland & Egan, 1999: 506). 
 
Third, managers’ concern to monitor teleworkers translated into selection of individuals on 
the basis of particular traits, like trustworthiness. Distance makes manager-subordinate 
exchanges during the process of work accomplishment more difficult as just discussed. 
This seems to shift the control mode partially to selection, an example of input control 
(Snell, 1992). “(…) we learned that some supervisors identified individuals who they 
believed could work effectively away from the office, and then offered the telecommuting 
option to these selected individuals. One supervisor even insisted that an individual exhibit 
the traits necessary to successfully telecommute before he would hire that person” 
(Kurland & Egan, 1999: 507).  
Finally, the research did not find clear support for the proposition that managers of 
teleworkers become more output oriented. Or that telecommuters’ jobs become more 
formalized and planned. (In fact, in line with contingency theory, tasks may be too 
uncertain for defining outputs in advance, or specifying behaviors (Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 
1977)). Instead, a regular pace of informal contact seemed to build and maintain trust 
between manager and subordinates (Kurland & Egan, 1999: 509). This is embedded in a 
formalized pattern of scheduled meetings, possibly collocated for regional telecommuters:  
 
“(I)n our environment I have meetings, audio meetings . . . scheduled every week. (…) 
from a training perspective, we have regularly scheduled weekly team meetings for 
both our field service and sales groups where everybody gets together and they are in 
the same room. You know, they can all look at each other. And that may be the only 
time that everybody’s together” (Kurland & Egan, 1999: 509). 
 
§ 6.3.3  Perin (1991) and Wiesenfeld, Raghuram et al. (1998) 
Perin (1991) studied those telecommuting practices, where “salaried professionals might 
substitute work at home for some part of their regular work week and remain electronically 
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in touch with their offices (…)” (Perin, 1991: 242). Despite advantages of such programs 
in terms of flexibility, undisturbed working, and cost savings, Perin (1991) asserts that 
their adoption remains limited. Part of her explanation relates this phenomenon to the 
importance of direct supervision, also for salaried professionals. For the professional, 
presence in the office is considered a prerequisite for visual observation and recognition by 
one’s manager. This in turn provides the basis for performance assessment and rewards. 
For the professional’s manager, Perin (1991: 250) describes his or her major concern being 
“How can I supervise my employees if I can’t see them?”  
Distance not only implies that direct supervision of behaviors becomes unfeasible. It also 
makes clan control forms that rely on socialization and peer contact less likely. “(T)here 
are fewer opportunities to socialize employees when organizations are (…) dispersed over 
large geographic areas (…)” (Sparrow & Daniels, 1999: 57). A similar concern was aired 
by Wiesenfeld, Raghuram et al. (1998). They conducted a single-firm study on people 
working most of their time from home or client sites. A survey measured this group’s 
communication behaviors, and the extent to which they identify with their employer. 
Wiesenfeld, Raghuram et al. (1998) pointed at a paradox in recent literature that 
emphasizes clan control modes in geographically dispersed settings:  
 
“What remains unclear is how identification can be strengthened in a virtual context, 
particularly because the traditional means by which member identification is created 
and sustained (…) may not be available to virtual workers. Thus, virtual organizations 
may find themselves in a catch-22 situation: on one hand, maintaining the 
organizational identification of virtual employees is especially critical because it helps 
organizations meet the challenges of managing dispersed employees (i.e., obstacles 
to coordination and control). On the other hand, virtual employees are the least likely 
to be exposed to organizational factors that have traditionally strengthened member 
identification” (Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 1998).  
 
When distance makes the use of behavioral supervision and clan control modes less likely, 
alternative mechanisms need to be found. First, telecommuting increases professionals’ 
autonomy and self-responsibility for work planning and accomplishment. Second, a more 
traditional response, as Kurland and Egan mentioned (1999), is to focus on outputs. This 
makes sense when identifiable outputs result from the subordinate’s work, and these reflect 
their efforts. As a realistic U.S. government agency manager remarked on his mobile 
agents: “So what if he beats me for a few hours - I know by the quality of his final report 
whether he’s doing the job” (Perin, 1991: 254). Third, referring to Olson’s (1982) research, 
Perin (1991) describes how duties and work procedures of telecommuters working 3 days a 
week from home were formalized beforehand. Their accomplishments became subject to a 
formal reporting system, making them feel more supervised remotely than when they 
worked in the office. Formalization and output control thus substitute for monitoring and 
communications common to collocation. Fourth, the group of telecommuters just 
mentioned were selected for their competence (Olson, 1982). Since distance increases job 
autonomy and the need for self-reliance, selection becomes an input control mode to 
ensure remote workers’ capability to handle task demands (Kurland & Egan, 1999).  
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§ 6.3.4  Dimitrova and Salaff (1998) 
Dimitrova and Salaff (1998) conducted a study on teleworking at a large 
telecommunications firm in Canada. They compared communication patterns and media 
use of two teleworking groups: provisioners and consultants. Provisioners perform 
predictable, independent administrative tasks related to the installation of 
telecommunications hardware. Consultants are embedded in a network of contacts and 
relationships to advice clients on managing their call centers. Since their job depends on 
the customer, they often meet face-to-face to sell and negotiate a deal. They also 
communicate extensively with peers to exchange ideas and experiences. When remotely, 
consultants prefer a rich and synchronous medium like the phone to keep updated with 
customers and peers. They alternate phone with other media like voice mail and email to 
ascertain ongoing connectivity.  
Provisioners on the other hand operate more autonomously and inside the company’s 
boundaries. They do not interact considerably with peers or their supervisor, since the 
work is mainly captured in documented workflows. Email and electronic file exchange 
suffice for teleworking: “To make a list of the software to go with the new equipment, 
provisioners exchange spreadsheets over e-mail with the company’s software group: “I 
give them the job number and what I am putting in, and electronically send it across to 
them”” (Dimitrova & Salaff, 1998: 265). Distant collaboration is feasible when tasks are to 
a large extent represented in documentation and are autonomously accomplished (Olson, 
1982). Technologies like electronic document exchange, shared databases and workflow 
systems embed and channel task performance (Majchrzak et al., 2000a; Maznevski & 
Chudoba, 2000). Documentation is less central to the consultants’ job which is more fluid 
and person-oriented. Since the phone is their ‘lifeline’, they use documentation and textual 
communications technologies more as a backup medium. The study thus shows that 
teleworkers’ use of media is a function of work interdependence, and the extent to which 
task accomplishment is structured and relies on documentation.  
 
§ 6.3.5  Telework and Remote Control: A Synopsis  
Remote control is a recurrent theme in the studies on teleworking. While teleworking 
mostly concerns urban or regional work setups, one could expect that findings from 
research on teleworking have strong relevance for globally dispersed projects.  
This section relates the research to the integrated matrix of control mechanisms earlier 
introduced (Table 7). It reveals substitution patterns to compensate for the effects of 
distance. Table 10 shows the matrix with the findings from teleworking literature added in 
brackets. The columns refer to the object of control processes: input, transformation 
process (behaviors), and output. The rows show entities taking on the role of controller.  
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Table 10 - Impact of distance on control modes  
 
Objects of control:  
Controllers: 
 
Input 
[intensified use] 
Transformation process 
[← less likely →] 
Output 
[intensified use] 
Hierarchical 
supervision 
[less effective] 
Hierarchical selection 
of inputs 
[intensified use] 
Supervision of process 
 
[less likely, formalize] 
Hierarchical checking 
of outputs 
[intensified use, 
frequent] 
Co-workers (clan) 
[difficult to maintain] 
Ballotage Observation of peers  
[less likely] 
Co-workers outputs 
control 
Technology 
[intensified use] 
Technical monitoring 
of inputs 
Technical monitoring of 
transformation process 
Technical monitoring of 
outputs 
Self 
[intensified use] 
Self selection Monitoring of controller’s 
own behaviors 
Controller’s 
assessment of own 
outputs 
Contractual party Selection of 
contractual party 
Monitoring of counterpart’s 
behaviors 
Contractual party 
assessment of 
counterpart’s output 
Third party Third party input 
control 
Third party observation of 
process 
Third party control of 
outputs 
 
Starting with the columns, distance reduces especially the opportunity for keeping updated 
with someone’s behaviors (the transformation process column). Compared to collocated 
situations, face-to-face and observation of a person actually working at his or her disk is 
not possible remotely (Sia et al., 1998; Staples, 1997). In response, three possible changes 
occur. First, managers (the first row) may formalize task accomplishment to make it more 
transparent (Olson, 1982; Perin, 1991). They can easily fit intermediate updates in the 
overall planning. Similarly, agency theory proposes that when an agent’s behaviors are not 
observable, the principal should complement a behavior-based contract with information 
systems (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Kirsch, 1996).  
A second response to unobservability of behaviors is a shift in the object of control, across 
the columns. Managers emphasize selection of employees capable and committed to work 
remotely (Perin, 1991; Sparrow & Daniels, 1999). In the transformation process cell, this 
form of input control is depicted with the arrow to the left hand. As an alternative, people 
are assessed based on task outputs (a shift to the right). Traditionally, this consists of pure 
output controls that emphasize tangible results (Olson, 1982). But one study also noticed a 
hybrid form of behavior and output control where manager and subordinate maintained 
frequent, punctuated exchanges (Kurland & Egan, 1999). This recurrent contact does not 
represent behavioral observation as the subordinate is rather telling about his or her work. 
Nor is it a form of output control since it permeates the task accomplishment process. 
Managers formalize this remote mode - which could be referred to as punctuated output 
control - for teleworkers involved in urgent tasks (Kurland & Egan, 1999).  
Third and finally, the control mode may shift across the rows as controller roles are 
affected by distance. Teleworkers cannot maintain frequent face-to-face contact with 
managers and peers (Kurland & Egan, 1999). As a consequence, hierarchical and co-
worker control modes (first two rows) become less likely (Wiesenfeld et al., 1998). 
Instead, a shift down the columns seems to occur, where the teleworker becomes more 
responsibility for his or her own work (self control), and relies on technology to remain 
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updated and exchange work (Dimitrova & Salaff, 1998). As earlier mentioned, self control 
seems less appropriate for workers whose tasks are interlocked remotely (Manz & Stewart, 
1997).  
 
§ 6.4  Distributed Communications  
 
This section describes empirical research on distributed communications and collaboration. 
It is an extension of the general theories on electronic media use introduced in the 
preceding section. The studies presented here were selected and analyzed for dealing with 
the effects of geographical distributedness on processes of communication, coordination 
and control.  
 
§ 6.4.1  Vaughan (1990, 1997) 
The explosion of the NASA Challenger space shuttle on January 28, 1986 led to scrutinous 
investigations to find possible causes for failure in the so-called O-rings, rubber rings that 
seal the aft of the space shuttle’s solid rocket boosters (Vaughan, 1990, 1997). Vaughan’s 
(1996) historical ethnographic study complements formal inquiries and reporting by the 
Presidential Commission and the U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology. Over 
a period of nine years she analyzed documented records, and interviewed people inside and 
outside the organizations involved in the launch.  
For the study of geographically dispersed work, her analysis of one event in the launch 
decision making process is important. It concerned a teleconference (audio-only) meeting 
that lasted 2 hours from 8:45 PM EST onwards, and involved 34 people from different 
organizations at three sites: engineers from Morton Thiokol in Utah (contractor for the 
rocket propulsion system), NASA managers at Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama 
(overall responsibility for launches), and NASA staff at Kennedy Space Center in Florida 
(operational launch site).  
Thiokol engineers were concerned about the cold temperature predicted for the launch and 
advised against the launch. Low temperature had caused earlier problems with the O-ring 
system. But they lacked quantitative data - commonly expected to raise a safety issue in 
Thiokol and NASA - to support their concerns. At the same time, flight cancellation was 
costly and undesirable for NASA managers because of commitments and additional 
preparation efforts. NASA managers at Marshall therefore urged Thiokol engineers at the 
start of the meeting to motivate their concerns. Vaughan’s (1997) analysis of subsequent 
events during the teleconference focuses on the interplay of local and remote exchanges. It 
is best reflected in her own words:  
 
“In three locations, people could not see each other, so words and inflections were all 
important. Midway in the teleconference, the people assembled at Morton Thiokol in 
Utah held an off-line caucus. In it, a senior Thiokol administrator who knew little about 
the technology took charge, repeating the challenges of the Marshall managers.  
 
Without any new data to support their arguments, the engineers could not build a 
stronger data analysis. Four administrators in Utah reversed the original engineering 
recommendations, going back on-line and announcing that Thiokol had re-examined 
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their data, reversed the decision, and recommended launch. When Marshall managers 
asked, “Does anybody have anything to more to say?” no one spoke up.  
 
Ironically - and fatally - people at Marshall and Kennedy did not know that the Thiokol 
engineers still objected. Moreover, Thiokol engineers did not know that during the 
caucus, people at the other two locations believed the launch was going to be 
canceled. They also were unaware that the top Marshall administrator, participating in 
Alabama, was making a list of people to call in order to stop the launch” (Vaughan, 
1997: 92-93). 
 
The third paragraph of this section illustrates how remote meetings differ from collocated 
ones. Participants lacked comprehensive insight in opinions, interactions and actions at 
remote sites. This seems to be caused by, first, limited direct or active involvement from 
local actors in the teleconference. Second, the teleconference technology only supported 
audio transmissions, and did not reveal visual cues like facial expressions. A relatively lean 
technology was used in a situation of asymmetrical knowledge distribution and an 
equivocal discussion topic (Weick, 1997: 399). Third, local conversations (like the caucus 
at Thiokol in Utah) remained outside the mainstream teleconference. People at Marshall 
and Kennedy only heard supposed results from Thiokol administrators. The combined 
effect was that actors could form only a limited representation of processes and positions at 
partner sites in a situation of equivocal and risky decision making .  
 
 
Figure 30 - Distributed communications and awareness 
Local processes
Site A
Local processes
Site B
Local processes
Site C
Representation
of site A
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of site B
Representation
of site C
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In a similar way, Roberts (1997: 409) indicates in her review of Vaughan’s (1996) book 
that “(…) the geographical arrangement eliminated any possibility for understanding the 
situation or for bringing together important information developed across the centers.” She 
also refers to another instance the morning after the teleconference when distance seems to 
impede effective collaboration. Weather-related inspection at Kennedy Space Center yields 
results of interest to Thiokol engineers. However, physical separation and absence of 
interactions leave groups from both sites unaware of information dependencies between 
them. “(…) at 1:30 AM on January 28th, the Ice/Frost Inspection team assessed the ice on 
the launch pad. They alerted Rockwell, the prime contractor for the orbiter, about the ice 
conditions. By 9:00 AM a Rockwell representative said Rockwell could not assure that it 
was safe to fly. Rockwell, at Kennedy Space Center, had no way of knowing about the 
previous evening’s teleconference, when the concern over temperature rested heavily on 
the minds of Thiokol’s engineers in Utah” (Roberts, 1997: 409).  
Both examples illustrate that remote collaboration is not only a problem of availability of 
communication technology, and media richness properties. It also appears difficult to 
assess when to communicate remotely and with whom. And to define whose responsibility 
it is to connect people who are involved in the same issue or have knowledge of relevance 
to their counterpart. This raises coordination questions for distributed projects, in particular 
when they are not planned in detail in advance. Like: should local actors be expected to 
connect on their own initiative? Are lateral liaison necessary to foster relevant 
connections? Or does distributed collaboration need a centralized role of project 
coordinator on a meta-site level? 
Vaughan’s (1997) research indicates, in line with Meadows’ (1996), that absence of such 
mechanisms leaves actors unaware of remote contexts. They supplement this with 
assumptions of counterparts’ preferences and expectations, resulting in imprecise 
connectivity of distributed actions.  
 
§ 6.4.2  Mars Climate Orbiter 
Another space-related example concerns the loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) 
spacecraft in September 1999. The spacecraft was controlled by the Mars Climate Orbiter 
spacecraft team in Denver, Colorado, and the mission navigation team in Pasadena, 
California.  
 
On September 30, 1999, the Media Relations Office of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
at CALTECH released the following statement:  
 
“A failure to recognize and correct an error in a transfer of information between the 
Mars Climate Orbiter spacecraft team in Colorado and the mission navigation team in 
California led to the loss of the spacecraft last week, preliminary findings by NASA's 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory internal peer review indicate. "People sometimes make 
errors," said Dr. Edward Weiler, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Science. 
"The problem here was not the error, it was the failure of NASA's systems 
engineering, and the checks and balances in our processes to detect the error. That's 
why we lost the spacecraft.” The peer review preliminary findings indicate that one 
team used English units (e.g., inches, feet and pounds) while the other used metric 
units for a key spacecraft operation. This information was critical to the maneuvers 
required to place the spacecraft in the proper Mars orbit. (…)”.  
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The communication problem between the distributed sites led to loss of the MCO 
spacecraft on September 23, 1999 when it entered the Martian atmosphere on a trajectory 
that was lower than expected. Subsequent research by NASA’s Mishap Investigation 
Board (MIB) led to a report on November 10, 1999 (NASA, 1999). The MIB elaborates on 
the specific root cause of the loss: 
 
 
Apart from the root cause, MIB cites the following factors that contributed to the loss:25  
 
1. Errors went undetected within ground-based computer models of how small thruster 
firings on the spacecraft were predicted and then carried out on the spacecraft during 
its interplanetary trip to Mars  
2. The operational navigation team was not fully informed on the details of the way that 
Mars Climate Orbiter was pointed in space, as compared to the earlier Mars Global 
Surveyor mission 
3. A final, optional engine firing to raise the spacecraft’s path relative to Mars before its 
arrival was considered but not performed for several interdependent reasons 
4. The systems engineering function within the project that is supposed to track and 
double-check all interconnected aspects of the mission was not robust enough, 
exacerbated by the first-time handover of a Mars-bound spacecraft from a group that 
constructed it and launched it to a new, multi-mission operations team 
5. Some communications channels among project engineering groups were too informal 
6. The small mission navigation team was oversubscribed and its work did not receive 
peer review by independent experts 
7. Personnel were not trained sufficiently in areas such as the relationship between the 
operation of the mission and its detailed navigational characteristics, or the process of 
filing formal anomaly reports 
8. The process to verify and validate certain engineering requirements and technical 
interfaces between some project groups, and between the project and its prime mission 
contractor, was inadequate 
 
From our perspective, it is interesting to look at the report as far as it focuses on 
collaboration processes between the teams in California and Colorado. This leads to the 
following observations. The teams used different measurement standards for 
communicating spatial distance and navigation plans. In itself, this complicates remote 
collaboration. The diversity could work if communications were more formal and 
interactive (feed back loops). For instance, communications mention explicitly the 
measurement system used. Interactivity implies that the receiver feeds back his/ her 
understanding of the communication, including the measurement units.  
 
                                                 
25 Source: E-mail to NASA public list for MCO project mars98-owner@www.jpl.nasa.gov, 
on November 10, 1999. 
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§ 6.4.3  Cramton (1997, 1999, 2001) 
Cramton (1997) reports on remote collaboration of 13 international student teams involved 
in a 6-week assignment that required close cooperation. Teams consisted of 2 students 
from 3 locations and used only electronic communication tools. Cramton (1997) adopted a 
grounded theory approach to analyze email messages exchanged by the student teams, and 
their reflective papers. Her analysis resulted in a number of themes, framed as problems of 
information dispersion and mutual knowledge (Cramton, 1997, 2001; Cramton & Webber, 
1999). These are discussed here as far as relevant to the research.  
  
 Failure to communicate contextual information - team members had never 
cooperated before, and lacked insight in each other’s context and constraints. Two 
behaviors relating to contextual information surfaced. First, during the project, 
students incompletely informed and updated counterparts on their absence, local 
organizational rules, or technical constraints. “(…) people did not always perceive the 
need to describe their situation to remote teammates whose situations might be quite 
different” (Cramton, 1997: 300). Second, it appeared that when members did send 
messages to inform on their absence for example, recipients failed to take note of 
them.  
A consequence of incomplete informing and careless receiving was that interpretation 
and attribution of remote partner’s actions (and absence of actions) mainly relied on 
assumptions. Since these usually did not correspond with real causes or motivations, 
conflicts arose or relationships suffered. Counteracting this phenomenon requires 
according to Cramton (1997) different behaviors from both sides. On the initiating 
side, team members are responsible for updating someone not familiar with their 
context. “Relationships fared better when preoccupied teammates immediately 
explained their situation to their remote partners” (Cramton, 1997: 300). On the 
receiving end, close attention is required to digest and interpret messages, and ask for 
confirmation if need be. “Dispersion may require extra effort on the part of teammates 
to create a mental map of their partners’ situation into which they can fit new 
information as it arrives” (Cramton, 1997: 300).  
 
 Difficulties in communicating the salience of information - reliance on textual 
exchanges made it difficult to convey the nuance of senders’ intentions, and the 
relative importance of a topic. “Writers often assumed that what was salient to them 
would be salient to their readers. Tone of voice, facial expressions and body language 
add meaning to communication, but also help signify salience. Electronic 
communication proved to require skills for directing attention that many team 
members did not have” (Cramton, 1997: 300). Crafting email messages thus required 
scrutinous attention to possible ways in which recipients would read and interpret 
them. Incomplete knowledge of the recipient’s context, and absence of feedback on 
messages made this task possibly even more difficult.  
Similarly, from the recipients’ point of view, interpretation of the communication 
intent behind a ‘lean’ textual message proved challenging. This required precision in 
reading messages to detect possible intentions and requests. And feedback by 
requesting the sender to clarify or confirm the receiver’s interpretation. “A member of 
Team 17 observed, “People always said, ‘Hope to hear from you soon.’ Who then has 
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responsibility for initiating communication?” The salience of the request for feedback 
seems to have been greater for senders than receivers” (Cramton, 1997: 300).  
 
 Unevenly distributed information - asymmetrical information distribution was 
caused by the use of incorrect email addresses, and exchanges deliberately not 
including all team members. Unlike collocated teams that access to multiple media 
and instances for interaction, the student groups relied mainly on email for interaction 
and participation. Hence, the effects of exclusion seem stronger since it leaves only 
silence, and little opportunity to find out what the group’s mainstream activities are. 
“Private exchanges of e-mail distort perceptions of the volume of activity in the team, 
and may confuse the team’s pacing and sense of timing” (Cramton, 1997: 302).  
As earlier indicated, members can only guess what their partners’ activities are, and 
they may respond inappropriately when their impression is not correct. Limited 
feedback loops in distributed settings make it difficult to surface and restore these 
mismatches. “Analysis of the team histories suggests that these kinds of perceptions 
can be excruciatingly difficult to identify and change when a team is dispersed. Private 
“conversations” may create much more confusion for dispersed teams than face-to-
face teams” (Cramton, 1997: 302).  
 
 Interpreting the meaning of silence - on occasions, team members did not respond to 
messages for technical reasons or other motivations. This left the original sender with 
the puzzle of interpreting absence of communications. As Cramton (1997: 302) 
indicates: “(…) silence meant all of the following at one time or another: I agree. I 
strongly disagree. I am indifferent. I am out of town. I am having technical problems. I 
don’t know how to address this sensitive issue. I am busy with other things. I did not 
notice your question. I did not realize that you wanted a response.”  
Interpreting silence remained a guess, also because partners lacked additional channels 
to find out or possess historical knowledge on their counterparts. Technical issues or 
time-zone related misunderstanding were attributed to personal intentions of 
(non)participation (Cramton, 1997: 302). It took long for attributors to find out real 
causes, and for the ‘victim’ to become aware of counterpart’s attributions and 
impressions.  
 
In another piece of research, Cramton and Webber (1999) assessed the impact of 
geographic dispersion on teams in an international consulting firm where staff frequently 
participate in distributed teams. The study distinguishes two dimensions of geographic 
dispersion: frequency of remote collaboration, and actual distance between sites. A survey 
was conducted to investigate the effect of both on three variables: team processes, 
relationships and outcomes.  
For the relationship between dispersion and team processes, the research suggests that 
frequency of dispersion (not geographic distance per se) negatively affects communication 
intensity and coordination effectiveness. In line with literature on physical proximity 
(Allen, 1984), people communicated less frequently and extensively the more they worked 
from different locations. The second relationship in the study showed that geographic 
distance (and not frequency of dispersion) contributed to the fact that people perceived 
each other as being less trustworthy and dependable (Cramton & Webber, 1999: 20). 
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Finally, performance effectiveness appeared to suffer from both geographic distance and 
frequent dispersed collaboration.  
 
§ 6.4.4  Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) 
Jarvenpaa et al. (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; Knoll & Jarvenpaa, 
1998) organized and conducted research on geographically distributed collaboration of 
international students (the same setting as Cramton (1997) referred to). Students - scattered 
across different continents - relied on email and occasional chatting to accomplish 
assignments that moved from simple introductory tasks to a challenging team deliverable. 
Jarvenpaa et al. (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; Knoll & Jarvenpaa, 
1998) studied the students’ communication behaviors, and the evolution of trust among 
team members. Data for the analysis included students’ email messages and their responses 
to questionnaires.  
 
Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) surveyed 29 teams over two periods, and assessed for each 
period the level of trust (high versus low) as compared to the mean level for the overall 
sample. Teams were assigned to one of the four categories that emerged: LoLo indicating 
low trust in period 1 and 2, LoHi for low trust in period 1 but high trust in period 2, HiLo, 
and HiHi. Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) present mini-case studies for three teams per 
categories, using transcripts of students’ email messages. These are insightful for 
understanding geographically distributed collaboration, and briefly discussed as far as 
relevant for this research. The sequence from LoLo to HiHi teams is illustrative for 
analyzing determinants of respectively less effective and effective remote collaboration. 
 
 Team LoLo 1 - typical for this group was the lack of responsiveness of some 
members. Members did not update others on their local situation or constraints. Long 
and frequent lapses of communications led an active participant to remark: “I have 
observed that effective groups are those who communicate constantly and (are) 
committed to all datelines set” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). Often members did not 
provide direct feedback on prior messages, or even relate their communications to 
these.  
 
 Team LoLo 2 - this team also suffered from lack of responses to messages. Proposed 
schedules were not adhered to. Similar to Cramton’s (1997) observation, messages 
were not precisely read and incorporated in subsequent work.  
 
 Team LoLo 3 - team members were confused about the overall work process in a 
distributed setting. On reflection, one participant compared the distributed assignment 
with collocated projects: “Although some things didn’t work well it was a good 
experience to see IF it is possible to work in such a virtual environment. In my 
opinion, it’s much more complicated to communicate in such a way without face-to-
face contact” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). This seemed also related to a lack of 
responsiveness and broad participation. An exclamation of one member is illustrative: 
“Please can EVERYONE provide DETAILS about the idea they like most. I am 
scared because I can’t see how to proceed” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998).  
 
 128
 Team LoHi 1 - on average, this group frequently interacted and produced satisfying 
results. At the start rules for interaction were proposed and agreed upon, but not 
always adhered to. Some members of this team did not precisely connect to prior 
communications or specifications like deadlines. “Another member stated that he did 
not understand what to do for the second assignment even though two members had 
already submitted their parts of the second assignment to the group” (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998).  
 
 Team LoHi 2 - the team experienced initial contacts as challenging given the lean 
properties of email: “Quickly establishing a mutual understanding is not an easy task,” 
and “Everyone makes an introduction, but the impression you get is like via a letter” 
(Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). Members were nevertheless strongly involved and 
provided information on their schedule and availability. They were responsive to each 
others’ proposals, and executed tasks according to commitments made. People were 
positive on their group effort as one student remark illustrates: “Dear Virtual Team 
members: now you are almost becoming real to me” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
Keeping commitments seemed an important aspect of their successful remote 
collaboration: “I enjoyed very much working with you. You all did what you promised 
to do. In a teamwork, it’s the most important thing” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998).  
 
 Team LoHi 3 - members disappeared because of other commitments, but failed to 
update counterparts. They responded slowly, which led one participant to compare 
distributed collaboration with “playing chess with one move made every 24 hours” 
(Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). Eventually, a prototype website (which they were 
supposed to build) was ready and functioned as coordination node for improvement 
efforts.  
 
 Team HiLo 1 - team members expressed concern to maintain an overview of the 
project, and embed their efforts in the larger project tasks. Wrote one student: “(…) 
plz (please - author) plz plz mail me in what way I can contribute (…). I still am a 
little confused. Just tell me what I need to contribute” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
They missed meetings to address equivocality of their group task, as one participants 
reflected: “How hard is it to carry out an entire project without having those boring 
professional meetings” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). Like other teams, students 
agreed on the need for rules and planning to structure the interaction process, but 
failed to implement and/ or comply to these.  
 
 Team HiLo 2 - response lapses were typical also for this team. Feedback on 
interactions were unpredictable (sometimes because of technical problems), and 
delays were hardly explained. Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) offer an example on one 
of the students: “He offered an idea for the project. He received no immediate 
response and sent a second message asking if his message was received.” Days later 
responses dripped in that referred to did not adequately connect to the issue.  
In an effort to encourage broader participation, an active participant sent a 
complaining note to the (central) project administrator. The message was then copied 
to professors of other project members, and led - supposedly - to local exchanges 
between professors and ‘controllees’. Organizational structure (local professors and a 
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central project administrator) was thus used to control the participation of 
counterparts.  
 
 Team HiLo 3 - this team started actively on the group task, and proposed rules and 
procedures for the collaboration process. Enforcing these appeared often unfeasible. 
Without the desired effect, some members attempted to enhance participation by 
sending emails like: (capitals in original) “The situation is not very encouraging. 
UNLESS ALL TEAM MEMBERS START CONTRIBUTING SERIOUSLY NOW, 
WE WILL NOT GET A SATISFYING RESULT” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
‘Inactive’ members excused their behaviors with reference to technical difficulties and 
lack of task understanding.  
 
 Team HiHi 1 - members were committed to participate in the distributed group. They 
exchanged numerous messages that also included descriptions of their personal 
context and experiences. The team did not define rules and procedures for interactions, 
perhaps because earlier social interactions made these superfluous. (By contrast, other 
groups that engaged in less socializing upfront and remained task centered afterwards, 
often proposed - possibly as compensation - rules and procedures for their exchanges). 
The team here did agree on a schedule that broke the work process down in milestones 
and deadlines. One member took the responsibility for collecting ideas and 
summarizing them. When members worked on tasks that were closely dependent, they 
coordinated their efforts on a detailed level: “Emma and Anders coordinated their 
working times as did Riikka and Linda because of overlap in their work” (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998).  
 
 Team HiHi 2 - at an early stage, a member explained her confusion with distributed 
communications. She described the need for confirming message exchanges: “one of 
the frustrations I have with this virtual team process is that there seems to be no way 
of knowing what has been sent or received” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
Consequently, the team formalized communications: “The team developed a system of 
numbering messages and agreed to confirm receipt of messages by referring to the 
number” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). A recurring issue in the teams is lack of topic 
understanding, and insight in the work process. “Machtelt expressed confusion over 
the topic, saying that she was “not quite sure what to do, and what to write” and asked 
them to describe to her “in short clear terms”” (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998).  
 
 Team HiHi 3 - this group did not socialize at the start of the project but developed 
elaborate rules and procedures for communicating. It thus illustrates the phenomenon 
described for team HiHI 1. Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) describe the team’s focus on 
interaction norms: “The team agreed upon procedures at the start of the second week - 
they would read all messages before responding to any, use meaningful subject 
headings, code their messages for easy reference, and divide into roles,” and, “The 
members discussed the proper way to exchange versions of the paper well before 
anything had been written.”  
 
Knoll and Jarvenpaa (1998) report on the same type of student assignment, providing some 
additional insights in distributed collaboration.  
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First, they explain that criteria for selecting students were “fluency in English, access to 
the internet, and the possession of an individual electronic mail account for receiving mail 
from his or her teammates” (Knoll & Jarvenpaa, 1998: 5). The first criterion refers to a 
basic type of common knowledge (Grant, 1996b). It constitutes an upfront attempt to 
reduce diversity and thus equivocality for the actual collaboration process (Daft & Lengel, 
1986; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b).  
Second, participating students reported that collective work progressed slowly in a 
distributed context (see also earlier team LoHi 3). “Team members were astonished at the 
turnaround times required for decisions and production” (Knoll & Jarvenpaa, 1998: 6). 
Tasks requiring interactive arguing suffered in particular from reliance on asynchronous 
emails. 
Third, students experienced a tension between the need for feedback communications and 
time zone differences. Real-time chatting appeared unfeasible because of time zone 
differences or technical delays. As an alternative, students used asynchronous 
communications (email) across multiple time zones. This implied that participants could 
process only one communication cycle (receiving messages, sending comments) per 
working day. Leveraging time differences in a ‘follow-the-sun” mode appeared unfeasible. 
“Almost all students in both studies decried the 24-hour lag that resulted from sending one 
message per shift. The teams were burdened, rather than liberated, by the time zones” 
(Knoll & Jarvenpaa, 1998: 9).  
Time differences enforced precise planning and deliberate anticipation of working hours at 
counterparts’ sites, especially for organizing occasional real-time exchanges. Knoll and 
Jarvenpaa (1998: 10) quote students illustrate: “I learned to specify not just the earliest 
start and latest finish dates, but a specific period of time during the day taking into account 
each country time difference (…),” and, “the team realized rather slowly that the 
discussion proceeds rather slowly via the e-mail, it takes a week before everyone has 
commented on an idea presented by one member of the team.” Different time zones 
necessitate group members to actively update others on their mail-checking behaviors and 
availability for real-time communications. As one student commented: “I think it will be 
handy to let each other know how often you check your mailbox and if you know an exact 
time we could even have a live meeting sometime” (Knoll & Jarvenpaa, 1998: 10).  
Finally, Knoll and Jarvenpaa (1998) distill a set of functional and dysfunctional behaviors 
in distributed teams. It should be noted that this applies to situations where people 
collaborate remotely for the first time, using mainly email to accomplish increasingly 
challenging tasks. Behaviors that appeared functional and relevant for this research can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
 Documentation - Knoll and Jarvenpaa (1998) point out that in face-to-face contexts, 
people communicate more frequently and have ample opportunity to access 
information. Distributed collaboration reduces this fluid mode of connecting. Instead, 
stronger emphasis should be placed on documentation in several ways. First, inputs 
from people at various locations should be collected, integrated and distributed. In this 
process, prior communications are included for reference, like the mosaic message 
chain Markus (1994) describes. Second, documentation itself thus becomes a central 
means to elicit comments for extension and improvement. It becomes a coordinating 
‘boundary’ object to connect distributed participants (Henderson, 1991; Karsten et al., 
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1999). Third, as a group moves on, archived documentation becomes their memory for 
posterior reference.  
 
 Organizational structure - effective team members contacted the central project 
coordinator in case counterparts did not respond to messages. They thus relied on the 
(remote) organizational structure in addition to their direct partners. 
 
 Remote communications behaviors - Knoll and Jarvenpaa (1998) list effective and 
ineffective behaviors in distributed groups. Ineffective behaviors include ignoring 
others’ messages, leaving rules implicit, and making assumptions instead of checking 
one’s understanding of communications. Effective attitudes for remote 
communications concern both the sender and receiver involved. For senders 
effectiveness means careful crafting of messages with sufficient explanations, and 
possibly providing additional clarifications. Receivers should read messages precisely, 
confirm reception, and respond rapidly. They should provide feedback by rephrasing 
their understanding, and ask for clarification if need be. Following up on requests or 
commitments is considered important, as is fostering broad participation of other 
people connected to the topic. Functional behaviors also included alternation of lean 
and rich media, here email with chats. The latter medium is considered richer since it 
allows for real-time interactivity (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). In all, Knoll and 
Jarvenpaa’s (1998) recommendations for remote behaviors closely correspond to those 
suggested in literature on collective mind (Weick & Roberts, 1993), and High 
Reliability Organizations (Eisenhardt, 1993; Roberts & Moore, 1993).  
 
§ 6.4.5  Hinds and Bailey (2000) 
Hinds and Bailey (2000) develop propositions for investigation the impact of geographic 
dispersion and time zone differences on the occurrence of conflict in groups. The study 
proposes that distance and time zone differences have two consequences: the use of 
electronic media, and so-called “unshared context”. In turn, these explain the emergence of 
conflict in group with distributed participants.  
Hinds and Bailey (2000) suggest that electronic media reduce the salience of 
communications, and lead to task-centered interactions. Difficulty in conveying rich and 
unstructured communications imply that groups are constrained in executing tasks that 
require intense coordination efforts (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). In addition, empirical work 
shows that people who collaborate remotely do not share information evenly across sites 
(Cramton, 2001). This is because people do not realize that their remote counterparts do 
not have access to the same information. And communication by electronic media requires 
more effort than local exchanges (Kraut & Galegher, 1990).  
 
The abovementioned factors contribute to the “stickiness” of information: it is hardly 
shared beyond its original location (von Hippel, 1994, 1998). This applies in particular to 
non-structured information and tacit knowledge. Local work with remote dependencies 
may remain unconnected with incomplete communications (Vaughan, 1990, 1997). 
Research found that “(C)onflicts among (distant) sites went unidentified and unaddressed 
longer than conflicts among members of collocated groups (…)” (Armstrong & Cole, 
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1995: 194). Apparently, people using electronic media find it difficult to bridge unshared 
contexts (Hinds & Bailey, 2000).  
Temporal differences further exacerbate these behaviors and consequences: people cannot 
connect remotely at any time during their working day (Barley, 1998; Hinds & Bailey, 
2000). Finally, task dependence across sites makes the effects of unshared contexts more 
visible, and therefore conflicts more likely (Hinds & Bailey, 2000; Walton & Dutton, 
1969).  
 
§ 6.4.6  Abel (1990) 
Abel (1990) describes an experimental research project at the Xerox Palo Alto Research 
Center (PARC) between 1985 and 1988. The computer research organization was split into 
two groups, and assigned to sites in Palo Alto, CA and Portland, OR. This geographical 
setup is shown in Figure 31, with the US West Coast depicted on the right. The purpose of 
this project was to test remote collaboration relying on electronic media. In addition to 
email and internet groupware functionality, a permanent two-way audio/video link (video 
wall) was set up between two rooms at both locations. At any time, researchers could walk 
in the room at their site to see if anyone else was available in the remote room. This facility 
was extended with a video network of multiple cameras at each site, remotely controllable 
from any workstation. This simulated a collocated work environment in many ways: 
people could look at rooms and check for availability of people. 
Abel (1990) reports on several themes of distributed collaboration and communications 
that emerged from the experiment. We analyze these using Figure 31. The figure depicts 
three categories of groups for each site, and categorizes remote connections with the letters 
A to D. In addition, the links are numbered 1 or 2 if two similar connections could be 
made. For instance, B1 connects local researchers in Portland with colleagues from the 
same site who are visiting Palo Alto. B2 refers to the opposite case where Palo Alto 
researchers communicate with their local colleagues who visit Portland at that time.  
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Figure 31 - Distributed communications at Xerox Research 
 
A first finding is that during the experiment, people remained quite well involved in, and 
aware of events at the counterpart site. When a Palo Alto researcher traveled to Portland to 
join a research meeting, he could participate almost instantaneously in local 
communications:  
 
“He (the Palo Alto researcher - author) had not visited Portland in person for over six 
months. He happened to arrive during this technical discussion. Almost without 
missing a beat and without almost any “introduction protocol,” the Palo Alto based lab 
member joined this brainstorming session. As the discussion wound down after about 
fifteen minutes, the Portland folks realized that the Palo Alto based lab member had 
arrived in person, and welcomed him” (Abel, 1990: 497).  
 
In the preceding period of distant interaction, people had shared knowledge about the 
project (connection A in Figure 31). This enabled a smooth transition between remote and 
collocated collaboration (Abel, 1990).  
Second, the video link enabled to some extent managers to keep track of subordinates 
remotely. It restored the loss of manager-subordinate contact Meadows (1996) described in 
Xerox Research Portland, OR
Visiting researchers
from Palo Alto
Local researchers
Portland
Other visitors
Visiting researchers
from Portland
Local researchers
Palo Alto
Other visitors
Xerox Research Palo Alto, CA
A
D2
D1 C B1
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an offshore outsourcing situation. At the same time, it should be realized that the Xerox 
experiment was within the same company and region (US west coast), and it did not 
involve cultural differences. 
 
A third theme is that participants in video conversations developed special rules for 
interacting or giving demonstrations. Careful planning and preparation were required 
beforehand, since adaptation during the meeting appeared more difficult. While presenting, 
people had to pay special attention to shaping their remote communications and presence:  
 
“We have become sensitized to the different social protocols of the link. For example, 
we have adapted to the technology in giving cross-site demos in the following ways:  
1. Wearing bright colors to give more cross-site presence,  
2. Preparing ahead of time because glitches are much more difficult to deal with 
over the link (the communication mechanism and demo are using the same 
channel),  
3. Trying not to move too much so that the video compression doesn’t dominate the 
conversation,  
4. Doing things “on cue,”  
5. Speaking loudly, and choosing carefully when to speak, etc” (Abel, 1990: 499-
500).  
 
Fourth, the video wall appeared more supportive for researchers with established working 
relationships than newcomers or visitors. This corresponds with media expansion theory, 
which states that more ‘experience with communication co participants’ implies that 
people perceive a medium as being richer (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). Compared to face-to-
face contact, video appeared not capable to establish strong initial contacts (connection D2, 
Figure 31):  
 
“(A visitor) met (two of the Portland researchers) over the video from Palo Alto. The 
next day she was in Portland physically. Someone said “Well at least you met (the 
Portland researchers) via the video before you came up.” The visitor emphatically 
said, “I hadn’t really met until I met them in person in Portland!”” (Abel, 1990: 501).  
  
When people had only ‘met’ remote colleagues through videoconferencing, they perceived 
a discrepancy when meeting these persons face-to-face during a visit. The richness of face-
to-face communications compared with videoconferencing is well illustrated with the 
following quote from a Portland-based consultant. He had communicated with Palo Alto 
staff remotely (connection A, Figure 31), and visited that site for the first time:  
 
“(...) The (Palo Alto lab members) that I had met only on (video) seemed different in 
person. My pre-trip perception of their faces and individual traits did not match reality 
that well. I had problems matching faces to names. 
 
At the same time, this consultant’s inclusion in the Portland context facilitated and in a 
sense enriched his videoconference experience with Portland colleagues while visiting the 
Palo Alto site (connection B1, Figure 31):  
 
“On the other hand, I found talking to (the Portland) people via (video while in Palo 
Alto) to be easy and natural” (Abel, 1990: 505). 
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Fifth, interactive discussions on new or challenging topics still required collocated 
presence. The video facility did not allow for multiple rapid exchanges to gain insights in 
participants’ point of view:  
 
“(…) Somehow when we were all in the same room together it seemed easier to get 
this back and forth (discussion) to happen than over the video” (Abel, 1990: 502). 
 
Finally, despite its limitations and special requirements, the video wall did simulate 
collocation. While most media require dedicated effort to contact someone (sending an 
email, placing a call), the permanent video link enabled also random informal contacts. 
Researchers with established working relationships could leverage the medium to sustain 
these. They perceived the remote location as close by, as became apparent when the link 
was down at one point of time:  
 
“I … have missed the link, and have already started to think of Portland as one might 
expect a remote lab to be thought of - a group of people who are intellectually known 
to exist, but that’s it. At least with the (video), I felt like we had a common back fence 
over which to chat” (Abel, 1990: 506). 
 
§ 6.4.7  Kraut & Galegher (1990) 
Kraut and Galegher (1990) studied the relationship between physical proximity and the 
development of collaborative relationships among scientists in a large industrial R&D 
laboratory. Specifically, they investigated collaboration projects between pairs of scientists 
located in the same corridor, same floor, different floors or different buildings. The 
likelihood of joint work increased clearly with the measures of proximity just mentioned. 
Kraut and Galegher (1990) propose several explanatory factors that are summarized here.  
First, distance reduces the frequency of communications as proven by a standing tradition 
of research (Allen, 1984). Despite the availability of electronic communications media, 
people interact more frequently the closer their offices are.  
Second, proximity increases the quality of communications. Kraut and Galegher (1990) 
define high quality communications as two-way interactions, involving more than one 
sensory channel (Kraut & Galegher, 1990: 161). Initial discussions among scientists when 
they have only a vague notion of possible collaboration thrive on informal, face-to-face 
exchanges. They use these gathering to surface common interests and share knowledge. 
Electronic means are not likely to sustain this phase that is characterized by rapid 
interactions and spontaneous exchanges of documents and notes (Kraut & Galegher, 1990: 
162).  
Third, distance increases the costs of communications. Apart from monetary expenses for 
phone calls or travel, they include “the burden of having only intentional, structured 
interactions via a restricted modality within an already existing relationship” (Kraut & 
Galegher, 1990: 162). Proximity to other scientists promotes impromptu contacts with 
little effort. At a later stage of collaboration, scientists must exchange on numerous small 
topics relating to their joint project. They were often used to fluid communications with 
collocated partners to handle these reciprocal dependencies. Distance tended to slow down 
this traffic. Kraut and Galegher (1990: 163) quote one researcher’s experience: 
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“This was the first project that I had done long distance and it certainly made it more 
time consuming. I was used to being able to walk down the hallway from my office to 
(my collaborator’s) office to talk to him about a problem (…).  
(In the long distance collaboration) we either relied on the mail going back and forth or 
even phone conversations and that just wasn’t as satisfactory as talking face-to-face. 
(…) It took a long time, and I wasn’t used to having that much of a lag for the turn-
around. (...) I was used to being able to make it much faster.” 
 
The quote illustrates the fact that face-to-face contact is richer than electronic media like 
phone or mail. It also emphasizes the occurrence of delays in distributed collaboration. 
This phenomenon also surfaced in other research on remote collaboration (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998; Meadows, 1996b), and seems related to individual responsiveness to 
mediated communications (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). Kraut and Galegher (1990) use 
their findings to propose two requirements for remote communications technology: low 
personal costs and high quality. Low costs refer to the behavioral effort for a person to use 
electronic connectivity tools, rather than financial costs to an organization. High quality 
means that real-time multi-sensory communications are feasible.  
 
§ 6.4.8  Nemiro (2000)
26
 
Nemiro (2000) conducted a study on creativity in various distributed groups. She 
investigated factors that contribute to a creative workplace, even though members are 
spread across multiple locations. Nemiro (2000) found that the creating a connection 
between team members is key to shaping a creative work environment. She distinguished 
two types of connections. First, task connection, referring to clarity of goals and 
commitment of actors. And second, interpersonal connection consisting of “information 
sharing, trust, and personal bond” (Nemiro, 2000: 102).  
While the focus of her studies is slightly different, the connection concept overlaps with 
our research. We selected therefore 5 quotes from her research and re-analyzed them.  
 
“(…) It should have been a fun project. It was not fun because there were a lot of 
assumptions made, which I think sometimes a problem with [a] virtual environment is 
that assumptions are made by one party sitting in their office, closed door, typing 
away, and they said, oh yes, this must be what this meant, so they fire off an e-mail. 
We interpret it in a completely different way. We don’t have the luxury of a dialogue 
back and forth. Instead we have the aggravation of e-mails back and forth, one shot e-
mails. So there was a tremendous amount of unclarity, and there was a lot of 
assumptions made about which party would do what, and who would pay for what, and 
what the end result would be, and basically people’s role’s roles would be (…)” 
(Nemiro, 2000: 112-113).  
 
What this quote suggests is that remoteness leads to a shift from interactive - probably 
face-to-face - communications to emails. This implies a simultaneous shift from 
synchronous to asynchronous communications, and from rich (audio, sight) to lean (text) 
                                                 
26 This resource provides extensive insight in the topic of our study, especially the quotes 
from research interviews. As a source of secondary empirical data, it is re-analyzed here 
from our perspective, not merely summarized. 
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interactions. The interviewee seems to point at a mismatch between the needs of a 
collaborative work environment, and communication modes people have at their disposal. 
Lean, asynchronous communications delay the work since two-way dialogue is stretched 
out in chains of emails. More importantly, email does not enable people to develop an 
understanding of their counterparts and the collaborative task. People lack knowledge of 
their counterpart and therefore the larger collaborative task. They miss the ‘big picture’ 
that seems easier to emerge in a dialogue format. Instead, they start working from 
assumptions that often do not match counterparts’ point of view.27  
In a second quote from an international car manufacturer’s team, one member from outside 
the US commented:  
 
“The fact that we are actually talking to the U.S., and we know names and everything, 
it really has made a big impact and a big improvement … Since we went over there [to 
the United States] last October, and that was the first time anyone had gone there 
from our area, I spent 3 weeks with them. When I came back, we’ve had an excellent 
relationship since then … because up until then it was just a name” (Nemiro, 2000: 
115). 
 
This experience shows that people appreciate face-to-face communications. Temporary 
immersion in the counterpart’s context (here the US) enables people to build interpersonal 
rapport and effective working relationships. These visits enable subsequent remote 
collaboration that relies on electronic media. The issue here confirms professional 
literature suggesting that team members should meet face-to-face at the start of a project 
(O'Hara & Johansen, 1994).  
A third quote focuses on the transition from a collocated collaborative work environment 
to one that is geographically distributed:  
 
“I think because virtual teaming is a comparatively new organizational approach that it 
definitely adds challenge, and adds stress. I think a lot of companies, mine included, 
are rushing rather head long into an embrace of the virtual concept. And I must say, 
even though I am a proponent of an aspect of virtuality, this community business, I do 
have some reservations about whether people will be able to accommodate to the new 
framework of the virtual workplace as rapidly as management expects it to” (Nemiro, 
2000: 117).  
 
The interviewee seems to point at the fact that distributed collaboration differs 
substantially from collocated collaboration. This requires an adaptation process from 
people working in distributed teams, as well as their managers.  
Finally, an interviewee stresses that remote, virtual counterparts should be treated just as 
‘real’ as someone in the same physical setting. This demands considerable effort since 
people lack the luxury of frequent face-to-face communications.  
 
“I don’t think that people should get it in their head that because I’m working at a 
distance with somebody that the human side and the human issues go away. They 
don’t. All of the personality or what people call personality issues, all of the 
communication issues, all of the need to respect and be conscious of the other 
                                                 
27 For related views see our earlier discussion of (Vaughan, 1997; Weick & Roberts, 1993) 
and (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). See also (Meadows, 1996b) and Figure 36.  
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person’s feelings and where they’re coming from, all of that is still there. Whether 
you’re in the same office building and conference room together, or whether you’re on 
the other end of a telephone or a computer terminal, the person doesn’t go away in a 
virtual team. What we have to do is to work very hard to keep this a very personal 
relationship. You have to respect the fact that it’s another human being who has 
feelings and emotions, and ups and downs, and assumptions and lenses. That doesn’t 
go away when you [are] working [at] a distance. And you have to find ways to manage 
al of that if your team is going to be successful” (Nemiro, 2000: 118).  
 
§ 6.5  Groupware 
 
Groupware - also referred to as collaborative technology (Majchrzak et al., 2000a) and 
Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) (Kling, 1997) - is one of the 
technologies that has become widespread to support (remote) collaboration. It combines 
telecommunications with integrated functionality for message exchange, documentation, 
and time and workflow management. This section discusses empirical research on the use 
of groupware for coordinating and controlling geographically distributed work.  
 
§ 6.5.1  Majchrzak, Rice, et al. (2000)
28
 
Majchrzak, Rice et al. (2000) conducted a comprehensive study on a geographically 
distributed team of engineers in the United States, responsible for designing an advanced 
rocket injector. The members worked only part-time for this project and came from 3 
different organizations, referred to as RocketCo with 3 sites each 1 mile apart, StressCo 
located 100 miles from RocketCo, and 6SigmaCo, 1000 miles from RocketCo (not real 
names). They had not collaborated on prior occasions, and only 2 of the 8 members were 
actually experienced in rocket injectors. The project was considered challenging and 
required participants to contribute in a tightly interdependent mode. The team used a 
collaborative technology (CT) called Internet Notebook. Project participants could login to 
this browser-enabled groupware environment that was centrally maintained by the vendor. 
The system supports CAD/CAM drawings, document management and communications.  
The research focuses on knowledge sharing and reuse among distributed team members. 
Two authors were participant observers throughout the project. Ethnographic data 
collection was complemented with weekly questionnaires and feedback sessions. 
The project started with a collocated kick-off meeting with 5 members of the team. Rules, 
norms and plans were agreed upon to govern subsequent remote exchanges. The intention 
was to “use the CT for all communication and knowledge-sharing needs” (Majchrzak et 
al., 2000a: 11).29 For meetings, the engineers planned to login to the CT all at the same 
                                                 
28 This research on a virtual design team has led to a number of papers (Majchrzak et al., 
2000a; Majchrzak, Rice, King, Malhotra, & Ba, 2000b; Malhotra et al., 2001; Rice, 
Majchrzak, King, Ba, & Malhotra, 2000). We analyzed (Majchrzak et al., 2000a) 
extensively because of its qualitative research approach and content focus that is relevant 
to our research. 
29 Page numbers refer to the 1998 working paper version of the paper. 
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time, and use teleconferencing tools for audio. The groupware system was thus supposed 
to take on a central role, as depicted in Figure 32 with the bold lines connecting people 
from 3 sites.  
 
Figure 32 - Initial, intended use of groupware 
 
Majchrzak, Rice et al. (2000) describe the team’s experiences of dispersed collaboration 
during subsequent project phases.  
First, the CT functioned as a shared platform for storing, sharing and commenting 
individuals’ contributions. It became a ‘focal artifact’ (Majchrzak et al., 2000a) that 
represented the unfolding design, much like boundary objects quoted in other research 
(Engeström et al., 1995; Henderson, 1991; Karsten et al., 1999).  
Second, the team deviated in some ways from the initially agreed upon protocol, which 
envisioned among others a central role for the system. For instance, some RocketCo 
members discussed project related matters during informal meetings (like during lunch in 
the cafeteria). They did not enter results in the CT, implying that remote members were not 
updated. This is similar to the meeting Vaughan (1997) describes, where remote 
participants remained unaware of a local caucus at Thiokol. It appears difficult to achieve 
full inclusion of group members in a remote context. In another paper on presumably the 
same research, the authors point at the importance of ‘Guarding Against Alienation’. A 
team member of the design team is quoted as follows: “It is very important to me to not 
feel left out. If I'm not there [meaning not physically collocated at Rocketdyne 
(presumably RocketCo - author)], I want to know I'm not missing anything” (Malhotra, 
Majchrzak, Carman, & Lott, 2000: 21). 
Third, distributed synchronous brainstorming sessions appeared difficult. Engineers were 
used to rapidly drawing design proposals with paper and pencil. In the distributed setting, 
they were not able to use the system in the same way. Instead, they decided to enter their 
proposal asynchronously in the system, and discuss them later on. During a particularly 
strained phase of the project, the team decided to arrange a collocated meeting to iron out 
Site 3Site 1
Site 2
Groupware
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diverse interpretations of members. Like Abel (1990) noticed, people seem to prefer face-
to-face meetings for highly interactive discussion sessions.  
Fourth, the system provided extensive functionality for connecting keywords to entries, 
and generating automatic messages related to team member interest profiles. However, the 
fluidity of the design process (with bi-weekly changes) made information quickly outdated 
and irrelevant. Entering keywords was therefore too ‘costly’ in Galegher and Kraut’s 
(1990) terms. As a consequence, it became increasingly difficult to trace past 
contributions, one of the potential contributions of the CT in a distributed environment.  
Making ideas explicit in the CT environment became also costly for other reasons. People 
were concerned that their entries could be used in formal investigations in case any errors 
were made. They preferred to submit contributions only when these were ‘absolutely 
correct’ (Majchrzak et al., 2000a).  
In fact, a different role for the CT emerged than originally envisioned. It was unable to 
become the central platform for facilitating group interactions since the design process had 
too dynamic and transient aspects (Majchrzak et al., 2000a). More likely, teleconferences 
and face-to-face meetings were held to handle equivocal tasks, brainstorm, clarify a topic, 
or deal with conflicts. These were probably situations of reciprocal or team 
interdependence with simultaneous interlocked exchanges (Van de Ven et al., 1976). The 
CT complemented this versatile process by providing collective design and project 
management functionality. It visualized, documented and linked contributions, and 
processed information on the accomplishment of project tasks. The combined use of 
meetings and the CT confirms findings from other researchers (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 
1998; Markus, 1994) that people use multiple technologies to connect remotely. Figure 33 
illustrates this emerging way of using the groupware. Compared to Figure 32, the bold 
lines reflect inter-personal contact - by means of teleconferences or visits - between sites as 
a main form of coordination. Groupware (here depicted with dotted lines) still has an 
important role, but rather to support and document the interaction process.  
 
 
Figure 33 - Emerging use of groupware 
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§ 6.5.2  Goodman and Darr (1998) 
Goodman and Darr (1998) investigated the use of an Electronic Library System (ELS) by a 
division of a Fortune-100 company in the U.S. The company has about 60 sites for selling 
and servicing equipment for business offices. The ELS was initiated to capture best 
practices, evaluate these and make them available in a structured format to corporate sites 
through the existing network. Two themes emerged from Goodman and Darr’s (1998) 
study that are relevant to the research.  
First, the system made contributions explicit, visible and retrievable throughout the 
network of distributed locations. “It created a memory independent of any individual, and 
it allowed for searching for solutions and for updating of the memory” (Goodman & Darr, 
1998: 436). Preserving organizational know-how in technology is not a new notion (Walsh 
& Ungson, 1991). As Jelinek (1979) noted: “Administrative systems are the mechanisms 
for impounding and preserving knowledge” (Jelinek, 1979: 62). Similar to Majchrzak, 
Rice et al. (2000), information technology and telecommunications have expanded this 
role. They enable people to document insights in digital format, and group these in a 
centrally structured, searchable database environment. Storage technology and 
functionality facilitate updating and expanding these resources. They extend a passive 
retrieval type of environment with proactive prompting mechanisms to notify people of 
new entries that match their interest profile. Remote access to the database broadens the 
community contributing to, and benefiting from the information and underlying knowledge 
base.  
 
A second theme refers to the actual use of the system. Majchrzak, Rice et al. (2000) noted 
that groupware cannot exclusively facilitate distributed collaboration, especially with 
unstructured and interlocked activities. Likewise, Goodman and Darr (1998) found that the 
system was mainly employed for straightforward problems. Entering or searching for 
information on more complex issues was not likely, partially because of technical 
limitations. One of the reasons was also the heterogeneity of local business contexts. 
“There are so many variations between office to office … it’s hard to share” (Goodman & 
Darr, 1998: 16). As Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) suggested, differences in work-related 
orientation increases information processing and integration efforts. While they referred to 
cross-functional diversity, the same could apply to regional differences of machine 
operations and experiences. As a consequence, knowledge sharing beyond a homogeneous 
region is not effective and likely. But within those regions, Goodman and Darr (1998) 
found that people in the same job sustained inter-personal contacts to exchange know-how, 
rather than using the system. “Machines react differently in different regions. I always turn 
to my own work group for ideas … we are in the same region” (Goodman & Darr, 1998: 
16). These communities leveraged their common language and memory to resolve 
complex problems.  
In sum, groupware supports coordination of distributed worked by documenting and 
providing access to information on structured tasks. Groups of people working in similar 
roles and business areas benefit in particular from this support. In this case, existing 
communities of people working in the same geographical region substituted for that role. 
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§ 6.5.3  Ciborra and Patriotta (1998) 
Ciborra and Patriotta (1998) investigated the use of Lotus Notes for new product 
development projects at a division of Unilever. The system is accessible for multiple 
product development centers world wide. It formalizes the development process with a 
funnel model that contains punctuated milestones for project deliverables and decision 
making. Actual new product development projects were supposed to follow this template 
and provide detailed information in the Lotus Notes environment. On some occasions, 
product development staff experienced the system as constraining. They were used to more 
informal processes and procedures for developing a product and getting it approved, also 
remotely. Instead, the system was supposed to embed and handle the majority of project 
exchanges as a central node. It imposed a framework for explicit, frequent reporting of 
(intermediate) outputs. In all, the system required considerable effort for staff to enter 
project information into the system in accordance with the generic model. It thus increases 
the costs of collaboration in terms of efforts (Kraut & Galegher, 1990). Even though 
groupware offers extensive documentation and communication functionality, it seems not 
capable to channel effectively equivocal work on a distance, see also (Goodman & Darr, 
1998; Majchrzak et al., 2000a).  
As the system made contributions explicit and viewable across sites, it allowed managers 
to observe entries in the system and work progress. This discouraged staff to enter 
preliminary ideas and discuss proposals, similar to the concerns that arose in the study by 
Majchrzak, Rice et al. (2000). Consequently, system access was split into two layers. One 
for staff with full access to work-in-progress, and a restricted layer for management to 
monitor formal deliverables.  
 
§ 6.6  Distributed Organizing in Global Software Projects 
 
We conclude this chapter with an analysis of two studies on global software projects 
(Meadows, 1996b; Millar, 1999). These resources provide extensive insight in the topic of 
our study, especially the quotes from research interviews. As a source of secondary 
empirical data, we re-analyze the data here from our perspective rather than merely 
summarizing them. 
 
§ 6.6.1  Meadows (1996b) 
One of the most comprehensive studies to date on geographically distributed IS projects 
was completed by CJ Meadows in 1996 as a Harvard Business School dissertation 
(Meadows, 1996b). Its purpose was to assess two questions: (1) “How should international 
outsourcing projects be coordinated and controlled (for both successful project outcome 
and enhanced relationships)?” And (2) “What projects and tasks (within projects) are good 
candidates for international outsourcing?” (Meadows, 1996b: 47). The research focused on 
international IT outsourcing projects at Tata Consultancy Services. It encompassed an 
exploratory, grounded-theory phase in the Philippines that resulted in a preliminary 
framework and set of propositions. A second, theory-testing phase in India was intended to 
validate these findings with structured interviews and a research. Structured interviews 
were conducted with TCS project managers at TCS sites in Bombay, Bangalore, Madras, 
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and New Delhi. The interviews concerned projects involving these sites and clients in the 
USA, Canada, UK, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, and Japan. Typically, TCS 
staff in India cooperated with remote client IT staff and users to develop and implement an 
information system. As indicated, Meadows’ (1996) work is currently one of the few 
studies on global IS Projects, with a focus close to our research. Results from the study are 
therefore summarized and analyzed comprehensively, including relevant quotes.  
 
§ 6.6.1.1  Remote Work Division: The Role of Prototyping 
Meadows’ (1996) research focused on offshore outsourced IS projects in which vendor 
staff develops or maintains a system for a client firm. This implies an agency relationship 
that has been defined as “(…) the ubiquitous relationship, in which one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work” (Eisenhardt, 
1989a: 58). Delegation of work means that the agent is informed on the principal’s 
expectations, and delivers work in accordance with these. For IS work, methodologies for 
structuring this process include the waterfall model and prototyping as earlier introduced.  
 
Using the waterfall model for remote outsourcing means that user requirements are 
analyzed, specified, and sent to vendor staff for coding. Different people are responsible 
for capturing user requirements and programming the software. The former task is 
typically performed by client IT staff, independent consultants, vendor representatives 
(Meadows, 1996b). The offshore vendor team becomes responsible for the latter task. 
Literature documents problems associated with this work division. Such as capturing 
complex and fluid requirements in a comprehensive manner, and transferring requirements 
understanding to the programming team (von Hippel, 1994). Geographic distance between 
analysts (on-site) and programmers (offshore) seems to exacerbate this transfer problem 
(Meadows, 1996b). Says one of the TCS managers on his project (Meadows, 1996b: 112): 
 
“We weren’t the primary requirements-analysis agent, so we didn’t learn enough to 
understand the business completely. That hurt us down the road” (Manager, Finance 
Co. #2 Project).  
 
On the other hand, vendor involvement in the analysis process appears to reduce their 
dependence on client staff, and facilitate subsequent project phases (Meadows, 1996b: 
112): 
 
“Most requirements analysis and high-level design on our projects is done by the 
client, but on this project, we did it, and it made the rest of the work easier. We are 
not as dependent on their feedback and approval” (Manager, Transportation Co. #2 
Project). 
 
Meadows (1996) reports on other projects that use prototyping for remote outsourcing. The 
prototype visualizes the system-under-development, and thus enables the client to provide 
feedback throughout the development process (Meadows, 1996b: 108).  
 
“Mistakes and lessons learned? This project should've been Rapid Application 
Development, not this methodology. We should have prototyped, shown the client the 
“look and feel” of the system and gotten feedback” (Manager, Telecom. Co. #1 
Project). 
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§ 6.6.1.2  Remote Management and Liaisons 
Even for outsourced projects, client firms may maintain the overall responsibility for 
managing the project. Client management manages vendor personnel to some extent, 
especially when they are stationed at the client site. In principle, offshore outsourcing 
could imply that vendor personnel is managed remotely from the client’s site. Yet 
Meadows’ (1996) research suggests that managers lack the direct and nuanced connectivity 
to subordinates common in collocated situations (Haeckel & Slywotzky, 1999; Mintzberg, 
1994). As one of the vendor managers explains (Meadows, 1996b: 113):  
 
“A common mistake of on-site managers is not letting the off-site manager manage the 
off-site people. The off-site manager knows the situation minute-to-minute and is from 
the same culture, able to understand all the nuances of what the team members will 
and will not say outright” (Manager, Telecom. Co. #1 Project). 
 
Liaisons 
Meadows (1996) also found a second theme related to organization design. Vendors 
commonly stationed representatives at the client site. These liaisons worked locally with 
client staff and maintained remote contact with the offshore vendor team. This practice 
follows proposals in contingency literature to connect departments through a liaison, 
linking pin or integrator (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b). Meadows (1996: 
111) found that this focal person channels communications between on and offshore, even 
though technically speaking ramified connections are possible.  
 
“It is extremely important to have a focal person on-site and a focal person off-site, 
otherwise there’s too much mish-mash in communications and people don't respond” 
(Manager, Computer Co. #5 Project). 
 
Other respondents confirmed the last part of this quote. They emphasize that the remote 
vendor team needs a dedicated, onshore foothold to ensure adequate responses in their 
interests (Meadows, 1996b: 87-88).  
 
“On-site presence is also critical for demanding attention and learning the client’s 
business: building the business knowledge is easier to do on-site. Off-site questions 
get answered in one or two days - on-site can be immediate, and you have continual 
contact with client expertise” (Manager, Computer Co. #4 Project). 
 
Concerns associated with liaisons 
Meadows (1996) found risks and disadvantages associated with the use of liaisons. First, 
going through an on-site person substitutes for direct contact between client and (remote) 
vendor personnel. As a liaison facilitates communications between these groups, he or she 
may (unknowingly) interpret and filter messages (Meadows, 1996b: 111):  
 
“The risk is that we do not talk directly to the user, so the level of interpretation is 
high. Our on-site coordinator interprets what the users say and passes it to us, and we 
interpret what he says. It’s just like the telephone game (Manager, Computer Co. #5 
Project). 
 
 145
Second, indirect contact also limits or slows down the establishment of working 
relationships between sites (Meadows, 1996b: 111): 
 
“We learned slowly how to communicate with the client, because everything was 
filtered through the on-site person” (Manager, Chemical Co. Project). 
 
Third, since both sides become dependent on a single channel - possibly just a single 
person - their linkage is vulnerable to breakdown (Meadows, 1996b: 103):  
 
“Communication protocols were agreed on, and all communication was to go through 
our client liaison. Unfortunately, he was sick for a week, and the client was totally cut 
off then. We hadn't planned for that (he also wasn't available on the phone). So, we 
learned contingencies - if this person is unavailable, contact that one, and mail is 
always multiple” (Manager, Transportation Co. #2 Project). 
 
Finally, with complex projects, liaisons may lack the capacity, resources, or knowledge to 
support exchanges going back and forth between sites (Meadows, 1996b: 111):  
 
“We had communication problems because we would tell the on-site coordinator 
something assuming he knew something, but he didn't, and he didn’t understand what 
we wanted and had to ask for explanation, etc. This was a problem at the construction 
phase, when communication grew highly technical, which sometimes was not fully 
appreciated by the on-site coordinator. Getting from the initial question to the ultimate 
answer took a long time!” (Manager #1, Insurance Co. Project). 
 
An organization theory perspective on liaisons 
It is interesting to further analyze the use of liaisons from an organization theory 
perspective. First, Eisenhardt’s (1993) research on high reliability organizations that 
operate in high velocity environment. She describes the importance of multiple channels of 
communication between (often remotely) interacting groups: “The (second) theme is the 
importance of rich real-time information (...). Thus, there are multiple, real-time channels 
between individuals and multiple individuals connected with one another. The result is a 
dense web of communication” (Eisenhardt, 1993: 132). This suggests that remote sites are 
preferably not exclusively linked through a single linking pin. Their role is complemented 
with multiple contact persons and some form of direct communication, as the manager of 
Transportation Co. #2 Project mentioned (see quote above). 
A second link to organization literature concerns Ronald Burt’s theory of Structural holes 
(Burt, 1993, 1997). Structural holes exist when one actor connects two or more (groups of) 
actors that have no alternative, direct linkage. Figure 34 applies this notion to the client-
vendor relationship. Client staff (lined dots) maintains contact with remote vendor staff 
(black dots) through the on-site vendor liaison (black dots).  
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Figure 34 - Structural holes in remote client-vendor collaboration 
 
Burt (1997) focuses on the benefits for the linking pin to maintain nonredundant contacts. 
His framework can also be used to analyze issues of remote, inter-organizational 
collaboration as Meadows (1996) describes. The measures suggested by the Manager of 
the Transportation Co. #2 Project (see quote above) complement the remote link with 
direct contact between client and vendor staff. Figure 35 shows additional dotted lines that 
could represent copied messages or alternative contact persons. This reduces the risk of 
depending on exclusive channels for remote collaboration. 
 
 
Figure 35 - Redundancy in remote client-vendor contact 
 
§ 6.6.1.3  The Role of Face-to-face Contacts 
Meadows (1996) assessed the role of face-to-face interactions in geographically distributed 
projects. This may take the form of vendor staff visiting the client site, or people from the 
client site (client staff or vendor liaison) visiting the vendor site. Sometimes, the nature of 
work undertaken makes it possible to do without cross-site interactions, as the following 
quote illustrates (Meadows, 1996b: 113):  
 
“On-site and off-site didn’t have to work together much (this was a highly technical 
project), so we didn’t build much of a relationship” (Manager, Computer Co. #2 
Project). 
 
But in many other cases, Meadows (1996) found that face-to-face interactions are 
important to promote rapport and reciprocal insight in expectations and collaboration 
modes. This common knowledge facilitated remote cooperation once people returned to 
their site (Krauss & Fussell, 1990).  
Client staff Vendor liaison Vendor staff
Client staff Vendor liaison Vendor staff
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“When I was on-site at the beginning of the project, we developed our “common 
language.” Then, when the client came here, we had no problems communicating. 
Now, I understand European clients better. I can usually assess whether perceptions 
are in synch, and I can foresee and try to preempt some problems” (Manager, 
Transportation Co. #1 Project).  
 
Similarly, offshore vendor staff benefited from past immersion in a remote context to 
cooperate offshore in their current projects (Meadows, 1996b: 87, 109):  
 
“Even the English is a little different, but the people are getting used to each other's 
specific ways of communicating. If you've been in the U.S., you can figure out what 
they're saying, but if you've never been or never dealt with a foreign client, there will 
be problems. I try to pass on my understanding of communication, but it’s difficult 
because this project doesn’t send people over. It’s not the same hearing it second-
hand” (Manager, Publishing Co. Project). 
 
Visits by onshore liaisons to the offshore team were considered important since remote 
collaboration mainly relies on interaction between these two. Liaisons could transfer 
client-related know-how, and anchor their familiarity with offshore staff (Meadows, 
1996b: 109): 
 
“What really helps with a shared way of talking and doing things is having on-site 
people come back off-site” (Manager, Computer Co. #3 Project). 
 
Meadows (1996) also found that client staff visits to the offshore team improved working 
relationships and facilitated remote collaboration. Says Meadows (1996: 109): “Many 
managers said they strongly encouraged clients to visit, even if for only a few days, in 
order to “get a feel” for the environment and become aware of different constraints and 
capabilities.”  
 
§ 6.6.1.4  Remote Communications  
Meadows (1996) emphasizes the importance of remote communications to sustain 
cooperation between sites. Her research covers protocols for using electronic media and 
crafting viable remote contacts. One of her first findings is that distance between sites 
impedes fluid exchanges between offshore vendor staff and users. As two respondents 
mentioned (Meadows, 1996b: 112, 107): 
 
“We really missed quick, small, easy contact with the end user. That's the hassle with 
working remote” (Manager, Computer Co. #5 Project). 
 
When the project proceeds without sufficient interaction, teams start working from their 
own assumptions concerning expectations from remote counterparts. Since these are not 
anchored in solid exchanges, activities remain uncoordinated without both sides being 
aware of that. Figure 36 shows how local processes rely on assumptions that do not match 
expectations on counterpart sites.  
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Figure 36 - Assumption-based coordination between sites 
 
These mismatches may surface rather late in the project and require extensive exchanges 
and adjustments (Meadows, 1996b: 107): 
 
“The client gave us requirements, and we thought they wanted us to make the system 
from that. They thought it would be iterative and that there would be changes. Neither 
of us thought to confirm assumptions” (Manager #1, Telecom. Co. #1 Project). 
 
Shaping distributed communications  
Teams avoid uncoordinated distributed performance in a couple of ways. First, they foster 
frequent, informal exchanges across sites. Instead of limiting interactions to occasions with 
an apparent need for exchange, they maintain contact on an ongoing basis. This makes 
potential mismatches apparent in an early stage (Meadows, 1996b: 106): 
 
“You need to talk to your clients frequently, and not necessarily officially all the time. 
You have to build rapport between module leaders and managers on- and off-site. 
Informal talk is important for that and also important for rectifying things in the system 
- small things, mostly, which make the user very happy” (Manager, Finance Co. #3 
Project). 
 
A second mode for avoiding miscommunications is to encourage feedback. Recipients of a 
message communicate their interpretation and intended action pattern back to the sender 
for verification. In fact, this constitutes a double feedback loop, since the original sender 
can comment on the first feedback loop (Meadows, 1996b: 107):  
 
"Reconfirm what the other person has said and what you understand. This is one of 
the sources of miscommunication that can play havoc” (Manager, Telecom. Co. #1 
Project). 
 
Even senders seek feedback from recipients to ensure reception of their message 
(Meadows, 1996b: 103): 
 
“Earlier, when we were not connected with e-mail, we sent lots of faxes. 
Unfortunately, we thought that when the fax machine confirmed sending, we thought 
they would get it. Sometimes they didn’t. So, now, we always confirm, and if we don't 
hear within a day, we contact them again” (Manager, Transportation Co. #2 Project). 
 
A similar emphasis on feedback loops is proposed by literature on High Reliability 
Organizations. Roberts and Moore’s (1993) research on the Exxon Valdez disaster 
Local processes
Site A
Site A assumption of 
processes site B
Site A
Local processes
Site B
Site B assumption of 
processes site A
Site B
Mismatch
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revealed the importance of cross-checking among crew members: “Both the ship handling 
requirements and the nature of the environment prescribed the use of a more tightly 
coupled system in which players in various organizations recognize their interdependence 
with one another. (...) Tight interconnections would have been represented by continuous 
feedback and checking with one another about the meaning of orders, placement of 
warning lights (...)” (Roberts & Moore, 1993: 245).  
 
Third, Meadows (1996) reports on the use electronic media, in particular asynchronous 
ones like email and fax. Crafting textual messages that transmit the sender’s intention in a 
format that is recognizable for the receiver appeared challenging, especially with language 
differences (Meadows, 1996b: 79): 
 
 “There were some language problems where the nuances were lost in translation 
(and by writing instead of hearing someone’s voice) - something would be said too 
strongly or without friendly feeling. We realized then that their English and our English 
were different!  After a few months, we learned to soften their messages on receipt, 
and pointed out the harsh feelings to them. Whenever we did, they invariably said that 
was not the intention” (Manager, Transportation Co. #1 Project). 
 
Textual media required particular attention to clarity and comprehensiveness of messages 
to achieve the desired effect (Meadows, 1996b: 107):  
 
“It has to be precise and clear. Always try to understand who you are communicating 
to. You must put the same message to different people in different ways. Otherwise, it 
doesn't have the same impact” (Manager, Computer Co. #4 Project). 
 
Finally, Meadows (1996) found that the vendor emphasized documentation and 
formalization of client-vendor interactions. On a contract level, the vendor preferred 
detailed documentation to explicitate vendor and client expectations (Meadows, 1996b: 
106): 
 
“This project was lacking a proper contract with the client - an explicit agreement on 
exactly what they wanted and how things should be managed. I will always make sure 
next time everything is clear and written out. Having nothing written created problems 
later on” (Manager, Computer Co. #1 Project). 
 
During the project, remote communications tended to become formalized compared to 
collocated situations (Meadows, 1996b: 105): 
 
“Informal communication had to formalize. When you are there on-site, informal is OK, 
but not for off-site! ” (Manager, Computer Co. #3 Project). 
 
Vendor staff preferred a formal, lockstep development process with client approval 
milestones. This was considered important to deal with turnover of client personnel and 
deal with change requests (Meadows, 1996b):  
 
“We would send documents, the client manager would ignore them, we would keep 
working and call, and then he would say OK but not sign anything. This was OK in the 
beginning but became a disaster when the client manager changed!” (Manager, 
Computer Co. #3 Project). 
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In a similar mode, synchronous remote interactions like phone calls or teleconferences are 
embedded in a process of documentation. Before people from both sides meet, minutes were setup 
and distributed. The meetings themselves were logged and translated into action items. 
Afterwards, results were documented, made available to both sides, and verified.  
 
“If there’s a teleconference, we record and send minutes, even for daily 
teleconferences. Minutes do clarify whether misinterpretation occurred. Our on-site 
person reads the minutes every day” (Manager, Chemical Co. Project). 
 
§ 6.6.1.5  Interlocking Technical Infrastructure 
Meadows’ (1996) research suggests that remote client-vendor collaboration benefits from 
standardizing and interconnecting their communication infrastructures. Access to the 
counterpart’s network means that both parties can use the same email system and 
databases. Another form of infrastructure integration is incorporating vendor staff in the 
client’s telephone system. Vendor staff thus receives internal extensions as if they were 
part of the client’s organization.  
Interconnected infrastructure supports close forms of collaboration that include reciprocal 
dependencies (Kumar & van Dissel, 1996). It appears to reduce perceived distance 
between client and vendor sites, and becomes more desirable when the client involves the 
same vendor in multiple projects over time (Meadows, 1996b). Meadows (1996: 93) 
quotes vendor managers on the importance of integrated email and telephone services: 
 
“Since we’ve had such a long relationship, we use Unix e-mail to communicate with 
our client and will move to their new e-mail system soon (…)” (Manager, Bombay). 
 
“(…) Projects here sometimes use the dedicated voice system of the client, so it’s like 
being members of their office” (Manager, Madras). 
 
Other vendor managers emphasized the feeling of quasi integration with the client’s 
operations (Meadows, 1996b: 102, 103) 
 
“(…) Being in the same network as the client and having their e-mail and facilities as 
our e-mail and facilities is a big deal. We are closer to the client than our account 
rep., who is in their city but not hooked into their system” (Manager, Telecom. Co. #1 
Project). 
 
“Key for managing communication? Hook into client e-mail!  We didn't have it at the 
beginning, but now we do. They feel like we work for them, not another company, and 
that level of openness and sharing and quick feedback really helps us do our job” 
(Manager, Transportation Co. #2 Project). 
 
§ 6.6.1.6  Time Zone Differences
30
 
Respondents in Meadows’ (1996) research mentioned their experiences with time zones in 
offshore outsourced projects. Outsourcing creates a remote agency relationship between 
                                                 
30 Background information on time zone differences is provided in Part 2  § 7.1.2  . 
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vendor and client with bi-directional communication flows. For instance, vendor staff has 
to absorb knowledge on the client’s business requirements and project expectations. And 
the client must verify vendor achievements and pass on change requests. Time zone 
differences almost inevitable impact these dependencies for Indian software houses like 
TCS, because most of their clients are in Europe or North America. They can be avoided, 
though, by having vendor representatives at the client’s site as a first layer of problem 
solvers (Meadows, 1996b: 112): 
 
“On-site gets input from the client and takes care of urgent problems, so the client has 
control, and the on-site people are in a good time zone for them” (Manager, Computer 
Co. #4 Project). 
 
Project teams can even use time differences to their advantage. They assemble work at the 
end of their working day and pass them on before the next working day at a counterpart 
site (Meadows, 1996b: 112).  
 
“Before we go home, we collect all issues and send them to Australia. When they get 
into office, they have them all, and no time is wasted. We adapt our work - shifts for 
even the people in Australia so they overlap enough to teleconference” (Manager, 
Finance Co. #2 Project). 
 
As this quote indicates, using time zones beneficially requires local adaptation. For 
synchronous communications, people must be aware of office hours at other sites. They 
may even have to alter their working patterns to enable real-time interaction (Meadows, 
1996b: 112).  
 
“The on-site people were split into a day shift and a night shift specifically in order to 
get them ready for passing info. between the U.S. and India. It was just a one-time 
effort for two weeks before some of the on-site people came back to India. One group 
was on days and the other on nights for a week, then the two switched for a week” 
(Manager, Computer Co. #4 Project). 
 
Dependencies may also arise in the period that office hours do not overlap, for example 
during afternoon in the USA and night in India. On these occasions, people may rely on 
asynchronous communications to send a request before the working day at the counterpart 
site starts. Potentially, the receiving side (e.g., India) starts working as soon as they arrive, 
and have the work ready when the sender (e.g., in the USA) returns to office. Meadows 
(1996), however, points out that this requires comprehensive messages that explain a 
request in detail such that additional exchanges are not necessary (Meadows, 1996b: 112): 
 
“The problem in passing off information is that there’s no second chance to ask for 
clarification. People learned to give very comprehensive instructions”  
(Manager, Computer Co. #4 Project). 
 
§ 6.6.1.7  Remote Control 
Offshore outsourcing implies that vendor staff works miles apart from the client site. 
Compared to collocated situations, the client lacks opportunities for regular face-to-face 
meetings, or even directly controlling vendor staff working at the client’s site. Distance 
makes clients loose a feeling for work progress, and this may make them “nervous” and 
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“uncomfortable”. Gradually, formal controls on the vendor side reduced this tension 
(Meadows, 1996b: 106):  
 
“At first, the client was uncomfortable with how to control something halfway around 
the world. “How do I know you'll work the eight hours you charge me, and who will 
work on what, and how you will manage it?” I provided updated information constantly 
on who did what when, etc. Systematic, detailed tracking and reporting made them 
comfortable because they felt like they knew everything that was going on. I gave 
them estimated hours for everything, then if we went over, I gave the reason. They 
wanted everything (everything! ) communicated. It took seven or eight months after I 
came back to Madras before they were truly comfortable. Now, they trust me to make 
people work, but I’m trying to make them trust TCS, not just me personally. It is hard 
to build trust remote! ” (Manager, Publishing Co. Project). 
 
The quotes also illustrate some of the measures vendor firms implement to enable remote 
control. These coincide with earlier mentioned modes for remote collaboration and 
communications. But the emphasis here is more on ensuring remote work accomplishment, 
rather than activity coordination.  
A first mode for remote control is on-shore liaisons. Their control role works both sides. 
On the one hand, they follow up on requests from the offshore vendor team concerning the 
client site. The following quotes reveal this function (Meadows, 1996b: 87): 
 
“The client had a project manager and didn't want an on-site person, but we said they 
must. If we had relied on their manager, the project wouldn’t have finished on time, 
because he had other responsibilities - we could not have gotten timely answers” 
(Manager, Energy Co. Project).  
 
On the other hand, liaisons provide the client firm with an on-site ‘portal’ to the vendor 
team. Client staff relies on the liaison to handle requests for the offshore team. Some 
clients even prefer a number of vendor representatives onshore to reinforce this role 
(Meadows, 1996b): 
 
“It is transparent whether we are in Bombay or London or Chicago. On-site does 
exactly what off-site does, but they are on-site because the client put that in the 
contract. They want to see them in person” (Manager, Computer Co. #4 Project). 
 
Second, remote control benefits from comprehensive contractual specifications and 
planning upfront. Vendors make the development process transparent by specifying phases 
and ways for reporting and communicating. This makes the client becomes more 
comfortable with the actual unfolding of the project. They use documentation of the 
project process to follow progress and detect possible deviations. Formalization continues 
throughout the project in a couple of ways. Major milestones or change requests require 
written approval from the client. Communications are verified to ensure proper 
understanding and agreement with proposed action patterns. Meetings are documented and 
verified for ex post proof if need be (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
“If anything's important (for example, if it affects the schedule), lay it down in writing. 
We could not always insist on the client writing it down or signing an acceptance form, 
but near the end, we refused to work without sign-off” (Manager, Computer Co. #3 
Project). 
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Third, once the project starts, vendor staff keeps the client regularly and comprehensively 
updated on work progress. Since the client lacks collocated interaction with the vendor 
team, they almost exclusively rely on these communications to get an idea of work 
progress. For that reasons, vendor managers emphasize their proactive attitude to update 
clients extensively in a standardized format, especially when the offshore team deviates 
from the original plan (Meadows, 1996b: 107, 104).  
 
“Keep the client informed always. If you're not able to meet a deadline, inform them 
well in advance. Always put things in a proper format and give weekly status reports. 
We didn't do enough of that early on and learned. Never assume that they know!” 
(Manager, Finance Co. #1 Project). 
 
Regular contact encompasses not only formal reporting, but also informal exchanges and 
rapport on a management level. This provides client and vendor with a good feel for 
offshore work progress and onshore expectations.  
Finally, in addition to reporting on work progress, vendor staff transmits intermediate 
outputs of the work itself. Regular deliverables show the client tangible results of the 
offshore team. At the same time, they involve the client in the control process. Given the 
risk of miscommunications on a distance, iterative verification cycles ensure that the 
offshore team’s efforts are coordinated with client expectations (Meadows, 1996b: 107).  
 
“We sent software every fortnight during development at whatever stage of 
development. The client wanted to scan through code in the process of development. 
That helped, because they could change what was being done before it was finished 
and had to be re-worked” (Manager, Finance Co. #5 Project). 
 
§ 6.6.2  Millar (1999) 
Millar (1999) reports on two research projects that investigated the management of 
internationally distributed software trading partnerships in India and Malaysia. She 
conducted in-depth case studies that included interviews on a managerial level with 
representatives from software exporters and international trading partner companies.  
Millar (1999) adopts a learning perspective to explain the dynamics of international 
software trade. She points out that software is a knowledge-intensive product. Insight in 
the requirements that drive the software development process is distributed among multiple 
users. Incorporation of user expectations therefore depends on interaction between user 
communities and software development professionals.  
Using theory from developmental psychology, Millar (1999) proposes that vendors in 
developing countries experience a 3-phase learning trajectory. First, they become an 
insourcing partner by providing onshore staff to client firms. This allows them to acquire 
the expertise and skills to enter a second phase of “punctuated offshore work” (Millar, 
1999: 11). Vendors alternate onshore and offshore phases, and start to take on more 
complex projects. Or they have on-site liaisons that link onshore client staff and offshore 
vendor staff. A third, “rare” phase is “process internalization” (Millar, 1999: 14). Know-
how acquired at the client’s site is generalized and incorporated at offshore vendor 
locations. It is then leveraged to other distributed projects that rely mainly on remote 
collaboration, even for complex projects.  
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Millar (1999) presents for the first two phases of her framework quotes from interviews 
with vendor managers and executives. These are insightful for the purpose of this study 
and are therefore analyzed below.  
 
Concerning the first phase, one interviewee vendor explains the properties of working 
onshore, at the client’s site:  
 
“On-site (…) you have the comfort, you know on a daily basis what’s happening, 
comfort level is very high and you know the people, the calibre, etc” (Millar, 1999: 10). 
 
The quote suggests that collocation provides a natural way for gaining insight in staff 
capacity. It also keeps people updated on work progress automatically since they 
participate in the same context. Conversely, geographic distributedness may impede 
awareness of remote staff capacity and work progress.  
A British firm that partners with a Malaysian company considered on-shore rotation of 
offshore vendor staff important for acquiring client-related know-how.  
 
“What we’re certainly doing, on the (Malaysian firm) side, is doing quite a lot of 
physical interchange of people. (…) So that they get a good idea of what goes on in a 
European product team. (…) They certainly have a much better understanding of some 
of the dynamics of the project (…)” (Millar, 1999: 10). 
 
In addition to generic insight in the client context, on-shore rotation also increases 
awareness of project evolution. The quote seems to indicate that entirely remote 
connections would fail to transfer insight in client operations and project intricacies.  
 
For the second phase, Millar (1999) found that migration to punctuated offshore work 
depended on the vendors’ track record onshore. This also determined the complexity of 
projects outsourced. An Indian vendor representative commented:  
 
“More than anything else, (on-site) it has been building up credibility with customers. 
Providing satisfactory services to them over a short period of time, winning their 
confidence and then moving on to getting more complex work to be done out of here” 
(Millar, 1999: 11). 
 
Unless clients have perceived on-site satisfying performance, they seem reluctant to 
embark on remote work arrangements, especially for more complex projects. Distance may 
limit their ability to control vendor performance. And remote coordination of complex 
work may appear unfeasible at early stages of cooperation. This could imply that - 
compared to collocated projects - remote work arrangements have limited capacity for 
information processing and problem resolution.  
 
Similar to Meadows’ (1996) research, Millar (1999) found that vendors often choose a 
liaison model to connect on- and offshore:  
 
“The way we conducted this remote maintenance was, certain people will be there on-
site as our on-site co-ordinators. The bulk of the staff will be sitting in India” (Millar, 
1999: 12). 
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The second phase of punctuated offshore work makes the difference between onshore and 
remote working more apparent. An Indian vendor representative points at the need for 
extensive communications with offshore collaboration. In turn, this makes technical 
infrastructure vital for sustaining remote contact: 
 
“There is a tremendous difference in the way that you manage projects on-site and 
manage remotely. (…) The level of communications will have to be a much higher 
order (…) and therefore that is where the technical infrastructure becomes extremely 
critical. (…) Email becomes very important, followed by teleconferencing (…) and 
videoconferencing too” (Millar, 1999: 12). 
 
Millar (1999) asserts that knowledge exchange between client and vendor staff fluctuates 
during IS projects. More intensive phases include the front and backend of a project. The 
intensity of knowledge exchange interrelates with the vendor’s preference for working 
onshore or remotely. Onshore is typically considered more suitable for interlocked client-
vendor cooperation:  
 
“The front end activity, the analysis, frameworking analysis, design up to a certain 
stage is best done in close co-operation in communion with the end user” (Millar, 
1999: 13).  
 
Millar’s (1999) research suggests that remote contact - even with the support of electronic 
media - provides limited support for certain types of work during a project. These includes 
activities that require knowledge exchange, are unstructured and tightly interdependent. 
Typically, project participants face these tasks at the front-end of a project in the analysis 
phase.  
Millar (1999) further expands on the properties of remote collaboration that underpin this 
notion. She explains that remote communications lack the suppleness and low threshold of 
collocated exchanges. As a consequence, documented communications (like 
specifications) tend to substitute for interpersonal exchanges and must therefore 
extensively cover a topic: 
 
“(for offshore telework) the specifications need to be a lot more comprehensive than 
when I’m sitting (on-site) and you tell me something, next day I don’t understand and I 
can come back and say ‘what exactly do you mean’. But when I’m sitting 10,000 miles 
away I can’t do that” (Millar, 1999: 13) 
 
This substitution process is triggered by distance, not by task uncertainty as contingency 
theory states (Galbraith, 1973; Van de Ven et al., 1976). But contingency theory can be 
used to analyze the reverse causal pattern that seems to emerge. As distance brings about a 
switch to documented exchanges, it limits remote information processing capacity. In turn, 
this limits actors to take on simple, structured tasks remotely. Onsite liaisons or visits 
complement these exchanges to cater for complex work.  
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Chapter 7  Conceptual Lens and Framing Literature 
 
This section proposes a conceptual lens for investigating the effects of global 
distributedness on the coordination and control of IS projects. The conceptual lens is then 
used for surfacing lines of reasoning that emerge from current research as reviewed in the 
preceding section. This concludes the theoretical framework, and provides a basis for 
empirical research.  
 
§ 7.1  Gaps 
 
The research question - in particular sub question 2 - that guides this study includes global 
distributedness as independent construct. Building on our literature review, we provide a 
refined definition by using the concept of gaps. Global distributedness is considered to 
introduce gaps or differences between people involved in global IS projects. We propose 
five dimensions to conceptualize gaps: geographical distance, time zone differences, 
governance differences, cultural differences, and infrastructural differences. These are 
elaborated below. 
 
§ 7.1.1  Geographical Distance 
Since the late 60s, distance - or physical proximity, remoteness - has become part of 
theorizing and empirical research in the organization sciences. A research group around 
T.J. Allen has related distance to work dependencies, communication patterns and 
organizational structure in R&D organizations (Allen, 1984; Allen & Cohen, 1969; Allen 
& Hauptman, 1992). Most studies in this tradition focus on distance in terms of office 
shape and the number of feet or meters between people’s rooms. Distance appears to 
reduce the frequency of exchanges, in particular informal communications (Kraut & 
Galegher, 1990). This limits information processing capacity, and suggests that the further 
people work apart the less they can handle interdependent and uncertain tasks (McCann & 
Galbraith, 1981; Van de Ven et al., 1976). While these findings are useful, they apply to 
relatively proximate settings where physical distance may be changed gradually. It thus 
results in recommendations like collocating people working on closely intertwined tasks 
(McCann & Galbraith, 1981).  
Advanced and affordable transportation and information technologies change this 
traditional notion of distance. All of a sudden, people may work not a couple of doors or 
floors away, but a couple of miles or kilometers, like with teleworking. This process 
started with projects that involved multiple sites in the same country, like the Polaris 
project (Sapolsky, 1972). Another example is collaboration in the context of European 
integration, like the ESPRIT research programs, Airbus Industries, and the European Space 
Agency (ESA). Distance between co-workers contributing to the same project was further 
stretched when companies spread across the globe (Andres, 1992), or outsourced to remote 
partner firms (Solomon, 1995). These two forms of distributedness - within the same 
company or between two or more firms - also apply to IS projects. An example of intra-
firm distributedness is multi-site operations and IS implementations that require integrated 
information technology infrastructure (Markus et al., 2000). An example of inter-
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organizational remote collaboration is offshore outsourcing by firms from the US and 
Europe to countries like India, China, or Ireland (Rajkumar & Dawley, 1997).  
 
From an empirical research perspective, distance in global projects differs from physical 
proximity as a construct. While it appears useful to define a gradual scale of distance in the 
latter case, this approach seems not suitable for situations where sites are thousands of 
miles or kilometers apart. This is because dependent constructs - like coordination and 
communications modes - are not likely to shift gradually once people work from sites that 
make regular face-to-face contact too costly in terms of resources or effort. Instead of 
investigating distributed projects that range from collocation to those that are 
geographically dispersed, only the latter are therefore included in the empirical research 
section. As indicated, we focus on those projects where face-to-face interaction is 
unfeasible on a frequent basis.  
 
§ 7.1.2  Time zone Differences 
‘Clock time’ is a traditional notion in organizational theorizing that characterizes the 
temporal dimensions as being linear, objective and quantifiable (Hassard, 1989). Recent 
studies typically consider this view somewhat mundane, “(…) because, though perhaps 
useful for practical purposes, it is limiting for gaining a comprehensive understanding of 
time in organizational settings” (Lee & Liebenau, 1999: 1039). Yet within this tradition, 
one area has not yet received the attention from researchers it deserves. It is the situation of 
actors working on different clocks, like night shifts of blue collar manufacturing 
employees or medical professionals (Blau & Lunz, 1999).  
Another example concerns east - west collaboration across geographical boundaries 
(Boutellier, Gassmann, Macho, & Roux, 1998; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). The earth is 
divided in 12 time zones that run north-south. The zones have different shapes because 
each country can decide which time they want to be on. This depends on their degree of 
latitude and local preferences. Standardization of world time has resulted in the 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), replacing the earlier GMT or Greenwich Mean Time 
in 1986. Geographically UTC is in time zone 0 (see Table 11) that starts up north from 
Greenland and goes all the way south across the UK, Ireland and west from Africa to the 
South Pole. In the summer period, time is adjusted by adding 1 hour for daylight saving. 
This is called Daylight Saving Time (DST) and applies to North America, Europe and 
Russia. UTC is independent of DST settings, so Paris at UTC +1 becomes UTC +2.  
For any time zone the local time can be simply calculated by taking the current time in 
UTC and adding or subtracting the number of time zones east or west from UTC. Going 
eastbound from the UTC zone (like London - Singapore) means adding one hour for each 
zone. Westbound (London - New York) implies subtracting one hour per zone. For 
example, the US East Coast Time (EST) is UTC -5 (no daylight saving). Using the 24-hour 
system common in Europe and Asia, this means that when it is 15:00 in the UTC zone 
(e.g., London), it is 15:00 minus 5 = 10:00 in New York. Similarly, Melbourne is UTC 
+10. So UTC 9:00 in London means 19:00 in Melbourne (same day). 
East - west collaboration means that people contributing to the same process or project 
work at different hours. People may work in New York from 9:00 to 17:00 local time, 
while for co-workers in e.g. London this means 14:00 to 22:00 local time (Table 11).  
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In Table 11, the second row shows the number of hours that should be subtracted from or 
added to UTC to yield local time. It also provides examples of cities or regions that are in 
the particular time zone, like New York, Sao Paulo and London. From the next row 
onwards, local time is indicated following the 24-hour system. Scrolling down the columns 
implies moving ahead in time for each zone. Colors indicate day or night hours: from 
23:00 until 5:00 dark gray for the night, 6:00 until 7:00 for the morning period, 8:00 until 
19:00 for (extended) working hours, and 20:00 until 22:00 for evening hours. The table 
facilitates comparison of hours across time zones. Horizontally the table shows the same 
moment across different time zones, and provides an overview of one complete day that 
‘proceeds’ westbound. The color shifts reinforce that idea. 
 
At the opposite side of the globe, UTC has the International Date Line as its counterpart, which 
runs from the Bering sea (up north) down to the Aleutian Islands and east from New Zealand. 
Passing the date line from east to west (like Auckland - San Francisco) requires subtracting 24 
hours (hence a full day). Going in the opposite direction (e.g., Vancouver - Tokyo) implies 
adding 24 hours. Apart from this date line, local dates switch of course at 12 o’clock at night. 
The DiskCo case - with sites in the Far East and US - elaborates on this notion. 
 
Remote collaboration often bridges multiple time zones, unless people are only working north-
south in the same ‘vertical’ zone, like Europe - South Africa, North America - South America. In 
all other cases, time zone differences between sites are important for determining the ‘window’ 
between sites. This refers to the period available for synchronous remote collaboration.  
 
 
Table 11 - Example of time zone differences 
 
   Direction in which day & night proceed    
UTC -5 UTC -4 UTC -3 UTC -2 UTC -1 UTC 
New York  Sao Paulo   London 
1:00 2:00 3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 
2:00 3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 
3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 
4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 
5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 
6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 
7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 
8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 
9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 
10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 
11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 
12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 
13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 
14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 
15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 
16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 
18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 
19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 
20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 0:00 1:00 
Daylight Saving Time (DST) not applied
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So far, research on distributed collaboration has not considered time differences as an 
explicit construct. A few studies offer insights in people’s experiences with time zones, but 
more as a peripheral theme (Cramton, 1997; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). Yet the potential 
implications of time zone differences on the way distributed projects are coordinated and 
controlled are important to consider. For instance, they may enforce sequential 
interdependence where reciprocal or team dependence would be preferable. Also, the fact 
the working hours do not (completely) overlap may impede traditional coordination and 
control mechanisms that rely on synchronous interaction between actors. (E.g., mutual 
adjustment (Thompson, 1967), and behavior and clan control modes (Ouchi, 1977)).  
 
§ 7.1.3  Governance Differences 
A third dimension of global distributedness is the governance gap. In a collocated setting, 
collaboration within firms and across organizational boundaries is embedded in an 
organizational hierarchy or lateral contract (Hennart, 1993). Within the same organization, 
people adhere to a consistent control structure and develop a common jargon (Williamson, 
1975). Between firms, contractual and implicit rules common to a geographical or business 
area govern exchange relationships (Powell, 1990).  
Global distributedness introduces differences for these governance forms. Multiple sites of 
the same organization may have adapted to local conditions and rules. When they connect 
for a project - e.g., implementing a distributed network infrastructure - differences in 
management structure and approach may surface. Remote collaboration between firms 
may reveal different contractual regimes and implicit practices. Connecting staff from both 
sides requires attention to communication structure and division of responsibilities (Kumar 
& Willcocks, 1996). 
 
§ 7.1.4  Cultural Differences 
Globally distributed collaboration is likely to involve people with different cultural 
backgrounds. Cultural diversity encompasses norms for behavior, values, and language. 
Scholars have proposed dimensions that capture these differences (Hall, 1988; Hofstede, 
1991; Trompenaars, 1993).  
This study perceives culture as a form of common knowledge (Grant, 1996b; Krauss & 
Fussell, 1990). People absorb and apply common norms of behavior while including over 
time in various geographically constrained communities, and in organizations and other 
(professional) groups.  
Interaction across cultures can then be interpreted in accordance with the (cross-functional) 
diversity construct as defined by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Dougherty (1990, 
1992). Their research perceives functional diversity as differences in professional outlook, 
perceptions and work procedures. Within a department, people become used to particular 
behaviors and attitudes that may differ from those common to another unit.  
 
Like with cross-functional diversity, cultural differences increase information processing 
needs (Dougherty, 1992; Krauss & Fussell, 1990). Dissimilar ‘common’ knowledge 
translates in diverse repertoires of behaviors that are not self-explanatory across 
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communities. Complementary efforts becomes necessary to anticipate and enable re-
interpretation of actions. For remote communications, this view can be integrated with 
media expansion theory as earlier introduced (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). Cultural 
differences imply that people lack insight in their counterpart’s cultural background and 
language (nuances). They will therefore need relatively rich media or preceding face-to-
face contact to contextualize exchanges.  
 
§ 7.1.5  Infrastructural Differences 
Finally, technical infrastructures may differ across sites. This includes access to basic 
facilities like electricity and telecommunications (capacity) in some parts of the world. But 
also different (versions of) hardware, platforms, and applications. Even within the same 
firm, units may have adopted different infrastructures that are not compliant. This becomes 
apparent when people start collaborating across sites and often results in implementing 
common technology across sites (Dickson et al., 1997). Between firms, vendor and client 
organization may deploy different infrastructures that constrain collaboration between IS 
professionals from both sides (Smith et al., 1996).  
 
§ 7.2  Conceptual Lens 
 
The research question guiding this study is How global distributedness affects the 
coordination and control of globally distributed IS projects. The conceptual lens that is 
used for empirically investigating this question draws on results from the preceding 
sections. It combines (1) general coordination and control theory, (2) research on 
distributed work, and (3) the gaps, as shown in  
Figure 37. The conceptual lens incorporates the relationship between contingencies and 
coordination and control portfolios as earlier elaborated (see also Figure 28) 
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Figure 37 - Conceptual lens of the study 
 
Starting at the top of the figure, global distributedness results in five gaps that, in turn, 
impact (a) the contingencies (bottom left), and (b) coordination and control portfolios 
(bottom right). In a sense, the gaps can be seen as a new set of contingencies.  
The conceptual lens allows for different patterns of explanation. An example of (a) is that 
cultural differences extend functional diversity. This translates into a portfolio of 
coordination mechanisms that reflects the need for contextual communications. An 
example of (b) is the fact that geographic distance affects the control portfolio since it 
makes direct observation unlikely.  
 
§ 7.3  Framing the Literature on Distributed Work 
 
This section summarizes research on distributed work earlier introduced. It uses the 
conceptual lens to assess and frame current insight into the effects of global distributedness 
(i.e., the five gaps) on coordination and control of (IS project) work. The result serves as a 
form of propositions in subsequent phases of the research. For illustration purposes, some 
quotes are included from a Rotterdam School of Management student research project on 
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-Time zone differences
-Governance 
-Culture
-Infrastructure
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Global Virtual Teams at Shell Deepwater Services (SDS), part of Royal Dutch Shell Group 
(Brasz, 2000).  
 
§ 7.3.1  Geographical Distance 
 
“The reduction of spatial-physical barriers between highly interdependent people can 
reduce response times and coordination costs by substituting more personal, flexible 
forms of communication for impersonal forms, and can help prevent conflict by 
encouraging friendships” - McCann and Galbraith (1981). 
 
As the quote suggests, one strategy to handle work interdependencies is to reduce distance 
between co-workers or departments (McCann & Galbraith, 1981). This view resulted from 
research on the effects of proximity on communication patterns (Allen & Cohen, 1969). 
The findings are confined to spatial environments like office floor plans, and refer to an era 
before advanced communications technologies became widespread. But one could apply 
them analogically to global distances. Reversing McCann and Galbraith’s (1981) quote, 
this implies that distance would: 
 
1. Increase response times 
2. Increase coordination costs 
3. Result in impersonal and inflexible forms of communication 
4. Increase the likelihood of conflicts due to limited friendships. 
 
With these statements in mind, the effects of distance on coordination and control are 
assessed here. Research on distributed work has shown that physical or geographical 
distance accounts for particular issues, effects and responses. An attempt is made to elicit 
lines of reasoning around the following themes: polycontextuality, electronic 
communication media, groupware, distance and the interpersonal connection, remote 
management, and control. 
 
§ 7.3.1.1  Polycontextuality 
An initial consequence of distance is that two or more physically separate sites are 
involved in some form of joint effort. Each site can be considered a context on its own, 
with unique local actors, activity processes, and events (Engeström et al., 1995). Without 
deliberate effort, these local contexts remain separate and ‘unshared’ (Hinds & Bailey, 
2000). This can be traced to the stickiness of local information, in particular information 
that remains non-explicitated in collocated settings (von Hippel, 1994). A primary effect of 
distance is therefore that people working from different sites are basically unconnected 
(Vaughan, 1997). If they are supposed to accomplish work with cross-site dependencies, 
they must therefore move beyond their local setting by engaging in some form of bridging. 
Modes for connecting contexts include representatives, common knowledge, boundary 
objects, and direct contact (Engeström et al., 1995).  
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§ 7.3.1.2  Electronic Communication Media 
 
“People make jokes that don’t come across and are received as being dishonest. 
Email is very user-friendly, but only when you know the team members and they know 
you, otherwise misinterpretation of the intentions is just as easily done.” - Interviewee 
in Brasz (2000: 96)  
 
Distance induces reliance on electronic media like e-mail, v-mail, fax, phone and 
videoconferencing to sustain remote communications. These media not only extend inter-
personal communications from co-presence to distributedness. Some of them also offer 
complementary opportunities for documenting and sharing messages (Markus, 1994). 
More specifically, people can broadcast and forward messages, and include prior 
exchanges to reveal communication chains (Dimitrova & Salaff, 1998; Maznevski & 
Chudoba, 2000). Asynchronous communication modes - like e-mail and v-mail - can 
prepare synchronous inter-personal exchanges and economize on the duration of these 
(Markus, 1994).  
 
§ 7.3.1.2.1  Issues 
While electronic media extend inter-personal encounters beyond co-presence, they do not 
seamlessly substitute for these. Research has surfaced a number of issues relating to the 
use of electronic media for remote collaboration.  
First, people become highly dependent on technologies used for maintaining remote 
contact (Abel, 1990; Staples, 1997). Work progress thus relies on the quality of inter-
linked technologies to sustain communications, like network quality, satellite connection, 
computer hardware reliability, and the extent to which operating systems and applications 
are bug-free and compatible. Reliance on technology also implies that users need training 
and support to familiarize and integrate technology in their work environment (Staples, 
1997).  
 
Second, a substantial stream of research has elaborated on the fact that electronic media 
support only a limited level of interactivity and number of cues (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). 
‘Richer’ media like videoconferencing and phone transmit a more comprehensive 
communication experience than textual and asynchronous media like e-mail and v-mail. 
Yet still, technology cannot transmit a person’s ‘presence’ like in face-to-face settings 
(Lombard & Ditton, 1997). As a consequence, salience and nuance of communications 
suffer when people attempt to interact electronically (Cramton, 1997; Vaughan, 1997). 
This compromises communication quality, typically defined in terms of interactivity and 
number of sensory channels involved (Kraut & Galegher, 1990).  
At the same time, more recent approaches emphasize that a medium’s richness is not a 
static property (Lee, 1994; Markus, 1994). For instance, Channel Expansion Theory 
suggests that common experience bases between remote participants enhance their 
communication experience. These include experience with the channel, experience with 
the messaging topic, experience with the organizational context, and experience with 
communication co participants (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). In particular, face-to-face 
encounters prior to remote communications appear to enrich mediated exchanges (Abel, 
1990; Meadows, 1996b).  
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Third, from a, individual behavior point of view, remote communications require more 
effort than face-to-face encounters (Kraut & Galegher, 1990). Remote communications are 
more deliberate and intention-dependent than collocated exchanges that may rely on a 
rather impromptu pace (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). In particular real-time encounters like 
videoconferencing require careful advance planning (Maznevski & Chudoba, 2000).  
Remote exchanges require also more effort as people are expected to transmit and digest 
communication intentions within the constraints of the technology in use. Limitations in 
channel richness and interactivity may conflict with task demands. This may lengthen the 
cycle times of communications, for instance when people use e-mail for complex tasks or 
sensitive issues (Kraut & Galegher, 1990).  
 
Fourth, people are often not familiar with the nature of remote communications. 
Communications tend to become more task-oriented and formal than common in a 
collocated work setting (Staples, 1997). This reduces the feasibility of building social 
connections and, hence, more complex coordination processes (Perin, 1991; Wiesenfeld et 
al., 1998).  
Throughout the collaboration process, people often fail to describe their local context, 
assuming that their background and current situation is known to their counterpart 
(Cramton, 1997). As it seems, people transpose their mode for maintaining contact with 
local people to the distributed setting. However, as earlier indicated, in a polycontextual 
environment, people are included in settings with their own local actors, events and 
processes (Engeström et al., 1995). Experiencing different events and coming from diverse 
backgrounds, they cannot assume commonality with remote counterparts.  
Furthermore, when people act as a sender in remote exchanges, they appear not skilled in 
crafting salient messages with lean media (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). And as a receiver, 
they do not digest electronic messages with sufficient precision, and respond in a rapid 
manner (Staples, 1997). To local people, their behaviors are self-explanatory and logic. 
But on a meta-site level, these behaviors tend to result in infrequent and irregular 
communication patterns (Meadows, 1996b). Distributed contributions to a common task 
are no longer interwoven, but fall apart in multiple individual actions without apparent 
coherence on a collective level (Adler & Borys, 1996; Weick & Roberts, 1993).  
 
Finally, remote electronic communications result in inclusion problems. On the one hand, 
local people may not be included in cross-site exchanges (Cramton, 1997). For instance, 
they do not receive a cc of emails, and remain unaware of dynamics at a remote site 
(Staples, 1997).  
On the other hand, local interactions may remain separate from remote exchanges. In the 
Challenger case, the teleconference was interrupted for a local caucus (Vaughan, 1997). 
When the teleconference was resumed, remote counterparts were granted only limited 
insight in the caucus process and results. In her study of , one of Brasz’ (2000: 90) 
interviewees reports: “I get very confused sometimes. I know that it is wonderful that we 
can work together even if we are globally dispersed but I have a continuous feeling that I 
am missing out on something as my team members are not nearby and communication 
doesn’t always go smoothly.”  
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§ 7.3.1.2.2  Effects 
A number of effects can be derived from the issue areas introduced above.  
 
First, the use of electronic media requires more deliberate effort and other ‘costs’ (Kraut & 
Galegher, 1990). Part of these costs comes from using lean - possibly asynchronous - 
electronic media for demanding inter-personal tasks. For instance, trust building, conflict 
resolution or collaborating on unstructured, knowledge-intensive tasks (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998).  
 
Second, these constraints translate into infrequent communications between sites, and they 
stretch cycle times (Kraut & Galegher, 1990).  
 
Third, they also impede information sharing across sites. Local information remains 
locally, contributing to its ‘stickiness’ (von Hippel, 1994).  
 
Fourth, on a meta-site collaborative level, this has significant consequences. Limited 
remote contact results in information asymmetries, and incomplete insight in counterpart 
sites (Cramton, 1997; Vaughan, 1997). People connect imprecisely and lack the capacity to 
handle delicate and sensitive issues. They may attribute miscommunications, silence, or 
delays incorrectly. This increases the likelihood of conflicts and communication 
breakdowns. And it suggests that people do not easily perceive counterparts as being 
reliable and trustworthy.  
 
Finally, as local perceptions, assumptions, events, and constraints remain unknown for 
counterparts, conflicts easily arise, yet without being surfaced. And if they are surfaced, 
remote resolution takes longer than in collocated situations (Hinds & Bailey, 2000).  
 
§ 7.3.1.2.3  Adaptation 
 
“Orchestrate for the members to meet face-to-face for instance twice a year. Virtual 
communication goes so much better when you know the faces with the names’. ‘Face-
to-face meetings are required to develop a real sense of team and team alignment. It’s 
the people that make it work not the infrastructure. (…) 
 
Face-to-face meetings can clear the air when tensions are created by 
misunderstanding’. ‘Sometimes misunderstanding just happens, you can’t see the 
other persons facial expressions and can’t feel the intentions, when this happens 
frequently the team dynamics will deteriorate. (…)  
 
Crystal clear roles and responsibilities are a requirement.” - Interviewees in Brasz 
(2000: 92, 93, 91) 
 
As people start to realize the issues and effects tied to distributed collaboration and 
electronic media, they develop modes for dealing with these. Research reports on the 
following strategies.  
 
First, people tend to alternate different types of media and - possibly - visits. This blending 
combines beneficial properties of media, while counteracting their disadvantages. For 
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example, instead of exclusively relying on email, they call each other once in a while to 
maintain the ‘personal connection’ (Markus, 1994). And before making a phone call, 
people send emails to communicate basic information (Markus, 1994; Maznevski & 
Chudoba, 2000). Alternation also means that remote collaboration is often preceded and 
punctuated by visits (Abel, 1990). 
 
Second, remote communications require specific skills and attitudes. People are expected 
to behave more proactively. They should take initiative to update others, request 
clarification, and describe their local context and constraints (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
Deliberate inclusion of people in communication loops becomes important to avoid 
information asymmetries (Vaughan, 1997). When sending electronic messages, attention to 
comprehensive and clear shaping of messages is important to address loss of salience 
(Abel, 1990; Cramton, 1997). On the receiving end, people should pay special attention to 
digesting incoming messages, and responding in a rapid manner (Staples, 1997). Since 
perceptions across sites easily divert, more attention is required for feedback loops and 
cross-checks (Meadows, 1996a). An interviewee in Brasz’ (2000: 89) research mentions: 
“Repeat back what you have heard as to ensure that you have understood what the speaker 
intended to communicate.”  
 
 
Third, selection of contributors to a distributed work setting is an anticipatory strategy. 
Common knowledge in relevant areas (like language and work-related competence) 
facilitate remote contact (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998) and enriches peoples’ perception of 
electronic media (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). Also, distance means that people are expected 
to work more autonomously. Participants in distributed collaboration are therefore selected 
on criteria like on-the-job experience, and capability to work independently (Perin, 1991; 
Wiesenfeld et al., 1998).  
 
Fourth, distance makes collaboration more formal and documented (Meadows, 1996a). In 
collocated situations, incomplete documentation may suffice as people can ask for 
clarification. Remoteness enforces more extensive specifications (Millar, 1999) to 
compensate for remote ‘myopia’. As a consequence, organizations shift to prototypes to 
elicit user requirements and subsequent feedback (Meadows, 1996b). Expectations and 
processes are made explicit upfront as far as possible by means of rules and procedures. 
Work progress is documented and shared to obviate the loss of face-to-face contact 
(Staples, 1997).  
 
This process of documentation facilitates inclusion of multiple actors. Each person can be 
asked to contribute, submit, and comment on their counterparts’ work (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998; Majchrzak et al., 2000a).  
 
At the same time, formalization may contradict intricate coordination demands of 
unstructured and interconnected work (see Figure 19 and Figure 21). Another problem of 
formalization resides on a meta-communication level (Watzlawick et al., 1967). Limited 
common knowledge and working relationships imply that people have difficulty 
establishing workable protocols for remote collaboration. This adds to inefficiency of 
remote communications. It reduces the scope of remote collaboration to simple, loosely 
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coupled tasks that remain constant (cell 1 in Table 8). Researchers found that groups are 
unable to agree upon or adhere to protocols if they did not engage in social exchanges 
upfront (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998) or tasks are unstructured (Majchrzak et al., 2000a). 
On the other hand, cohesive groups seems to rely on implicit group norms that substitute 
for explicit structuring of exchanges (Goodman & Darr, 1998). This suggest a relationship 
between group cohesiveness and use of formal protocols.  
 
This suggests that low-cohesion reduces the effectiveness of impersonal coordination 
mechanisms. Such groups lack both main categories of coordination mechanisms (Van de 
Ven et al., 1976), and are unable to achieve even basic collaborative results (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998).  
 
Fifth, people compensate for reduced inter-personal effectiveness on a distance by 
moderating the division and structure of the work itself. They simplify and reduce 
dependencies across sites, and divide work in recognizable ‘chunks’. Lockstep stages are 
formulated with formal sign-offs to make tasks more transparent and understandable for 
remote partners (Meadows, 1996a).  
 
Finally, distributed contributors become heavily dependent on technology (hardware, 
software, network) to connect and integrate their efforts. They need reliable, compatible 
technology that includes training and support (Staples, 1997). Permanent electronic links - 
like video walls, lease lines - reduce communication effort and simulate co-presence. This 
may increase communication frequency and information sharing between sites (Abel, 
1990). As an emerging form of quasi collocated collaboration, some of the 
abovementioned issues - like the need for formalization - may thus loose relevance.  
 
§ 7.3.1.3  Groupware 
Groupware offers a coherent set of functionality that allows for transmitting, storing, 
categorizing, and retrieving information. It consists of communication tools, workflow 
applications and shared databases.  
 
For people working in a distributed setting, groupware offers a central virtual platform for 
planning, interacting and documenting work (Goodman & Darr, 1998; Majchrzak et al., 
2000a). It facilitates sharing of explicit, formalized information (Ciborra & Patriotta, 
1996).  
 
§ 7.3.1.3.1  Initial Use 
Researchers found that initially people assume that groupware could exclusively facilitate 
distributed collaboration processes (Majchrzak et al., 2000a). The collaborative technology 
was to be used for “all communication and knowledge-sharing needs” (Majchrzak et al., 
2000a: 11).31 Similarly, Ciborra and Patriotta (1996) found that groupware was intended to 
                                                 
31 Page numbers refer to the 1998 working paper version of the paper. 
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comprehensively capture and ‘funnel’ interactions related to new product development 
projects.  
 
§ 7.3.1.3.2  Issues & Effects 
Having started from this perspective, groups encountered a number of issues. First, 
groupware mainly supports asynchronous exchange of textual and visual data. These lean 
media appear less suitable for facilitating rich and interactive exchanges. The latter is 
needed when people collaborate with different backgrounds (Goodman & Darr, 1998). Or 
when groups work on innovative design tasks that change regularly and require 
simultaneous brainstorming (Majchrzak et al., 2000a). Technology thus increases the costs 
of communicating in terms of effort and time (Kraut & Galegher, 1990). People must 
textualize and visualize contributions that remained implicit or verbal in a collocated 
setting (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996; Majchrzak et al., 2000a).  
Second, groupware systems impose a formal structure on work processes. It enforces work 
sequences, procedures, and sign-offs. This may burden people used to more informal, 
impromptu ways of collaborating (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996; Majchrzak et al., 2000a). It 
increases the burden of communicating as people attempt to channel their collaboration 
patterns through the system.  
A more specific example of this issues is the fact that groupware supports extensive 
categorization and search functionality to organize collective work. For example, 
communications can be numbered, coded, and identified with keywords. This seems useful 
for ex-post information retrieval, or updating people who join a project at an intermediate 
stage. However, for the current work processes, this implies that communications must be 
labeled and structured in accordance with the documentation system. Since people cannot 
or do not want to spend additional effort in this area, they leave parts of the groupware 
functionality unused (Majchrzak et al., 2000a).  
Third, people may start to connect off-line, even in situations where groupware was 
supposed to channel exclusively collaboration processes (Majchrzak et al., 2000a). This 
creates an inclusion issue similar to the one earlier discussed for electronic media. Off-line 
communications - like discussing work over the phone or lunch - are often not included in 
the system. This results in information asymmetries for people who did not participate in 
off-line exchanges. An implication is that people cannot rely on groupware as a central, 
comprehensive resource for making the collaboration process transparent.  
Finally, groupware cannot (yet) cater for intensive, unstructured group communication 
needs, like design teams have (Majchrzak et al., 2000a). Typically, in a collocated setting, 
these groups engage in dynamic discussions that include drawings, modifications and so 
forth. Similar to experiences with videoconferencing (Abel, 1990), technology cannot (yet) 
facilitate these ‘rich’ meetings because of the complex information processing demands. 
The intricacy stems from (1) the fact that multiple channels should be supported real time 
(audio, video, documents), (2) communications require use of digital media (instead of 
plain drawings for instance), and (3) the need for simultaneously adapting documents. This 
results in a complex environment for capturing, transmitting and representing multiple 
cues remotely.  
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§ 7.3.1.3.3  Adaptation 
People collaborating on structured tasks benefit from groupware functionality since work 
processes and deliverables are mainly represented in (digital) documents (Dimitrova & 
Salaff, 1998). Groupware plays a less central role for more interactive, complex tasks. In 
these cases, its documentation features support only part of the collaboration process 
(Majchrzak et al., 2000a). For rich and synchronous communication needs, groupware 
would enforce a more sequential and text-based interaction process that becomes 
strenuous. Instead, people revert to teleconferences or collocated meetings (Majchrzak et 
al., 2000a).  
 
§ 7.3.1.4  Distance and the Inter-personal connection 
Working from different sites means that people use electronic media, and possibly meet 
each on occasional visits (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). This implies that they have less social 
contact and opportunities to socialize with remote counterparts (Sia et al., 1998). 
Infrequent and lean contact make it more difficult to establish and maintain working 
relationships (Gabarro, 1990; Hallowell, 1999). As a consequence, coordination of 
intricately connected tasks becomes challenging, see also Figure 19 and Figure 21 
(Meadows, 1996b).  
 
Researchers found several ways for dealing with the potential loss of interpersonal contact. 
First, prior on-site collaborative experience is considered important. People acquire local 
insight and build common knowledge that facilitates subsequent remote exchanges 
(Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Meadows, 1996b). With offshore outsourcing, vendor 
representatives spend an initial on-site period (at the client site) to become acquainted with 
local people and their ways of working (Millar, 1999). Second, firms may station more 
permanent representatives as liaisons to maintain close contact with counterparts. Finally, 
paced visits during the project strengthen cross-site contacts, and facilitate discussion on 
the collaboration process (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
§ 7.3.1.5  Remote Management 
 
“For managers of distributed teams it’s impossible to supervise employees the old-
fashioned way - by scouting the office floor to see who showed up for work and 
whether or not the person is busy. People who don’t work in the same office space 
every day aren’t as likely to know who is having a bad day, or whether the message a 
colleague sent through the e-mail is a rebuke or a joke.” - Saccomano (1999). 
 
Distance introduces a challenge for management relationships, here referring to the 
situation that person A is responsible as a manager for person B’s performance. Managers 
cannot observe their subordinates’ behaviors. They experience infrequent, more 
cumbersome communication processes that result in incomplete insight in subordinates’ 
context and experiences. They also hinder building and maintaining working relationships 
and trust (Kurland & Egan, 1999).  
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Since some form of management is usually still required, research shows several strategies 
to deal with distance. First, a local manager is appointed to manage subordinates. He or she 
reports back to the initial manager (Meadows, 1996b). The local manager substitutes for or 
complements the initial manager’s contact with subordinates.  
 
Second, managers pay more deliberate attention to initiating communications with remote 
subordinates compared to local ones (Kurland & Egan, 1999). They may formalize a 
regular and frequent pace of meetings to maintain contact. Permanent communication links 
like video walls may sustain quasi-local exchange and observation patterns for managers 
(Abel, 1990).  
 
Third, before subordinates start working remotely, expectations on their work is made 
explicit and formal in close detail (Perin, 1991). This substitutes for the loss of face-to-face 
contact and observational control. It also facilitates reporting during the accomplishment 
process.  
 
Fourth, managers can shift their focus to (intermediate) outputs instead of process (Perin, 
1991; Wiesenfeld et al., 1998). Assessment is based on deliverables, supposing that these 
sufficiently reflect desirable performance.  
 
Finally, managers can reduce subordinates’ need for managerial involvement. They can 
select workers who are trustworthy and capable of working autonomously (Perin, 1991; 
Wiesenfeld et al., 1998).  
 
§ 7.3.1.6  Control 
Distance interferes with cybernetic control cycles underlying control modes (Figure 13 and 
Figure 23). Control is considered here in a broad sense: it applies to the relationship 
between manager and subordinates, and also among peers. (Vendor - client control is 
discussed in the section on governance gaps). The impact of dispersedness on control is 
summarized here in three stages: issues, effects, and adaptation.  
 
§ 7.3.1.6.1  Issues 
Distance has two initial effects on control modes. First, it means that controller and 
controllee loose opportunities for direct work observation common to collocation. 
Managers cannot supervise subordinates’ task accomplishment (Sia et al., 1998; Staples, 
1997), and peers remain unaware of their counterparts efforts (Kurland & Egan, 1999).  
Second, remoteness makes establishment and maintenance of working relationships more 
difficult (Meadows, 1996b). This questions the viability of clan type of control modes 
(Ouchi & Johnson, 1978) in remote settings (Wiesenfeld et al., 1998).  
 
§ 7.3.1.6.2  Effects 
As observation processes become constrained, information asymmetries between controller 
and controllee emerge (Cramton, 1997). Controllers lack insight in controllees’ efforts, 
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context and constraints. Used to frequent exchanges in collocated office environments, this 
knowledge and information gap makes controllers uncomfortable (Perin, 1991).  
Loss of social contact - the second issue - ties in with this effect. Distance interrupts not 
only information flows and observation processes between controller and controllee. It also 
affects their working relationship and trust levels (Wiesenfeld et al., 1998).  
 
§ 7.3.1.6.3  Adaptation 
Several patterns of adaptation have been distinguished in literature. (For teleworking these 
have been summarized more extensively in an earlier section.) These affect work input, 
processes, and outputs. Since distance impacts observation of work processes in particular, 
a stronger emphasis on input and output control modes has been observed (Meadows, 
1996b; Perin, 1991).  
 
Input control implies that controllees are selected based on trustworthiness, dependability, 
and capacity to work on their own (Sparrow & Daniels, 1999). This substitutes for the loss 
of inter-personal exchanges while working remotely. Another strategy is to arrange for a 
period of intensified face-to-face contact prior to distant collaboration (Millar, 1999).  
 
Loss of process-observation and involvement leads to two forms of adaptation.  
First, some researchers found that work processes are more extensively clarified, 
documented and formalized upfront. They are even simplified to facilitate remote 
recognition of work progress (Meadows, 1996b). Supportive technology like groupware 
materializes this approach. It makes task accomplishment processes more transparent by 
planning, funneling, documenting, and categorizing the work. However, since people are 
used to less explicit collaboration processes in collocated settings, they may feel 
uncomfortable with this level of transparency (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996; Perin, 1991).  
 
A second approach attempts to retain communication openness and information flows 
remotely (Meadows, 1996b). People set a regular pace of interacting, even when there is 
not an apparent work-related need for exchanges. Managers encourage subordinates to 
update them at a frequent pace (Kurland & Egan, 1999). They may even schedule regular 
tele-meetings to avoid that contacts become impersonal (Markus, 1994: 520). In general, 
participants in dispersed projects are expected to display proactive communication 
attitudes. They should initiate exchanges while reporting on their local context, work 
progress, and possible impacts of their work for counterparts (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998).  
 
A final strategy emphasizes work outputs (Olson, 1982). Controllers receive and check 
(intermediate) deliverables that represent controllees’ efforts so far (Perin, 1991). Remote 
control of outputs has an advantage over process control (Ouchi, 1978). The latter requires 
the controller to gain insight in a remote context with local events and issue. But work 
output often consists of documented deliverables - like reports - that are easily 
transmittable in electronic format.  
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§ 7.3.1.7  Development Methodology 
Meadows (1996) briefly elaborates on development methodology in the context of offshore 
outsourcing. She found that offshore vendors were sometimes not involved in the 
requirements analysis process. This meant that they could not build know-how on the 
customer organization, and requirements from the user or IT departments. The offshore 
team thus lacked vital input for the development process. Their task became much more 
uncertain, and they remained dependent on the inputs from the ‘onshore’ organization.  
Preferably, they would like to be involved early on in a development project. They could 
gradually grow into the project as it evolved, instead of jumping onboard in a later stage. 
Offshore vendors appreciated prototyping/ RAD approaches. They could visualize a 
product and receive feedback, instead of depending on elaborate specifications. The 
prototype functioned as a sort of boundary object that elicited feedback and showed 
improvements on consecutive stages (Karsten et al., 1999; Star & Griesemer, 1989).  
 
§ 7.3.2  Time Zone Differences 
 
Collaborating across different time zones is a relatively new phenomenon. While scholarly 
work on the effects of distance abounds since late 60s (Allen & Cohen, 1969), only few 
studies have addressed the impact of time differences. These studies quote time zone-
related experiences from their field studies mainly as a side theme of globally distributed 
collaboration (Cramton, 1997; Meadows, 1996b). As a starting point, these findings are 
useful and summarized here from this research’s perspective.  
 
§ 7.3.2.1  Issues & Effects 
Time zone differences imply that working days at 2 or more locations do not perfectly 
overlap if people stick to local office hours. It is supposed that some form of task 
interdependence exists or may emerge across sites. This section discusses effects of time 
differences. 
 
A first effect of time differences is that people have a limited window at their disposal for 
real-time communications. Their opportunities to connect remote counterparts are 
constrained (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). If a task requires involvement of a remote site outside 
the window, it must be delayed until the next opportunity for synchronous contact 
(Meadows, 1996b). Among the factors that influence the delay is the east-west positioning 
of sites. This is illustrated with Table 11 which suggests that an office in London (closing 
at 17:00) interacts with an office in New York (starting at 9:00 in the morning). The dark 
square shows the window between both sites. If the New York office (westwards of 
London) must be involved in the work process in London, the delay is limited to the time 
people wait until the window opens at 14:00 London time. On the other hand, when 
London (eastwards of New York) must be contacted after the window, New Yorkers must 
wait until the next office day.  
 
Second, time zones induce people to switch to asynchronous communication modes. Using 
the same example mentioned above, New Yorkers could send email or voice mail so that 
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staff in London is informed when their office day starts. Asynchronous media have usually 
a limited number of cues, and are by definition not interactive. Time differences may 
necessitate the use of these media even when richer and more interactive channels would 
be preferred (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998).  
 
Finally, people often do not realize the zone of their counterpart, and fail to communicate 
their time constraints and preferences (Cramton, 1997; Meadows, 1996b). Unawareness of 
time constraints at both sides may result in confusion, conflicts and wrong attributions of 
behaviors (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). It means that limited opportunities available for 
collaboration are not fully utilized. This lengthens cycle time of work processes, especially 
with interactive tasks in which people from multiple sites are involved (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998).  
 
§ 7.3.2.2  Adaptation 
Research suggests several modes for addressing the impact of time differences.  
First, people are expected to communicate their time-related constraints and expectations 
to counterparts. Explicitness of this contextual information fosters mutual understanding 
and collaboration effectiveness (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998).  
Second, people become dependent on asynchronous media for their communication needs. 
Since opportunities for interaction are limited, they must anticipate their counterparts’ 
existing knowledge and information needs. This calls for messages that explain issues in 
detail so that receivers can start working without having to consult senders (Meadows, 
1996b). With reference to Table 11, New York staff could send an asynchronous message 
to London for issues arising in New York after the window ends. This message should 
contain sufficient detail for staff in London since they cannot contact New York before the 
window starts at 14:00 London time.  
Third, local operations can be adapted to cater for remote demands. Local tasks can be 
prioritized such that staff needs at counterpart sites are taken care of. Office hours can be 
adapted to enlarge the window for real-time exchanges. Using Table 11, this means 
coming in earlier in New York, or staying later in London. People can be asked to stand-by 
at home, or participate in conference calls from home. 
Finally, staff at one site could remain at the time zone of their counterparts, creating a full 
working day window. For instance, onshore liaisons in the US work at the offshore team’s 
schedule in India (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
§ 7.3.3  Governance Differences 
The governance gap features most prominently in current research on offshore outsourcing 
of software development (Meadows, 1996b; Millar, 1999). In a collocated situation, 
outsourcing introduces already issues of project management, trust and control between 
client and vendor organization (Lacity et al., 1996; Sabherwal, 1999). These are magnified 
when governance gaps coincide with distance between onshore staff form the client 
organization, and offshore IT professionals.  
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§ 7.3.3.1  Issues  
First, at the start of a project, vendor IT staff lacks intimate knowledge of the client’s 
business. While this occurs in collocated projects as well, the means for acquiring this 
insight are more limited with offshore projects (Millar, 1999).  
 
Second, while working on the system, the offshore vendor team needs feedback from 
onshore professionals at intermediate stages of the project. Dispersion of both teams puts 
constraints on communications between both groups (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
Third, for local outsourced projects, client IT management may take on the role of overall 
project management. This model appears unfeasible with offshore outsourcing. The 
onshore manager from the client organization is not familiar with the remote vendor team, 
which usually has a different cultural background as well (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
Fourth, task dependencies between onshore and offshore professionals easily result in a 
myriad of communication lines between sites. Project managers and team members may 
loose an overview of these exchanges, especially with large projects (Meadows, 1996b) 
 
Fifth, client and vendor staff tend to transpose their local style of collaboration to a remote 
environment. Collocated outsourced projects usually rely on building rapport between 
professionals from both organizations, and collaborating in an informal manner (Kumar & 
Willcocks, 1996). Bridging the governance gap in this way appears less feasible in an 
offshore project (Millar, 1999). This may result in misunderstanding and conflicts 
(Meadows, 1996b).  
 
A final issue concerns the process of controlling task accomplishment. Outsourcing 
relationships are lateral; they lack hierarchical structure and reporting lines common to a 
single organization (Bradach, 1997). Paired with distance, this makes it difficult for the 
client to monitor and control performance of a remote vendor team. And for vendor 
professionals it becomes more difficult to make sure that their needs are met, like receiving 
information from client staff (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
§ 7.3.3.2  Responses 
Investigators found several modes for addressing these issues.  
 
First, offshore managers are installed to head vendor staff. Managing a vendor team from 
the remote client site appears unfeasible (Meadows, 1996b). 
 
Second, prototyping is favored as development methodology for offshore outsourced 
projects. Promoting regular interaction across sites, it facilitates information exchange and 
feedback processes between users and developers (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
Third, stakeholders prefer a more explicit, formalized and documented development 
process compared to collocated projects. This makes it easier for the client to keep track of 
work progress. From the vendor perspective it specifies boundaries of the client’s 
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expectations. This approach makes project progress and work methodology also less 
dependent on particular individuals that may leave the project at intermediate stages 
(Meadows, 1996b).  
 
Finally, contact between sites is encouraged by visits and vendor liaisons at the client site. 
Visits - offshore to onshore and vice versa - promote face-to-face exchanges and mutual 
understanding across sites. People build common approaches that facilitate subsequent 
remote interaction (Millar, 1999).  
 
§ 7.3.3.3  Liaisons 
Vendor liaisons (onshore) play a variety of roles to address many of the issues mentioned 
above. They function as an exclusive gateway for communications between offshore and 
onshore, see Figure 34. For the vendor, liaisons make sure that requests from the offshore 
team regarding onsite operations are take care of. For the client, they represent the vendor 
and offer a local point of presence for handling requests (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
At the same time, routing cross-site contact exclusively through a liaison introduces new 
issues as well.  
 
First, the liaison substitutes for direct contact between sites. This slows down relationship 
building between onshore and offshore staff, and makes people dependent on the liaison’s 
interpretation of communications (Meadows, 1996b). 
 
Second, the project becomes dependent on a single person to process all information flows 
between sites. This may delay inter-site work flows, and poses a risk when the liaison is 
sick or leaves the project (Meadows, 1996b). Finally, it not likely that the liaison is 
knowledgeable in all areas of the project; he or she may thus constrain exchanges between 
specialized staff at the onshore and offshore site.  
 
Some insight exists on how to deal with these liaison-related issues. The vendor can station 
multiple liaisons onshore, and communications are copied as a backup for the liaison’s 
role, see also Figure 35 (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
§ 7.3.4  Cultural Differences 
Cultural differences are perceived here as a lack of mutual knowledge (Krauss & Fussell, 
1990). They are framed in accordance with literature on functional diversity (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967b). Diversity has a variety of effects (Figure 27). For example, it increases the 
need for information processing since people lack common knowledge, (33) in Figure 27. 
Using Media Richness Theory and Channel Expansion Theory, it can be argued that 
people from different cultural background need therefore rich communication media 
(Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Daft & Macintosh, 1981). Since they lack common cultural 
norms and familiarity with the same language, multiple cues are needed for shaping and 
assessing the communication process (Gabarro, 1990).  
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Electronic media in general and lean media in particular may hinder these rich exchanges. 
Nuances apparent to people from the same background may be lost when using 
communication media (Meadows, 1996b). Surfacing this type of miscommunications may 
take more time than in collocated situations (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). This is caused by a 
lack of feedback loops, a generic remote communication issue as earlier indicated.  
 
One response to these issues is attempting to maximize common knowledge across sites. 
This may take the form of selecting people with fluency in English (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 
1998). Or selecting project staff with experience in the business and country of the 
counterpart site (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
§ 7.3.5  Infrastructural Differences 
Infrastructural differences could refer to both diversity of local systems (i.e., each using 
their own project management software), and the fact that systems are not integrated across 
sites (local networks are not connected). Current research emphasizes infrastructural 
differences in case of inter-firm projects (offshore outsourcing) (Meadows, 1996b). 
International projects within multinational firms can usually benefit from a standardized IT 
infrastructure.  
 
Infrastructural differences have a strong effect on distributed projects since these rely 
heavily on technology for communications and sharing documentation (Meadows, 1996b). 
For instance, offshore developers must prepare and test the system based on the client’s 
infrastructure, or they need data from the client organization. At both sides, technical 
differences contribute to the costs of communicating in terms of effort (Kraut & Galegher, 
1990). People must dial international numbers or adapt local operations to their 
counterparts’ infrastructure. This adds to the perception of distance between sites 
(Meadows, 1996b).  
 
Several responses are distinguished in current research. First, vendor staff is often granted 
remote access to the client’s network and email system. They are also connected to the 
client’s telephone system so that extensions suffice for connecting across sites. As these 
measures lower communication efforts, people perceive their counterparts at distant sites 
as closer. Second, teams at both sides may share a common database with project related 
documentation. Third, firms may decide to implement similar infrastructures at sites to 
create a standardized and more integrated environment (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
§ 7.4  Summary 
 
The preceding sections have presented the literature on distributed work. They also 
contained a reinterpretation of that literature based on the research question and model. 
Before embarking on the empirical research, it seems useful to summarize our findings 
(see Table 12 and following). The gaps are listed across the first column. For each of these, 
the table presents the results of the preceding literature analysis: issues, effects, and 
analysis. (For some gaps, ‘issues’ and ‘effects’ are combined). The second row 
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summarizes findings for geographical distance from McCann and Galbraith (1981). 
Subtopics are elaborated for geographical distance and governance differences in separate 
rows.  
 
Table 12 - Summary of literature: geographical distance 
 
Gap Issues Effects Adaptation 
 
Geographical 
distance 
 
 Increased response times 
 Increased coordination costs 
 Impersonal & inflexible forms of communication 
 Conflicts are likely 
 
Polycontextuality 
 Unshared contexts, 
sticky information 
 Disjointed 
contexts 
 Deliberate bridging 
efforts: 
representatives, 
common knowledge, 
boundary objects, 
and direct contact  
 
Distance and the 
interpersonal 
connection 
 Less interpersonal 
contact 
 Difficulty to build 
working relationship 
 Difficulty to handle 
intricate 
collaborative tasks
 On-site, ftf 
collaboration 
preceding remote 
contact 
 Liaison at 
counterpart site 
 Remote 
collaboration 
punctuated by 
cross-site visits 
 
Electronic 
communication 
media 
 Technology offers new 
communication 
capabilities 
 Dependence on 
technology 
 Mediated 
communications lack 
richness and 
interactivity 
 More deliberate, costly 
communication 
 Mismatch electronic 
media and complex 
communication needs 
 More formal, task-
oriented 
communication 
 Lack of remote 
communication skills 
 Inclusion problems 
 Media cannot 
support complex 
task and 
relationship 
communications 
 Infrequent 
communication 
patterns 
 Insufficient cross-
site information 
sharing, 
information 
asymmetries, lack 
of trust building 
 Collaborative task 
seems more 
difficult, people 
lack the big 
picture 
 People work from 
assumptions  
 Conflicts likely, yet 
difficult to handle 
 Alternating different 
types of media and 
visits 
 Foster reciprocal 
knowledge 
 Develop remote 
communication 
skills: more 
proactive, 
comprehensive, 
precise, rapid 
response, and 
feedback loops 
 Careful selection of 
contributors: 
common knowledge, 
ability to function 
autonomously 
 More formal, 
documented 
collaboration 
 Modify work division, 
simplify and chunk 
work 
 Ensure reliable, 
available technology 
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Groupware 
 Initial assumption that groupware can 
exclusively mediate collaboration processes 
 This increases effort for tasks that require rich 
interaction 
 Groupware structures and formalizes 
collaboration; this may hinder fluid, fast, informal 
interactions 
 Inclusion of people in communications, risk of 
information asymmetries 
 Limited support for multi-actor, multi-media, real-
time interactions 
 Modified use of 
groupware: 
enhances task 
structuring and 
multi-site 
documentation 
 Rich and complex 
interactions rely on 
other media 
 
Remote 
management 
 Limited ftf contact between manager and 
subordinate 
 Less frequent contact 
 Manager has less insight in subordinate’s 
context, experiences and communication 
intentions 
 More difficult to build rapport and trust 
 Another person, 
representing and 
complementing 
manager at 
subordinate’s site 
 Manager proactive 
to initiate more 
formal, deliberate 
communication 
process at regular 
pace 
 Control:  
(1) Explicit, detailed 
upfront communication of 
work expectations (input 
control). 
(2) Intermediate 
deliverables, formal 
controls points. 
(3) Emphasis on output 
control. 
 Select capable, 
trustworthy 
subordinates 
 
Control 
 Loss of process 
control, direct 
supervision controller - 
controllee 
 Difficulty to build trust 
and working 
relationships 
 Information 
asymmetries 
between controller 
- controllee 
 Loss of social 
contact between 
controller - 
controllee 
 Loss of process 
control leads to 
adaptations:  
(1) Process is made more 
explicit and transparent; it 
is simplified, formalized 
and documented; IT is 
enabler. 
(2) Structured setup of 
regular exchanges; 
proactive attitude; update 
counterpart on local 
context and constraints 
 Emphasis on input 
and output control 
modes 
 Input control: 
selection; ftf 
socialization before 
period of remote 
collaboration 
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Development 
methodology 
 offshore staff not 
involved in 
requirements analysis 
 Offshore staff 
lacks know-how 
on customer's 
business and 
requirements 
 They become 
strongly 
dependent on 
onshore customer 
organization 
 Direct involvement 
offshore staff in 
requirements 
analysis process 
 Use of prototyping 
as a tool to make 
the product and 
development 
process more 
explicit 
 
Table 13 - Summary of literature: time zone differences 
 
Gap Issues Effects Adaptation 
 
Time zone 
differences 
 
 Limited windows for real-time 
communication; outside window risk of 
delays 
 Shift to asynchronous (lean) media, even if 
tasks demand otherwise  
 Unawareness of counterpart’s time 
constraints and preferences due to 
insufficient exchanges; risk of confusion, 
conflict, work delays 
 Update counterpart on 
time constraints, 
preferences, and 
planning 
 Comprehensive 
asynchronous 
messages so that 
counterpart can 
proceed without real 
time contact 
 Adapt local task 
prioritization, working 
hours, and staff 
availability to 
counterpart 
 Local staff shifts to 
counterpart site’s time 
zone 
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Table 14 - Summary of literature: governance differences 
 
Gap Issues Effects Adaptation 
 
Governance 
differences 
 
 Vendor staff lacks knowledge of client’s 
business; difficulty to acquire this knowledge 
remotely 
 Difficulty for vendor staff to receive feedback 
from client staff 
 Assignment of overall project responsibility 
not clear 
 Difficulty to manage task dependencies and 
communication linkages between onshore 
and offshore teams 
 Reliance on interpersonal rapport between 
client and vendor staff less feasible 
 Reciprocal control challenges because of 
distance and lateral client-vendor relationship 
 Installing of offshore 
manager for vendor 
team 
 Use of prototyping to 
elicit client feedback 
 More explicit, 
documented, 
formalized project 
process 
 Vendor liaisons at 
client site; reciprocal 
visits 
 
Liaisons 
 
 Liaisons channel inter-site communications; 
their onsite presence facilitates catering for 
counterpart site’s needs 
 Lack of relationship building between onshore 
and offshore team 
 Dependence on liaison’s interpretation of 
communications 
 Liaison as exclusive gateway may become 
bottleneck for communications, add little 
value, and makes project vulnerable for 
communication breakdowns 
 Multiple liaisons 
 Copying 
communications as 
backup 
 
Table 15 - Summary of literature: cultural differences 
 
Gap Issues Effects Adaptation 
 
Cultural differences
 
 Lack of common knowledge, and reciprocal 
knowledge  
 Increases need for information processing, 
and rich media; this may not be feasible 
remotely 
 Risk of miscommunications using lean media; 
difficulty of becoming aware of this 
 Increase common, 
reciprocal knowledge 
across sites by e.g. 
staff selection  
 
Table 16 - Summary of literature: infrastructural differences 
 
Gap Issues Effects Adaptation 
 
Infrastructural 
differences 
 
 Infrastructural differences surface especially 
in inter-firm projects (e.g., vendor staff 
needs client infrastructure for development 
and testing) 
 Strong impact because people rely heavily 
on IT for remote connectivity 
 Increased perception of distance, and 
increased efforts to collaborate 
 Embed vendor staff in 
client’s infrastructure: 
remote network access 
(email, phone) 
 common, remotely 
shared project 
databases  
 standardization of 
infrastructures across 
sites 
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A number of themes recur across the rows. For issues and effects, differences materialize 
as lack of information, knowledge, and relationships. Research shows that people have 
struggled with these concerns, and adapted as follows:  
 
 Deliberate attention to some form of face-to-face contact, visits, and liaisons 
 Improving people’s awareness of remote counterparts; enhancing their communication 
skills 
 Re-thinking the way work is divided, structured, and task dependencies are created 
 Becoming more explicit, emphasizing formalization, documentation, and 
standardization 
 
Our empirical research intends to further substantiate and extend these insights. 
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PART 3  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
The empirical section of our research reports on two qualitative case studies. The first case 
at DiskCo concerns the implementation of packaged software across multiple sites in the 
Far East region. The second case focuses on a project at CarCo that involved SoftHouse as 
offshore vendor. We adopted a qualitative case study methodology that is explained in the 
first chapter. The case studies feature a descriptive part and interpretive analyses that is 
strongly data-driven. The next part contains our cross-case analysis that is more positivist 
oriented.  
 
 
Chapter 8  Case Study Research Methodology 
 
In this section, we outline our approach for conducting qualitative case studies. We reflect 
on the methodological dimension of our research cycles as indicated in Figure 8. We 
describe our motivation for adopting a case study research methodology, and elaborate on 
design and preparation. Next, our field work at DiskCo and CarCo is discussed, followed 
by techniques for processing and managing empirical data. We indicate our approach to 
analyzing data per single case and across the case studies. The section concludes with an 
exposé on quality criteria and their application to our empirical work.  
 
§ 8.1  Motivation for Case Study Research Methodology 
 
“The motivation for doing qualitative research, as opposed to quantitative research, 
comes from the observation that, if there is one thing which distinguishes humans 
from the natural world, it is our ability to talk!  Qualitative research methods are 
designed to help researchers understand people and the social and cultural contexts 
within which they live.” (Myers, 2001)  
 
Empirical research connects an investigator in some form to a real-life setting. His 
methodology for this process depends on a number of factors. First, his preferences and 
capabilities. Myers’ (2001) quote at the beginning of this section frames qualitative 
research in terms of relating to human beings as objects of study. An advantage of social 
science research is that the researcher can talk with individuals and groups. This 
differentiates the field from studies on for instance animals, processes in our natural 
environment, and man-made artifacts. We liked doing qualitative research, precisely 
because we could talk to interviewees and analyze their verbalization of experiences. We 
preferred real-life projects over student teams or experiments (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
We believed that this would contribute to the validity of our study and its relevance to 
practitioners.  
 
Second, research constraints scope an empirical methodology. Like any project, our study 
faced constraints of the researcher, his research context, and resources, e.g., its temporal 
scope and budget. Especially with dispersed temporary systems, the researcher must make 
choices as to how (long) he relates to a real-life setting. We would have liked to do a 
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longitudinal investigation with visits to places all over the world, but this is unfeasible. 
Qualitative case study research enabled temporary interaction with an empirical setting. 
We could talk to a number of people and ask on their experiences. Since our immersion in 
a project context was temporarily limited, we could accomplish two large case studies. 
Long term participation would have resulted in a single case study. This would have 
limited replication logic.  
 
Third, an empirical research strategy depends on the properties of that study. We discuss 
here the role of three conditions as distinguished by Yin (1994: 4). These define the choice 
for different empirical approaches - experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case 
study. 
 
 Type of research question - The nature of a research question is defined by the 
interrogative word used in that sentence. Key words include “Who”, “What”, 
“Where”, “How”, and “Why” (Yin, 1994). Our research questions move from “What” 
questions to “How”. The first three “What” questions ask for descriptions (e.g., “What 
are coordination and control modes?”). In general, for this type of question one could 
adopt any of the methodologies earlier introduced. “How” questions are explanatory. 
Yin (1994) suggests to use case studies, experiments or histories under these 
conditions. Of these, experiments would not allow us to enter ‘real-life’ global 
projects. Historic research appeared a less relevant strategy since we study a 
contemporary phenomenon.  
 
 Extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events - An 
investigator’s access to an empirical setting further determines his research strategy. 
We had the opportunity to conduct on-site research at DiskCo and CarCo. This made 
it possible to move beyond a completely historic study. Experiments would provide a 
high degree of control but lack the flavor of a project in the business community.  
 
 Degree of focus on contemporary versus historical events - Global software 
projects constitute a contemporary phenomenon (see also Table 2). Their widespread 
use started around mid 1990s when organizations in the US and Western Europe 
outsourced IT services to vendors in e.g. India, Philippines, and Eastern Europe. As 
Yin (1994) mentions, the case study methodology is an appropriate strategy for these 
contemporary events. The operational existence of a setting - as opposed to a historic 
study - implies that the researchers can deploy a broad range of data collection 
sources, like interviews, observations and (electronic) documentation.  
 
§ 8.2  Case Study Design and Preparation 
 
A case study connects a researcher temporarily to an organizational setting. Case study 
design defines how he intends to accomplish this. It outlines parameters for the mode of 
connectivity and the object thereof. We elaborate here on a number of general dimensions. 
Next, we explain our approach to case study selection and data collection in a dispersed 
research environment. We pay attention to skills and knowledge required for field work, 
and elaborate on the specifics of preparing data collection.  
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The nature of our study is explanatory. We seek to understand how global distributedness 
affects modes of coordination and control. As context of this phenomenon, we focus on 
temporary systems. This continues a tradition started by scholars like (Goodman & 
Goodman, 1972), (Bryman et al., 1987), and (Meyerson et al., 1996). These systems are 
defined as a collective endeavor that is supposed to last for a limited period of time. It may 
involve people from different departments, organizations, and sites. We look 
geographically dispersed projects that concern the development and/ or implementation of 
software. Our study continues earlier work on offshore software projects that tapped into 
the first wave of project globalization (Kumar & Willcocks, 1996).  
 
While the temporary system as such is our primary unit of analysis, we take into account 
what exceeds its boundaries, like a company’s transnational management structure. We 
also pay attention to more fine-grained phenomena, within its boundaries. These include 
project stages, separate locations, and connections between sites. Our design is therefore 
embedded as opposed to holistic (Yin, 1994: 41). An assessment of global distributedness 
concerns predominantly inter-site coordination and control issues. These are the primary 
point of attention. In addition, we elaborate on events within a single site if these are 
relevant to understand the temporary system as a whole. For instance, autonomy of staff at 
one site may reduce remote management and communications needs. Or unique features of 
operations at one site may complicate the job of people assisting from another site.  
 
On the content side, our research scope could be considered broad as compared to more 
positivist oriented studies. First, we include a number of gaps to capture global 
distributedness. Second, adoption of coordination and control means that two large areas 
had to be integrated and assessed. This decision was made based on the interwovenness of 
the two constructs in literature. For each construct, we included portfolio’s of mechanisms 
that cover a multidisciplinary range of areas - sociology, organization sciences, 
communications studies, and cognitive science. Overall, we made a trade-off between 
broadness with the advantage of covering a large range of factors that could be of 
relevance to understand the phenomenon. And on the other hand a tight focus which 
facilitates conceptual coherence.  
 
We decided to conduct multiple case studies. Not in order to generalize our findings to a 
larger population, but to increase replication logic (see a later section on quality of our case 
study research) (Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 1994). DiskCo and CarCo were our main studies 
and are reported here. We also conducted a couple of smaller studies while in Singapore. 
These provided additional insights in important themes. We did not move beyond two 
large studies because of resource constraints, especially time.  
 
When entering a case setting, we adopted a retrospective-longitudinal perspective. We 
asked people for their experiences so far in the project they were working on. For DiskCo 
we were two weeks on-site in May 1999, and collected data on the Oracle project that 
started for the Far East in 1996. CarCo’s Goldd project was followed for a longer period of 
time. Our co-investigator participated in the project as on-site administrator between 
September 1996 and March 1997. She logged her experiences during that time and 
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conducted interviews. The author visited the German site in June 1997 for reflective 
interviews.  
 
§ 8.2.1  Case Study Selection 
The case study selection process was defined by a combination of factors. We were 
looking for software projects that met the criteria outlined above. For reasons of feasibility, 
they should be medium to large size (about 10 to 30 people), dispersed over 2 to 4 sites. 
We preferred project with sites in different continents, like the US, Europe, and Asia/ 
Pacific region. The collective task involving dispersed actors should be complex, i.e., not 
fixing bugs or a help desk. Our research was funded by Erasmus University - Department 
of Decision & Information Sciences at Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus 
Research Institute for Management (ERIM), and Trustfonds. Participating companies 
invested time and resources to make the research feasible. 
 
We found our first case study - CarCo - through contacts from our supervisor with a 
graduate student at Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University. The so-called 
Goldd project involved CarCo units from US and Germany, and an outsourcing partner in 
the UK and India. We investigated how participating individuals had experienced the 
project. 
 
DiskCo was our second case. We contacted Kanapaty Pelly Periasamy from Nanyang 
Technological University (NTU) at the International Conference on Information Systems 
in Helsinki, December 1998. He used his network of IT firms in Singapore and found 
DiskCo plus some smaller firms willing to participate. DiskCo Singapore had almost 
completed a regional roll-out of Oracle ERP as part of a global implementation trajectory. 
We focused on their local and regional experiences.  
 
§ 8.2.2  Collecting Data in a Multi-site Research Environment 
Traditionally, it seems that social researchers were considered to conduct empirical 
research in a single context. They met people with various role in an organization 
(Burgelman, 1983; Kunda, 1992), traced the performance of a team (Ancona, 1992; Weick, 
1993a), or investigated the role of individuals (Mintzberg, 1994). In today’s dispersed 
work place, researchers must rethink how to connect to an empirical setting if their unit of 
analysis includes more than one context.  
Two questions seem relevant in this respect. First, does the researcher meet people in 
person or contact them remotely? If he wants to meet them face-to-face, he must arrange 
for sequential visits to the various locations (Marschan, 1996). Remote exchange reduces 
travel costs but also the richness of his encounters (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). A second 
question is whether he connects to people directly, or through other persons. In the latter 
case, interpretation issues could arise. We explain our approach here and elaborate more on 
the topic in the section on field work.  
 
 186
For DiskCo, initially we relied on KKP to arrange for contact with the firm. This was 
convenient in the sense that we did not know yet DiskCo personnel, but we knew Dr. 
Periasamy and he knew the company. Upon our arrival, we - author and Mr. Diepeveen -  
conducted on-site interviews. Interviews were conducted with just the interviewee (one at a 
time) and the interviewers - the author and Mr. Diepeveen. We organized face-to-face 
interviews with people working at DiskCo regional HQ in Singapore. Teleconferences 
(audio-only) were held with DiskCo staff working in other areas of Singapore or Malaysia. 
Afterwards, we maintained some remote, direct contact with the VP IT and his director 
Applications Development.  
 
In the case of CarCo, most data collection was accomplished by Ms Cijntje, i.e., liaised 
research. She talked to people face-to-face in Cologne, including visiting Indian team 
members. Through videoconferencing, she interviewed a person in Detroit. We visited the 
German site once and conducted together with Ms Cijntje face-to-face interviews. 
 
§ 8.2.3  Skills and Knowledge for Field Work  
Qualitative investigation requires extensive preparation to smoothen the transition towards 
a research context. It encompasses a myriad of dimensions and details, especially when 
conducted internationally. Several competence and skills areas can be distinguished for 
which preparation is indispensable (Yin, 1994). 
First, we prepared ourselves extensively on the content side. We ensured a solid theoretical 
background and read professional-oriented literature as well. We sharpened our research 
focus as much as possible, in particular for the DiskCo case that was conducted about 2 
years after the CarCo case.  
Second, we enhanced our data collection skills. We consulted various resources on 
interviewing techniques (Fontana & Frey, 1994; Rubin & Rubin, 1995), and practiced 
these. Specific skills include managing the interview curve (the process), listening well, 
and asking questions that are appropriate for a particular interviewee and the stage of an 
interview.  
Third, we prepared ourselves on the case organizations’ context, often in cooperation with 
our co-investigator. We checked learned more about a company and its industry through 
public resources like articles and internet. With our European background, we collected 
extensive information on Singapore and its surrounding region. We subscribed to news 
services, checked internet sites, and acquired cross cultural information.32  
Fourth, time zones of sites involved in a project were checked beforehand. We developed a 
format for displaying time zone differences, and made print outs for data collection and 
analysis.  
 
                                                 
32 For instance, culturegrams on Singapore, China, India, and Malaysia from Kennedy 
Center Publications at BYU, www.culturegrams.org. 
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§ 8.2.4  Preparation DiskCo case 
For the DiskCo case we developed several ‘Research products’. These were destined for 
DiskCo or the researchers (author and co-investigator Mr. Berry Diepeveen). DiskCo 
received first of all a flyer that described the research in detail as a sort of brochure. Upon 
their request, we developed more specific documents that outlined how participation in our 
research program worked. This clarified reciprocal expectations. Interviewees received a 
document with a condensed set of topics and questions they could expect. All these 
resources were mailed in digital format to Dr. Periasamy and were relayed from there to 
DiskCo.  
We developed an extensive research manual for ourselves, Mr. Diepeveen, Dr. Periasamy 
and NTU administrative purposes. It defined our research cycle that was organized in 
stages: field work set-up, preparation of field work, conducting field work on-site, ex post 
contact and procedures, and analysis and reporting. The manual indicated the types of data 
sources we would collect, e.g., interviews, documentation, and direct observation. We 
customized interview duration and topics for different roles, like executives, project 
managers and users. Figure 38 gives an example of scenario’s for interviews with project 
managers. It shows how many minutes we intended to spend on for 8 topic areas 
(depending in the overall length of the interview). 
 
 
Where interview topics stand for: 
1. Key Information 
2. “Gaps”  
3. System & Development Process 
4. The Project Team(s)  
5. User Connections 
6. The Managerial Role 
7. Complexity & Uncertainty 
8. Key Lessons Learnt 
 
Figure 38 - Interview planning for project managers 
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We setup an interview protocol to complement the manual on the content side. It followed 
the research questions, and fit within our conceptual lens. The questions were designed for 
semi-structured interviews. We tried to balance our focus with the interviewees’ story line. 
This document contained some questions from Mr. Diepeveen that extended the author’s 
perspective.  
 
Before going to interviews, we prepared taping equipment, and other resources like pencils 
and paper. With Mr. Diepeveen we agreed on procedures and signals to coordinate our 
actions during an interview. At a later stage, we refined our interview questions. Evenings 
before an interview we would prepare a separate sheet at the NTU campus. All resources 
for DiskCo are kept accessible in their original format and available upon request.  
 
§ 8.2.5  Preparation CarCo case 
The CarCo case was conducted at an early stage in our research project. We developed 
documents for empirical research together with Ms Cijntje. Most of the time, the author 
would submit a first version to Ms Cijntje and receive comments based on her experiences 
in the CarCo context. This process was repeated until we had a satisfactory protocol. A 
first round of (semi-structured) interviews was conducted late February 1997. We 
developed an interview protocol around four areas: overall project tasks, individual project 
tasks, working with others/ communications, and achievements/ crises. A second round of 
interview took place in March and April. By that time we had a much more refined set of 
questions structured in a systematic fashion in six sections: coordination mechanisms, gaps 
& coordination mechanisms, role of IT, control mechanisms, gaps & control mechanism, 
and role of IT. In a separate document we outlined for Ms Cijntje how the various 
mechanisms and gaps were defined. In some cases, Ms Cijntje could not talk to people 
face-to-face or remotely. She created forms with open questions and some with a limited 
number of answering options. The author’s preparation for his visit to Cologne in June 
1997 included areas mentioned earlier: interviewing skills, company information, and 
research content and focus. We developed an interview protocol on paper. Resources for 
CarCo are mostly available as reference material.  
 
 
§ 8.3  Field Work 
 
Field work refers to the stage of research when the author connects to an empirical setting. 
In fact, this process starts already during the preparatory phase. But it becomes more 
immersive at some point. For a geographically dispersed environment, one is confronted 
with some constraints. Budget-wise, it is unfeasible to visit far-flung locations, or even 
stay for a longer period at one site. Remote contacting of people in a setting may be 
difficult too. They may not understand the objectives of a research project. And the 
researcher cannot visualize what a context looks like, and how his field work may fit in. 
Together, these factors require some choices, each with pros and cons. Two important 
dimensions include on-site research versus remote contact, and direct interaction between 
the researcher and interviewees versus liaised contact. Table 17 depicts these dimensions 
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with four resulting options. In terms of pros and cons, face-to-face (rows) contact yields 
rich date and allows for interactive discussions (Daft & Lewin, 1984). Yet it requires 
traveling on the side of the researcher to meet the interviewee. Direct contact (columns) 
reduces interpretation layers but demands time and effort to connect to another context. 
Liaisons may smoothen this bridging by means of their familiarity with both the researcher 
and interviewees (Engeström et al., 1995; Galbraith, 1973). We discuss our approach 
briefly here and elaborate for each case in the next sections.  
 
Table 17 - Research modes 
 
 Direct contact Liaised contact 
Cell A - DiskCo: 
 On-site research Singapore site A 
 
Cell B - DiskCo: 
 HHT on-site research 
coordination 
Face-to-face, 
collocated 
research 
 
 
 
Cell A - CarCo: 
 Ms Cijntje participant-observer 
 On-site research Cologne 
Cell B - CarCo: 
 Ms Cijntje empirical research 
Cologne 
Cell C - DiskCo: 
 Teleconferences Singapore, 
Malaysia 
 Email CPW, HHT 
Cell D - DiskCo: 
 Preparation through Dr. 
Periasamy 
Remote, 
electronically 
mediated 
research 
 Cell C - CarCo: 
 Contact with Ms Cijntje while she 
was in Cologne 
Cell D - CarCo: 
 Ms Cijntje empirical research 
Detroit 
 
DiskCo fieldwork relied mostly on face-to-face interviews with members of the Oracle 
conversion team in Singapore site A (cell A). The author conducted these with Mr. 
Diepeveen, graduate student at that time at Erasmus University, Rotterdam School of 
Management. During our stay there, we setup up conference calls to a person temporarily 
stationed at another plant in Singapore, and staff in Malaysia (cell C). After our on-site 
field work, we stayed for other research projects in Singapore and exchanged a few emails 
with CPW and HHT (cell C). In the preparatory stage of our field work, we worked not 
directly with DiskCo personnel, but through Kanapaty Pelly Periasamy from Nanyang 
Technological University (NTU) (cell D). He liaised with CPW (VP Information 
Technologies) to explain our research and relay questions from DiskCo to the author. HHT 
(Director Applications Development) connected to potential interviewees. As far as we 
know, she explained our research and setup up interview times (cell B).  
 
For CarCo, Ms Amanda Cijntje (graduate student at that time at Erasmus University, 
Rotterdam School of Management) participated in the Goldd project. At the same time, she 
worked with the author on joint research (cell A). The author visited Cologne once for on-
site interviews (cell A). Ms Cijntje conducted multiple collocated interviews with CarCo 
and SoftHouse staff in Cologne (cell B). She set up twice a videoconferencing session with 
a CarCo staff member in Detroit (cell D). The author interacted with Ms Cijntje during her 
stay in Cologne through phone calls and mostly emails (cell C).  
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§ 8.3.1  DiskCo case 
For fieldwork on the DiskCo case, the author and co-investigator Mr. Diepeveen flew from 
Amsterdam to Singapore early May 1999. They stayed for a month at visitor 
accommodation on the campus of Nanyang Technological University (NTU), in the 
western part of Singapore. The first several days were used for acclimatizing and meeting 
with people from Nut’s School of Accountancy & Business who supported our research. 
Most notably, Dr. Periasamy who had arranged access to case study companies, and 
Christina So head of the Strategy and Information Systems department that hosted our 
visit.  
 
On May 11, 1999, we paid our first visit to DiskCo site A in Singapore. During an hour’s 
meeting, the author, Mr. Diepeveen and Dr. Periasamy met the Vice President Information 
Technologies Mr. CPW, and the Director Applications Development Information 
Technologies, Ms. HHT.33 We discussed the background of the Oracle project, and 
outlined the contours of our fieldwork investigation, consisting mainly of interviewing 
people involved in the Far East implementation. The Oracle project concerned a roll-out of 
Oracle ERP at DiskCo sites around the world. We focused on the Far East 
implementations (China, Malaysia, Singapore) with the exception of Thailand. The case is 
elaborated in detail in a later section.  
 
From May 12, 1999 onwards, the author and Mr. Diepeveen commuted regularly to 
DiskCo site A for interviews and collecting other sources of data. We collected a broad 
and deep set of data, covering the Oracle implementation project that took from late 1997 
until mid 1999 (see project time line Table 25). We entered the project in its final stage, so 
most of the local implementations in the Far East had already taken place. This meant that 
the nature of our data collection process was reflective, i.e., people telling about their 
experience during earlier months.  
 
We interviewed people from the IT department in Singapore site A, Singapore site E, and 
Malaysia site A. In the latter site, a separate task force for data conversion was setup to 
cover that area in the Oracle project. We also talked to key users from departments in 
Singapore site A and Malaysia site A. Key users represent a larger user group of a certain 
department (like Finance). They were part of the so-called core team, a cross-functional 
group that was responsible for Oracle implementations. Table 18 gives an overview of 
interviewees. The table is setup as a matrix of sites (Singapore site A and Malaysia site A), 
and people’s functional area (IT or user departments). Names have been abbreviated for 
maintaining confidentiality. CPW, head of the IT group, worked with HHT as on-site 
director for Applications Development. She in turn steered the Oracle core team consisting 
of IT members OBT, GP, JPL, SCC and a few others. From user functions, JLL and ST 
participated in the core team as liaison for their department. JNL headed the data 
conversion team in Malaysia site A, with MC as one of the key members. SKL, ET and 
some of ET’s colleagues who participated in our interview represented two user 
departments in Malaysia site A.  
                                                 
33 Names have been abbreviated to maintain confidentiality. 
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Table 18 - Interviewees DiskCo Oracle project  
 
 Interviewee work location: 
Singapore (site A)
34
 Malaysia (site A)  
Functional 
area: 
Interviewee 
name: 
Interviewee  
role: 
Interviewee 
name: 
Interviewee role: 
CPW 
 
Vice President IT 
 
JNL Project Manager 
Data Conversion 
Team 
HHT Director 
Applications 
Development IT 
MC 
 
Member Data 
Conversion 
Team 
OBT 
 
Member Oracle 
Conversion Team 
  
GP 
 
Member Oracle 
Conversion Team 
  
JPL 
 
Member Oracle 
Conversion Team 
  
Information 
Technologies 
(IT) 
SCC Member Oracle 
Conversion Team 
  
JLL 
 
Key User, 
Material & System 
ET and some 
colleagues 
Key User, 
Inventory Control 
User 
departments 
 ST Key User, 
Finance  
SKL Key User, 
Finance  
 
Our on-site work commenced after the kick off meeting on May 10, 1999. Table 19 
provides an overview of our interactions with DiskCo personnel. It includes all interviews, 
and most informal conversations and email exchanges. The columns show from left to 
right: (1) interviewee name (abbreviated), (2) date and location (NL stands for The 
Netherlands, NTU stands for the campus of Nanyang Technological University), (3) 
interviewers (author and usually Mr. Diepeveen (BD) as co-investigator), and interview 
mode (“ftf” stands for face-to-face interviews). DiskCo teleconferencing facilities were 
used from Singapore site A. (4) Data processing refers to the way we handled interviews 
and conversations afterwards. All interviews have been fully transcribed by the author. We 
noted down interesting thoughts from conversations, and saved email messages for later 
reference. Column (5) of Table 19 gives a unique code assigned to each data source per 
row. The letter after DiskCo identifies all sources related to an interviewee. For instance, 
an “A” for CPW, and “B” for HHT. The number shows the sequence of data collection per 
interviewee.  
                                                 
34 At the time of our study, GP was stationed at Singapore site E. 
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Table 19 - Interviews and conversations DiskCo Oracle project  
 
Interviewee Interview  
Date & Location 
Interviewers & 
Interview mode 
Data 
Processing 
Code 
May 10, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Ex post report DiskCo-A-1 
May 11, 1999, Singapore site A 
(lunch) 
Author, BD (ftf) Ex post report DiskCo-A-2 
May 12, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-A-3 
May 14, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-A-4 
May 21, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-A-5 
CPW 
May 24, 1999, Singapore site A 
- NTU 
Author (e-mail) Full transcript DiskCo-A-6 
May 11, 1999, Singapore site A Author, (e-mail) Full transcript DiskCo-B-1 
May 17, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-B-2 
May 20, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-B-3 
June 9, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-B-4 
HHT 
July, 1999, Singapore site A - 
NL 
Author, (e-mail) Full transcript DiskCo-B-5 
OBT May 13, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-C-1 
JPL May 17, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-I-1 
SCC May 17, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-J-1 
ST May 14, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-H-1 
JLL May 14, 1999, Singapore site A Author, BD (ftf) Full transcript DiskCo-G-1 
GP May 13, 1999, Singapore site A 
- Singapore site E 
Author, BD 
(teleconference) 
Full transcript DiskCo-D-1 
JNL May 13, 1999, Singapore site A 
- Malaysia site A 
Author, BD 
(teleconference) 
Full transcript DiskCo-F-1 
MC May 13, 1999, Singapore site A 
- Malaysia site A 
Author, BD 
(teleconference) 
Full transcript DiskCo-E-1 
SKL May 18, 1999, Singapore site A 
- Malaysia site A 
Author, BD 
(teleconference) 
Full transcript DiskCo-L-1 
ET & some 
colleagues 
May 17, 1999, Singapore site A 
- Malaysia site A 
Author, BD 
(teleconference) 
Full transcript DiskCo-K-1 
 
We started interviewing with HHT on May 11th, and talked during that day also to CPW 
over lunch. From then on, we maintained a rapid pace of interviewing with sometimes 2 or 
3 interviews on a day. Some rows refer to email exchanges as indicated in the 
“Interviewers & Mode” column. We held teleconferences from DiskCo’s Singapore site A 
to GP in Singapore site E, and a couple of people in Malaysia site A. DiskCo-A-6 stands 
for an email exchange with CPW when the author and Mr. Diepeveen were working at 
Nanyang Technological University (NTU) towards the end of their stay in Singapore. 
DiskCo-B-5 refers to an email exchange with HHT when the authors where back in the 
Netherlands (NL). In total we conducted 18 interviews of which 15 were face-to-face at 
Singapore HQ, and 3 remotely to another site in Singapore and Malaysia. 
Over the course of the interview sessions, we sometimes refined our focus to zoom in on 
relevant aspects of the Oracle conversion. Typically, on evenings before a session, the 
author and Mr. Diepeveen would discuss how to enhance the usefulness of an interview. 
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We prepared interview notes geared to an interviewee’s position (executive, manager, IT 
project team member, or key user), and the status of our inquiry process. The refined 
interview protocols are retained as reference material by the author, as are all tapes, notes, 
and transcripts. 
Interviews were always conducted by the author and Mr. Diepeveen. We used the research 
manual and a print-out from HHT to check names. Interviews followed a standard 
procedure of mutual introductions. The author and Mr. Diepeveen occasionally switched 
roles, from lead interviewer and observer. This promoted recuperating, and a fresh look at 
the interview pattern. Interviews lasted between 1 and 2 hours and were taped from 
beginning to end. We managed the interview in terms of process and content, following 
specific resources on these skill areas (Fontana & Frey, 1994; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). 
 
Other data sources 
While working on-site at DiskCo, we collected all sorts of data in addition to taping the 
interviews. During interviews we made notes and had blank sheets of paper available. 
Sometimes we asked people to draw an organization chart, or to clarify a point.  
The author and Mr. Diepeveen were granted access to DiskCo’s global intranet from a 
computer at Singapore site A. From the standard access page, we followed numerous links. 
We visited sites that were related to topic areas, specific technologies, sites, or functional 
areas. Queries were made on specific topics. Data relevant to our study was saved for 
processing at a later stage.  
 
Paper-based corporate documents were collected or copied. For instance, we received or 
made copies of Oracle’s Application Implementation Method, organization charts, and 
contact lists. We also picked up copies from an internal DiskCo publication to read about 
recent achievements and plans. After our on-site investigation, CPW kindly mailed us the 
master implementation plan. This was an Excel file that listed major implementation steps 
for all DiskCo site across the globe. 
DiskCo’s internet sites was accessed from Singapore site A and NTU. Before arriving in 
Singapore we had already checked information on DiskCo and its industry from database 
queries. We now looked for more specific information and updates, like a recent annual 
report. We also checked sites from companies involved in the case (SysCo), or whose 
products were used at DiskCo (Oracle, Lotus Notes, CCC/Harvest).  
Dr. Periasamy kindly provided us with a book from NTU that contained a case study on 
DiskCo (Lee & Palvia, 1996). He also provided us with tapes from Mr. Lee’s research on 
DiskCo some years earlier. Portions from these were copied and later transcribed. 
The author took several pictures at DiskCo - from the building, videoconferencing room, 
and a white board with drawings from CPW, the author and Mr. Diepeveen.  
During one session (DiskCorp-B-2), HHT demonstrated us Lotus Notes databases. She 
explained different types of databases and ways in which DiskCo used the application 
world wide. We received print-outs from several screens as reference material. 
Being on-site provided us with a unique view on people’s physical work space, their local 
work behaviors, and remote teleconversations. We used DiskCo’s restaurant for lunch and 
looked at the drive manufacturing hall on-site.  
After two weeks of on-site research, we processed some of the material and delivered a 
first cut of the case description (van Fenema & Diepeveen, 1999). It was mailed to HHT 
and Dr. Periasamy. Their feedback was used to enhance its completeness and accuracy.  
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§ 8.3.2  CarCo case 
The CarCo case was initiated when Amanda Cijntje worked with the author’s supervisor 
on her masters thesis. From September 1996 onwards, she participated in the Goldd project 
for administrative duties and local coordination. She stayed there until March 1997, 
logging her experiences on a weekly basis (see data source CarCo-K-135 in Table 20). The 
author’s involvement in Goldd commenced late 1996. We worked with Ms Cijntje to 
develop a research setup that would match reciprocal interests. Our theoretical work had 
started around October 1996. It was used for a first opportunity to conduct interviews in 
December 1996 (see CarCo-E-1 in Table 20, and reflections on that interview CarCo-E-3). 
At that time, SPB from the Indian offshore team visited the German unit on his way back 
from a meeting in Detroit. Over the next weeks, we designed a first semi-structured 
questionnaire early 1997 (available upon request). It was refined through interactions with 
our supervisor and Ms Cijntje. While she worked in Cologne we exchanged emails, or 
called occasionally. Sometimes she was in the Netherlands for on-site meetings in 
Rotterdam. Ms Cijntje (abbreviated as AC) conducted a first round of interviews late 
February 1997 (see interviews in Table 20). Most of these were face-to-face in Cologne 
with CarCo staff - HH, HN, MB. Because of local constraints, Ms Cijntje used a semi-
structured form for parts of her interview with MB (CarCo-C-2). She had a second 
opportunity to talk to SPB who assisted BJ as temporary onshore liaison. BW had left the 
project but was willing to fill out and submit electronically a semi-structured form. For JF - 
a CarCo staff member in Detroit, USA - Ms Cijntje set up a videoconference call. 
Interviews were processed and analyzed. Ms Cijntje wrote shortly after interviews 
comprehensive notes and reflections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 The data code consists of the case study name (CarCo), a letter to identify a member of 
the Goldd project team, and a number to differentiate data per participant. The column 
shows abbreviations for Goldd partipants’ names, as well as their role. For details see the 
description of the CarCo case.  
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Table 20 - Key data CarCo Goldd project  
 
Goldd  
Participant & Role 
Date & Location Researchers & 
Interview mode 
Data 
Processing 
Code 
February 27, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-A-1 
March 6, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-A-2 
June 12, 1997, 
Cologne 
Author, AC (ftf) Full transcript CarCo-A-3 
January 20-24, 1997 PowerPoint N.A. CarCo-A-4 
HH, Project 
Leader 
Spring, 1997, Cologne AC, supervisor 
(ftf) 
Ex post 
discussion 
CarCo-A-5 
February 20, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-B-1 
April, 1997, Cologne AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-B-2 
HN, Senior 
Analyst 
June 12, 1997, 
Cologne 
Author, AC (ftf) Full transcript CarCo-B-3 
February 27, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-C-1 
February 27, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC semi-
structured form 
Ex post report CarCo-C-2 
MB, Data 
modeling 
March 5, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-C-3 
February 21, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC 
(videoconference) 
Ex post report CarCo-D-1 JF, Replacing 
senior analyst, 
team leader March 7, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC 
(videoconference) 
Ex post report CarCo-D-2 
December 17, 1996, 
Cologne 
AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-E-1 
February 21, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-E-2 
SPB, Offshore 
senior team 
member, later also 
onshore liaison 
December 17, 1996, 
Cologne 
AC reflections Ex post report CarCo-E-3 
MD, Offshore 
senior team 
member, later also 
onshore liaison 
March 7, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-F-1 
February 23, 1997, 
Cologne 
AC semi-
structured form 
Ex post report CarCo-G-1 
October 5, 1999 CV from Internet N.A. CarCo-G-2 
BW, Initial 
consultant, 
onshore liaison, 
Cologne 
October 24, 2000 CV from Internet N.A. CarCo-G-3 
April, 1997, Cologne AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-H-1 BJ, Replacing 
consultant, 
onshore liaison, 
Cologne 
June 12, 1997, 
Cologne (lunch) 
Author, AC (ftf) Ex post report CarCo-H-2 
Logs until early March, 
1997 
AC logs Ex post report CarCo-K-1 N.A. 
Summer, 1997 AC thesis N.A. CarCo-K-2 
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After the first round of interviews, we designed a second set of questions to refine our 
research. Ms Cijntje conducted this series in March and April with HH, HN, and MB from 
Cologne, and JF through another videoconference session. She returned to Cologne for 
these interviews since her internship had ended. Ms Cijntje talked to BJ, the new onshore 
liaison, and MD from the offshore team (temporary assistant to BJ). These interviews were 
processed soon afterwards. Somewhere in Spring 1997, the author’s supervisor went over 
to Cologne for an extensive meeting with the project leader, HH. Upon his return, he 
discussed his impressions with the author. In June 1997, the author visited the Cologne 
site. Together with Ms Cijntje he interviewed HH and HN, and had lunch with BJ. For that 
day he had prepared a series of questions to expand on the existing data set. The two 
interviews were taped and literally transcribed afterwards. Impressions from the lunch with 
BJ were noted soon afterwards. Other data sources include a PowerPoint presentation 
prepared by the project leader, HH (CarCo-A-4). BW’s curriculum vitae was picked up 
from the internet in 1999 and 2000. Ms Cijntje’s thesis on the CarCo case was used as 
reference material. Finally, Ms Cijntje retrieved corporate documentation and information 
from CarCo’s intranet and internet site. She communicated regularly with the author in her 
dual role of on-site participant and researcher. This was either remotely from Cologne, or 
face-to-face whilst she was in Rotterdam.  
 
§ 8.4  Data Processing and Management 
 
The yield of fieldwork depends to a large extent on data processing and management 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Yin (1994) stresses the value of a formal case study database. 
It represents in an explicit manner information obtained from fieldwork. We explain here 
how data was processed and organized for the DiskCo and CarCo case. Raw data from 
fieldwork at DiskCo included large numbers of standard magnetic tapes, a Microsoft Excel 
file, some printed pictures, and information from the corporate intranet (see Table 19 for 
interviews). In their present stage, it appeared challenging to maintain an overview of this 
data volume, and make meaningful connections. We took several steps to make data 
accessible. First, data was digitized as much as possible. We transcribed each interview 
word for word, while at the same time entering analytical thoughts in a separate file. This 
took months for about 18 interviews of each 1 hour to 1½ hours. Pictures were scanned 
into jpg format. Second, we built a folder structure for each data category: documents, 
interviews raw (pure transcriptions), interviews coded (we highlighted and entered 
comments in these files), intranet, pictures and internet. Next, we created on a meta level a 
portal file called “Data DiskCo Case”. In that file, we entered the same data categories, and 
created hyperlinks to the actual data files. For instance, we included links to the interview 
transcripts, pictures, intranet resources, and master plan file. We did the same for the 
CarCo case and created a supra-case file called “Case Control Center”. From there, we had 
access to DiskCo and CarCo as well as data sets from other researchers, and articles. We 
linked the case portals to facilitate cross-case analysis. Figure 39 depicts this data structure.  
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Figure 39 - Organizing for data analysis 
 
The simple logic underlying the environment made it transparent and easily accessible. 
Hyperlinks created a sort of web surfing experience. Starting from the Case Control Center 
file, we would click once for any portal; from there we clicked once for full text interview 
transcripts, PowerPoint files, pictures and so on. Paper based resources were not scanned 
because of time constraints. This made it more challenging to integrate them in the data 
analysis process.  
We used the environment for highlighting themes in the data sources, and creating links 
between data files. Separate files were created around promising themes and linked to 
relevant sentences from interview transcripts. In fact, interaction with data became so 
convenient that we memorized key pieces.  
We linked the database to separate analysis files (light gray in Figure 39) while 
maintaining its original format. This made it easy to separate the database from our 
analysis process (Yin, 1994). For each case we setup an analysis portal file that was linked 
to important data sources. A case analysis portal provided centralized access to the portals, 
and a file for cross-case analysis.  
 
 
§ 8.5  Analysis 
 
Analyzing ‘data’ from a social setting is an intricate process (Yin, 1994). It constitutes a 
process with cognitive, social, and psychological dimensions. Cognitive because the 
Analysis Case A Analysis Case B
Case Analysis Portal
Cross-case analysis
Case Control Center
Portal Case A
Data type 1
Data type 2
Data type 3
Data type 4
Portal Case B
Data type 1
Data type 2
Data type 3
Data type 4
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researcher attempts to conceptualize and understand an empirical setting. The process is 
social since data is obtained through interactions with an empirical context. And 
afterwards, the researcher discusses findings with colleagues and others in various settings. 
Analysis is also a psychological process - it depends on the internal make-up of the 
researcher. His preferences, mental style and mode of working are indistinguishably 
intertwined with an empirical study. A few sentences back, we noted data in quotation 
marks. This is because data constitutes not only explicit notes, tapes, drawings and so 
forth. It also includes the research’s memory, his interpretations and perceptions. We use 
the term in this broader sense.  
The process of qualitative analysis is only in part conscious and deliberate (Stake, 1995). 
Somehow, the researcher builds a mental world that attempts to understand the empirical 
setting he has been connected with. This constructing relies on three pillars: research focus, 
theoretical baggage, and empirical data (see Figure 5 and Figure 40) (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). The research focus stems from the overarching objectives of a study, as condensed 
in research questions. Theory refers to the researcher’s immersion in existing literature that 
is relevant to his study. Empirical data finally encompasses his direct encounters with 
empirical contexts or representations thereof. For our research, we conducted two major 
case studies - DiskCo and CarCo - and a few smaller ones. We received data from other 
researchers (Meadows, 1996b; Millar, 1999), talked with practitioners, and reflected on our 
own experiences with remote collaboration.  
 
 
Figure 40 - Researcher and the process of qualitative analysis 
 
In our experience, qualitative analysis is a recurrent process, with multiple cycles. In fact, 
we interacted with the three pillars Figure 40 countless times. Each time, we somehow 
Resear cher
Processing
Themes
Patterns
Research focus
Current literatureEmpirical data
Understanding
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made progress in the sense of better understanding our case studies. This means that we 
developed a conceptual story line that frames what happened in the case studies. A limited 
set of coherent themes and patterns started to emerge with explanatory power. This 
conceptual progress interwove data with current literature such that novel insights 
emerged.  
 
Our description so far of qualitative analysis offers a reflection on the prolonged process 
we went through. Somehow, this is incompletely captured in techniques, methods and 
tools that abound in methodological literature (Miles & Huberman, 1994). It is somewhat 
like preparing a meal - the cooking process and capabilities encompass more than a recipe 
or ingredients (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Similarly, interaction with ‘data’ refers not only to 
manipulation of explicit information. It also implies more tacit processes, like working 
from memory, flashbacks, brainwaves, and other ad hoc activities. Qualitative analysis is a 
very intensive process that pulls in the researcher at frequent times and is incompletely 
controlled. Of course, we supported and channeled it. To this end, we deployed several 
techniques.  
 
We constructed a digital environment to facilitate data access (Figure 39). It contained 
mainly Microsoft Office files (Word, PowerPoint, Excel), html files, and jpg files (figures). 
We maintained original data resources, and used exact copies of the files for analysis. In 
this data set, we highlighted sections of interest to our research (yellow). For sentences that 
conveyed important insights we used red or light green. This made subsequent processing 
of data more efficient. Apart from the data set, we maintained separate files around key 
themes, like electronic media use, liaisons, and technology. We used Microsoft explorer to 
query multiple data files, or searched through separate data files using an application’s 
search functionality. The theme files contained multiple hyperlinks to the data set, so that 
with one click one jumped to data sources like an interview transcript. Hyperlinks made 
coding of data sources or use of specialized applications largely superfluous. Theme files 
were organized on a meta level so that our analysis became as accessible as the original 
data set (Figure 39). With this infrastructure, we deployed common techniques like pattern 
matching, explanation building and time series (Yin, 1994). With the first technique, we 
compared patterns from our literature section with those found in our empirical data sets. 
Explanation building refers to causal links in a data set. We made many drawings with 
multiple boxes that are connected in a logical manner. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
describe these as explanatory effects matrices or causal networks. Finally, time series trace 
the chronology of case studies, this was key to understanding the CarCo case that featured 
many changes over time. We analyzed what changed, and why, thus recognizing 
overarching themes. We kept all results from our analyses approaches as reference 
material.  
 
Together, these procedures helped us define a case’s story line while working towards a 
more generic understanding (Lee, 1991). On an interpretive level, we worked on our 
understanding of the two cases by going back to the data sets time and again. In the end, 
we had memorized key sections. This facilitated our writing of case descriptions and single 
case analyses. Intentionally, we included an extensive amount of data excerpts to make our 
analysis as transparent and reliable as possible (Kunda, 1992). Getting familiar with the 
data set was required for developing more generalizable - positivist - understanding (Lee, 
 201
1991). We leveraged our intrinsic understanding for a meta-empirical goal (Stake, 1995). 
In order to accomplish this, we tied our insight into the data sets to the conceptual model. 
This way, we assessed the extent to which we could use our conceptual lens to explain the 
cases’ story line. If it exceeded our initial framework, we investigated how we had to 
extend our original understanding, still within the overall research focus. 
 
§ 8.5.1  Cross-case Analysis 
Multiple case studies offer a form of generalizability. Not in the statistical sense, but to 
deepen our understanding of a phenomenon (Miles & Huberman, 1994). A number of case 
studies strengthen the underpinning of generalizing statements, or what Lee’s (1991) calls 
positive understanding. This leaves a question however. We can develop for each case 
separately a description, interpretive understanding and positivist understanding. But at 
which point do we connect the case studies?  
Table 21 depicts two dimensions that seem central here. On the one hand, the analytical 
process of describing a case study, and developing interpretive and positivist 
understanding (Lee, 1991). And on the other hand, the unit of analysis - one or more single 
cases, versus a meta-case level. We expand here on the right hand column to answer the 
question raised above. Light gray cells and arrows show the path we followed. 
 
Table 21 - Philosophical perspective and single versus cross-case analysis  
 
 Single case analysis Cross-case, integrative analysis 
 
Positivist analysis 
 
 
Positivist analysis per single case 
 
 
Positivist cross-case analysis 
 
 
 
Interpretive 
analysis 
                                 
Interpretive analysis per single case 
 
 
Interpretive cross-case analysis 
 
 
 
Case description 
 
 
Single case description 
 
 
Comparison of single case 
descriptions 
 
First, one could relate descriptions of multiple case studies, but this seems to add little 
value. Each case presents a unique environment and period of time that does not easily 
compare to other situations. This applies in particular to research designs with diverse 
studies. In our case, the DiskCo and CarCo case concerned different types of projects 
(implementation versus development), and involved different companies and geographical 
locations. The cases lacked similarity along many dimensions which made comparison not 
useful. We merely structured the case descriptions in a similar manner.  
 
Second, a researcher could compare interpretive understanding of different cases. This 
seems to contradict in a sense the nature of this type of analysis. It is closely intertwined 
with people’s subjective understanding of an empirical setting. Interpretive analysis sticks 
as closely as possible to empirical data to render a credible storyline. Integration across 
interpretive analyses would jeopardize this quality. The researcher could twist his 
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understanding to achieve artificial connections. We therefore abstained from this approach. 
Still, our research focus promoted consistency across the interpretive analyses. Many 
themes recurred in both interpretive analyses. At the same time, we left room for case-
specific features and data sources. For instance, the CarCo case has strong process data 
from Ms Cijntje’s logs. We elaborated these to enhance our understanding of people’s 
experiences and adaptations during that project. This would be less interesting for DiskCo.  
 
Third, positivist analysis is by nature more extra-case oriented. It has been described as 
instrumental research (Stake, 1995), outside oriented (Burell & Morgan, 1979), and 
focused on the discovery of general laws (Luthans & Davis, 1982). Looking from a 
positivist angle, the researcher deliberately moves beyond a specific case situation to 
identify generalizable insights. These factors encourage cross-case analysis. Abstraction 
from the cases facilitates an integrative comparison of findings from different cases. We 
adopted this approach and included an integrative chapter. Here, we present our findings 
from the DiskCo and CarCo case studies. These are preceded by applicable notes from our 
literature study. The chapter connects insights from our empirical research with current 
literature, all within the overall research focus (Figure 40). This was facilitated by the 
coherent theme structure of our interpretive analyses. In this chapter we answers the 
research questions and show how our empirical work push current know-how a little bit 
further. We elaborate on this at the beginning of the chapter containing the integrative 
analysis.  
 
§ 8.6  Reporting 
 
Reporting on case studies is a vital component of the case study methodology (Yin, 1994). 
It provides not only added value to audiences, but helps the researcher better understand 
his empirical work. We communicated on the DiskCo and CarCo cases with peers, 
students, and practitioners. Apart from my work, the co-investigators wrote their own 
version of the case studies, Mr. Diepeveen for DiskCo (Diepeveen, 1999), and Ms Cijntje 
for CarCo (Cijntje, 1997). The author published a first short piece on the CarCo case for 
the International Conference on Information Systems (van Fenema, 1997). On the DiskCo 
case, the author and Mr. Diepeveen wrote a first cut whilst in Singapore (van Fenema & 
Diepeveen, 1999). It contained mainly descriptions of the case, and was verified by the 
Director Applications Development.  
After we had transcribed and analyzed the interviews from DiskCo, we wrote a digital 
white paper. This was the first time that we identified a number of themes that recurred in 
our interpretive analysis. The paper was finished in April 2000 and loaded on a server. We 
made it accessible - password protected - to participating companies and a few peers. The 
author wrote another case study on DiskCo, and used both cases for teaching assignments 
at Florida International University. We learned from the preparatory process, and received 
valuable feedback from students. Examples from both cases returned in a conference paper 
for Erasmus University (van Fenema & Kumar, 2001). Each communication opportunity 
helped us look at the cases from different angles. This enhanced our understanding and 
craftsmanship.  
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§ 8.7  Quality of Case Study Research 
 
With empirical case study research in the social sciences, the investigator temporarily 
connects to a ‘real-life’ setting (Yin, 1994). In this interaction process, he obtains 
impressions that are interpreted according to his frame of reference. The quality of this 
endeavor is usually defined by four tests: construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity, and reliability (Kirk & Miller, 1986; Yin, 1994). Yin (1994) operationalizes the 
tests with several tactics, and relates these to four phases of case study research: research 
design, data collection, composition of case report, and data analysis (Table 22). We 
elaborate on these quality criteria in the context of our case study research.  
 
Table 22 - Quality criteria for case study research 
 
Phases of case study research  
Tests: Research design Data collection Composition Data analysis 
 
Construct 
validity 
  Multiple 
sources of 
evidence 
 Establish 
chain of 
evidence 
 Key 
informants 
review case 
study report 
 
 
Internal 
validity 
    Pattern 
matching 
 Explanation 
building 
 Time series 
analysis 
 
External 
validity 
 Replication 
logic in 
multiple 
case studies 
   
 
Reliability 
  Case study 
protocol 
 Case study 
database 
  
  Adopted  from: Yin (1994: 33) and modified 
 
§ 8.7.1  Construct Validity 
 
Construct validity refers to the quality of a measurement instrument. More precisely, it 
concerns the relationship between a construct or theoretical paradigm and their empirical 
measurements (Kirk & Miller, 1986). Validity is not easily achieved in qualitative 
research. With this approach, investigators do not have something like the statistical 
verification procedures common to survey based research. Still, some tactics have been 
proposed to approximate construct validity in qualitative inquiry (Yin, 1994): multiple 
sources of evidence, establishing chain of evidence, and having key informants review a 
case study report. We discuss these for our empirical work.  
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 Multiple sources of evidence - For data collection the researcher should obtain data 
from different sources. This promotes analysis of a phenomenon from different angles 
(triangulation). We attempted to vary our repertoire of data categories within the 
overall constraints of our empirical research. In the case of DiskCo these included 
interviews, electronic communications, corporate documents, intranet/ internet 
information and pictures of white board drawings and some DiskCo facilities (e.g., 
videoconferencing room). For CarCo, we relied on our co-investigator’s participant-
observer role. We conducted interviews and received corporate documentation. We 
picked resources from the internet on CarCo, the vendor firm (SoftHouse), and one of 
the independent consultants working on Goldd.  
 
 Establishing chain of evidence - Results from a case study should be traceable to the 
original data set. External researchers should be able to identify connections across 
stages of a case investigation. We achieved this chain transparency by referring to data 
sources with codes, and including quotes from interviews and other data sources. Data 
codes uniquely identify a data source and show details like location, time, and data 
collection mode. We followed protocols for collecting data, and maintained files used 
for interpretation (Yin, 1994). Together, these techniques promoted the integrative 
quality of our case research process.  
 
 Key informants review case study report - Yin (1994) proposes to have key 
informants from a case context review the eventual report. For DiskCo, we submitted 
an early version of the case study description to that company. It was reviewed by the 
Director Applications Development. She provided us with comments that were 
incorporated in later versions. Corporate PR screened the documents and requested a 
couple of changes. Others may also have looked at the initial report, like the VP 
Information Technologies and core team members at Singapore site A. In the case of 
CarCo, Ms Cijntje had her report checked by the project leader HH. It was used as 
reference material for our work. We provided Ms Cijntje and Mr. Diepeveen with the 
opportunity to read the final manuscript.  
 
 
§ 8.7.2  Internal Validity 
Internal validity applies to the analytical phase of case research with causal claims. The 
investigator attempts to explain the status of a social situation from a number of factors. As 
Yin (1994) proposes, these explanations be wrong or incomplete. With incomplete 
information at his disposal, the researcher makes inferences. Internal validity means that he 
underpins his causal claims as strongly as possible. Yin (1994) suggests three approaches 
to accomplish this: pattern matching, explanation building, and time series analysis. We 
elaborate here on what was mentioned in a preceding section on analysis.  
 
 Pattern matching - Pattern matching means that a researcher compares predicted 
patterns with those found in an empirical case. We accomplished this first of all by 
developing a strong theoretical base. We summarized existing research and drew 
initial conclusions on patterns likely to be found in actual cases. Having elaborated 
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and analyzed our cases, we included an integrative chapter that brought together 
expected and actual patterns.  
 
 Explanation building - Building an explanation implies that the researcher constructs 
a plausible chain of evidence. Yin (1994) describes the challenges of making 
theoretical statements that are refined through iterative processes. He suggests that the 
researcher - while interacting with data and theory - may drift off from his original 
focus. In order to obviate this risk, the researcher should keep referring back to the 
original outline of his study. He should also use a case protocol and database. We tried 
to balance the potential tension between the original focus and conceptual lens, versus 
new insights derived from the cases. Either extreme would reduce the value of the 
eventual result. To sustain consistency, we adopted Yin’s (1994) proposed techniques 
for both case studies. These were earlier explained.  
 
 Time series analysis - Case studies represent social phenomena that change over time. 
As researchers, we usually pick only a limited time frame for reasons of feasibility and 
interest. For DiskCo, we entered the project towards the end and asked people to look 
back on their experience. In our analysis, time played appeared mostly of interest to 
the descriptive part. The project itself did not change much over time from a process 
analysis point of view. With CarCo, we traced a longer period of time because our co-
investigator worked on-site. Time was very relevant to this case study since people 
adjusted important properties of their social system such as the organization of 
communications. We included a separate process analysis to this case to elaborate on 
these changes and explain them.  
 
§ 8.7.3  External Validity 
The third test concerns external validity, i.e., the domain for which findings can be 
generalized. One could ask whether results from a study have relevance outside its 
boundaries (Yin, 1994). Results obtained with methodologies like case studies and 
experiments cannot be generalized in a statistical sense. Unlike survey research, these 
approaches are not based on an empirical sample that represents a larger population. It is 
therefore unfeasible to make inferences on that population (Figure 41). 
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Figure 41 - Statistical generalization 
 
Case study research supports another form of generalization that is analytical. The 
researcher can suggest broader applicability of his findings when results are confirmed 
across multiple cases (or experiments). Consistency of conceptual insights derived from 
more than one case suggest replication logic (Figure 42). This remains on a theoretical 
level. It does not refer to sample logic which is on a data level.  
 
 
 
Figure 42 - Replication logic: analytical generalization 
 
Replication logic has played an important role in our research. Starting from our research 
questions, we have developed a conceptual lens that was consistently used for analyzing 
empirical research from other scholars. These results were presented and summarized in 
the theory section. From there, we conducted two large case studies to assess replication of 
our findings. As a final step, we compared results from our studies with those from other 
scholars. This enabled identification of recurrent themes. 
 
Empirical sample
Theories
Population
Empirical Dimension
Research Design & 
Methodological Dimension
Theoretical Dimension
Survey methodologyInference
Empirical case 1
Theories
Empirical Dimension
Research Design & 
Methodological Dimension
Theoretical Dimension
Case study
methodology
Empirical case 2
Similar cases Replication logic
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§ 8.7.4  Reliability 
The final test points at the idea that another investigator would come up with the same 
results if he were to repeat the case study. It makes the results of a case study less 
dependent on the original researcher, and contributes to objectivity (Kirk & Miller, 
1986).36 Yin (1994) suggests two approaches to ensure reliability: case study protocol, and 
case study database. Both apply to the data collection phase. We elaborate on their role in 
our empirical investigation. 
 
 Case study protocol - For the DiskCo case, we developed an extensive research 
manual that guided our field work. It covered topics like data sources, field work 
cycle, and a myriad of details concerning the interview process (supplies, timing, 
priorities). On the content side, we used an interview protocol that outlined step-wise 
the topics that we wanted to discuss. At several points, it included questions from Mr. 
Diepeveen on some complementary areas. During our field work, we slightly modified 
interview questions and procedures to enhance our effectiveness in that setting. The 
CarCo case was conducted earlier in our research process. We used several resources 
on interview and research skills but did not yet have a research manual. We developed 
protocols for two subsequent rounds of interviews. These were discussed with Ms 
Cijntje and modified. The protocols described here are available upon request.  
 
 Case study database - For the DiskCo and CarCo case we set up an integrated digital 
environment. It contained most data resources that were linked to a case portal file. On 
a meta-case level, we had a central file for accessing our case studies and empirical 
data from other investigators. Copies of this environment are maintained and available 
upon request.  
                                                 
36 One could argue that repeatability as common in the natural sciences is challenging to 
achieve in social case study research. The latter focuses on human interactions which seem 
bound in their unicity to a certain time frame. A hypothetical researcher returning to an 
earlier case study context may find another firm, other people, and novel interaction 
patterns. 
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Chapter 9  DiskCo Case: Multi-site ERP Implementation Far East
37
 
 
This case study deals with DiskCo’s implementation of an ERP package in the Far East 
region. The company converted multiple sites to Oracle ERP and worked closely with US 
counterparts. We describe the context and setup of this project, and continue with a data-
drive analysis.  
 
§ 9.1  Description
38
 
 
The DiskCo case description outlines the context and setup of the Far East Oracle 
implementation project. It contains information on companies, individuals, and sites 
involved, and the project timeline. After these basics we elaborate on the situation before 
the conversion project. The section concludes with an exposé on various dimensions of the 
project’s setup.  
 
§ 9.1.1  Companies, People and Sites  
DiskCo is the focal organization of this study. The company offers solutions for data 
storage and processing to individuals and business. DiskCo’s activities include two main 
categories: physical products (disc and tape drives), and software. We focus on the former 
category that is organized around disc drive and media operations. The company relies on 
tightly integrated vertical supply chains that start at production facilities in the US, Europe 
and Asia for large volumes. Distribution and sales rely on a global network of DiskCo sites 
and partner organizations. R&D is located in Singapore, and a couple of sites in the US.  
 
Our study zooms in on DiskCo Far East and their role in the global project to implement 
Oracle ERP. Table 23 shows organizations and people tied to our study. We conducted 
research at DiskCo’s regional HQ for the Far East in Singapore (site A). The right hand 
column shows whom we interviewed, including their role. Names are represented by 2 or 3 
letter combinations to maintain confidentiality.  
We interviewed DiskCo employees in Singapore and Malaysia from the Information 
Technologies function. CPW was the project champion for the Oracle implementation in 
the Far East except for Thailand. HHT worked for CPW. She guided the local IT team, and 
provided support for IT staff at sites in China, Malaysia and Japan. In Malaysia, a separate 
data conversion team - headed by JNL - was set up to assist other sites.  
                                                 
37 The author gratefully acknowledges cooperation from DiskCo Singapore and Malaysia, 
Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - especially Dr. Kanapaty Pelly Periasamy, Dr. 
Christina Soh, and Mr. Kenny Lee -  and from Erasmus University co-investigator Berry 
Diepeveen. The case study is intended for generating knowledge on distributed work, 
rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative 
situation. DiskCo and SysCo are not real names but used for reasons of confidentiality. 
38 Based in part on an earlier version of the case description (van Fenema & Diepeveen, 
1999).  
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We also talked with DiskCo people who were key user in the Oracle project. They were 
selected from their department (like Finance) to function as a linking pin between IT 
project team and other users in their own department.  
 
Table 23 - Companies, sites and actors involved in DiskCo case 
 
Company Unit & Site Functional Area People & Role*) 
CPW, Vice President  
HHT, Director Applications 
Development 
OBT, Member Oracle 
Conversion Team 
JPL, Member Oracle 
Conversion Team 
Information Technologies 
SCC, Member Oracle 
Conversion Team 
Finance ST, Key user 
Singapore site A 
(HQ) 
 
Material & System JLL, Key user 
Singapore site B  No interviews 
Singapore site C  No interviews 
Singapore site D  No interviews 
Singapore site E Information Technologies GP, Member Oracle 
Conversion Team. Temporarily 
stationed here from Singapore 
site A 
JNL, Project Manager Data 
Conversion Team 
Information Technologies 
MC, Member Data Conversion 
Team 
Finance SKL, Key user 
Malaysia site A 
 
 
Inventory Control ET and some colleagues, Key 
users 
Malaysia site B  No interviews 
China site A  No interviews 
China site B  No interviews 
Thailand sites  No interviews 
Japan site  No interviews 
US site: HQ West 
coast 
 No interviews 
DiskCo 
US site: Central time 
zone 
 No interviews 
Oracle US, Singapore, 
Malaysia 
 No interviews 
SysCo US, India, Singapore  No interviews 
  
On a broader basis, DiskCo engaged Oracle locations in the US and Far East for training 
and support. SysCo is a global software house from India that was contracted to assist 
DiskCo IT staff with development tasks.  
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§ 9.1.2  Time Zones and Windows DiskCo Sites 
 
The Oracle implementation project was a truly global effort in the sense that sites in 
different continents and time zones were involved (Table 24). For the Far East region, this 
was not really an issue, since most sites are located in UTC +8. This applies to Singapore, 
and sites in Malaysia and China. Japan is located in UTC +9, and SysCo’s site in UTC 
+5.39 Time zones did play a role between sites in the Far East and the US. Staff in 
Singapore and Malaysia frequently consulted their counterparts in the US. This was to tap 
into their experience with the Oracle implementation that was initiated at an earlier stage at 
US sites. DiskCo US sites are located in the Pacific time zone (UTC -8), and Central time 
zone (UTC -6). Table 24 shows for each of the regions involved bold rectangles that 
represent an extended working day from 8 o’clock in the morning until 19:00 hours.40  
The bold dotted vertical date line officially splits the time zone that is both UTC +12 and 
UTC -12 (in total planet earth is divided in 24 zones, with UTC 0 as starting point). Here it 
is shown as right from the UTC +/- 12 zone for practical reasons. The date line implies that 
e.g. Tuesday morning 8:00 hours in Singapore matches 16:00 hours in US Pacific time 
zone the previous day - Monday. Absolute time differences from Singapore are shown in 
one of the top rows. This is because there the Far East regional HQ is located.  
 
                                                 
39 Although the site in India is UTC +5.5, we use UTC +5 for practical reasons. 
40 For lay-out rasons, working days in US Central (UTC - 6) are shown between 9:00 and 
19:00 hours. In India, days are depicted until 17:00 hours.  
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§ 9.1.3  Project Timeline 
 
In 1994, firms across the globe like DiskCo initiated projects to investigate the impact of 
the Y2K problem.41 The need for system modification or replacement was often used to 
implement more advanced information technology like client/server environments and 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems (Markus et al., 2000). At DiskCo, US sites 
and representatives from the Far East and Europe initiated an evaluation process for ERP 
software. In 1995, DiskCo selected Oracle ERP from the final set of 2 vendors (SAP and 
Oracle), to be implemented across its worldwide operations (Table 25).  
 
Preparations for the actual implementations started in 1996. While US sites would 
implement before Europe and the Far East, representatives from these regions were 
involved to accelerate their learning curves. Singapore HQ setup an IT development 
organization in December 1996 to become a key resource for the Far East 
implementations. Over 1997, Oracle was implemented in the US, and Singapore site A. 
Table 25 shows for sites in the Far East42 turn live dates, i.e., when the system is ready for 
operational launch.  
 
The initial master schedule dictated a tight sequence of implementations based on the fixed 
end date: the Y2K problem. In reality, implementations had to be delayed to cater for 
learning effects and site specific needs, see most right hand column in (Table 25). The final 
site - Japan - was ready just in time by June 1999. The Y2K problem would already start to 
have an impact form July 1999 onwards. Actual turn live dates show a more spread-out, 
sequential implementation pattern than the original plan. Local IT and user groups needed 
more time to deal with the complexity and novelty of Oracle ERP. In addition, Singapore 
site A hosted the so-called core team that assisted remote sites. This team included IT 
professionals and key users from various functional departments. Their capacity for 
helping simultaneously multiple sites was limited. As the project proceeded, urgent local 
constraints were communicated to the upper management echelon. The master plan was 
adapted accordingly and communicated backwards to local management. Communicating 
the global implementation master plan relied on a straightforward Excel file. On a regional 
and local level people use Microsoft Project to plan the work in close detail. In addition, 
some functional user groups posted more specific outlines on their section of DiskCo’s 
globally accessible intranet.  
                                                 
41 The Y2K (year 2000) problem refers to information systems from the 70s and 80s that 
contain only 2 digits for years in the date field. From the year 2000 onwards, year digits 
represent combinations that could also refer to the year 0 or 1 AD. This makes computer 
hardware and applications stop operating, or function improperly.  
42 Thailand is not included here. Since local requirements were very specific, it was 
decided to organize the Oracle implementation there separately.  
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Table 25 - Timeline DiskCo Oracle implementation Far East 
 
Date Turn live date 
Year Month 
Project events 
Planned Actually realized 
1994  DiskCo US starts working on 
Y2K problem 
  
1995  ERP project definition and 
vendor selection process 
  
1996  Implementation preparation US, 
Far East and Europe 
Singapore site A kick-off IT 
development team in December 
  
January  
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
Singapore IT development team 
follows US implementations, 
and prepares for Far East 
implementations 
Implementations DiskCo sites US and 
Europe 
 
November Singapore site A  
1997 
December   
January    
February Singapore site B Singapore site A 
March Singapore site C  
April   
May  Singapore site B 
June   
July Malaysia site A Singapore site C 
August China site A  
September China site B  
October Malaysia site B Malaysia site A 
November Japan China site A 
1998 
December Singapore site E  
January  Singapore site D China site B, 
Malaysia site B 
February  Singapore site D 
March   
April   
May  Singapore site E 
1999 
June 
Far East implementations 
 Japan 
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§ 9.1.4  Situation before the Project 
DiskCo initiated a re-evaluation of its global IT infrastructure in 1994. This project 
touched systems for key business processes like product design, manufacturing and 
distribution. So far, DiskCo used a system called MANMAN (Manufacturing 
Management). Local IT readily customized this application according to user expectations. 
This resulted in a heterogeneous IT infrastructure that was expensive to maintain. Sites 
kept their own data center, leading to a situation of hundreds of small local data centers. 
Data feeding into Management Information Systems was mainly available locally.  
 
The Y2K problem made reconsideration of this situation urgent. It enabled DiskCo to 
assess implementation of advanced IT to leap forward strategically. Around 1994, ERP 
software introduced a new era of standardized and integrated computing. This promised 
improvement on operational parameters like costs, customization, flexibility and speed 
(Davenport, 1998). ERP seemed to fit DiskCo’s organizational model well. The company 
did not outsource activities that other firms in similar industries may consider peripheral, 
like manufacturing PCB’s.43 DiskCo rather relied on integrated intra-organizational supply 
chains to achieve speed and agility. About daily, planes with product components arrive in 
Singapore to be assembled there and flown to markets in across all continents. Considering 
this international nature of DiskCo’s operations, standardized global ERP system appeared 
very attractive (Kay, 1998; Markus et al., 2000). It would make centralized data centers 
feasible, and simplify global enhancement of applications through a single source code. 
Standardized IT infrastructure facilitates connecting and exchanging IT staff across sites. 
 
DiskCo executives from around the world were involved in selecting a vendor and 
package. At the end, Oracle ERP was selected because of its strength in client/server 
technology. DiskCo selected 4 main modules: Engineering, Finance, Manufacturing, and 
Order Management. DiskCo now faced the challenge of implementing the ERP system 
across its global operations. There was not much time: since FY 2000 starts by the end of 
June 1999, systems have to be replaced by that time. The challenge was also to move the 
current IT and user organization into a new era of enterprise computing. ERP was new to 
the entire organization. It would require major efforts to embed ERP know-how across the 
globe. And to change the mindset from local control to centrally maintained software, 
since Oracle ERP relies on a single source code that is replicated to local sites. The 
challenge was also to ensure user buy-in of the new system, and even get them involved as 
key users in the implementation process. Finally, a project of this magnitude required 
project management skills and international collaboration beyond the IT group’s 
experience so far. Most sites had operated in a somewhat independent fashion with IT staff 
providing support to their local user groups.  
 
At the same time, other factors made the implementation easier in the Far East. First, the 
Singapore HQ had considerable experience with sites in China and Malaysia. Many sites 
were originally from another company [StorCo] that merged with DiskCo in the late 
                                                 
43 PCB stands for Printed Circuit Board, a semi-conductor product that connects disc 
drives with the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of a computer. 
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1990s. after the merger, Singapore HQ replaced the partner’s local systems with their own 
infrastructure. This standardized IT to some extent, and helped build relationships with IT 
staff and users at sites in China and Malaysia. The VP in Singapore for the Oracle project 
hand-picked new IT staff members in China. Second, across sites with similar business 
operations, users had developed extensive contacts to share experiences. These networks 
could be used to get people involved in the Oracle project. Third, turnover at DiskCo Far 
East was fairly low, both at staff and managerial/ executive level. This preserved working 
relationships people established over time. This applies to contacts within the Far East 
region, and between Singapore and the US. For instance, the current CIO at DiskCo HQ in 
the US was head of the IT organization at Singapore HQ. Finally, from a technology point 
of view, DiskCo maintained an extensive network of lease lines. A fixed fee replaces the 
variable costs of calls, thus encouraging remote contacts. Lotus Notes groupware was 
installed across all DiskCo sites worldwide. This enables email contacts, document 
forwarding, and workflow management. About twice per 24 hours, local Lotus databases 
are replicated across the world to minimize interference with local operations. The global 
DiskCo intranet offers a more static communication medium. Here, sites and local 
functional groups present themselves. They provide contact information, news updates, 
and resources like manuals, presentations, and templates.  
 
Across DiskCo’s sites in the Far East sites, people leveraged these factors to collaborate 
remotely in the Oracle project.  
 
§ 9.1.5  Project Setup 
Global implementations of packaged software like ERP are complicated and challenging 
endeavors (Kay, 1998; Markus et al., 2000). ERP enforces commonality of IT 
infrastructure and business processes that often meets with local resistance. For global 
firms like DiskCo this can be especially painful since local sites have - or think they have - 
different requirements (Horwitt, 1998). This section describes how DiskCo approached 
their project. We focus on project organization, processes and planning, and technology. 
 
§ 9.1.5.1  Project Organization 
Two basic decision parameters for multi site implementations concern timing and 
responsibilities. Table 26 shows a matrix of these dimensions and 9 strategies as we 
explain below.  
 
First, timing refers to the temporal sequence of local implementations. With multiple sites, 
one option is purely sequential implementations. That is, first site A until turn live, then 
site B and so on. A second option is parallel implementation, where all sites go through 
similar steps simultaneously. This is also referred to as a big-bang approach. As CPW, 
Vice President Information Technologies in Singapore HQ remarked: 
 
“Are we going to do a big bang meaning that all the plants are going through the 
implementation process at the same time? But how are we going to build up the 
knowledge? Because all of us had no knowledge.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
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Apparently, a sequential approach offers the advantage of allowing some time for learning 
the novel application. A final possibility is to mix parallel and sequential approaches. 
DiskCo adopted this approach. On a meta-regional level, implementations were 
overlapping: Far East and Europe started when some US were still in progress. 
 
“Of course we are not waiting for all the US plants to convert before we start. We kind 
of started halfway. So by then some of those programs are already (really) there, even 
though they may need some further modification such as those data conversion 
programs.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Within regions, here the Far East, implementations were sequentially but with a twist: the 
first implementations were done sequentially until sufficient experience was acquired. 
Then, for some sites parallel implementation became feasible and desirable to save time.  
 
Table 26 - Multi-site implementation: organizational choices 
 
Implementation responsibility and resources   
Central Local Mixture 
Sequential 
 
Sequential, 
centralized 
implementation 
Sequential, local 
implementation 
Sequential 
implementation 
with mixture of 
central and local 
resources 
Parallel 
 
Parallel, 
centralized 
implementation 
Parallel, local 
implementation 
Parallel 
implementation 
with mixture of 
central and local 
resources 
 
 
 
 
 
Timing of multi-site 
implementations 
Mixture 
 
Centralized 
implementation 
with mixed timing 
Local 
implementation 
with mixed timing 
Mixed timing and 
resources 
 
A second choice relates to the division of responsibility and resources. A purely 
centralized approach implies that HQ is responsible and provides resources for the local 
implementations. On a global level, this could mean that a team from the US takes care of 
local projects - in person and/ or remotely. Regionally, it could mean that Singapore HQ 
takes on that role for the Far East sites. Finally, a mixture means that responsibilities and 
resources are divided between central HQ and remote sites.  
 
Initially, DiskCo US suggested adapting a centralized approach on a global level, where 
US staff caters for all sites. That concept was abandoned however as CPW explains:  
 
“The assumption that the US will have a team that go around all the sites to do a 
conversion is wrong. Because as we completed one plant we realize “Hey there is a 
lot more that need to be done, and a lot of post conversion support that need to be 
done. And there is no way that they can go.” If we need to convert a few plants at the 
same time, that one whole team cannot make it. So then it is decided that OK Far East 
you have to start working on your team with all your capabilities with the help of the 
US to do the conversion for the rest of the Far East.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
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Some form of parallel implementation was a necessity to meet the aggressive schedule. On 
a global level, however, this could not be combined with centralized responsibility and 
resources. Singapore HQ therefore took the responsibility for Far East implementations 
with the exception of Thailand. They were assisted by the US, resulting in a mixed strategy 
on a global level.  
 
Within the Far East region, Singapore HQ sometimes took full responsibility. This applies 
to small sites, like the ones in Singapore and Japan that do not have (extensive) local IT 
resources (see Table 23). In other cases, it adopted the same role on a regional level as US 
HQ adopted on a global level: local sites are responsible for their own implementations but 
receive support from the central organization. CPW compares the role of his core team in 
Singapore HQ, with the responsibility of local IT directors: 
 
“Each of the sites (in the Far East - author) are self-sufficient. They have a network 
engineer, they have the infrastructure they all report to the IT director, he reports back 
to me. And he is responsible for his conversion. The Singapore HQ team is the 
additional resource to help him. So he has to coordinate get the local infrastructure 
ready, he is the one going to work with Telecom to make sure that this lease line is up 
and running. He is the one to work with my Singapore telecom group to make sure 
that all the telecommunications are ready.  
My coordination role is more on a higher level in the sense that when we coordinate 
with all these people, they have issues, constraints, resource issues they come to me 
and report to me. (…) if it is everything coordinated out from here (Singapore HQ - 
author) it is going to be very difficult. I mean how are you going to make sure that the 
infrastructure is ready. Every area has its local IT, and all of them report back to me” - 
CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
As the quote suggests, local IT organizations replicate Singapore HQ organizational setup 
for their local project. Contacts between people with similar roles in different Far East sites 
are setup to share experiences. From Singapore HQ, people connect to their counterparts in 
the US for the same reason.  
 
Locally, DiskCo adopted a “core team” approach. This group consists of IT specialists and 
key users (user representatives). Their membership of the same team promotes cross-
functional collaboration. Key users liaise between the core team and users in their 
functional area. They also maintain contact with (key) users at other sites. For instance, 
(key) users in Finance .  
 
Thus, multiple distributed communities of people with similar responsibilities and 
backgrounds emerge. They keep each other updated through Lotus Notes email 
distribution lists, and intranet environments dedicated to their community. Singapore HQ 
is the central node in these networks for the Far East. People there also route 
communications for their respective community between the Far East and the US. Across 
communities, connections rely on the local core teams. The organizational setup of 
distributed Oracle implementation thus relies on remote contacts for intra-function, 
homogeneous communications. Heterogeneous collaboration is organized locally.  
 
Figure 43 applies this setup to IT and two other functions (Finance and Manufacturing). As 
a conceptual example, the figure shows communications setup from 1 site in Malaysia and 
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1 in China towards Singapore HQ, and from there to the US. Solid lines show intra-
community linkages across sites (bold for IT), while dotted lines illustrate local, cross-
functional contact.  
 
 
Figure 43 - Multiple distributed communities: communications setup 
 
 
 
From outside DiskCo, Oracle consultants and trainers were involved. In Singapore and 
Malaysia, they trained local IT staff and key users. Other sites relied on Singapore for 
training as local Oracle facilities were not available at that time. Oracle consultants 
assisted the core team at Singapore HQ during the first 6 months of the project. Later, 
SysCo consultants worked on site in Singapore HQ. They did programming and 
development work, and helped DiskCo core team members who lacked experience with 
Oracle ERP and development tools.  
US
Singapore
HQ
Site MalaysiaSite China
IT
Manufacturing
Finance
IT
Manufacturing
Finance
IT
Manufacturing
Finance
IT
Manufacturing
Finance
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§ 9.1.5.2  Project Processes and Planning 
ERP software usually comes with a method for business implementations. It offers a road 
map for implementation process. DiskCo adopted Oracle’s Application Implementation 
Method (AIM), and later the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC).  
 
Packaged in a handbook, the AIM method prescribes team roles, sequential phases and 
activities. AIM distinguishes 7 project phases: Implementation Strategy, Operations 
Analysis, Solution Design, Build (Conference Room Pilot (CRP), Business test, 
Integration test), Custom Documentation, Transition, and Production.  
The first phase - Implementation Strategy - is prior to the actual conversion project. It 
consists mainly of planning and training sessions for IT staff, key users and executives. 
Training modules are designed for specific roles and Oracle ERP modules. First, it 
introduces executives to Oracle ERP on an overview level. Second, IT staff and key users 
are trained on the applications modules. And finally, a technical in-depth workshop is held 
for IT staff. In the Operations Analysis phase, IT staff and key users conduct interviews 
with users to identify current business process and applications used. During the third 
phase, IT staff implements results from this analysis in a test environment. The Build 
phase consists of several tests to verify the correct functioning of modules and interfaces. 
This is to ensure that users approve the proposed system. A Conference Room Pilot (CRP) 
is conducted with key users per module to identify so-called gaps. These are differences 
between user needs and system functionality. Gaps are recorded in a Lotus Notes database, 
and analyzed to determine small enhancement ‘projects’ per gap. Upon incorporating these 
modifications, a Business Test is conducted to check the system again against user 
requirements. Finally, real-life business processes are simulated for the integration test. 
Transition and Production cover the week and weekend before the system turns live. In 
these phases, sites receive extensive help from Singapore HQ. People who come down 
include the VP Information Technologies, the Director Applications Development and core 
team members (IT staff, key users). All these people work on-site with the local team to 
ensure smooth transition to the new system.  
For each of these phases, Oracle’s AIM Advantage Implementor’s Handbook outlines 
inputs, activities and deliverables, often supported by templates. 
 
Well into the project, DiskCo shifted from AIM to the Software Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC). SDLC is a generic - Oracle independent - method to structure the design and 
implementation of information systems. DiskCo’s CIO seemed to prefer this generic IS 
project approach over a method that caters specifically for an Oracle ERP implementation 
(HHT, DiskCorp-B-1). Compared to AIM, SDLC is more detailed and comprehensive. It is 
based on standards from the IEEE Computer Society and originally developed by IBM in 
the late 50’s for the development of large Transaction Processing Systems. DiskCo’s 
Software Process Engineering Group (SPEG) in the US modified the method and 
implemented it as a corporate-wide standard for managing IS projects. SPEG 
communicated DiskCo’s approach to the method through the corporate intranet. The 
SDLC consists of 7 phases: Business Analysis, System Requirements Specification, 
Software Requirements Specification, Design Specification, Test Plan, System Turnover, 
and Review Summary. For each phase, the methodology describes its purpose and 
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specifies optional and requisite activities to be performed. The method emphasizes 
documentation of each step. People can download document templates for each phase from 
the DiskCo intranet, and use them for their project role and task.  
 
Planning the Oracle roll-out was top-down. On a global level, DiskCo US defined 4 
separate trajectories for the US/Mexico, Europe, Far East, and Thailand. Per trajectory, 
sequencing of sites and major phases were identified (see Table 25 for Far East). Financial 
reporting regulations in the US constrained opportunities for preparing and executing site 
conversions. The VP Information Technologies in Singapore HQ explains: 
 
“We have some criteria or constraints that the last month of a quarter we will not 
change anything because the nature of the business is thus that first 3 months of a 
quarter the production volume is normally (not at maximum - author). Because 
everybody in the US reports by quarter results. So it always comes to the last month 
that we push too many drives out of the factory. And that is a time when you cannot 
afford to have any changes in the system, i.e., major changes or hardware changes. 
So in last month of the quarter we don’t do anything. (…) Because near to the quarter 
report things are so busy, that you cannot organize training, people won’t come.  
But when the quarter closes, then you do the conversion. It is difficult but we have to 
do it because we don’t have much time. So every quarter we can only convert 2 
plants, 1 at the beginning and 1 at the end.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
DiskCo US maintains the master Oracle schedule, a document in Microsoft Excel format. 
It is shared with regional executives and directors and details sequencing of sites and 
phases from December 1996 through mid 1999. The generic plan approximates duration of 
the different phases as Table 27 illustrates.  
 
Table 27 - Planning Oracle ERP implementation phases 
 
Phase Description Estimated duration 
Pre-conversion 
training 
Directors and senior management are 
introduced to Oracle Application 
Core team members attend Application 
Module Training to become familiar with 
Oracle ERP. Key users are responsible for 
training users in their department at a later 
stage. 
IT members of the project team attend a 
technical workshop. 
 
First trial conversion The project team analyzes current 
business processes and prepares a first 
configuration of the system. They also test 
data conversion.  
Assume 2 full weeks 
CRP Training Key users are trained for the CRP Assume 1 week min. 
Conference Room 
Pilot 
The first setup is presented to users for 
feedback on each module. Gaps resulting 
from this session are analyzed and 
processed in a Gap Notes database. 
Depending on their importance, gaps 
result in enhancement projects.  
Assume 2 weeks 
Business Test Upon processing enhancement requests, 
a second test similar to the CRP is 
organized with users to ensure that their 
Assume 1 week min. 
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requirements are met.  
Second trial 
conversion:  
Integration test 
When separate modules are tested and 
verified, business processes are simulated 
to check integration between modules.  
Assume 2 full weeks 
User training Infrastructure is installed, including 
network, servers, and client installation. 
Users are trained under the responsibility 
of key-users. 
1-2 weeks 
Final conversion 
before going live 
Shortly before the go-live date, a final data 
conversion and user verification is carried 
out to ensure proper functioning of the 
system and hardware. 
Assume 1 full week prior to 
conversion weekend 
Week one on new 
system 
Users start to employ the new system in 
their daily work, and receive support from 
the project team. 
 
Source: DiskCo’s Oracle ERP implementation schedule 
 
The master plan is elaborated on a regional and functional level. The regional fine-tuning 
for each site is done by project executives and directors. At the same time, functional 
communities - like Finance, Engineering - coordinate implementation of modules on a 
global level. The plan is a living document: when sites cannot meet the schedule, they will 
contact local managers, who will escalate requests for a delay to regional executives. These 
people will contact the DiskCo CIO in the US to consider adjustments.  
 
§ 9.1.5.3  Technology 
Information Technology plays multiple roles in an international IT project like the DiskCo 
implementation of Oracle. The project itself is aimed at building a new IT infrastructure 
that consists of applications, hardware, and networking. At the same time, the process 
relies on technology for automated coordination and remote collaboration. We elaborate 
here on these themes.  
 
First, with the Oracle application, DiskCo takes a major step towards a globally 
standardized application environment. Local customizations of the previous MANMAN 
system had led to a diversified IT infrastructure with many local data centers. In the new 
setup, only 4 data centers remained: Europe, US, Singapore and Thailand. Multiple sites in 
these respective regions are linked through lease lines to the data centers.  
 
The same Oracle source code runs from these 4 centers, with the default code in the US. 
Since the application is world wide the same, any local modifications have potentially 
global impact. The form of dependence that emerges here is not easily defined. What 
comes close is Thompson’s (1967) definition of pooled dependence: “We can describe this 
situation as one in which each part renders a discrete contribution to the whole and each is 
supported by the whole. We will call this pooled interdependence.” However, this concept 
remains somewhat vague. The form of dependence here concerns the situation that 
multiple actors may work simultaneously on the same resource. We refer to this as 
resource modification dependence. (A related form is resource utilization dependence 
where people want to use the same resource at the same time, but individual usage 
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excludes others’ access. This not an issue here since an information resource like software 
is easily replicated to multiple sites).  
 
Coping with resource modification dependence requires tight coordination, especially 
during the implementation. Simultaneous modifications at different sites could lead to 
different versions and undermine the effectiveness of single source code operations. To 
ensure consistency, DiskCo relied on formal approval procedures. For the actual change 
process, they used a tool for application life cycle management called CCC/Harvest from 
Platinum, Inc. With that tool, three environments were setup to separate phases of source 
code modification: development, testing, and production. A local developer in for example 
Singapore must check-in at the development environment. The code is then locked for any 
other developer and available for local development work. Once the code has been 
modified, it is promoted to the test environment. Local IT staff and users can test and 
simulate working with the modified code. The local test environment is also replicated 
about weekly to similar facilities at other sites for testing there. Upon approval, the code in 
the testing environment is promoted to production and again replicated across the world.  
 
On top of these automated procedures, Oracle developers in DiskCo maintain contact 
through dedicated Lotus Notes mailing lists. They communicate updates and requests 
punctuated by the procedure described above.  
 
Lotus Notes is a key example of how technology enables remote inter-human 
collaboration. This multi-site groupware application supports email exchanges, email 
broadcasts, document management, calendar features and workflow management. The 
environment can also be used for databases that are replicated and accessible across 
international DiskCo locations. When the US started the Oracle implementation, they built 
a database to track issues and experiences from multiple sites there. Initially, DiskCo Far 
East started their own issues database, but it was integrated with the US database after a 
couple of months.  
In addition to the issues database, a knowledge database was started after a couple of US 
implementation. It logs in a helpdesk format resolutions to problems that may occur in the 
various conversion projects. Lotus Notes databases (like the issues and knowledge 
databases) can be accessed from multiple angles, such as type of issue, contributors, 
locations, and urgency of a task.  
 
Lotus Notes communications rely on an international leased network infrastructure that 
allows for instantaneous fixed-fee electronic communications, as well as phone 
conversations and faxing. For teleconferencing (audio), people can use either desktop 
telephones in larger rooms, or book a meeting room equipped with audio conferencing 
facilities, like a telephone with separate speaker and microphones. Staff can receive and 
send facsimile messages from a fax that is available for a number of people working at the 
same floor at close distance.  
Sites have a limited number of rooms equipped with video conferencing facilities (except 
for China). These are booked in advance through local Lotus Notes arrangements. The 
video conferencing facility relies on a package offered by the local telecom company, and 
includes 2 video cameras, a television set, and audio conferencing tools. Video 
transmission relies on ISDN connections. For calling other sites, people can use one-touch, 
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pre-defined numbers. Audio communications rely on integrated equipment with multiple 
microphones (e.g. Polycom products).  
 
Members of the project can use on their individual desktop machines common packages 
like Microsoft Office. They have access to Oracle applications and documentation, and can 
use Microsoft Netmeeting and similar packages for sharing applications while working 
remotely. In particular NetMeeting was used for real-time collaboration on a distance. 
People can show screens related to their questions, and discuss the application while 
talking to each other on the phone.  
 
DiskCo staff has access to the internet and the company’s global intranet. The intranet 
offers an extensive and diverse environment with links to local sites, departments, and 
projects. Concerning the Oracle project, it offers information on the application, servers, 
and implementation methods. The intranet also provides password-restricted access for 
DiskCo IT professionals to special servers, applications and information.  
 
Finally, in most developed countries, people have pagers and mobile phones to stay 
connected while not in their office.  
 
§ 9.2  Thematic Interpretive Analysis  
 
Data collected at DiskCo was analyzed for eliciting themes. This was an interpretive 
process that relied on a sustainable data focus while keeping our research objectives in 
mind. Our conceptual lens provided an overarching interpretation scheme without 
constraining the emergence of novel themes. This section reports on a number of themes, 
all related to the impact of global distributedness on coordination and control processes. A 
few key examples include: the role of ex ante coordination and control mechanisms; modes 
of planning, managing, and controlling; organizing for distributed collaboration; Learning, 
documentation and technology; face-to-face versus remote, electronically mediated 
collaboration; time zone differences; and cultural and lingual differences. In the next part, 
these results are re-considered in a more positivist manner while being integrated with 
results from the CarCo case.  
 
 
§ 9.2.1  Ex Ante Coordination and Control Mechanisms  
 
“(…) this is not a new organization” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
When interviewing people at DiskCo, we asked about their experience in a geographically 
distributed project. We knew from literature and other cases that people usually find it 
quite challenging to depend on and collaborate with remote counterparts. Surprisingly, in 
this case, it appeared that people did not have much difficulty. They emphasized the fact 
that prior to the Oracle ERP project, they had worked already with colleagues from other 
sites. This established for instance working relationships, common knowledge, and insight 
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in the way DiskCo operates at different sites. Together, they could be referred to as 
coordination and control ‘capital’. Like financial capital, people leveraged coordination 
and control practices from the past. Building on these experiences greatly reduced the 
effort of remote collaboration during the project.  
 
An implication is that we must consider the temporal dimension of coordination and 
control. Looking at existing literature, time has been mainly related to planning and work 
dependencies.  
 
First, planning and procedural mechanisms constitute an ex ante form of work division, 
coordination and control. At the beginning of a project, people spend time conceiving how 
the work should be done. This concept then integrates actors’ efforts and can be used for 
control purposes during or after task accomplishment (Blau & Scott, 1962).  
 
Second, temporal sequencing of work determines how complex coordination will be 
(Blackburn, Hoedemaker, & Wassenhoven, 1996; Terwiesch & Loch, 1999; Thompson, 
1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). It requires planning and other mechanisms to ensure 
integration at some point. In that spirit, Bardram (2000) defines temporal coordination as: 
“(…) an activity with the objective to ensure that the distributed actions realising a 
collaborative activity takes place at an appropriate time, both in relation to the activity’s 
other actions and in relation to other relevant sets of neighbour activities. Temporal 
coordination is mediated by temporal coordination artefacts and is shaped according to the 
temporal conditions of the collaborative activity and its surrounding socio-cultural 
context.” (Bardram, 2000).  
 
But here, the temporal dimension does not refer to planning since it concerns the phase 
before planning. Nor is it related to work contingencies (like task dependence) and their 
relationship to coordination and control mechanisms. It concerns these mechanisms 
themselves: their use at t0 determines how work is coordinated and controlled at t1. This 
phenomenon is elaborated for the DiskCo case in the next sections. 
 Before doing that, we sought to embed and extend our understanding of this temporal 
dimension of coordination and control mechanisms. To this end, we reverted to the 
literature reviewed for this research. We found the work of some authors insightful, even 
though ‘capital’ or the temporal dimension are often not explicitly mentioned. We discuss 
findings of our reinterpretation effort here, and then continue with the role of ex ante 
coordination and control mechanisms in the DiskCo case.  
 
§ 9.2.1.1  Literature Revisited 
First, channel expansion theory claims that various experiences enhance the perceived 
richness of electronic media (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). These so-called knowledge bases 
include: experience with the channel, experience with the messaging topic, experience with 
the organizational context, and experience with communication co-participants. Applying 
the temporal perspective here implies that people can perceive lean media they use during 
a project as rich because they have collaborated before the project. An email that the VP 
for the DiskCo project sent us may be understood along these lines. When we asked why 
people did not use the videoconferencing room frequently, he replied:  
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“We use teleconference much more than video conference. There is no need to have 
video conference because we don't really need to see each other face-to-face.” - 
CPW, DiskCo-A-6 
 
Second, Bryman (1987) describes for projects in the construction industry the importance 
of working with “a “known” site manager and a familiar “team” on whom they are able to 
rely” (Bryman et al., 1987: 262). The complexity of coordinating construction projects 
encourages contributors to rely on ex ante mechanisms, like prior relationships and 
collaborative experiences. This implies that people “are more readily “tuned in” to the 
culture, methods, and practices of the main contracting organization” (Bryman et al., 1987: 
267). 
 
Third, Gabarro (1990) suggests that working relationships impact communications in 
terms of efficiency, mutual knowledge, and capacity. Similarly, more recent discussions 
have emphasized the fact that working relationships - or more generally speaking social 
capital - facilitate and economize interpersonal exchanges (Adler & Kwon, 1999; Locke, 
1999; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
 
Fourth, a related stream of literature emphasizes the organizational advantage, often 
compared to market-based governance modes (Moran & Ghoshal, 1996; Williamson, 
1981). Organizations foster working relationships and commonality. They develop 
procedures and bureaucratic control mechanisms that allow for idiosyncratic and fast 
information processing capabilities (Williamson, 1975).  
Relating that to the temporal dimension, it can be argued that people from the same 
organization bring this organizational advantage to a project. They may know each other, 
but more likely, they have a common set of standards, norms and ways of working.  
 
Fifth, Grant (1996) lists several forms of common knowledge that help people collaborate 
and integrate their specialized knowledge domains. As an example of what we could be 
referred to as cognitive capital, language is believed to “enhance the efficiency and 
intensity of communication” (Grant, 1996b). For instance, mastering English is a 
prerequisite for participating in remote student teams (Knoll & Jarvenpaa, 1998). Ensuring 
this cognitive capital at the start of a project facilitates communications later on.  
 
Finally, literature on remote collaboration gives some relevant examples for the temporal 
dimension of coordination and control. The Mars Climate Orbiter Spacecraft was lost 
when two teams used different standards for maneuvers, i.e., English versus metric units 
(NASA, 1999). Imprecise coordination upfront led to misaligned remote communications 
that passed unobserved.  
Other researchers of distributed collaboration have repeatedly pointed at the importance of 
establishing interpersonal contact face-to-face before working remotely (Meadows, 1996b; 
Nemiro, 2000). This makes subsequent remote communications for instance “easy and 
natural” (Abel, 1990: 505). 
 
For our research, this implies that in order to understand coordination and control during a 
global project, we must take the ex ante situation into account as well. To this end we 
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present next insights from interviewees that illustrate how DiskCo staff benefited from 
various forms of coordination and control capital that existed already before the project.  
 
§ 9.2.1.2  DiskCo’s Ex Ante Coordination and Control Mechanisms  
In our interviews with DiskCo project members, we probed for differences between remote 
and local collaboration. Here, ‘remote’ implies working with counterparts from other Far 
East sites or the US. ‘Local’ refers to on-site collaboration within a department for 
instance. Time and again, interviewees mentioned how collaboration and resources from 
before the Oracle ERP project facilitated remote collaboration during the project itself. It 
helped them deal with many of the constraints of distributed collaboration. We explore in 
this section the existence and effects of ex ante coordination and control mechanisms. We 
look at how they support remote collaboration during the project. Our discussion is 
grouped around three players: VP, Director Applications Development, and staff.  
 
VP perspective 
At DiskCo Far East, many people stay within the same career track for a long time. 
Collectively, this implies that collaborative relationships evolve over the years. As people 
work together in hierarchical relationships, they carve out norms for communicating, 
reporting and managing. After a while, these form the backbone of new collaborative 
endeavors, even though they remain implicit. This section reflects our discussions with 
managers and executives on this topic. They focused on three forms of managerial 
relationships: lateral with peers, and hierarchical with superiors or subordinates.  
 
To start with, the VP in Singapore site A summarizes his perspective on ex ante 
coordination and control mechanisms: 
 
“In the Eastern environment (DiskCo Far East - author) we have been working 
together for a long time, so that we have already established some reporting 
mechanisms and some expectations. Like for example, when you talk about the 
conversion, I will expect my director to give me voice mail at every stage of the 
conversion. They will give me a voice mail and report the status. And as I say, every 
week we have a meeting. We check the status and cover all areas. And they all know 
very well that if they have issues and they don't bring it up, in the end, they are 
responsible, not me. If you bring up an issue that I didn't help to resolve it, then that 
passes back to me. So, that is why it is important that the team members have been 
working with each other for some time already. Some of these thing are like a norm.  
Like myself and my boss - the CIO now, he worked here for 2 years - we had a norm 
that during my conversion (an earlier IT implementation project - author) every 2 -3 
hours I will leave him a voice mail. Whether it is good news or bad news, I definitely 
will. And he will also feel very uncomfortable if I leave him a voice mail and say “Yeah, 
I won't give any more status reports, because everything is going on fine, so no news 
is good news.” He wouldn't feel comfortable. It's the same for me. And because of 
that, every time with my staff we do some major project, and they never leave me any 
messages or anything, I don't fire them but I will remind them many times. And they 
know, they will be very upset, when they don't give me the status. So that is a 
standard practice, a procedure we need there” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
From an executive’s point of view, the common practices described here facilitate the 
managerial process, i.e., the relationship between boss and subordinate. Basic expectations 
are clear from the outset. This frees up resources for issues that are truly novel and demand 
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attention. Because of successful past collaboration, people trust each other and 
communications are easily setup. The VP explores these dimensions of his relationship to 
American expat executives (his superiors) who worked for some time in the Singapore site 
A.  
 
“I have a director from the US who worked in Singapore before Oracle. He was in 
Singapore for 7 years working with me, so he knows me very well. And they already 
see all the results, how we work here, and things that we get done. Then after that, 
the ex-boss went away and we have this new boss who came over. I worked with the 
new boss. And he is now the CIO (at DiskCo HQ in the US - author). He was my direct 
boss for 2 years in Singapore, and then he got promoted from senior Director all the 
way to CIO in Singapore and went back to the US. So that in terms of from an IT high 
level standpoint, I know him very well, he knows me very well. So for anything, I can 
just pick up the phone and call him up and say "I got this issue”.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
The relationship leads to mutual knowledge and trust. This impacts the (remote) 
collaboration process. The threshold for setting up communications and assigning work is 
very low. Subsequent exchanges and controls are minimal and efficient, while still 
achieving the desired results. The VP comments on the same relationship with the US 
expat executive: 
 
“We know each other so well. And the trust level and confidence level are all there. So 
that when he passes a task on to me, he knows that we can make it. And also when I 
tell him that I need this and this and this, he knows that I've really done all the 
necessary things before I ask for it. So he will not question me, like "Oh have you 
checked this, have you checked that". He will just approve it. And that's a lot easier 
for us.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Laterally, the VP maintains rapport with buddies in similar positions whose help he needs 
for the Oracle ERP project. His relationships with directors and executives in user 
departments implies that minimal effort suffices to coordinate project activities. Similarly, 
in his monitoring role, the VP easily connects to these people for updates.  
 
“(…) Over the past ten years (…) not many people changed at the management level. 
So I know them (managers of user departments - author). I can walk in their office and 
it's just like: "Hey how do you feel about the preparation, what do you feel about this 
conversion, do you think there is any issue".” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3  
 
The VP describes similar experiences with his subordinates. Locally, he has been working 
with the IT team at Singapore site A for a long time. Remotely, he and his staff have 
shaped IT other Far East sites. For instance, after the merger with StorCo they selected 
local staff in China and helped them replace local systems with DiskCo standard IT 
infrastructure. The effect of past collaboration is that people have local and remote 
relationships, or at least know ‘who does what’.  
 
“We have one advantage over here and that is the whole history. We start off with only 
this plant (Singapore site A - author). Then we go to China and start this [China site A] 
plant. We are the one who go there and pick the IT people, good IT people. We train 
the people, set up the infrastructure, everything, and it all handover to local IT. So the 
good thing about the IT team here (Singapore site A - author) is that on average they 
are about 8 years with [DiskCo]. I have very old staff with me for a long, long time. 
And that helps a lot, because their knowledge and what they know, who are the 
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people they know, is all there. (…) Our advantage is really all these things: Our 
setting, our factory, all these things of mergers, work with the people there (China - 
author), and they fly over there and work there work a while, and they come over here 
(Singapore site A - author). With all this, one of the key success factors is the 
interaction. Not just on a higher lever, but on a lower level. Like for example China - 
they send people over here for training. In fact the whole IT group was trained here in 
Singapore when we first started the factory, not for the Oracle conversion (but before 
that - author). For Oracle conversion itself we send 2 more persons (form China - 
author) over here, who had been here before and work on this project with our people. 
And it turned out to be a great team, everybody knows each other pretty well, knows 
their environment.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Specifically, the VP commented on the role of collaborative experience and knowledge for 
the initial phase of the Oracle ERP project. One of his responsibilities is assigning work to 
his subordinates. To this end, he needs clear insight in their capabilities. This applies 
especially to a distributed project where people must work to a great extent on their own. 
Here, the VP comments on the importance of knowing people at other sites. He describes 
the role of this knowledge for assigning data conversion work to the IT group in Malaysia 
site A:  
 
“I think that makes a lot of difference. If you know them, not so much like knowing a 
friend, but knowing the person, you know what he's good at, what he's capable of. 
Like for example this data conversion team (this part of the Oracle ERP project was 
assigned to the IT group in Malaysia site A - author). The manager that we picked to 
take care of data conversion, she's a very detailed, very organized person. And it's 
very important for us whether you find that person. Because for data conversion what 
we want is 100% integrity. We want everything mapped over correctly.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-3 
 
Combined, we could use the term social-cognitive capital to note the organizational 
relationships and mutual knowledge that has been built up prior to a collaborative effort. 
(See also in the theory section the inter-personal coordination mechanisms box in the 
integrated coordination ‘diamond’ figure). This capital can be seen as a root system: At 
any time it can bring forth new branches at surprisingly little effort. Similarly, for DiskCo 
case, a first advantage of collaborative history is that it simplifies the start-up phase of a 
new project, such as the Oracle ERP implementation. The collaborative history makes 
group building efforts at the beginning of a project superfluous:  
 
 “There is no need for teambuilding because we trained them, taught them, they come 
over here for a few months stay with us here to work together. And that kind of 
relationship is already there. Then we acquired [StorCo] and their 2 plants. They are 
all using an old system. When we acquire them, we also take over their IT 
organization. And we send some of their people home, and there are some people we 
keep. And because they are all using their own different hardware, we have a project 
to convert all this to our system. (…) And then these people (from China and 
Singapore - author) work with each other very closely. And the guy who manages 
China IT is formally from here (Singapore site A - author), he is recruited from here, 
he knows the people here very well.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3  
 
A second advantage of prior collaboration is that it lowers the threshold for (remote) 
communications. People know already whom to connect to, and they are comfortable 
discussing challenges that they face (Gabarro, 1990). This smoothens communications, a 
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particular advantage in distributed projects where communications rely on electronic 
media with limited richness (Carlson & Zmud, 1999).  
 
“I always believe before the project starts, these people have to know each other, they 
will need to have some working relationships beforehand. That will help a lot because 
once you know each other it will be very easy to talk over the phone. And they also 
feel very easy to pick up the phone and just call you to say: “Hey, there is an issue 
how are we gonna deal with it”. The relationship is very important because that helps 
to improve the communications. Many times we hesitate to talk to somebody we are 
not familiar with. Especially you feel very uncomfortable telling them that you have a 
problem because you don't know what he is gonna think of you. But we really know 
each other so well since we were involved in all these projects. They all know that this 
guy is a master in this area, and this guy always helps us when we bring up an issue, 
and so forth. So that kind of understanding is already there, and that helps a lot 
because the communication flow is very smooth.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Third and finally, collaborative history impacts the VP’s role as a manager of distributed 
resources. He can trust the people he has been working with, and quickly assign and 
coordinate work:  
 
“The team and all the directors have reported to me for many years. And it is very 
easy for me to manage them. Whether it is a team or not, they all report to me. It is 
very easy for me to say: “OK, I assign this to you, I assign this to you”. And we won't 
need to talk to settle it. It is all very well controlled.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Prior collaboration thus establishes trust that substitutes for monitoring mechanisms. 
Temporally, trust has been built before it is needed in a project. This complements Ouchi’s 
(1979) observation that “(P)eople must either be able to trust each other or to closely 
monitor each other if they are to engage in cooperative enterprise”. We add here the 
temporal dimension of trust, and the process that underpins its evolution. 
 
To conclude the VP’s perspective, we further focus on the relevance of our discussion so 
far for geographically distributed projects. The VP stresses that ex ante working 
relationships and mutual knowledge are in particular necessary in these environments. This 
is because during the project, limited opportunity exists to connect people and build socio-
cognitive capital:  
 
“I'm a very hands-on man. That means I work with them together and I also know what 
they need. Management is supportive. They can communicate with me. I worked with 
them for many years, and the style and support I give to them is very clear. They all 
know. Every organization may be different. But I believe that establishing the trust 
with management, establishing the relationships among the team members is one of 
the important factors for any project. It's not just this kind of project. But for a cross-
country, I mean a remote project, this is even more important. At least within the same 
organization (i.e., collocated - author) you see each other, you know each other fairly 
well. When you start working together you see each other every day. But when 
working remotely, we ‘see’ each other through the phone, we don't really see each 
other every day. So if we don't have that kind of relationship which is built up 
beforehand, then it's kind of difficult.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
For geographically distributed projects, socio-cognitive capital becomes important in two 
ways. First, remoteness impacts communication patterns. Often the frequency is lower, and 
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exchanges are electronically mediated instead of face-to-face (Meadows, 1996b). This 
makes it difficult to establish capital remotely. Second, if it exists already before the 
project, it facilitates and economizing on (remote) communications. This makes it easier to 
deal with distributedness. 
 
Director Applications Development perspective 
The Director Applications Development - HHT - supervises the local IT team at Singapore 
site A, and manages indirectly (dotted lines) IT development staff at other locations. She 
reports to the VP - CPW - and has been working at DiskCo for a long time in staff and 
managerial positions. Before looking at her perspective, we let the VP describe her 
position in the organization.  
 
“There is a time you have to establish a so-called relationship in the sense of who is 
the leader. Who is the guy who does the execution. Not everybody can be the leader 
in a team. There always has to be only one person finally who makes the core. And I 
think that kind of establishment is already there like in such a way that HHT has been 
around for many years. She has been involved in all these various projects with 
people from all the site. So when she is the project leader for the [Singapore site A] 
team and helping the rest of the sites, they all look towards there because they know 
that she can do it, she is the leader for them. She knows everything much better than 
them. So that kind of thing is there.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
A consequence of her track record is that reciprocal knowledge and working relationships 
exist in the organization: people know her and vice versa. On top of that knowledge, 
people respect and trust her in the role she fulfills for the Oracle ERP project. In fact, this 
project is just another opportunity for her to leverage this socio-cognitive capital:  
 
“I would say the trust is already there in the sense that these people have been 
working in the IT organization for quite a while. They are not new to us. Even prior to 
the Oracle conversion project we already have the working relationships. So this is 
just another project that we have to work together on to achieve the goal that we want 
to go” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
These close bonds exist in particular in the Far East: 
 
“Because the IT manager there we have worked before the Oracle conversion before. 
They are not people that are new to me. And in fact the China IT director is 
Singaporean. They do come to Singapore for meetings quite often. I would say they 
normally do a ½ yearly visit to this region, (…) and Singapore is one of the places he 
will come. So we also get to meet each other at least ½ yearly. So I would say, we 
know each other quite well. It's not only by name but also by face.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
With the US, contacts were mainly established and maintained through electronic media. 
This resulted in minimal relationships. For the Oracle ERP project, face-to-face meetings 
with US staff extended working relationships. In turn, this facilitated remote 
communications: 
 
But (the existence of working relationships - author) is less the case with US. Before I 
attended the first Oracle meeting in the US we already have communicated through 
mails and maybe through phone calls. So we only know them by name and maybe by 
the voice. Now you meet them, so I think it is very different. If you get to meet the 
people and next time when you talk to them even through the phone or by mail, I think 
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it's different because it's after that you know the person in person. So I think it helps 
to communicate better.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
On a more pragmatic level, HHT emphasized the role of DiskCo’s technical infrastructure 
(e.g., networking, groupware). It was already built up and standardized before the Oracle 
ERP project. This facilitated remote collaboration forms like teleconferencing:  
 
“Distance wise, for Malaysia and for China I think the communication is not really a 
problem because for us it is just a phone call away. It is quite convenient because we 
have all the infrastructure set up. (…) Before we have Oracle turned on, I would say 
all the networking infrastructure are all in place, and it's all standardized across sites. 
So it's quite convenient to have like a conference call with a few sites at the same 
time.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Staff perspective 
Having looked at the VP and Director’s point of view, we explore here how staff perceives 
the role of ex ante coordination and control mechanisms.  
 
First, a key user in the Material & System area from Singapore site A - JLL - describes 
how she worked with key users at DiskCo locations in the Far East. She helped them 
install and maintain local systems that are also used at regional HQ. To her, the Oracle 
ERP project did not represent a novel challenge in terms of working remotely: 
 
“I don't feel a big difference because basically for other sites when they first set up 
their inventory control system and system on departmental time, I'm the one who 
trains them, who also transfers the subsystem over there. So they follow pretty closely 
the subsystems that [Singapore site A] is using. So it's quite close. When I go there 
(Far East sites - author) and tell them "OK, now we are gonna convert to Oracle, these 
are the subsystems that [Singapore site A] are using, you can use the same,” they 
follow quite closely.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
Before the Oracle project, she maintained close contact with her remote counterparts. 
Before requesting customizations to their systems, she channeled distributed key users’ 
requests: 
 
“Before the Oracle project came in I used to contact them. For any change to the 
subsystem that we use in [Singapore site A], I make sure that everyone agreed to it, 
or that there is no impact on their side. So if everyone agreed then I say OK, go ahead 
IT, I want to change or enhance the system. So we have very close communications.” 
- JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
Over the years, she and her colleagues have gone through an evolutionary process that 
provides her with intimate understanding of local organizational context, work practices, 
and technical infrastructure. Communicating in this network then becomes very easy, 
especially since many people stay in the DiskCo organization. As Gabarro (1990) claimed 
- the effect of common knowledge and working relationships is that “intended meanings 
are transmitted and understood rapidly, accurately, and with sensitivity to nuance”.  
 
“I know them, and I know the way they are working. (…) We have gone through so 
many things. From the basis of no system, to the system (before Oracle ERP - 
author), and enhancements. And now there is a new system (Oracle ERP - author) 
again. We have the history of that. When I talk of something they know what I mean. 
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So that part plays a very important role. These key users that I deal with they have 
been with me for so many many years. So it makes the communication easier in that 
sense. But one day if let's say these people change, any new person is coming in, I 
might face (a) problem.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
Another key user - also from Singapore site A - points out that people ‘roughly’ know the 
organization because of prior visits. They know representative aspects of local contexts, 
like names and roles. This expedites setting up remote communications: 
 
“If there is any issue we will contact the manager, that's the final person. If we cannot 
get anybody, we will look for the manager. (…) We know the local manager, we know 
roughly the organization, because I visited them before. So I know them, I know their 
manager, and who is doing what in their sections. It's a sort of knowing whom to 
communicate to when I have any issues and so on.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
There are two other effects of this socio-cognitive capital. First, people can anticipate the 
needs of remote counterparts when working on system modification or new systems, like 
Oracle ERP. This simplifies back and forth communications. A second, more control 
oriented effect is that socio-cognitive capital facilitates ensuring consistency of the multi-
site IT infrastructure:  
 
“When they first start up the plant or setup the department, at that time I'm the one 
who tells them OK this is how [Singapore site A] is doing things. So subsequently, if 
let's say I have a new project that I need to develop for [Singapore site A], I will take 
into consideration their operation. Because I understand some of their operation. So I 
will take that into consideration, I will come up with some request or spec and discuss 
these with them. If they have no issue on that, then I say OK, go ahead we can do it. 
And we can use it for all the sites, all the drive plants in the Far East. 
(…) I know them, and I know the way they are working. (…) So those people I just tell 
them one time and they can do the rest of it (…)” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
The trust factor mentioned here was echoed by an IT staff member from the same site. 
Establishing trust takes time. It is rooted in successfully collaboration with known 
counterparts:  
 
“You hardly can have trust in new people. For people you have been working with for 
a long period of time, normally there will be some trust between us. But for new 
people you still have to develop that kind of trust.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
To her, working with people she knew made the international dimension of the Oracle ERP 
project easier:  
 
“I have already experience in the MANMAN (former DiskCo business application - 
author) time, we dealt with US people. So it's not very difficult for me.” - SCC, DiskCo-
J-1 
 
Finally, an IT core team member from Singapore site A comments on the fact that even 
though Oracle ERP is a new system to them, their knowledge of the existing MANMAN 
infrastructure remains relevant. This technical know-how makes it easier to connect with 
users who have always worked with MANMAN. In Grant’s (1996) words, “(T)he 
importance of common knowledge is that it permits individuals to share and integrate 
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aspects of knowledge which are not common between them.” The shared MANMAN 
background thus equips IT and users with the same terminology and concepts.  
 
“To us, Oracle is completely new. (…) Of course if you have a MANMAN background it 
helps you a lot. (…) Because in our project team, 2 persons don't have a MANMAN 
background. So I noticed that they may have some difficulties to understand some 
terms. When you talk to users - they are also from MANMAN - you may not be able to 
understand their terms. So you need some time to pick up. For us if we have a 
MANMAN background, we know what they are talking about. It is easy to understand.” 
- OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
To conclude, ex ante coordination and control mechanisms include working relationships, 
mutual knowledge, and technical infrastructure. Past collaboration opportunities shaped 
this ‘capital’. This has a multifold impact on remote coordination and control mechanisms 
during the ERP project as summarized in Figure 44. The capital reduces the need for 
remote communications and control. For remaining collaboration needs, it facilitates 
processes of connecting, communicating and controlling.  
 
 
Figure 44 - Source and impact of ex ante coordination and control mechanisms 
 
§ 9.2.2  Planning, Managing, Controlling  
This section reports on three themes that seemed closely intertwined in the DiskCo case: 
planning, managing, and controlling. ‘Managing’ is considered here in the context of 
hierarchical relationships between boss and subordinates, or a boss and his boss. On top of 
that relationship, a project manager enacts a role in his day-to-day mode of operating that 
encompasses behaviors like communicating, relating, planning and controlling (PMI, 
1999). We analyze the role of these themes in a distributed project like DiskCo’s 
implementation of Oracle ERP. The section is structured as follows. We start with the 
VP’s role in the project, and his emphasis on centralization. We then look at the setup of 
local implementation projects, and subsequent ways in which CPW manages and controls 
project progress. Next, delays in the project are analyzed, and the use of nonhierchical 
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control modes. We conclude with control modes that rely on representation of work 
processes and technology. 
 
§ 9.2.2.1  The VP’s Role 
We start our analysis of distributed project management from the perspective of the VP 
(CPW) Information Technologies at DiskCo, Singapore site A. He is the main supervisor 
for DiskCo’s IT organization in the Far East, except for Thailand. This responsibility is 
split into two groups: Singapore site A and remote sites. At Singapore site A, CPW heads 
HHT, Director Applications Development, and the Director Computer Operations. Remote 
IT organizations are located in other Singapore sites, China, Malaysia and Japan. They are 
usually headed by an IT director who reports to CPW.  
 
Until the Oracle project, CPW’s involvement in IT projects was often minimal. These 
projects concerned mainly software maintenance and modifications, and did not have a 
broad impact on business operations:  
 
“Last time with the smaller project, I don't really have to be involved. (…) We always 
organized our support by manufacturing support, financial support, HR payroll 
support, and operations support. That was before Oracle. So like manufacturing we 
had some projects with manufacturing, this team of people (IT from Singapore site A - 
author) will work with their counterparts to get it done. And they don't have to involve 
things like infrastructure, they don't have to involve operation, nothing. It's mostly a 
software project. A software project means: today I introduce another new function, 
we need to transfer the program, we need to be trained on that function, and how to 
teach the user to install that. But those projects were very small. It was on a small 
scale, which means you only need a manager and a team to work with them (users - 
author) directly. We don't even need to know anything at all. (…) And my involvement 
used to be (…) neglectable.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
These projects were almost completely delegated. The project manager hardly contacted IT 
executives like CPW. He worked with a small project plan that sufficed:  
 
“With the small projects, (…) you have some small plan, and the manager will manage 
and I don't even need to know. I only need to know when he will finish it. If he never 
come back to me with any issue I assume that he is OK.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3  
 
The Oracle project changed all that. It encompassed software and hardware/ infrastructure, 
had a major impact on the business, and involved many user departments. It was a 
completely novel IT environment. Like, now for the first time key business applications 
used Graphical User Interfaces:  
 
“But this (Oracle ERP - author) is different. This is a whole plan. You are converting 
something totally different. And now with the mouse, with windows, it's totally 
different. And the users themselves have been using their old method for a long time. 
And now they have to switch.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
This impact and visibility challenged the existing IT organization, including its leadership. 
From VP’s point of view, it meant strong involvement in the project’s setup and 
operations. Project success or failure was his ultimate responsibility. There was no back up 
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in case the new system would fail. And the time line was tight to meet Y2K readiness 
requirements. All this meant a very engaged, supportive role for the VP: 
 
“You can’t just sit in your office, waiting for something to happen. Because the impact 
is so great, when you turn on and it fails, there is no way to go back. And in our 
conversion, there is no such thing as a parallel run (i.e., running simultaneously the 
old MANMAN system and new Oracle ERP - author). It's cut. So when they cut, you 
move on from one week, there is no way to move back anymore.  
Since the consequences are a lot more serious, I cannot just sit there and wait for 
people to tell me all the good news. I have to be in there to see it. And also an 
important thing is our conversion schedule is so tight. It's all 24 hours or sometimes 2 
days, 2 nights continuously.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
In fact, this approach constituted a new project management layer. The VP oversees and 
guides the project on a meta-site level, in addition to local project leaders (usually the IT 
director). These leaders focus on their site and their implementation. They do not 
concentrate on the big, regional picture since that is not their primary responsibility. 
However, local implementations are embedded in the Far East and global environment. 
They are interdependent in the sense of sharing resources, and ensuring consistency and 
commonality. The VP complements the local leaders’ role by focusing on that inter-site 
connectivity:  
 
“When you come to a global project like this, you have to have a person to oversee 
the whole thing. Because everybody oversees only their part. I'm another layer on top 
who sees the important things. Not all the details, but I can see everything. And I think 
that helps a lot.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
The VP relies on local management to bring up issues that feed into his role. He does not 
setup and steer local processes, that remains a local responsibility. His added value is 
ensuring the conditions for successful local implementations. He signals local needs and 
supports these by involving different groups. To this end, the VP maintains close ties with 
IT and user communities whose help or approval is needed: 
 
“My coordination role is more on a higher level, in the sense that when we coordinate 
all these people, if they have issues, constraints, resource issues, they come to me 
and report to me. And then I have to go see different groups. Some of them report to 
me, then it's easy. When they are not reporting to me I have to go talk to their boss. 
And that is how we coordinate. (…) My role is looking at resources, (…) looking at the 
overall picture. (…) And at the same time working with the US counterpart to tap their 
knowledge, organize the support from the US to support our team here. (…) If it is 
everything coordinated out from here (Singapore site A - author) it is going to be very 
difficult. I mean how are you going to make sure that the infrastructure is ready. Every 
area has its local IT, and all of them report back to me.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
The VP meets regularly with local IT directors through on-site visits or teleconferences. 
Within the framework of the master schedule, they elaborate on local needs and 
constraints. If need be, the VP can arrange his resources at Singapore site A to support 
local implementations.  
 
“For my role, I have to cover all the plan make sure that all the plants are converted 
on time and according to the schedule. For example [Malaysia site A] - all these 
people there, my director there they have the master plan. They know when it is their 
 236
turn, and when what they need to do what. We have weekly meeting so that we know 
when they are supposed to send somebody for what, and when they need to make 
sure that all the infrastructure is ready. And they also coordinate and work with their 
local key user to organize training. And if they need any help from here to conduct the 
training, that is when we have a meeting or even before the meeting they all talk to me 
very regularly. And then over here (Singapore site A - author) I will coordinate the 
resources to help them.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3  
 
Building this distributed support web was a departure from the way IT operated in the Far 
East before the Oracle project. So far, local IT cared for their own business. They 
supported local users and were authorized to customize the MANMAN program according 
to local user requests. Now with Oracle, sites need expertise from others, in particular from 
Singapore site A.  
 
“In fact this whole Oracle project, make all the IT people work much closer than 
before. Before this project, they hardly see each other. Before they are very 
independent in the sense that they care of all local issues, they have the right to 
change the program (i.e., MANMAN - author). But because of Oracle, they work as a 
whole IT group, as a total resource. And the good thing is that all of them report to 
me.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Interwoven with the supportive side of the VP’s role is control. The VP compares work 
progress at the various sites against pre-set expectations. He connects closely and 
frequently with directors and the team in Singapore site A to get a feel of task 
accomplishments:  
 
“My role is also to monitor the progress of the project. I have briefings with [HHT] and 
sometimes with the team (local IT team at Singapore sit A - author) to see how things 
are going, and to monitor the project schedule and all the tasks. Whether we are 
meeting the schedule or there are any issues. And of course I also communicate with 
the local management and update them. (…) I update the local management (...) and 
work with my boss back in the US to make sure that all the preparations are done.” - 
CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
  
Underpinning his control role is the global Oracle ERP master plan that schedules local 
implementations over the period 1997 - mid 1999. It groups these into four regions: US-
Mexico, Europe, Thailand, and other Far East sites (Figure 45). The figure shows a partial 
screen shot for US and Mexican sites (left from the first red vertical bar), European sites, 
and some Far East sites (right from second red bar). For each implementation, major 
milestones are identified with abbreviations. These are explained in the legend (Figure 46). 
The rows in yellow depict the first week of a fiscal month.  
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Figure 45 - Master plan global Oracle ERP implementations (partial screenshot) 
 
 
Figure 46 - Master plan global Oracle ERP implementations (legend 
screenshot) 
 
The schedule is a basic Microsoft Excel file. DiskCo HQ in the US developed and 
maintained the file. It is shared with top management across the world to update them on 
project planning and progress. The schedule defines only major steps and sequencing of 
local implementations. It can be seen as a condensed boundary object (Star & Griesemer, 
1989). That is, the schedule communicates minimal information that is sufficient for those 
with leadership responsibility in the project. Its task is to coordinate and control on a 
global level the embeddedness of local activity contexts.  
 
“Everything is followed from the master plan. The schedule tells which plant will go 
first, that one will go later. And then in between what are the activities that need to be 
done for all these plants to be prepared for the conversion. (…) Basically it only 
indicates some of the big milestone tasks that need to be done, but not in detail.” - 
CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Details for local implementations are filled in by the VP and local directors. They work 
backwards from key milestones to ensure on-time performance:  
 
“From [the master plan] we know like for China when to send people up to Singapore 
for training. (…) But there is always a lead time that we need to consider. For China 
especially, they need at least 3 months to get their passport, visa everything. I know 
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that (when) China needs to convert at this time, I know that before that these are 
things that need to be done, and this guy must be here to Singapore by when. So then 
we have a lead-time of 3 months to get a visa. So we work backwards in that sense. 
So in terms of impact, in terms of how we organize it, basically it is all based on a 
schedule, and we work backwards. And then we initiate all the so called plans to bring 
them over and for how long and ticket and everything. (…) When people must come 
and all these things is really based on the master plan and works according to the 
timeframe that we have” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
The schedule structures the relationship between the VP and his directors. It demarcates 
overall boundaries and identifies key dimensions for local leadership (Star & Griesemer, 
1989). During the project, the schedule helps the VP to monitor progress.  
 
“We have a project schedule. Every meeting (with local IT directors - author) we will 
look at the update, where we are now, what is the update. The IT director decides to 
update whether these task have been completed (…). So I think that is really good 
enough to monitor them. And I also believe in empowering the local IT directors. I 
have given them this (responsibility for their local implementation - author). How you 
break this down in smaller tasks, the people below who need to do it etc, he has the 
responsibility to make sure that it is all carried out. Of course he is also being 
assessed, performance appraisal etc.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Locally, the schedule is translated into detailed activity plans. This is done by the IT 
director as a key user in Finance reports from Malaysia site A. Local staff works from the 
detailed planning, and not so much from the global master plan:  
 
“They (local project leadership - author) just set the guidelines, like this month what 
are the things that we have to achieve; this is the timeline (…) that we have to follow. 
What the framework is that they use I am not very sure. (…) I guess he has his 
resources and input from [Singapore site A] as well as [US HQ] how they do about it. I 
think that sort of timeline is perhaps already worked out at the corporate level” - SKL, 
DiskCo-L-1 
 
§ 9.2.2.2  Centralization 
ERP software offers an integrated platform of business applications. It supports - at least in 
theory - processes that cut across functional, organizational, and locational boundaries. 
Achieving this degree of commonality and integration is not always easy (Davenport, 
1998). Companies may operate in a way that does not fit the assumptions underlying ERP 
packages (Soh, Kien, & Tay-Yap, 2000). They may have a tradition of laissez-faire, 
leaving adoption and modification of IT infrastructures to local sites. This results in a 
collection of IT infrastructures that operate fairly independently and differently.  
Implementing ERP in these distributed and diverse environments is a major challenge from 
a project management point of view (Markus et al., 2000).  
 
One response to this challenge is centralized, hierarchical control. In a sense, this 
facilitates the transition towards a common though distributed environment. Control has 
been perceived as one of the advantages of bureaucracies from a Transaction Cost 
Economics point of view (Arrow, 1974; Williamson, 1975). Barney (1996) claims: 
“Disputes are less likely to occur because the hierarchy is able to establish joint goals 
which lead to convergent expectations between those in a transaction. Additionally, 
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hierarchy facilitates the development of codes and language that are unique to a firm which 
allow for more accurate and efficient communication” (Barney & Hesterley, 1996: 119).  
 
For DiskCo, the VP repeatedly emphasized how easy direct hierarchical control was in a 
geographically distributed organization. It enabled him to assign and shift resources on a 
regional level with minimal effort. He did not have to liaise with others for his own 
resources, that is, the IT organization in Singapore, Malaysia, China and Japan. Direct, 
hierarchical control thus facilitated meta-site coordination. 
 
“All of them report back to the same boss (i.e., CPW - author). That means that all the 
people involved at all the sites, the IT organization report back to the same boss. That 
is one of the key success factors, because you cut down a lot of unnecessary 
coordination. And you lead to one dedicated person to make a lot of decisions to make 
sure that everything is coordinated properly, and to make decisions, and to move the 
resources to fill the gap. Because all of them now report to one person, all report back 
to the same organization. The management here can anytime almost randomly move 
their resources depending on which one is more critical, what is the situation now, 
how we coordinate that. I think that is very important.  
If we did not have the free hand to do that, it is very difficult. Because, when the 
project moves forward, always some things happen, something that you never 
planned, or something last minute pops up. Like we are doing some hardware, then 
this factory suddenly ramps up, needs more capacity and things like that. So you have 
to have the overall person who is able to coordinate all this and also make decisions, 
and make this call. So it's like: “OK you down to there, drop everything, do this”. And 
I'm not talking about just the application, I'm talking about infrastructure, operation, 
everything. (…) I think it is important that you have one place, one person to make the 
call.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Direct hierarchical control helps avoiding and solving conflicts like Barney (1996: 119) 
mentions. When conflicts emerge, they can refer to the same boss who emphasizes overall 
interests. With DiskCo, this helped. The master plan for the Oracle project was considered 
very aggressive. Time allocated to local implementations was therefore tight. Without a 
hierarchy, solving these tensions would have been probably very difficult and time 
consuming. Now, the VP’s decision making power smoothened emerging issues. And if 
need be, he could ultimately refer to his boss: 
 
“I would say that this whole conversion project is more centrally controlled. But in 
terms of resources it is distributed across the sites. But in terms of control - dictating 
how to go about doing it - it is really more centrally controlled. (…) If we leave it to 
every site to go do it we can never standardize, we never use common resources. 
Now I dictate how we gonna do it, I dictate that these are the resources to be shared, 
I dictate when these resources go to here, when these resources go to there. (…) If 
you leave things to the sites, you have all these conflicts. Because we have this kind 
of structure, any conflict that people bring up here, I can make a decision and just go. 
(…) I don't know whether this will work for other type of projects, but it works here 
because in this one, the thing is commonality. (…) And we have the task to implement 
Oracle, control the project and try to make sure all processes are standardized. So 
that gives a lot of help in the sense of any time anybody disagrees I say: “Big boss 
says”.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
In CPW’s approach, direct hierarchical control is closely intertwined with his enabling 
role. On the one hand, he uses his position in the hierarchy to enforce the project schedule. 
 240
At the same time, he quickly responds to local resource constraints. As earlier indicated, 
his units in Singapore site A are available as a central, supportive resource to other sites.  
 
 “You have to have a command hierarchy. And they all know who makes the core, the 
decision. If you leave it open to anybody to make the core, then there is no way that 
you can really meet that kind of schedule. Because everybody wants things their way. 
Everybody wants their convenient time. But we have a kind of structure in such a way 
that the program is already all laid out, the schedule has to be followed. And in the US 
the big bosses are all following the schedule very closely. So there is nobody below 
who can say “Hey I don’t want to do it.” No. So I think hierarchy is very important. You 
have a strong support there and it is very clear that that must be done. And it’s a 
“don’t ask any questions, just get it done” kind of thing. And then we will draw all the 
plans nicely to help you to meet that plan. But don’t change the schedule. We are the 
ones who can change or don’t change.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
To conclude, centralization and hierarchy underpin coordination and control DiskCo’s 
geographically distributed IT organization. Since people have the same boss, there is 
probably more goal congruence. Escalation of issues eventually leads to the same person in 
charge. This clarity fosters cross-site collaboration as the Director Applications 
Development (Singapore site A) remarks:  
 
“They are all reporting to CPW except 2 groups. I think the other all report directly to 
CPW. So it is quite easy in the sense that because I also report to CPW, we work 
together quite well (with remote sites - author). I mean that is part of the responsibility 
registered in the beginning that the core team had to help the other sites to do the roll 
out.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
§ 9.2.2.3  Local Implementations Setup 
 
When he started to work with local sites, the VP could rely on an existing organization (see 
section on ex ante coordination and control mechanisms). He had worked with local 
directors and staff on previous IT projects, like after the merger with StorCo. He selected 
many IT professionals at local sites. And for the Oracle ERP project, he only pulled in 
people from the existing IT organization. All this constitutes a form of input control that 
reduced uncertainty during the project itself.  
 
“(…) (F)or this conversion project, we never employ new people to do the project. We 
take from the existing organization.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
The responsibility for local implementations was clearly delegated to the local level, the IT 
directors (unless a site was close to Singapore site A, or lacked a local IT organization, like 
in Japan). This was challenging at times, because user communities did not feel the need 
for new business applications as strongly as the IT organization: 
 
“Coming to the ownership of this Oracle conversion project. To the users IT is the 
owner, not the user. Why? Because all the while the old system has been running, 
they are used to it, there are no issues, they can do their job. And suddenly somebody 
says: “I want to change all this”. So to them this is an IT project. So this means that IT 
must push a lot to make it happen. So the ownership is within IT. The IT director, all 
these people report to me. Whether you feel you are owner of this or not, I tell you 
that you are responsible, you better be the owner.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
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With the burden of local ownership, the IT director could at the same time rely on the IT 
organization from Singapore site A as an additional resource. Experience from the US and 
early Far East implementations was formatted into templates, and provided to remote sites.  
 
“We (Singapore site A - author) are the resource for them (other sites - author). So we 
know the plan, we deal with the plan, with the things that we know they will need, we 
organize all this for them. But the rest they have to organize. Like they have to come 
up with a check list, they have to come up with a schedule. But for all these things 
there is a template given to them. They just fill in their own timing, they fill in who are 
the persons and some additional local stuff. They are responsible but they always 
have us to support them.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
The local project organization was replicated from sites that converted at an earlier 
moment, like in the US or Singapore site A. The local IT director leveraged on this 
experience when structuring his implementation. His site should be self sufficient, thus in a 
sense representing the variety of the reference site, Singapore site A (Ashby, 1968). 
Variety refers to resources and areas in which you need expertise to convert to Oracle ERP 
and provide support. The VP comments on variety replication at local sites: 
 
“I have the local IT team here (Singapore site A). So when we have these resources 
here, correspondingly over there, they also assign a few people to be for the Oracle 
conversion.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Since the system is new to the local IT organization, they are initially strongly supported 
by resources from Singapore site A and local Oracle presence. This work division shifts 
over the course of the project. The local team’s initial role is to facilitate basics like 
infrastructure and external training. Later on, they become more autonomously responsible 
for things like systems operations and support. Local kick-off meetings were held to 
communicate the project goal and setup. The VP and staff from Singapore site A explained 
the project to local people impacted by the change.  
 
“When we first started off, this was very clearly communicated. We always have a 
project kick-off meeting. Not only just to communicate to the IT people about the 
project. We also communicate with the management there and tell them: “OK this is 
how we gonna implement the project, and why you want to convert to Oracle, and 
what is the role of the local key users and IT persons”. So you set the expectation 
very clear, and also the responsibility is very clear.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
In a later interview, VP emphasized that during the kick off meetings he communicated to 
two groups: local IT (management, staff), and management from user departments. The 
local IT organization would reach staff from user departments:  
 
“Every project before the site starts, we have a kick-off meeting with all the site 
management and the key users. I'm the one who goes around and does a presentation 
to them to explain why we need to convert and what are the steps to be carried out to 
do the conversion. And how the site prepares, and what are the involvements and 
what is the schedule. And I'm the one who does the communication. And that is the 
main communication to the manager level. For the key user level, I use the IT person 
at the site to communicate with them, prepare them, and go through the schedule: 
when we should bring a PC, upgrade the PC's, when the users should go for training, 
and how plan according to that.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
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In our research interviews, the VP and others repeatedly emphasized the same project 
setup that has been described above. Apparently, the VP communicated his viewpoint in a 
very clear and explicit manner. This illustrates findings from other students of distributed 
projects (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; Meadows, 1996b). Explicit communications reduce 
uncertainty and, hence, remote communication needs. They avoid misunderstanding, and 
different assumptions common to distributed work environments (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). 
 
Even though the overall approach was clear, some project participants missed the same 
explicitness and formality on a more detailed level. It could have sped up the overall 
process. And it would have made it easier to oversee the project, despite its impressive 
size. In a sense, the frame of the house was there, but how each room was to be completed 
remained somewhat vague. Perhaps this was because the project was very novel, and 
people were not used to working so closely under high pressure. In any case, one of the 
key users from Malaysia site A comments: 
 
“The key lessons that I learnt from this project is that whenever you want to do a 
project of this big scale, we have to plan it very well. Because a good planning can 
avoid a lot of problems, and can eliminate some of the issues from occurring. That is 
the first thing that I learnt, that we must work on a detailed plan.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
The Director Applications Development echoes this concern. Reflecting on the project, she 
points out that elaborate planning ensures ex ante commitments from the many parties 
involved. It reduces novelty in an early stage, and cuts down on (remote) exchanges. 
Detailed plans make it easier to prepare local sites for their local implementation:  
 
“Maybe we can build up a more formal type of communication channel. Because so far 
what I have seen it's really quite an informal way. In certain cases if we can do it in a 
more formal way then sometimes we can get things done better. People can also 
expect what needs to be done in a more formal way. I would say the problem I have is 
when I was first putting on the project I didn't really know what to expect. And then a 
lot of things is like: We do one step and then just take ahead one step of what needs 
to be done. So if I had an opportunity to do it again, of course with my experience I 
have, definitely we want to have a more formal type of planning in the sense that we 
can have a better, complete plan on all the activities that need to be done. So that 
each site that is responsible for doing certain tasks is better informed beforehand. So 
I think that is something that I want to do.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
She emphasizes pre-coordination: coordinating activities and making expectations clear as 
early on in the project. To her, this applies in particular to groups of people supporting 
implementations more from the sidelines, and remote IT units. They were not sufficiently 
briefed and committed in advance.  
 
“Maybe we will need to have a more structured organization in a sense. Although now 
I have my core team reporting to me. But some of the other support groups are 
assisting and there is no formal kind of structure saying: “OK who will be doing what, 
who will be part of the project”. So if I have an opportunity I would want to have 
specific people assigned to do certain tasks. I would want it to be pre-defined and pre-
assigned so that everybody knows they are part of the team in a sense. And then 
similarly for the remote IT groups also in the same way. So it's like I'd prefer to have a 
more structured way of running the project. It will help to be able to do a more formal 
type of communication.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
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According to the director, the IT organization operated in quite an informal fashion. 
Factors contributing to this include the small size of the IT organization, and the fact that 
people knew each other quite well.  
 
“I think CPW mentioned yesterday that we have been working in a very casual way on 
this (Oracle project - author). Because we work from a very small group.” - HHT, 
DiskCo-B-1 
 
The director indicated that although local groups were often small, the Oracle project 
joined multiple dispersed groups. She related her emphasis on planning and formalization 
to the size of the Oracle project, and the fact that it was distributed: 
 
“(It is) (b)ecause there are so many groups involved and it is cross-country. So I think 
it will help if you have a more structured way of managing and running the project.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
Earlier in the theory section, we looked at the impact of work unit size on coordination and 
control modes. Among the effects are substitution of informal contacts for formalization 
(plans, standards and so on). A project’s size may make it unfeasible to handle too much 
informality. It could lead to communications overload (Galbraith, 1973; Van de Ven et al., 
1976). In Director HHT’s view, geographical distributedness further adds to this argument. 
It may make remote communications more difficult. All this encourages detailed planning 
to reduce remote information processing needs.  
 
In our interview, HHT clarified the combination of size (number of parties involved), and 
distributedness. She distinguished two types of implementations: those for which she (and 
her Singapore site A team) was directly responsible, versus those ‘owned’ by local IT. The 
first category was relatively easy to coordinate. She supervised her group that handled the 
complete implementation process.  
The second category is more complex from a coordination point of view. Now, the local IT 
is responsible for the implementation project. HHT’s group supports local IT as they work 
with users to get the system implemented. In fact, one more party is involved - the local IT 
organization. This increases the number of linkages, and thus complexity (Haeckel & 
Nolan, 1993):  
 
“The local IT is the main coordinator for their projects, because it is their country. So 
the core team (HHT’s team in Singapore site A - author) acts more or less as a 
resource, as a consultant to them a lot of time. Of course we try to tell them what are 
things to watch out for, things like that. But it all depends on how they want things to 
be done, and what are the requirements that they need. So I would say that there is 
more coordination to be done. Because there is one more channel, one more party to 
deal with.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
A key user from Singapore site A describes a similar difference between local versus 
remote contacts. Locally, i.e., in Singapore site A, she deals with people on the work floor, 
like a store or shipping supervisor. For remote sites, that contact is channeled through key 
users on-site.  
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“Is slightly different in the sense that when I deal with other sites, my contact point will 
be my counterpart (key user at remote site - author). Let's say they have inventory 
control or they have people that are in charge of inventory control. So my contact 
point is to them. Whereas for [Singapore site A] I deal directly with people like the 
store supervisor, or for shipping it is the shipping supervisor.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1  
 
In the next section, we expand on the organization of cross-site connections, and the role of 
key users.  
 
§ 9.2.2.4  Managing During the Project 
The VP’s close involvement in the setup phase, extended to the main implementation 
phases. He stays tuned through on-site visits and electronic media. During visits, he talks 
to a range of people involved in the project, both IT and users. This strengthens his 
perception of the local situation. He does not confine himself to remote updates, or the 
most obvious local representative, his IT director. In a sense, he avoids structural holes in 
his network (Burt, 1993). That is, his becoming dependent on e.g. local IT for maintaining 
contacts with local user communities. He also avoids too much reliance on remote contact. 
On-site presence makes it easy to connect with different people, and allows for on the spot 
problem solving: 
 
“It is important that we have a lot of these staff meetings, weekly meetings for the 
project. And I personally go down there and feel the ground. And every conversion, 
the actual conversion, I'm always there 1 week before. And I stay up to 1 week later. 
So the week before I can be there, when I see anything I do not like I need to mobilize 
some people from here (Singapore site A - author). And the good thing within Asia is 
that in 1 day you can reach most places. No major itinerary.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
  
Throughout the project, he maintains a regular and frequent pace of meetings. For early 
implementations in the Far East, meetings were scheduled on a daily basis. This boasts the 
conversion team’s information processing capacity when all of them are still learning. It 
sustains the VP’s awareness of project progress. He can map that against the master plan, 
and intervene in his role as a meta-site coordinator if need be:  
 
“We have a daily meeting with the conversion team, the IT team. At the end of the day 
we go through what we have done and what issues we are facing. So as we move 
forward, we will know the situation. Based on the master schedule we see where there 
is going to be a bottleneck, and we assess if we adjust it, what will happen to the rest. 
And sometime from the MS Project schedule you can see there is some time lacking, 
or there is slack time, and then we adjust it. For the very first plant we have every day 
at the end of the day a meeting. But subsequently we have weekly meetings. But 
anytime the project leaders have any issue, they will meet and talk about it.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-3 
 
Remotely, the VP arranges multi-party and one-on-one and conference calls. When 
multiple sites were in the conversion process, multi-party teleconferences were organized 
to share updates. He also talks individually with IT directors to gain an intimate 
understanding of local progress. All together, these communications provide the VP with 
an accurate picture of regional progress. This translates into fast response times when 
issues arise. On a meta-site level, this is important for two reasons: first, local 
implementations share central resources from Singapore and Malaysia site A. Delays at 
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one site have a spill-over effect to other ones. Second, projects are scheduled very tightly 
because of the Y2K problem, leaving little margins for prolonged cycle times. 
 
“When we have a weekly meeting it is a meeting conference call. That means all the 
sites that are involved in the project, we have a weekly meeting, conference call and 
each of the sites will report their status. What are the preparations they, are in and 
individually I will also talk to the director of my IT organization over there, to track 
where they are. What we have is, for example this is [Singapore site A], then this is 
say [Malaysia plant A]. We know that from [Singapore site A] to [Malaysia plant A] we 
have 2 months. And we also know exactly which week we are doing the trial data load, 
CRP, the business test, user training etc. We track this very closely to make sure that 
all this is on time. If any of these things slip it is potentially affecting other sites. So 
then we say immediately: “Which one can we adjust and how we can squeeze it in”.” - 
CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
When people worked on the master plan, they realized that some programs would stop by 
mid 1999 instead of by the end of that year. This is because FY2000 starts at that time. 
Consequently, some implementations were scheduled in parallel or overlapping: 
 
“The initial plan came from the US. But as we move forward we adjust our plan. 
Because initially they say: “Oh this will take only half a year”. But it ends up taking 
longer. Then we adjust it. Initially our plan is to convert all these plants by a certain 
date. But then we realize that the effort we are talking about lasts until the end of 
1999. But we realize that the existing package will not work anymore by mid 1999 
because of the fiscal year FY00. By the end of June we will start a new fiscal year. 
Then we are going to FY2000 and the existing program will fail. So we have to 
squeeze, and we adjust our plan and we end up having some plants convert at the 
same time.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
In practice, implementations presented a major challenge to the Far East IT organization. 
Especially for the first conversion, they needed more time for learning the application and 
the conversion process. This implied - according to the original plan - that the team from 
Singapore site A would have to start on the next site when theirs was still unfinished:  
 
“We adjusted the previous schedule twice. After [Singapore site A], (...) is supposed to 
convert another big plant, but ever since [Singapore site A] converted, we are having 
a lot of system issues because that is only the time when you see the real volume 
coming. During the test you cannot really do a so-called stress test to the real 
environment. And we have a lot of other things, also because we are in the learning 
stage of the learning curve. A lot of things we don’t understand well, we have to take 
much longer. So after the conversion of Singapore site A we suffer a lot - about 3 
months before we stabilize.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
The remaining uncertainty from the Singapore site A conversion would spill over to the 
next site. Experiences from the first conversion serve as a template for subsequent projects. 
To a great extent, other sites are merely a replication from first implementation. Starting 
those projects would lead to a lot of uncertainty. Remote IT would tax resources from 
Singapore site A, when those were still needed locally. Eventually, IT executives approved 
the schedule adjustment that rippled through the complete plan. This simplified cross-site 
dependencies, and reduced their intensity (Loch & Terwiesch, 1998). Instead of parallel or 
overlapping dependence, conversions were temporarily decoupled. That is, they are more 
sequentially arranged until uncertainty is sufficiently reduced (March & Simon, 1958).  
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“The initial plan is that next month we convert another plant. So I tell my boss no. That 
will just be a disaster. Because we believe that Singapore site A must be stabilized. 
Anything we do at [Singapore site A] we apply the same to rest of the drive plants. If 
we cannot stabilize here and we continue to apply, then every plant will fail. And I 
cannot afford to fail one plant and focus all my resources just to solve all the 
problems. I cannot afford to stretch my resources to solve problems of a few plants 
happening in the same time span. So we adjust that and we had a lot of good reasons 
to convince the boss to adjust. (…) And that is one of my roles, to look at the situation 
and adjust the plan and convince the management that we need to adjust the plan. 
And the people below are the ones who keep enough detail and feedback and say: 
“Hey we cannot make it”. I have to make that call and decide either to pull in more 
resources or adjust the plan.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
When issues were resolved at Singapore site A, people had aggregated a substantial body 
of experience. Now they could help other sites in a focused manner. Their know-how 
reduced the time needed for subsequent implementations. They could help counterparts 
either directly by talking to them. Or more indirectly through templates that reflected their 
experience. Says a key user from Singapore site A: 
 
“During the [Singapore site A] conversion we have gone through so many bad 
experiences, and good experiences as well, so we know a lot of things, we already 
know the process very well. So when we come to other sites that they want to convert, 
we can help them. If you gonna do it this way, you will face this problem, and what is 
the correct way that they should take. So it shortens a lot of time. Even the conversion 
table that we set up, they follow us closely. Because if you don't do it, then you face a 
lot of problems. And also, we have established a lot of reports so when they convert 
they can just pick up whichever they want. So the time required for them to convert is 
relatively shorter compared to [Singapore site A] .” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
The VP claims that the postponement he requested paid off. After his site stabilized, the 
team could channel efforts at local sites and reduce cycle times there: 
 
“We made 3 major adjustments. That means after the [Singapore site A] conversion, 
we were supposed to convert another Malaysian site one month later. But after 
[Singapore site A] conversion the system was not stable, we had a lot of problems. 
And the resources that we have are just good enough to solve our [Singapore site A] 
problems. Since the rest of the Drive plants were all depending on whatever 
modification we have for [Singapore site A], and wait for this system to stabilize, we 
think that we should push up the rest for 2 months. And that is a good decision 
because after 2 months we cleared all the issues here. Then when we (team from 
Singapore site A - author) go over there, the conversion only takes 2 days. Because 
all the issues were resolved.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5  
 
“Through all these experiences we learn. Every plant that we convert, we encounter 
some issues. So as we move forwards, a lot of these things we encountered before, 
we know exactly what the issue is and how to resolve it. And that is why initially our 
schedule to us is aggressive. But as we bring up our knowledge, we know that we can 
make it. Because then your life cycle, through your training, your learning curve, the 
time taken is much shorter.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
We can analyze the changes in strategy by drawing on March and Simon (1958). Figure 47 
shows a matrix work of uncertainty (predictability) and the intensity of interdependencies 
(rows). The master plan started off with tight dependence (parallel and overlapping 
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conversions), motivated by the Y2K problem. However, the project was also very 
unpredictable since IT units lacked experience with advanced applications like Oracle 
ERP. The schedule adjustment granted the Singapore site A some time to resolve issues. 
With their experience, the pacing of conversion projects could be increased again (see also 
Table 8). 
 
  
Figure 47 - Changes in conversion strategies DiskCo Far East 
 
§ 9.2.2.5  Nonhierchical Control Modes 
So far, we focused on hierarchical control modes. In this section, we look at other ways to 
“(…) ensure that another person or group works toward and attains a set of organizational 
goals” (Kirsch, 1996). First, people control their own performance. On a site level, the IT 
director is responsible for his conversion project. While people can call in support from 
Singapore site A, they are essentially on their own. A Finance key user from Singapore site 
A stresses the responsibility of her counterparts at other sites.  
 
“I can't monitor them, only provide them with training, and they will feedback to me if 
something doesn't work. So I don't really monitor what they are doing. They are on 
their own really, unless they have problems then they will come to us. Otherwise they 
will not come and call us.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
Self control is intertwined with forms of control that are based on trust. People are trusted 
to take care of their own local work. They are responsible for identifying issues and 
initiating communications. The Director Applications Development (Singapore site A) 
expresses this point of view when talking about project members at other sites: 
 
“I think we kind of trust individually that they know what they need to do, they are 
mature that if they don’t have the thing they will ask the right people to get the thing 
done.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
People relate trust to past collaborative experiences. When they worked before with 
someone, they know their counterpart’s usual performance. This is extrapolated to current 
opportunities for collaboration. McAllister (1995) referred to this as cognition based trust, 
i.e., individual beliefs bout peer reliability and dependability. One IT member from 
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Singapore HQ knows whom she can or cannot trust. She explains her different remote 
communication preferences based on experience with users:  
 
“It depends on people. Some people I will want them to write email to me, because 
some people really cannot be trusted. Because sometimes they talk to you over the 
phone, but then later regarding those things that you told them over the phone, they 
will say: “Oh you never mentioned that to me before.” So for some people I expect 
email from them, for some people just a call will do. It depends on individuals. (…) If 
you work long with all these people you know what sort of character, what sort of 
people they are.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Following this point of view, we should tie trust to prior collaborative experience. This 
means that when people have not worked together in the past, they may be hesitant to rely 
on trust-based control modes. People need time to develop the working relationships that 
substantiate trust (Gabarro, 1990; McAllister, 1995):  
 
“You can hardly have trust with new people. For people you have been working with 
for a long period of time, normally there will be some trust between us. But for new 
people you still have to develop that kind of trust.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Most people worked for years in the DiskCo organization. They have had ample 
opportunity to work with people on other projects, and develop a base for trust.  
 
The emphasis in the Far East organization on hierarchy and centralization had an 
interesting consequence for nonhierarchical modes of control. CPW utilized both his 
relationships with peer executives, and his hierarchical role to ensure management 
commitment to the project. This strong involvement paved the way for lateral 
collaboration. For instance, his kick off meetings at local sites presented the project as an 
important common goal for IT and users alike. This directed people in same direction, and 
ensured their willingness to help. When key users from Singapore or Malaysia site A 
visited remote sites for assistance, people know already about their role and display a 
helpful attitude.  
 
A key user from Material and System (Singapore site A) mentions the importance of 
communications at a management level before she is actually involved in a local project:  
 
“Before I go to a site, (…) in the first place there will be management communications. 
They will communicate, either the higher management or the site management will 
communicate with the other site management. So they understand that there is a 
project going on already. And we have to make sure that this thing works out. Then I 
will go there and talk, work with the key user on the project. So that's how we work.” - 
JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
This view is echoed by a key user in Finance from Malaysia site A. Before she started 
working with local (key) users on data conversion issues, her VP had urged his directors 
already to participate in a positive manner in the conversion process. These local directors 
made sure that their staff was informed and willing to cooperate: 
 
“As for Finance, our VP knows that this is the timeline that we have to meet, and the 
VP has already sent directives to the sites who have done the conversion that they 
have to give support to the other sites whatever they needed. So in that way, let's say 
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the Finance key users they already have the pressing from the VP or even the director 
that any communications or needs that we ask for, that we will have support from 
them.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
In a similar way, when the local IT director needs assistance from user management and 
key users, they are already ‘prepared’ to do that: 
 
“Once the IT director starts to work with the key user, all the (user - author) 
management already knows that we have to do this conversion. And they are already 
told to give support. So they will assign some users. And normally we will know who 
are the people.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
The same principle applied to relationships between Far East and US sites. A key user 
from Malaysia site A’s data conversion team recognized the importance of US 
management support. When she visits her counterpart in the US, she maintains rapport 
with that person’s boss to assess his commitment to her case. Ultimately, she depends on 
management level support to get her job done: 
 
“For my case personally, I know the superior from my US counterpart. When I go to 
visit their site, I not only visit them, I will talk to their superior too. I think it is 
important. (…) Because if you get to know the boss, you know what is the support that 
you can get from the boss. If let's say the boss is very supportive towards this 
assignment, then you know that you will get it done easily. If let's say the boss has 
different priorities, well, you got to try harder (interviewee laughs - author). You have 
to get some other management support to bring across the message that this project 
is important.”- JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
In short, control in lateral collaborative relationships depends on management level 
communications and support. This top level preparatory work precedes and paves the way 
for collaboration at director and staff level. Especially for a multi-site project, management 
support seems important. This could be because each context has its own ways of working 
and direction. When people are expected to collaborate in a site-crossing project, this could 
lead to conflicts without a priori management exchanges. 
 
§ 9.2.2.6  Control by Representation and Technology 
A final category relies on representation and technology. DiskCo’s Software Process 
Engineering Group (SPEG) in US HQ developed the Software Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC). This method standardizes software development throughout the DiskCo 
organization. For software development, enhancement and maintenance projects, it 
prescribes process steps and provides templates. As a standard, the method ensures 
consistency and quality. We found on DiskCo’s intranet a presentation from the Director 
of Software Engineering IT that explains in more detail the motivation for having a 
controlled and disciplined development process (downloaded in May 1999). First, the 
opposite case - not using a method - leads to an unpredictable processes. When people lack 
a template, they cannot ensure the quality and timeliness of process steps and outputs.  
Second, the method reflects past experiences. It distills successful actions and translates 
those into an explicit recipe. This makes it easier to ensure the quality of IT - user 
interactions. It also simplifies newcomer’s entry in a project since they can use the method 
to trace a project’s track record. Third, prescription simplifies ex post assessment and 
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modification of a system. It helps people trace process steps and descriptions of a system. 
Fourth, the method makes the output of software projects more understandable and 
therefore testable. The coding becomes more transparent since people must document it in 
detail according to the SDLC method. 
 
In interviews, people mentioned that the method helped them to work more systematically. 
They could download and use document templates form the intranet. This structured their 
activities, in particular in areas like documentation. The control effect of the SDLC method 
was further reinforced by the use of Lotus Notes. In that groupware system, people can 
enter requests for customizations to the Oracle system. Once these are accepted, people are 
formally assigned to handle the project. Requests are also prioritized. The Director 
Applications Development from Singapore site A describes the procedure for 
customization requests when showing us the Lotus Notes environment on a local PC. She 
outlines responsibilities of people involved in the process, and how the groupware 
facilitates involvement of people whose approval or assistance is needed. In a sense, the 
groupware offers an environment that looks like a single workspace even though people 
may contribute from different locations.  
 
“You have to first create a request that needs approval. The request will be created by 
the end user. Once it is approved then people from IT take over to be the responsible 
for the project. They will then create a project. (…) On top of this normally when the 
user raises a request, there will be a mail sent to tell you (IT director like HHT - 
author) that there is a request waiting for you to approve. But if you don't want that 
(email - author) you can also come here (in the Lotus Notes environment) and look at 
it. The general guideline is that the users raise it, the first level approval will be their 
immediate manager. And then after that they will come to IT. So normally they check 
who is the responsible manager in IT for type of project.  
For my case, there are some projects that may affect the other user sites. So after I 
receive a project and before I approve it I will include more approval into the list to 
make the US also look at it and make sure they have no issues on the changes. We 
need to add the requirement specs (specifications - author), the review, design specs, 
review, code test, review code, third party test, user test, and installation. So to each 
task can be assigned to more than one person. When they are about to start the task, 
they will update the date, and when they finish they have to update the hours worked, 
and they will do a sign off to indicate that they are finished. So once they sign off the 
first task, the mail will send out immediately to the next person to say OK I have 
finished this one, now it's your turn to do for example do a review.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-2 
 
Lotus Notes makes it easy to attach documents to emails or steps in a workflow. People 
use SDLC templates that ensure their compliance with DiskCo’s software development 
method. HHT describes the resources included in the process of fulfilling enhancement 
requests. At that time, she was showing us an example of a project in Lotus Notes: 
 
“The SDLC documentation is included. In fact in the design document, we have to put 
in the test plan to see what are the areas of testing. (…) All the attachments are 
attached here. Because let's say when [SX - name of IT staff member - author] 
finishes the requirements specs, before she signs off, she has to go in here and say: 
“Add supporting documents”. So by doing that, all the attachments will be included. 
For projects you normally will have at least one (attachment - author) for 
requirements, and one for design. So inside here we attach the requirements specs, a 
Word document, simple, just some description. The design specs will be just the 
same. When we do testing, Lotus is not a must-have kind of thing, but normally I 
encourage them to put even results from the third party test in the database. 
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Especially when there are issues so we put in the description of what happened, what 
issues we faced. They may need to rework the thing.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-2 
  
The groupware system promotes documentation of process steps. Task assignment and 
accomplishment become very explicit, formal and transparent. This facilitates ex post 
tracking and modification of a project. The transparency of an enhancement request project 
is not limited to the particular IT director and staff member assigned for that case. At a 
management and executive level, people have access to all projects on a worldwide basis. 
This is because Lotus Notes databases are automatically replicated across all DiskCo sites. 
Says an IT member of the Singapore site A core team: 
 
“We create the project in Lotus Notes. So all the sites will be able to see the projects. 
Because the Lotus Notes database replicates.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
When we were in Singapore, we could look at projects in Europe and the US with the help 
of the Director Applications Development. This included all kinds of details, like priority, 
planning, and people in charge. People can view - not always modify - the projects from 
different angles, like priority, location, category and so on. 
 
“Any project by e.g. users in [US Central] you can exactly see how it is processed. But 
you cannot edit - that’s only for people who are involved.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-2 
 
The groupware makes it easy to engage people regardless of their physical work site. Their 
involvement may be needed for approval, specific expertise, or because they have more 
resources available. Lotus Notes thus facilitates task differentiation on an international 
scale.  
For local projects, people often do not use the system extensively. They prefer a manual 
process where they just talk about requests, and work in a more informal manner. On the 
other hand, international change requests are almost exclusively represented in the system. 
The Director Applications Development explains the difference: 
 
“A lot of time we do the manual furtherance. If you just take it to me and say: “OK I 
finished this one, please review”. Then we don't really use Lotus. (…) If it is really in 
the same office then we will normally just talk about it. But we still want them to sign 
off so that we keep track. But let's say I have a project in which both the [Singapore 
site A] and US team are involved. Let's say they do the specs, we have to review 
because the request came from our users. So then of course this mailing is 
important.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-2 
 
Given the time pressure of the Oracle ERP implementation, management closely watches 
progress of enhancement request projects, especially those with high priority. The system 
allows them to track issues on a regular basis, and increase hierarchical pressure if need be. 
The Director Applications Development outlines how management uses Lotus Notes to 
ensure timely closure of enhancement requests: 
 
“We can see whether it's a system issue or the user doesn't know enough, or a PC 
issue. When an issue remains open, we will track it. We review the issues regularly 
and then close up the issue with the local IT or the US. But we track them in the 
Oracle issues database. We categorize them into open low (priority - author), open 
high and things like that. Then we review it weekly. 
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Basically we can put them by category, by person and by group because we have 
different locations. So you can see all the [Singapore site A] issues. And the other 
way you can look at them is by status. Each issue will pass a status of open, open 
high (priority - author), open low. This is especially for the CIO, because normally he 
will want to go through the open high to make sure they are closed up as soon as 
possible.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-2  
 
From a user perspective, the distributed groupware system accelerates problem solving. It 
makes their requests transparent and thus ensures timely performance. A key user from 
Malaysia site A comments describes her view on the system:  
 
“We have a very useful project database where we put in our individual enhancement 
requests. And this is accessible by all plants. From there the local IT approves them 
and they work on it. So for the programmers, the IT bosses or whoever has access 
can just view through that and see whether they are working on the right thing. I'm 
sure they print that status out and review that every week with their own department. 
But that has to be commented by the IT department. But that database really does 
help.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
On a staff level, people do not always appreciate this transparent electronic environment 
(Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996). It displays their work openly for hierarchical observation in a 
broader sense than the traditional manager-supervisor looking over someone’s shoulder 
(Kirsch & Cummings, 1996). For this reason, people are hesitant to formalize a request. 
Before entering it in Lotus Notes, they try to solve it through contacts with peers. A 
member of the IT core team at Singapore site A explains:  
 
“We try not to raise too many issues in the database, because [the IT management/ 
executive level] is always looking at this kind of issues. Since by experience we know 
people from the same project team doing the same kind of system, we normally write 
an email to them, to see whether they faced this kind of problem in that kind of 
environment. If they do, we ask how to solve it. Normally, we try to solve things on 
that (staff - author) level first, even within a small group, before you put it as an issue. 
Because once you have an issue, everybody is looking at the issue. And it's not good 
to have an issue open for so long.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
Finally, a specific example of control concerns the process of modifying the Oracle source 
code. So far, sites had their own version of MANMAN. They were free to adhere to local 
user requests and modify the system independently. The new ERP system changed all that. 
DiskCo strived to implement a single source code across all sites. They maintained the 
basic master code in the US and tried hard to avoid any changes to this code that was 
replicated to DiskCo’s globally dispersed sites.  
 
Technically speaking, software is not like a physical resource that is used by multiple 
parties. A printer can only print one page at a time. Software does not know this limitation. 
As a digital product, it is easily replicated across sites, or remotely accessed. Since people 
can independently use the software, there is not need for coordination and control (Blau & 
Scott, 1962). The problem comes when people want to change something to the program, 
probably because their local operations have unique requirements. This customization 
would have to be incorporated in the default code. When other sites receive their updated 
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copy of that code, they are confronted with a modified piece of software that may not 
match their operational requirements.44 The form of dependence described here concerns 
modification of a resource that is replicated across multiple sites. Earlier we referred to this 
as modification interdependence. In the DiskCo case, we observed to control issues caused 
by this type of dependence.  
 
First, from a management point of view, an organization must decide on approval 
procedures for change requests (See the recent section on Lotus Notes workflow control). 
The VP describes how this feature of Oracle changed the nature of software projects at 
DiskCo:  
 
“Previously, a lot of these projects in which we were engaged and worked with the US, 
were on a much smaller scale and very specific projects. Either I work with this 
particular site, or I work with another site. It’s not a project like this that all sites get 
involved, and do the same thing. Previously, we might be talking about this particular 
thing with the US, only applied to this plant. The plants that are not involved we don’t 
care. And each of the plants they have their own local project that they go deal with 
themselves. Now, because of the Oracle, everything is centralized, everything is one 
single source code. Any request that comes from the individual organization has to go 
through a committee to review the request, and see whether it can be approved or 
not.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
The second problem is more pragmatic, on a software level. The VP Information 
Technologies explained that usage of a single source code necessitates centralized control. 
This ensures distribution of the same code to different sites. Control is particularly needed 
since changes must be made. To this end, the company needs procedures and configuration 
management tools to coordinate people from different sites who want to make adaptations 
to the Oracle code: 
 
“Because last time (before Oracle - author) in the media sites we did a lot of things 
ourselves. Now it is global. That's why your study really comes to the right place. 
Because it's global, we need to have a central control mechanism. Of course our 
target is single source code worldwide. Even with single source you have some setting 
that need to be done. And that is a procedure that has to ensure that you pass 
updated versions of the code down to all the sites.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-4 
 
Supposing that people have access to the default Oracle server in the US, there is a risk 
that they try to modify the system simultaneously, in a conflicting manner. Or they 
customize the Oracle copy at their local site, like they did with MANMAN: 
 
“Last time in MANMAN we have different sources for different sites. At [Singapore site 
A] we have our own source, in China they have their own source. So we can do 
whatever things we want, relying on the source itself. But now we cannot. When we go 
to Oracle we emphasize on one common source worldwide. So any changes that we 
make we have to consider other sites also. We have to make a generic change. There 
have cases happened that there are some programmers who only hard coded 
something and then make the change just for the site. And then when they implement 
                                                 
44 Another problem is that Oracle Corp. seems less supportive of customized versions of 
their software. 
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this in production it affects all other sites. We would get a lot of complaints.”- OBT, 
DiskCo-C-1  
 
Avoiding this problem requires configuration management, where only one person can 
modify the source code during a certain period of time. Basically it means sequencing 
multiple developers instead of allowing them parallel access to the source code. Like 
earlier described, DiskCo uses an application life cycle management tool for this process 
called CCC/Harvest from Platinum, Inc. Developers must check in to lock the code for 
anyone else. After they are done, the code is promoted to a test and eventually production 
environment. When they check out, the code is unlocked so that other developers can 
incorporate their change requests.  
 
On top of this automated control tool, developers contact each other through dedicated 
Lotus Notes group mailing lists. They discuss and coordinate the requests they are working 
on, and brief peers afterwards. An IT staff member from Singapore site A explains how the 
developer community uses the configuration management tool and other control 
mechanisms to implement change requests: 
 
“We are using this application (CCC/Harvest - author) to control the source code. This 
means that if somebody is working on this program, another person can't change the 
same program at the same time. If they are using the Harvest feature it's not possible. 
But of course you can also change locally. You can always pull out the program, and 
do it locally without checking in to Harvest. But this (using the configuration 
management tool - author) is to avoid that different persons are working on the same 
program at the same time.  
Suppose for example that this person is working, and you know that you have a 
request to change this program as well. This means that you have to communicate 
with the person working on the project currently whether the person can incorporate 
your request in the program at the same time. Or we have to liaise with each other in 
terms of timing. Like: “When can you finish so that after you have finished I can 
continue working on that”.  
Usually we will wait until the other party finishes the program completely. Meaning 
that his program is a working program and already in production. Then I will continue 
from there. So when we start on our project (i.e., continue working on the same 
program - author), we will have to study the logic and then to fit in our codes.” - OBT, 
DiskCo-C-1 
 
§ 9.2.3  Organizing for Distributed Collaboration 
In this section, we explore relationships between DiskCo project locations. Throughout our 
interviews, it became apparent that knowledge was an important driver of cross-site 
connections. Many times, people referred to the need for knowledge transfer, and (remote) 
support. From a coordination theory perspective, the necessity to connect stems from work 
dependence, and ultimately task division (Smith, 1793; Thompson, 1967). One could 
suggest that in the DiskCo case, the task of implementing Oracle ERP was split and 
assigned to different sites. But that does not yet explain the existence of dependencies that 
we observed. After all, each site could have proceeded on its own. Equipped with 
resources and following standards, they could implement the same system across multiple 
sites. There is no eventual culmination into a single product or service, like with aircraft 
manufacturing (Galbraith, 1973). Still, sites were very dependent in terms of expertise and 
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assistance. In the next sections, we explore the role of these dependencies, and how 
DiskCo shaped remote contact patterns.  
 
§ 9.2.3.1  Cross-site Dependence: The Need to Connect Remotely 
Sites involved in the DiskCo implementation were very dependent in terms of resource 
exchange, assistance, and knowledge transfer. As coordination theory proclaims, such 
dependence triggered information processing and coordination needs (Galbraith, 1981; 
Tushman & Nadler, 1978). Applied to DiskCo, this means remote dependencies and 
information processing needs. We assess here the origins of cross-site interdependencies, 
and main dependence patterns. Our research suggested four drivers: novelty, commonality, 
asynchronicity, and intra-organizational advantage. We elaborate on these factors here.  
 
First, there was a tremendous amount of novelty and uncertainty. So far, sites were using 
MANMAN software that was locally customized, running on Digital VAX machines. For 
all sites, this uncertainty translated in a tremendous need to absorb knowledge on the new 
IT infrastructure (Oracle ERP application, SUN servers, centralized data centers in 
Singapore site A and Thailand).  
Second, all sites were implementing the same system. DiskCo heavily emphasized 
commonality of IT infrastructure and business processes. Gone were the days that local 
sites could customize MANMAN and run their own data centers. The new approach leads 
to a form of interdependence that we refer to as standardization interdependence. We 
found pointers to this form of dependence in literature on fast food chains (Bradach, 1997, 
1998; Leidner, 1993). And in some scholars’ work on a symphony orchestra, where 
musicians are glued to the pacing of the leader’s baton during a performance (Kirsh, 1999; 
Mintzberg, 1998a). Basically it means that multiple sites are expected to structure their 
local operations in the same way. They dependent on a single standard, one way of doing 
things. Their operations will be assessed based on that standard, just like fast food chains 
have mechanisms to observe compliance of local restaurants with a standard mode of 
operating. In DiskCo’s case, US HQ ‘owned’ the standard. They acted as exclusive 
gatekeepers for the default Oracle source code, and had to approve any possible changes. 
This facilitated consistency. When local change requests emerged, it also triggered 
connections from local sites to eventually the US for obtaining approval. Obviously, the 
emphasis on commonality and exclusive ownership constrains local autonomy, as the VP 
Information Technologies admits:  
 
“(…) (W)e have the objective to establish common processes, common procedures, 
commonality, standardization. So to us IT sometimes plays a part to maintain 
common, standardized processes. We tell them (users - author) this is the whole world 
using this system and this procedure (...). So that is how we deal with the rest of the 
sites. Not so diplomatic in the sense that everybody can discover what they want. No. 
Because the moment you do it you would just delay the conversion. Just like now. 
Now the users come in and tell me: “Oh we want this”. The answer is: “No”. Because 
there is no more time anyway. Because this coming month end is the conversion. 
There is no way I can design some special program for them” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Third, implementations were asynchronous. US sites kicked of the global Oracle roll out. 
Then in a partially overlapping and parallel mode, sites in Europe, Thailand and the rest of 
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the Far East followed. In these regions, usually a local HQ kicked off, like Singapore site 
A. When people in the US had already accumulated substantial experience, other sites 
were still in an early preparatory stage. This triggered knowledge flows, first from the US 
to regional HQ, and then from there to local sites. Says an IT member from Singapore site 
A: 
 
“What happens is this system didn't start with [Singapore site A], it started with the 
US. Eventually they passed the knowledge on to us, we passed the knowledge to 
China, we passed the knowledge to Malaysia and so on.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1  
 
In a similar fashion, Singapore site A took the lead for the in the Far East region. Their 
kick off implementation functioned as a reference model that could be replicated to other 
sites.  
 
Fourth, there was one more reason for leveraging US know-how. Standard Oracle training 
in countries like Singapore, Malaysia and Japan did not cater for DiskCo-specific needs. 
These local resources were not geared to the specifics of DiskCo’s operations. Instead, 
people experienced training from their US counterparts as more effective, since it focused 
on their industry. Similarly, the Conference Room Pilot (CRP) provided a useful way to 
assess the implications of Oracle ERP for users’ day-to-day operations. Training by people 
from the same organization and industry implies that concepts are already adapted and 
geared to the trainees’ context. A key user in Finance from Singapore site A comments on 
this intra-organizational advantage:  
 
“The time we attended the Oracle open house training at Oracle company, we didn't 
find that very useful. But the CRP when we go through our actual business, we find 
that more useful because it's what we are doing day-to-day. So we find that training 
from the US site to our users here is better than the one from the outside company. 
(…) When you go to the outside company, they use Human Resource data, and it's not 
relevant to [DiskCo]. So you cannot imagine what happens to your environment if 
things change.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
The four drivers discussed here resulted in two main patterns of remote dependence. One 
between Far East and US sites. This was mainly handled by the regional HQ in Singapore, 
and to some extent Malaysia site A for data conversion. The second one concerns the Far 
East region itself. Site A in Singapore and Malaysia kicked off the implementation roll out 
there. This experience base was channeled to other Far East sites. We elaborate here on the 
two dependence patterns. 
 
Dependence US and Far East sites 
When US sites started the Oracle implementation, they were the first group in DiskCo to 
learn about such a major software implementation and organizational transformation 
project. Areas of novel expertise included, first, insight in the application’s functioning, 
and the challenge to match that functionality to actual business operations. On some 
occasions, this required customizations to Oracle. Second, IT staff had to learn about 
different hardware and networking infrastructure, based on client/ server computing. Third, 
they must develop procedures for converting data from old systems like MANMAN to 
Oracle ERP. Fourth, sometimes interfaces were needed between the Oracle and other 
application that could not be replaced. And fifth, people must learn how to handle a multi-
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site system implementation and organizational change project. This intensified contacts 
within IT and user communities, and across these.  
 
Apart from some operational differences, US experience applied to the Far East situation. 
Those responsible for the roll out there - Singapore and Malaysia site A - were eager to 
learn from their US counterparts. At the start of the Far East roll out, US staff came over to 
Singapore for training IT staff and key users. During the implementation project, key users 
and IT staff from Singapore frequently contacted US counterparts for specific requests. A 
key user from Singapore site A comments on her experience:  
 
“The US sites converted earlier than [Singapore site A]. So they have a lot of people 
who are more experienced in Oracle. So I work with US in the sense that if I have any 
question or issue, or anything that I’m not sure of, I will normally ask them. Because 
when we have the training session, they do come over and train us, give us some sort 
of training. So if we have any questions, we are free to ask them.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
During the Far East conversion projects, novel issues that were not covered in training 
triggered remote exchanges with US colleagues. Task uncertainty thus initiates an 
assistance dependence relationships given knowledge asymmetry between Far East and US 
sites.  
 
“Sometimes we may also encounter some ad hoc issue which we have not 
encountered before. And then they (Far East sites - author) may also come back to us 
to ask us whether we know about all this problem. And sometimes if we can't really 
solve the problem, we write to the US counterpart, because they started Oracle earlier 
than us. So they have probably more experience than us. So we write to them, we 
seek their advice to resolve the problem.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
The Director Applications Development admits that the Oracle implementation presented 
her organization with a formidable challenge. Their motto became ‘learning by doing’, and 
part of that was learning from US sites. This was indispensable for materializing the roll 
out within project constraints:  
 
 “At that time (start of Far East roll out - author) we also were really not sure of a lot 
of things - it's really like we just tried to work things out. And then of course when 
there is any issue when we need more resources for help, one way we normally get 
the help is from the US in some areas, especially when you come to project 
development which is quite a main part of the time span. So US have given us a lot of 
help on that part. If we have to do everything on our own I think that is not possible.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
Experience with kick off implementations in the US was captured in documentation, 
templates, and Lotus Notes databases. It was also transferred in person, through US on-site 
training and support in the Far East. Conversions in the Far East were not exactly 
sequentially aligned to those in the US. When their implementations started, some of the 
US projects were still in progress.  
 
“They (US sites - author) started first, they started 2 years ahead of us. But the first 
year they have spent a lot of time doing a lot of foundation. Although it's for the US, 
but it helped to build a foundation for the Far East sites. When they were almost done 
with the first site, we have started doing it. So by the time when Far East started to 
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look at the requirements they (US sites - author) are still doing the other sites. 
Because I think they have about 7 sites to do. So it's still kind of in parallel.” - HHT, 
DiskCo-B-3 
 
At that time, US sites took on the role of both local implementator and remote supporter. 
Later, Singapore site A tried to avoid such a dual responsibility. That was when they were 
supposed to implement locally and prepare conversions at other Far East sites. As 
discussed in a previous section, the VP Information Technologies decided to postpone 
conversions that were supposed to follow closely the one at his own site. This was to avoid 
engaging his core team in local and remote concerns at the same time.  
 
Dependence in the Far East region 
In the Far East region, Singapore site A became the center of expertise. Having learnt from 
US sites, their mission was to implement the system at a couple of locations in Singapore, 
and to assist other Far East sites. People looked at Singapore site A as the center of 
excellence. They were responsible for their own implementation but lacked resources to do 
so. This made them dependent on Singapore site A. They started to connect to that site for 
leveraging expertise available there. Moreover, Singapore site A was the gateway for 
escalating local issues to the US. All this intensified contacts in the Far East region. The 
Director Applications Development comments on the renewed level of networking in her 
region: 
 
“I think, first of all it is the coordination and communication between the different IT 
groups. We didn't have to do that although we did communicate quite a bit last time 
with the older system (MANMAN - author). But it was not key, because we worked as 
groups quite independently. But because of the Oracle implementation, we try to 
emphasize knowledge sharing, communication, and commonality. So that is one of the 
aspects that we did very different from last time (before the Oracle project - author).” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
The team in Singapore site A started first, just like the US started before them. They 
worked with Oracle consultants and went through a full implementation cycle for their 
own site. The intention was that this would resolve most of the issues possibly emerging at 
other sites. The head start of this team equipped them to assist remote sites: 
 
“They are more like a consultant to them on technical aspects that they are not sure 
of, on the application. Because we started the [Singapore site A] team first, so they 
have slightly more experience than the other groups. Because we have gone through 
the full, more complete cycle doing the AIM method and then they have the chance to 
learn Oracle, learn from Oracle consultants quite a bit through the discussions and 
meetings. So basically it's transfer of knowledge, interacting.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Knowledge transfer to remote sites - in particular China - was setup according to 
specialization and function. IT members were experienced in specific Oracle modules, and 
connected with their counterpart from another site. The same applied to key users. An IT 
member from the core team in Singapore site A explains this setup for China. At the time 
of the ERP roll out, China did not have local Oracle training facilities available. They were 
mainly supplied from Singapore. Remote knowledge dependencies were mainly 
homogeneous, i.e., between people with similar roles. Contacts across areas were setup 
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locally. This applies to communications between users and IT. And also between IT staff 
members specialized in different modules that need interfacing.  
Not all sites needed the same level of remote support from Singapore site A. It depended 
on the availability of local resource, both within and outside the DiskCo organization. At 
the time of the Oracle project, China maintained a limited internal resource base. They also 
did not have access to local Oracle training facilities. Their demand for support from 
Singapore was therefore considerable as the VP Information Technologies explains: 
 
“Our plants are standard, but slightly different. The China plant is setup by us, we 
maintain a small group of IT people there to take care of daily operation. But the skill 
set in terms of knowledge everything is still mainly from Singapore. So as we move 
forward, like for example you talk about what kind of requirements for people, and I 
would say that if we start off in China, if China is the plant who start off doing the 
conversion, I don't think we can make it. We start off in Singapore because of the 
knowledge, the people here, their experience is much better than the other sites. 
These people help to transfer the knowledge down. And it is exactly the same [for 
other functions], not just our IT. Manufacturing it is the same thing. We go down to 
China and transfer and train the people out there. So there is always a gap between 
the level there and here. But Malaysia is very close to us. Their standard is very high, 
in fact their team is a very good team.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
The team in Malaysia site A was technically strong, and worked more independent from 
Singapore site A because of their local expertise. They were assigned to handle data 
conversion and supported the team in Singapore instead of just demanding resources. 
Having looked at remote dependencies, we expand in the next sections on modes for 
connecting people across sites.  
 
§ 9.2.3.2  Establishing Remote Contact in the Far East 
 
“We have very very little direct contact between remote key users and our IT 
(Singapore site A - author). So if in some cases we think that we need to get all the 
folks together and discuss something, then we will just have a meeting, a conference 
call where both the key user group and IT group are together in the room and talk.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Implementing an Information System is a cross-functional endeavor between users and IT 
(Grohowski, McGoff, Vogel, Martz, & Nunamaker, 1990). Eventually, the system should 
help users in their day-to-day work. They need IT for technology implementation and 
subsequent support and maintenance (users pulling resources from IT). Conversely, IT’s 
success depends on cooperative users whose input and help is needed to implement and 
customize the system (IT pulling resources from users).  
In DiskCo’s case, we transpose this mutual dependence relationship to a distributed work 
environment. Users operate at different sites for the business. And IT is also organized in a 
distributed mode to provide local support, headquartered by Singapore site A. For such an 
environment, a question is how users and IT connect. Do users pull from local IT 
resources, or refer back to Singapore site A? What if they need help from the US, how is 
that channeled? And the other way around: How does IT connect to local users? Directly 
or through local IT? Why? We look here at the initial phase of establishing remote contact, 
and give an example of the Japan implementation project. 
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A guiding principle that seemed to emerge from the case is: remote contact is organized as 
homogeneously as possible. That means: people with similar roles are supposed to connect 
across sites. Diverse, inter-functional contacts are preferably handled locally. The Director 
Applications Development expressed the principle as follows: 
 
“I think people communicate normally within the same area, where they share 
knowledge and seek advice on problems within the same application area.” - HHT, 
DiskCo-B-3 
 
The VP Information Technologies discussed with us is approach for connecting IT and 
user groups across sites. Starting point for local implementations is replication of the 
organizational structure at Singapore site A. That is, he asks local IT and user management 
to assign members for the local cross-functional core team. Once that structure is in place, 
the VP establishes contacts between corresponding individuals, or counterparts. These 
persons have the same role at different sites, both in IT and user areas. Here, the VP 
comments on remote connections for IT project members:  
 
“For every site we should have a minimum of one person taking care of this module, 
the other person taking care of that module. So we also have - like in China - a person 
looking after the manufacturing side, one person looking after the finance side. We 
always tie all of them back to who in this team at [Singapore site A] is expert in that 
area. So they all know. That is from an IT standpoint.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5  
 
Similarly, users from remote sites were connected to their counterparts in Singapore site A. 
For China, key users from Singapore site A were sent down to work with their local 
counterparts. Once people know their counterpart from such on-site visits, they find it easy 
to contact that person remotely:  
 
“From the user standpoint, we send the key users down (from Singapore site A - 
author) to work with the key users in corresponding areas, like receiving shipping. 
Then these people always tie up. So when the users in receiving have any issues, 
they will make a call to their counterpart who has been helping them last time during 
the conversion.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
In Malaysia, a similar procedure was followed. A key user there mentioned that the core 
team (key users and IT members) from Singapore site A came over for a project kick off. 
During that visit, the teams established rapport that helped them connect remotely during 
later stages of the implementation: 
 
“Before the conversion, the team (form Singapore site A - author) came down once 
and we talked and we had a presentation and things like that. That's when we get to 
know each other and when they went back we also called them.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1  
 
These quotes point at the role of visits to tie up counterparts between sites. Another way to 
achieve this is by providing contact lists. This provides people with a minimal awareness 
as to who does what at other sites: 
 
“When we started on the project we were given a list of people whom we can contact 
and what are the areas of responsibilities they are handling. So that gives us the 
information so we know whom to contact.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
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Contact lists were used in three ways. First, to establish remote homogeneous connections, 
i.e., users - users, or IT - IT. This way, people get to know who their counterpart is (at least 
by name), and how they can reach that person. For IT, this network connected local IT 
units with their counterparts at Singapore site A, and from there to experts in the US. A 
basic condition for establishing a globally distributed, homogeneous community was thus 
established. People could utilize that infrastructure to escalate local issues.  
The VP describes how users contact their local IT person on an issue. If that person cannot 
resolve the problem, he will liaise with specialists in Singapore or eventual the US:  
 
“Then this hierarchy here (i.e., resources in Singapore site A - author) is more for our 
additional support to them. If a local IT person has problems with purchasing users 
and cannot resolve them, they will know that hey there is another person. And this 
goes all the way back to the US. US also has some developers specialized in 
manufacturing or purchasing or AP or GL. So we know that anything to do with AP, if 
my AP person here cannot handle it any more, she will escalate up to the AP person 
in the US. That is how we manage it.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
In other words, when an issue emerges that requires attention from IT, users contact local 
IT (i.e., local heterogeneous connection). If need be, this is escalated through remote 
homogeneous contacts, namely, within IT.  
 
An IT member from Singapore site A describes how contact lists are used for setting up 
remote, intra-IT exchanges. Often, IT staff from the Far East had to contact US 
counterparts. After all, US sites were ahead in terms of know-how, and they had to 
approve changes to the application:  
 
“So they (IT management - author) give us a list in spreadsheet form stating who are 
the people we should contact for this kind of system. So we have the support list and 
know whom to contact. Once we have a problem, normally we contact this list of 
people in the US, and cc to all the people who are local.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1  
 
The IT member concludes by pointing out that communications within a geographically 
distributed community of like-minded IT professionals is very easy. This relies on a 
combination of common knowledge (Grant, 1996b), and working relationships (Gabarro, 
1990). People know each other since they have collaborated throughout the Oracle 
implementation, and possibly before. And they are obviously specialized in the same area 
(DeSanctis & Fulk (Eds), 1999).  
 
“But as I said earlier, we have seen each other, we implemented the system together, 
we know each other. We know whom to put on copy. Very very easy.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-
1 
 
Second, the lists provided local users with information on IT support at their site (and vice 
versa). Users know who is responsible for what areas in their IT department. This 
facilitates directs contact between people in the same area but from different functions as 
the VP explains:  
 
“If you talk about support we have a list given to the users in case they have any 
issues. I say regularly to them: “Anything to do with purchasing, contact this person; 
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anything to do with shipping, ask this person.” So this list was given to the users as 
well as IT. Within the local IT and local users. The local users knows in the local IT 
who manages manufacturing, who manages purchasing. They will approach the 
people accordingly.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Third, two IT units have a regional role: Singapore site A and Malaysia site A (for data 
conversion). While these units usually work through local IT, sometimes they want to 
connect directly to local users to obtain information. To this end, they receive a contact list 
that is shared through a Lotus Notes database. Says a member from the data conversion 
team in Malaysia:  
  
“We get a user list for the local sites, we put it up in our Lotus Notes database so that 
everybody knows whom to contact.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
Direct cross-functional contact across sites is seen as an exception. It occurs for instance 
when local IT cannot convince their users to supply information. The Project Manager of 
the data conversion team in Malaysia comments: 
 
“Most of the time we contact the IT person. So if the IT person tells us that the 
particular group of users cannot supply the information, we try to find out more what is 
the reason. Or sometimes if we need to, we will also call the users directly. And we'll 
try to explain to them why we need the information, and need to get their 
understanding and cooperation to give the information.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
Contact lists represent a location’s human resources. They are often a primary navigation 
tool for remote colleagues to connect to the right person. Changes in a local unit trigger a 
need for modifying the list. According to an IT team member from site A, sites should take 
this responsibility of updating and pushing renewed information to remote counterparts:  
 
“We had recently a reorganization. In the US they are also confused who are the 
people in charge of which module. So recently we have sent an email to them with the 
persons in charge of every module, so then they will know whom to contact. Otherwise 
they would still go back to the old people that were doing the modules.” - SCC, 
DiskCo-J-1 
 
Example Singapore site A - Japan 
Establishing remote contact thus relies on a combination of cross-site visits and providing 
contact information for electronic communications. The combination is well illustrated in 
an example provided by the VP Information Technologies on the implementation in Japan. 
He describes how he and his team started to work for the first time with users and IT there. 
To start with, they invited Japanese IT staff to Singapore. These visitors could get 
acquainted with their peers, attend basic Oracle training, and follow pending 
implementation projects:  
 
“The Japanese site is a good example of something new. Because we do not know 
anyone there. All the while Japan has been supported by the US. Because of the 
Oracle conversion they have employed somebody new. So we don't know them, we 
don't know the users, we don't know a single user, we don't know a single IT person.  
So what we did is to start off we sent the IT persons here first, way before the 
conversion. Come here, go for training, let them attend a local Oracle training. Get 
them involved in the team when they do the conversion of the other sites to know all 
the processes. So at the same time they were here for a while to know each other. I 
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mean the people they come here, we show them good hospitality, like HHT (Director 
Applications Development - author) taking them out for dinner.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
This immersion in the Singaporean context was followed by a counter visit to Japan. IT 
staff strengthened bonds earlier built in Singapore. Contacts were extended to key users 
who were tied back to their counterpart in Singapore site A. For both sides, people 
received lists of individuals with similar roles in the other location: 
 
“And when they went back we go. This time when we go there we ask them to 
organize a meeting with the key users. Then we sit down, we make a list of team, who 
is responsible for what, individually we get to know each other. “OK you are taking 
part of shipping, this is your IT counterpart in Singapore, and this is the Japan 
person”. And they get to know each other. We provide the individual there with 
information on the person with a corresponding role here, like telephone number, 
everything. So they know each other. So we have all the supporting lists, they know.” - 
CPW, DiskCo-A-5  
 
Once he had established homogeneous contacts across sites, the VP moved to the initial 
project phase, consisting mainly of training. Since people in Singapore site A were 
seasoned in Oracle, Japanese staff started to leverage these contacts:  
 
“And then we start to pull in there (in Japan - author) and conduct training for them by 
groups. And these people suddenly start to ring each other (i.e., DiskCo staff in Japan 
and Singapore - author). They will establish some kind of relationship there. And 
because they know that we are there to help them to do the conversion, to make them 
successful, the attitude is different.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5  
 
§ 9.2.3.3  Redundancy and Directness of Remote Contacts in the Far East  
 
“If I can't contact the person that I really want to talk to, I will try to catch somebody 
else whom I think may have the information. And that person may not work at that 
site. Let's say if I'm talking about Japan, I will contact somebody in Singapore. Just try 
out maybe somebody else who knows that information.” - JNL, Project Manager Data 
Conversion Team, Malaysia site A, DiskCo-F-1 
 
To people in the DiskCo’s Far East environment, remote collaboration came natural. Prior 
collaboration had established extensive contacts across sites. This fostered a climate of 
direct, informal communications, especially in the IT organization. We zoom here in on 
the fact that people knew - either personally or through contact lists - multiple colleagues 
at counterpart sites. They combined this contact redundancy with an emphasis on direct 
communications.  
Interviewees liked to establish multiple points of contacts at remote sites. This provided 
them with back-up channels in case their direct counterpart was not available (Burt, 1993; 
Meadows, 1996b). Through contact lists and visits, they got to know a local community, 
including management. A key user from Malaysia site A gives her perspective: 
 
“We need to know the name list of the supporting group from the other site: What are 
their names and what are their main projects and main areas that they are covering. 
And in their absence who would be the backup person. And also who are their bosses. 
I think the name list is very important.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
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Having redundant contacts at Singapore site A makes people in Malaysia less dependent 
on a single person. With time-pressed tasks, they can reach someone else when their 
primary point of contact is not available: 
 
“We have sometimes difficulty in getting them. Sometimes they have their own thing to 
do. And even through a call you might not be able get them. So we have to send them 
a note. At least in this company we are kind of advanced, we are equipped with all the 
Lotus Notes, and the phone lines so that we can get hold of them. If we can't get hold 
of their manager, we try to get hold of who is in charge in their office. So basically we 
don't really have much problem in that sense. In fact we do have good support from 
Singapore.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1  
 
Similarly, a key user in Finance from Singapore site A points out that she ‘roughly’ knows 
the organization. She can fall back on redundant contacts if need be: 
 
“If there is any issue we will contact the manager, that's the final person. If we cannot 
get anybody we will look for the manager. We know the local manager. (…) We know 
roughly the organization. Because I visited them before, so I know them, I know their 
manager, and who is doing what in their sections. So it's a sort of knowing whom to 
communicate to when I have any issues.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
Redundancy does not only mean that one person knows multiple persons at another site. It 
also means that people share experience locally so that when a remote call or email comes, 
they know how to help that person. A key user in the Material & System area from 
Singapore site A describes how local sharing enables people from her department to help 
remote counterparts in her absence. This is further reinforced by her practice of taking 
local colleagues along for visits to other sites. They establish rapport with remote 
counterparts that at a later moment when people must contact electronically. 
 
“Because my group is a very small group, we share everything. So that's why when 
sites are asking a question or they are asking for something, my people know what I 
want to give to them. Because I will normally discuss the problem with them even 
before they ask the question - they know what to do. So I have good people that work 
for me. (…) When I go for a site visit, I will sometimes bring them along, so they get to 
know all these people.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
Similarly, an IT team member from Singapore site A emphasizes two aspects of 
redundancy in the DiskCo organization. On the one hand, she knows multiple persons at 
another site. When people are on leave or for some reason not accessible, she can switch to 
that person’s manager or a local colleague. She knows these people from earlier visits. 
 
“Normally what I do is that if I write to this person (on leave - author), I will cc to 
his/her manager. Because his/her manager will know whether his staff is on leave or 
not. If it's an urgent matter normally they will ask another staff member to attend to it. 
I think it's important instead of just writing to a single person. If he or she is on a long 
vacation then your problem will not get solved. (…) Normally we know quite a few 
persons (at other sites - author), not just the person doing that module. They will 
introduce other people in their department to me also.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
On the other hand, different peers in her group know about her module. This local 
redundancy of knowledge helps people contacting the unit from outside. They have the 
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flexibility to talk to anyone for assistance, rather than being dependent on a single point of 
contact: 
 
“Right now we have more than one person in our department who knows the module 
so they can contact anybody else. Not like last time when we just started Oracle, I'm 
the only person who knows this module. So they got no one else to ask and had to 
wait for you the person to come back.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
For distributed work environments, this second point extends traditional notions of 
holographic organizing (Morgan, 1997). Redundancy of knowledge serves not only the 
local robustness of a system (Hutchins, 1990). It underpins choice and backup options for 
connections between a unit and its environment. 
 
Direct contact 
Interviewees emphasized the fact that communication lines between Singapore site A and 
local sites were usually short and direct. On an executive level, the VP from Singapore site 
A commented in previous sections that he worked directly with his IT directors in the Far 
East region. Similarly, on a staff level, people worked directly with their counterparts. One 
IT member from Singapore site A sketched her approach. She emphasizes that she does not 
contact her counterpart’s boss first. This would add a communications layer, and lengthen 
cycle times: 
 
“We don't go through layers. It's important, otherwise it would take a lot of time. If let's 
say the manager never attends to his emails, managers normally have a lot of emails. 
So you would be rather delaying things. (…) We talk to the person who is in charge of 
the module directly. We never go up to their boss.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Not only do people contact their counterpart - on staff level - directly (Figure 48, arrow A). 
If need be, they will connect directly to management of another site, without going through 
their local boss (Figure 48, arrow B).  
 
 
 
Figure 48 - Connecting across hierarchies 
 
We can further illustrate Figure 48, arrow A, i.e., lateral contact across hierarchies without 
managerial involvement. The Director Applications Development stresses that local IT 
staff and key users can contact her team in Singapore site A without management 
 Singapore 
IT 
IT 
Remote 
IT 
IT 
A 
B
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intervention. Similarly, she helps local directors without involvement of their common 
boss - the VP Information Technologies: 
 
“As for the local IT, they have the director who is overseeing it, and also a manager 
who's responsible for the implementation group. So when there is a need on the 
project management and coordination portion, then of course the manager will talk to 
me. And if there is a need for help in the respective units, they (local IT staff - author) 
are free to talk to each of them (Singapore site A core team - author) in any aspect 
when they need help. They are on modules like JPL for the GL module so anything 
concerning GL they (local IT - author) will just call him or send him a mail to ask 
questions. Sometimes even the key users they can consult them for anything.” - HHT, 
DiskCo-B-1 
 
An IT member of the core team in Singapore site A expands on Figure 48, arrow B. She 
comments: 
 
“We will contact whoever is in charge of that area. Then that is the manager, or SA or 
PA. So we don't really say that: “OK, if you are not at manager level, you don't contact 
the manager. We don't have that. So even at director level, if we need to contact the 
director we will contact the director. We don't really have to go by level. Like this level 
you need to contact within this level and then if you need to go to a higher level you 
must go through your manager and so on. We don't really practice that. I think that will 
be less efficient. Of course, when you contact a director you must put your director a 
copy in your mail so that your director or even higher manager know what's 
happening.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
While direct connecting across hierarchies seems more efficient, people run the risk of 
being left out. Unless the person quoted here sends a copy to her local boss in Singapore, 
the IT director remains unaware of what is going on. This is particularly a risk when 
multiple actors are involved and people communicate directly across sites. A concern 
related to that situation was aired by an IT project member from Singapore site A. He was 
responsible for coordinating IT support between Singapore site A and China. In that role, 
he worked with IT and users in Singapore and China. Sometimes he was left out of 
communication loops: 
 
“What happens is that normally I will try to get the expert from here [Singapore site A] 
and the expert from there [China] to talk. And I myself will receive a copy, and all the 
bosses are on copy. And there is a team role I would say. There is always a 
coordinator. I make sure they coordinate on all those issues. As I said earlier, 
sometimes I’m totally left out of the picture, because somehow there are too many 
people involved. It could just be a user department. They sent out a mail but forgot I’m 
supposed to be on copy for a certain kind of issue. And eventually this problem can go 
on for weeks without me knowing it, it’s possible. Maybe it’s initially, we are still 
learning, we make mistakes. So we try to make sure that it doesn’t happen.” - JPL, 
DiskCo-I-1  
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Knowing when to put people on copy requires judgment and skill. Too little cc-ing results 
in information asymmetries. Too much overburdens people who are only minimally 
involved in an issue. The same IT member reflects on this balancing act:45 
 
“Try to put people on copy so that they are aware of what is going on. Yet I think it’s 
not always possible. Sometimes for example when you write an email to VP, you can’t 
copy all these people [directors] because it may not be very effective. So that’s why 
I’m saying the communication skills of people at each level is important. Because a 
[director] may not write an email to a [VP] and send a cc to people at each level. 
Because it is not necessary for them [directors] to know sometimes at that moment. 
It’s only when they start to know what they want. I think that’s to say that the 
communication level of each leader is very very important.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
During the Oracle project, communications setup and cc-ing changed. Initially the 
interviewee with coordinator role expected direct emails from the persons he supported in 
China. Others locally involved, including bosses received a copy from that email. After 
turn live, local IT took on a primary support role. Consequently, the main contacts were 
between local users and IT. Our interviewee received in that stage only copies to remain 
aware of what is going on. 
 
“In an initial stage, during the system studies I said: “It's OK to go to me directly, but 
make sure that everybody is on copy”. Because it's quite difficult. (…) With email it's 
normally this way: to me comma whatever their own people there pop pop pop pop 
[interviewee points at chart], and cc to whoever is there at the last level, that's the 
way. But after we hand the system over to them, it's a different kind of support. They 
have to write to their own people, and put me on copy - it's the other way around.” - 
JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
Direct communications may leave some people unaware of communications. But is has 
many advantages over indirect linkages. We expanded on this topic in the theory section 
with the telephone game metaphor when discussing Meadows’ (1996) work. The game’s 
intentional use of indirect exchanges illustrates settings where people communicate 
through liaisons or persons with hierarchical roles. By doing so, they become dependent on 
the ‘middle man’. His capacities and interpretations affect overall communication loops. 
An IT member from Singapore site A reflects on the hypothetical situation that they would 
have to communicate with someone via her boss (see also Figure 48). She expresses 
concern for speed, message integrity and communication volume: 
 
“If you have to follow the hierarchy kind of communication, first thing you must tell 
your manager what's happening, and then wait for your manager to communicate with 
another party, and then come back again. I find that is less effective and there may be 
some missing communications. So maybe like when I tell you 10 point, and depends 
on how you interpret the 10 points. So when you talk to the other person, you talk 
based on your interpretation, so there may be a lot of communications.” - OBT, 
DiskCo-C-1 
                                                 
45 The interviewee used an example from the military to illustrate his point on multi-actor 
hierarchical communications in a distributed setting. This was applied to a civil 
organizational setting in the interview. We use here only role descriptions related to the 
latter context. 
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Middle men may color communications and add to task uncertainty. This, in turn, triggers 
more exchanges for clarification (Daft & Lewin, 1984; Van de Ven et al., 1976), and taxes 
the multi-node communications channeling (if it is retained).  
 
§ 9.2.3.4  The Role of Key Users  
Bridging the context from users and IT is traditionally considered a challenge (Newman & 
Robey, 1992). As an example of functional diversity, these groups are believed to work in 
distinct ‘thought worlds’ (Dougherty, 1992). This complicates cross-functional 
connections that are so important for implementing an Information System. To counteract 
possible concerns, DiskCo assigned the role of ‘key user’ for different functions. Persons 
with this role are usually senior users. They represent their user community, and act as an 
exclusive liaison to IT. In the Oracle project, they receive extensive training in the new 
system, and work closely with IT project staff in the so-called core team. 
 
Key users have one foot in the user community, and one in the IT community. This dual 
inclusion supports their role as boundary crossers (Engeström et al., 1995; Tyre & von 
Hippel, 1997). Their added value is threefold: remote, locally, and a mixture of these two.  
First, remotely, a key user participates in a distributed network of individuals with a 
similar role at another site. Leading in that community are key users from Singapore site 
A. Like the example on Japan in the previous section shows, they train and support local 
key users throughout the implementation process. The Director Applications Development 
(HHT) describes how key users from her site are seen as role models for other Far East 
sites: 
 
“There is another role that key users have - especially those from [Singapore site A]. I 
think the various sites - especially the drive sites - they really look quite a bit upon the 
[Singapore site A] key user group. They (key users from Singapore site A - author) are 
also like the lead key user: they help the local key user to do the thing they need to 
do, like understanding the system. Because they are the people who know the 
business better. So they will also advise them, why you need to do it this way, why we 
have to change the way of doing. (…) So they will also advise the various key user 
groups in the local sites - [Malaysia site A], China - on user procedures. So they also 
communicate between key users themselves, to learn from one another more on the 
business aspect of the application usage.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Key users find exchanges within their distributed community easier than working with IT. 
When they talk to counterparts, they experience little novelty because of the similar work 
environments. They lack this common base with IT. Working across functional boundaries 
implies facing novel terms and putting effort into effective communications. People 
attempt to avoid that for regular communications:  
 
“[Interactions between Finance people] are on the same wave length. As finance 
people we talk to finance easier. If we talk with IT, we may not really understand some 
of the technical things that they mention. So it will be better that the patterns of 
communication go by IT to IT people, and finance to finance.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
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Globally distributed key user communities do not exist for all functions. Mainly for 
Finance and Distribution, which are the most internationally oriented and standardized 
functions. Manufacturing in the Far East differs from the US. The former is mass-
production oriented, while the latter concentrates on design and test production runs. This 
operational diversity makes it less useful to foster exchanges internationally and impose 
guidelines (Goodman & Darr, 1998): 
 
“For manufacturing not as much (contact), but for financial yes. They have a corporate 
finance group. And they also have a financial systems group (…) They are the ones 
who communicate to all the different finance key users on standards and guidelines 
people should follow. This concerns financial guideline that are related to using Oracle 
ERP. It's only on the financial side. Because manufacturing their business is quite 
different. Theirs (in the US - author) is more on design center, very minimum on 
manufacturing, so there is a marginal guideline that they have imposed. Except maybe 
for the distribution site, the order entry, the shipment part. That one they also have a 
US system group that will standardize the procedure of how drives should be shipped, 
what are the procedures to follow, on things like credit check, receivables. There is 
some central body who governs some regulation. So it (international networking - 
author) is really for finance and distribution.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1  
 
Second, key users have a local role, as liaisons between users and IT. We expand in this 
section on that role. To start with, we look at the selection of key users, and their early 
involvement in implementation projects. The Director Applications Development from 
Singapore site A comments: 
 
“They (key users - author) started almost together with IT, about 2 months after we 
started the project. Because we need to get the management to identify who are the 
people who can be involved in the project. Although they are not full time. But they 
need to dedicate quite a bit of their time to involve because they have to go for 
training and they have to attend all the meetings when we do the studies (like 
Conference Room Pilot - author). So about 2 months after we started, we formed the 
key user group. Their role is to be the coordinator between the IT group and their own 
user department. They learn the package, and they know their business well.” - HHT, 
DiskCo-B-1  
 
As linking pins, key users have multiple roles. Some oriented towards IT, some towards 
the users they represent. In the initial phase of the implementation, they helped IT 
understand the business background of the implementation process. For users they 
conducted training: 
 
“They (key users - author) help us to understand the business process better. So 
basically that is the role of the key user group. And they need to subsequently do the 
user training for their own user department before the turn on.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Initially, IT and not the key users trained end users. One problem was that IT staff lacked 
insight in the users’ business environment. When they conducted classes for e.g. users in 
Finance, they obviously knew about the technology but not the specifics of using the 
system in that operational context. This made the training more difficult for users and IT 
alike. Key users on the other hand became very experienced in Oracle while carrying their 
departmental background with them. They could easily relate to Finance end users and pre-
contextualize technology concepts for this group. Says a key user in Finance from 
Singapore site A:  
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“Initially it's not like that. Initially we are just the key user. Each department will 
identify their key users and they will attend the business test and so on. And they find 
it much easier for the key user to train their users. They know what are the accounting 
entries. Because for the IT guys they will not understand the accounting background 
and so on.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
From an IT perspective, training by key users was not only easier since they did not have 
to connect in detail to the users’ operational context. It also allowed them to channel their 
support towards a limited number of key users, instead of working with larger user groups. 
Key users function as representatives for their user department and offer a single, 
economical point of contact for IT. An IT member of the Singapore site A core team 
comments: 
 
“We don't really train the local key user. Because the key users also attended Oracle 
courses. So we only identify a few key users. Because we have a lot of users. So the 
key users also attended the Oracle courses conducted by Oracle. And some of them 
are working full time on the Oracle project. So they themselves also have a lot of 
hands on experience. So for the first site converted they are the training team, they 
really conduct the user training for the end user. And IT only support them. We went 
there, we support them in the sense that in case they found anything like system 
problem, or any technical questions then we will try to give them some opinion or 
advice.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Key users are also charged with conducting the Conference Room Pilot as part of the 
implementation trajectory. They coordinate, filter and channel user comments towards IT. 
Says the director: 
 
“When we do the Conference Room Pilot they are the people who are there to do the 
things. Then when we finalize the gap, when we go into the detailed study and design 
of the individual gaps, then the respective key users involved will have to give input 
and coordinate and get input for us from the various users to finalize the design.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-1  
 
Later in the implementation trajectory, key users take care of testing, and voice user 
concerns or requests: 
 
“They are also involved in testing the project when it's done and the later part when 
we do the business test, [i.e.] the integration test. So they are also the people who do 
the test itself. Even now when some of the project sites have already have turned on, 
they still act as the coordinator between the IT group and the user group. So if they 
face any problems, or see that there is a need to enhance or improve, they will be the 
channel that the user will go through, and they are the people who normally talk with 
IT. 
Some of them are able to dedicate full time doing the project. In fact there is one we 
call them Material Systems group (…). They know the material process quite well. 
They are dedicated to look at all the system-related aspects of the business process. 
They act as the coordinator between IT and the end user. So they work very closely 
with the team here on testing system features, test out the enhancement that was 
made and give feedback on what users want.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Third and finally, key users at sites other than Singapore site A have a role in the user 
community that mixes local and remote elements. On the one hand, they know local 
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operations very well, and work closely with colleagues in their department. On the other 
hand, within the distributed community of key users, they have built relationships with 
people from Singapore site A. Early in the project, they received training from that site. 
And during an implementation trajectory local key users could escalate concerns from their 
users to issues through Singapore site A.  
 
A key user in Material & System (Singapore site A) talked with us about the way she 
connects with counterparts, and how roles are divided. Being part of the core team there, 
she is the spider in the web of key users with similar roles throughout the Far East region. 
She points out that her counterparts are closely connected to both their local context and 
herself. Participating daily in their own context, they know the local team and operations 
very well: 
  
“I find that my counterparts are well versed and they are in charge of this. The 
receiving supervisor, store supervisor and also the shipping supervisor are reporting 
to them. So I can talk to them (local key users - author), and they know the operation 
very well. And when these supervisors have a problem, they also feed back to my 
counterpart. So when I talk to them (local key users - author), it's the same thing as 
that I would be dealing with the end-user.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
At the same time, these people are embedded in a distributed network of key user with 
similar positions. These people know each other from visits and working together on the 
Oracle implementation:  
 
“Most of my counterparts understand me and I can understand them very well. 
Because they are also the core people that I communicate with. They have to 
communicate with the end user again. (…) When I talk to them they have to explain to 
the end user on how to do it in detail.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1  
 
Local key users play an important role for the person from Singapore. They are the first 
point of contact for local users and filter their issues before they reach Singapore site A. 
This economizes remote contacts between key users. 
 
“When users from other sites report any problem to my counterpart, he will check 
whether there is a general problem or he can offer a solution. If not, if he doesn't 
know what to do and needs help, then he will come back to my site. (…) Not for every 
problem people must come to me. Because if let's say it's an operations problem, then 
they need to change their process. I mean my counterpart can make the decision on 
that.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1  
 
When locally an issue arises, users contact first their key user. If more resources are 
needed, local key users escalate to their counterpart in Singapore site A. As a community 
coordinator, the key user in Singapore can leverage the network of key users to assess 
whether the issue has been faced before, and how people could solve it: 
 
“They (local key users - author) contact me first. Because maybe we have 
encountered already at [Singapore site A] the issue that they encounter. Or another 
site has encountered the issue and knows how to go about it. So the first thing they 
normally do is to contact me. Because sometimes it is not an IT issue at all. That's the 
way you do it. I am also a user, so normally they will contact me first” - JLL, DiskCo-
G-1 
 272
 
We expand on these contact patterns and procedures in the next sections. 
 
§ 9.2.3.5  Contact Patterns Between Local Users and Central IT 
In this section, we zoom in on contact patterns between IT and users, both during and after 
conversion trajectories. We focus in particular on connections between on the one hand IT 
teams in Singapore site A and Malaysia site A (data conversion). And on the other hand 
local IT and user communities. These IT sites were important as regional, central HQ’s for 
the Oracle ERP project. They supervised local implementations, and functioned as linking 
pin between local sites and the US. We analyze this linking role towards the end of this 
section, and conclude with risks associated with Singapore site A’s central role. 
 
To start with, we zoom in on situations where central IT (from the sites mentioned) 
initiates contact with local users. It seemed that one of the following two options was 
adopted. First, central IT worked through the local IT organization. They maintained close 
contact as a distributed IT community, and used that for collaboration with local users. For 
instance, the VP Information Technologies mentioned that he asked local IT to prepare 
users for the implementation project at their site:  
 
“For the key user level, I use the IT person at the site to communicate with them, 
prepare them, and go through the schedule: when we should bring a PC, upgrade the 
PC's, when the users should go for training, and how to plan according to that.” - 
CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Similarly, a member from the data conversion team in Malaysia site A outlines that she 
relies on local IT to work with users. Her team needs information from the local users to 
prepare the data conversion process: 
 
“In terms of data conversion I would say (…) the local site helps us to coordinate with 
the local users. So for us we do not meet with the local users. The local IT personnel 
are the contact point for us. (…) The IT staff will email or call us. They are the in-
between person. We do not contact directly with the local users. It's always through 
the local IT. We don't train them (local IT - author), because at this stage we only 
need them to help us, to provide us the information we need. We need them to be a 
contact point with the users.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
A second mode starts with the same central IT organization but works through key users at 
their site. These persons, in turn, contact their remote counterparts (also key users). The 
Director Applications Development explains that this contacting mode is used when her IT 
group must assess the feasibility of implementing a standard practice across Far East sites. 
She stresses the fact that key users know their counterparts’ setting. This makes it easier 
for them to receive and coordinate input from the local user groups:  
 
“Sometimes on certain things we want commonality, so I will tell the [Singapore site A] 
key users: “OK please sign up with the other key user sites whether they agree on the 
way we want to do things.” So I let the key user here do the necessary 
communication. If it is let's say [Singapore site A] initiated then normally we will get 
the [Singapore site A] key users to try to talk to the [local] key users. Because they 
know the business, they have a common language of the things they do. So we will 
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trust that the [Singapore site A] user will get the right feedback. And then we will just 
want to have one communication channel to know what things need to be done.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Applying the first mode here would mean that local IT works with local key users, and 
relay that information back to Singapore site A. There, the director’s IT team would have 
to consolidate feedback. The problem here is coordination of the distributed user 
community. Using their networking capital seems more appropriate here than relying on 
IT’s network, the first option. The director points to this notion when commenting on 
choosing between either mode:  
 
“I think it all depends on which is the best way they think is to get things done, and 
fast. It depends on the problem I would say.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
To conclude, central IT initiates contact with local users in two ways: through the local IT 
organization when the issue concerns IT related tasks. This leverages the capability of their 
distributed community. Alternatively, central IT works locally with key users on more 
business oriented topics. This benefits from the user relationships across sites. Either way 
relies on homogeneous remote contact. Direct contact between central IT and local users 
(heterogeneous) hardly occurs.  
 
Vice versa contact 
We now look at the reverse situation where users contact IT in Singapore site A or 
Malaysia site A for support or change requests. Sometimes, these questions are escalated to 
the US for approval or expertise from there. 
 
The Director Applications Development distinguishes two trajectories local users follow to 
resolve issues. First, they liaise with their key user counterparts in Singapore site A. These 
people may decide to contact IT members of the core team there. Second, local users may 
go to their own IT unit. From there, an issue may be escalated to IT members at Singapore 
site A. Generally speaking, the first option applies to business type of problems that are 
discussed almost constantly in distributed user communities. It also includes general 
questions on how to use Oracle ERP. The second mode is adopted when issues concern the 
technical infrastructure.  
 
The director describes the two routes users may follow: 
 
“Local users can either talk to the key users here (Singapore site A - author) and then 
through them they communicate back to us (IT team, Singapore site A - author). 
Sometimes when the local key user have problems on certain things that they face 
that they want to clarify, they will either chat with [Singapore site A] key users, if not 
they will go to their local IT group. And from there then the local IT group if they can't 
advise them, then they will come back to the core team for advice. So [people use] 
both channels.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1  
 
For issues related to the IT infrastructure, people usually talk to their local IT first. Direct 
contact between local users and central IT happens only on rare occasions:  
 
“If let's say the problems are initiated from the remote sites, then most likely I would 
say they will want to talk to their local IT. In fact they are advised to talk to their local 
 274
IT first, to see whether local IT can advise them on what to do. If they are not too 
sure, then they will come to the core IT group for advise.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
For the first option, an IT member of the director’s core team stresses the role of ex ante 
communications in user communities. Since people maintain a regular pace of exchanges 
with their remote colleagues, it is easy for them to discuss issues they are facing. He gives 
an example of users in shipping departments in China and Singapore. When they face an 
operational anomaly, they talk to each other remotely before escalating to IT. If need be, 
users can formalize their issue in the Lotus Notes issues database. Then more resources are 
pulled in, which may even culminate in requesting patches from Oracle if there is a bug:  
 
“What happens is that normally complaints come from the users. So in the first place 
they will communicate in the users community, because they are talking to each other 
every day. [Example] Because they have shipments: “I have a shipment to you, did 
you receive it or not?” “No my shipment record never came in.” “Let's wait for another 
day”. Then they will say: “It's still not there? OK, let me call IT”. IT may not know 
about the issue at that stage. They start to call IT, so the group gets bigger. Their 
bosses will be on copy too with this kind of problem. They will say: “OK let's put this 
as an issue if they (IT - author) still can't solve it”.  
And someone must have ownership of this issue - a person responsible for it. Could 
be anyone. And then the participants in this issue will be the people in this group. (…) 
China will contact the people here (in Singapore - author) because the data center is 
here, all the systems are stored remotely. And sometimes if there is a systems 
problem, even before we put it as an issue we try to talk to the DBA (database 
administrator - author). And they say "OK, maybe just check Oracle". Maybe there is a 
bug, maybe we need (…) patches”. (…) So once the patch comes we close the case 
and that's it.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
A key user in Inventory Control confirms that they liaise first within their own distributed 
community before contacting IT. Her group maintains close contact with key users in 
Singapore site A, who will escalate an issue to the US if need be: 
 
“We knew all the inventory control staff there (Singapore site A - author) and also the 
project staff, and some of the IT people. We do not have weekly meetings with our 
supporting group (at Singapore HQ - author), but in this project the key users are 
expected to really work with their counterparts on their own before we - the key users 
- post a problem and highlight it to IT. So what we do is we call a meeting internally 
(…). The key users are supposed to call their counterparts and find out the details. 
(…) I would say the conference calls with our counterparts in Singapore are more 
regular compared to the weekly meetings here (cross functional meetings with other 
core team members - author). Because the weekly meeting is supposed to be the main 
means to provide peer updates, and the conference calls and Lotus Notes with our 
counterparts are supposed to come up with some solutions. (…) We normally do not 
talk to key users in the United States. We liaise with Singapore.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
Another Finance key user from the same site points at the importance of homogeneous 
remote contacts. She liaises almost exclusively with her Finance counterparts in Singapore. 
The same applies to IT core team members from Singapore and Malaysia. Issues that 
cannot be resolved in the user community are locally escalated to IT. Either key users in 
Malaysia contact their local IT, or their user counterparts in Singapore site A liaise with IT 
members of the core team: 
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“Our key users in finance they will liaise with the [Singapore site A] key users to get 
things understood and to test on the Oracle data. That is on the finance side how we 
liaise with IT. And as for IT (…) they will liaise with IT on the technical side. We only 
contact the core team on the finance side. We don't contact to the IT. Because this is 
an arrangement that was made: IT will contact with IT, then key users will contact with 
key users. (…) we don't really communicate with the [Singapore site A] IT people. It's 
our core team IT people who communicate with them. As a key user, like I'm from the 
finance side, you are used to communicate with finance only. So if there is anything 
that they cannot resolve they will bring it to the core team and our IT director will then 
communicate with IT there” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1  
 
If users must contact IT, they do that locally. Direct contact between say a user in China 
site A and the IT team in Singapore site A rarely occurs. Local IT has the advantage of 
physical proximity to the user community. They know local staff and operational specifics 
more extensively than central IT. To give an example, the VP information Technologies 
describes the task division between local IT and his team in Singapore site A:  
 
“(…) It is their (local IT staff - author) responsibility to do the setup because some of 
the information in there is site specific. They are the ones who are near to the user, 
they are the ones who are going to get all the information. But the people here (core 
team at Singapore HQ - author) will train them and when they finish it, they always 
come back to us and say "OK we have done this one". It is part of our checklist before 
we do the turn live, that somebody here will do the check on all the setup that they 
make. So that is very consistently applied to the rest” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Later in the project, local IT filters user requests before they reach Singapore site A. This 
minimizes remote problem solving, and reduces the central IT team’s working load:  
 
“If users have any problem, our procedure is that they should report to the local IT 
first. So the local IT is supposed to do some investigation, at least front line 
investigation, and see whether they can resolve the problem or not. Of course if they 
still have no clue and don't know what to do (...) then they will come to us. Then we 
will try to help out from there.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1  
 
Reducing the workload for Singapore site A became important in the middle of the Oracle 
roll out trajectory. Involvement in new implementation projects absorbed most of their 
resources. For that reason, local IT became responsible for user issues that emerged after 
the turn live date. The same team member explains this policy and gives an example for a 
request emerging in Malaysia:  
 
“Let's say users in Malaysia have a request. They will contact their local IT. The local 
IT will have to see whether this request is a genuine request or not. Some requests 
may not be necessary. For genuine request, the user will have to query the request in 
the IT project manager database. And then they will post it for approval.  
Initially our team (Singapore site A - author) is to take care of the Oracle conversions. 
We provided support, and did also development. But later on, because of limited 
resources in our department, we don't provide support. We focus on development. 
After every turn on, we have a handover to the local IT. So the local IT will have to 
provide subsequent support. But of course if they think they need our help we will also 
be involved in helping them. But our focus now is really the development. Except for 
those sites that have not yet turned on Oracle. When they have any doubts or any 
questions, they will come to us.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
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Another member of the IT core team in Singapore site A confirms this view. Up to the turn 
live date, his group provided direct support to local users to expedite problem solving. 
Afterwards, a layered contact model was adopted where local IT has a front line role:  
 
“It is kind of a convention to contact the local IT before they (users - author) directly 
contacted the project group. This is what we expected in case of media (Singapore 
site A - author). After we implemented media that is the first site to go live, we 
requested the users to contact first the local IT and get the problem solved before 
they contact us. But during the project implementation and customization we used to 
directly talk to the users on the phone.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
Far East and US sites 
Involvement of US sites may be needed for various reasons. Sometimes, local sites have 
requests that require approval from the IT organization in the US. Or specific technical 
expertise is only available there. These issues are usually aggregated in Singapore site A, 
through user or IT communities. From there, IT staff members or key users connect to their 
counterparts in the States. Vice versa, people in the US may need information on Far East 
sites. They connect in a similar way: through Singapore site A. One key user from that site 
comments on this communication channeling: 
 
“If they (counterparts at Far East sites - author) encounter any questions, normally 
they will write to me. I'll get my people or some US guy, IT or anyone to find a solution 
for it. (…) I have a counterpart in the US too. Because I used to work in inventory 
control department, and on US side they do have their own inventory control 
department. So sometimes when I need information from them for certain things, I will 
contact them. Same thing if they need any information from Far East they will contact 
me.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
Direct contact between local Far East sites - e.g. in China - and the US seldomly occurs. 
Local users for instance prefer to liaise within their own counterpart in Singapore site A. 
Or they talk to their local IT. As far as US sites are concerned, they experience too many 
barriers as a key user from Singapore site A explains:  
 
“I mean the first thing is the time difference, second thing may be the language, and 
so on. Maybe some team manager they will call for some other issues. But for system 
issues and so on they will usually call me. Sometimes they (local users - author) will 
contact their IT, depends on what type of problems they encounter: is there a system 
problem, or is it to understand the program, so it depends. There is not really a 
procedure on this. Even for us, sometime we will contact local IT, sometimes local IT 
will ask us to contact the US IT and so. So there is no very clear procedure - we don't 
really have a procedure.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1  
 
In a similar way, users in Singapore site A prefer to liaise with their IT instead of going 
directly to the IT organization in the US. People communicate locally across functional 
communities. Bridging functional boundaries is easier when the counterpart is familiar 
with the local site (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b). Remote cross-functional contact would 
imply combining cross-functionality, and distance, i.e., unfamiliarity of another person 
with local operations. On the other hand, people seem to maintain close remote contacts 
within their own community at little effort. Commonality of their background makes it 
apparently easy to connect remotely (Grant, 1996b). A key user from Singapore site A 
comments on her experience with these topics: 
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“If we got a problem we will contact our local IT first. If our local IT cannot resolve it, 
then we will go straight to the US. We seldomly go straight to the US IT. Unless they 
want us to feedback and I mean some more supporting, then we will go straight to 
them and they will liaise with the US Finance. (…) When you talk to the local IT here, 
they understand the problem, it's much easier then. So that's why when we have 
system issues we communicate to the local IT. Then they will communicate to the US 
site. For IT we'll go through IT. But for users issues we will go straight to our 
counterpart related to Finance in [DiskCo US HQ].” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
Risks associated with the central role of Singapore site A  
The IT organization at Singapore site A adopted a central role in the Far East conversion 
project. The team there was responsible for implementing the system at various site in 
Singapore, and one site in Japan. Moreover, they assisted other sites in the region, and 
liaised with the US. The site was both a reference role for expertise and an almost 
exclusive gateway between the region and US sites. Figure 49 shows their position as a 
central node between Far East and US sites. The white and black dots represent sites. The 
connecting lines are communications and reporting linkages. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49 - Central role of Singapore site A 
 
 
Because of its role, communications in the Far East IT organization were mostly between 
local sites and Singapore site A, and not between local sites. On a staff level, people 
connected to Singapore site A for IT resources like applications development and the data 
center. On a management level, local IT directors reported to the VP Information 
Technologies in Singapore. Together, this implies that most connections are between local 
sites and Singapore site A in a ‘hub and spokes’ manner. Local sites operate independently 
as the Director Applications Development points out:  
 
“At different sites there will be different sets of issues. So to me, the sites are all 
independent. That means if we are talking about issues only in China then I would of 
course only communicate with the China group. It's quite independent in a sense.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
Later on she extended this purely ‘hub and spokes’ view. Some sites do contact directly if 
they manufacture similar products. Their common business requirements and IT 
infrastructures make it useful to interact and learn (Goodman & Darr, 1998): 
 
Far East sites
Singapore 
site A
US sites
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“The 2 China IT groups they communicate very frequently because they are under the 
same IT manager. So I think they also do share resources. Then I think the rest is 
mainly communication to [Singapore site A] itself. I would say they don't communicate 
with one another. Because if my boss calls a meeting he will normally involve all the 
IT organizations. If there are problem - [China site A] they talk directly to [Malaysia 
site A]. Because they are doing both the same desktop hard drive. So I think there are 
a lot of similarities, also in certain business requirements. So I think they do talk quite 
a bit. (...) This is the normal type of communication because we are under the same 
boss and they have similar business requirements. So it is really not only pertaining to 
the Oracle conversion. Even for other application groups where they have problems 
they also talk.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
The central positioning of Singapore site A in terms of resources and networking brings its 
risks too. Far East sites depend on the node’s availability and capacity to meet their needs. 
Similarly, US sites rely on the site for information on other sites in the Far East region. 
From Burt’s (1993) perspective, structural holes exist between sites that increase the 
importance of DiskCo site A. At the same time, they increase the vulnerability of the 
overall collaborative network. The core team in Singapore acquired expertise on Oracle 
conversions from US sites, external consultants, and trial and error. Subsequently, local IT 
units and key user groups depended critically on the core team to make their own 
implementation successful. Their demands for assistance taxed at times the capacity of the 
core team: 
 
“They (local IT - author) have to rely on 1 of the 6 of my core team members to do 
tasks like gap analysis, reviewing, testing, and whatever they did. So the bottleneck 
can be the core team. We started with 4. I was not given the reason on how many I 
want at that time. I decided that I wanted to have 4 at that time. I thought that is a 
manageable number. We tried to manage with the resources that were given to me, 
and then try to plan out the project based on priorities.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Not only could the existing core team be over demanded. There was the risk of core team 
members leaving the project, not unlikely in the volatile IT labor market of the late 1990s. 
The Director Applications Development explains that she did not have back up for any of 
the core team members. This decision was made after considering pros and cons of a 
redundant team of experts. Speaking for redundancy was the central role of the core team 
for the Far East region. On the other hand, a larger team would be more difficult to 
manage. It would also increase communications volume and complexity.  
 
“Sometimes I do see a problem, like if one person is going to leave and we have an 
issue on an area (...) and nobody can back it up. Of course if I can double the size of 
the team, then for each module I have 2 persons doing it. That could be ideal but then 
the bad point is that the team is getting too big, so it may be also hard to manage 
them. (…) So there are pros and cons. And then it is always the case if too many 
people are involved, I think the communication is always the problem. If there are too 
many parties involved, it's even more important that they have to communicate to one 
another to be able to get things done.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
§ 9.2.4  Task Contingencies  
Coordination and control theory distinguishes several contingencies that drive the need for, 
and use of integrating mechanisms (Kraut & Streeter, 1995; Malone & Crowston, 1994; 
Van de Ven et al., 1976). This section assesses the impact of some contingencies in the 
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DiskCo case: uncertainty and novelty, work unit size, and operational differences (see also 
Figure 37). It also features a contingency that has - to our knowledge - not yet received 
attention in literature or empirical research: the criticality and urgency of tasks. In this case 
it played an important role. The Oracle implementation was a time-pressed project with 
vital importance for DiskCo’s operational performance and competitive positioning.  
 
§ 9.2.4.1  Uncertainty and Novelty  
Information processing needs are related to task uncertainty and novelty (Scott, 1990). 
When people encounter tasks that exceeds their current set of competencies, they start 
contacting more experienced experts. Here, we assess the impact of task uncertainty and 
novelty on communication patterns in a distributed project. At the beginning of the 
conversion projects in the Far East, Singapore site A faced the challenge of implementing 
an application that was completely novel to them. This triggered their dependence on US 
teams that had started much earlier.  
 
During the initial phase of the Far East project, regular triple site teleconferences were 
held. At that time, the Singapore site A had a lot of questions and issues on which it 
needed input from the US and Europe. For instance, the setup of Far East operations 
required customizations to the Oracle application. These small projects had to done by the 
US since Singapore did not yet have sufficient know-how. Obviously, these dependencies 
had to be coordinated. 
 
“During the first year when we first started launching the Far East project, we had 
almost weekly teleconferences (with US and European counterparts - author). We 
discussed issue that are affecting all the different parties. And sometimes we have 
issue and then we need some advice and guidance from the US. And we brought up 
and discuss so that each party can give their opinions on that. And then we also have 
conferenced to do prioritization on the projects (small ones for customizations to 
Oracle - author) that need to be implemented. Especially those that are required by 
the Far East but need to be done by US counterparts.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
The kick-off phase of a project seems to lead to direct communication patterns (Galbraith, 
1973). People need real time contact to bring up and discuss issues. In a distributed project, 
this translates into phone calls and teleconferences. The manager of the Malaysian data 
conversion team mentioned: “What we normally do is we have a teleconference when we 
start (a local project - author)” (DiskCo-F-1). 
 
Underlying these communication needs is an increased level of dependence. Task 
uncertainty and novelty imply that people are responsible for a job that exceeds the know-
how they have accumulated so far. A sort of vacuum or knowledge under pressure emerges 
that urges people to pull in resources from outside. JLL, key user from Singapore site A, 
explained that she connected to her counterpart in the US to resolve issues related to her 
Oracle module:  
 
“I contacted the US for issues that were special to me. I don't know how to resolve the 
problem, that's why I need to contact them for advice.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
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An IT colleague form the same site pointed out that initially they depended on the US for 
designing customizations that were too complicated for their current level of experience. 
As time went by, they became more familiar with the Oracle application and modification 
process. Accumulation of expertise reduced the under pressure and thus dependence on the 
US: 
 
“Because we are very new in Oracle for those very complex customizations, we have 
the help from the US to do them for us. At [Singapore site A] we only pick up the 
simple customizations, but as experience goes on, now we are doing development for 
some of the complex processes also.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Novelty stretches the time people need for accomplishing a task. They cannot yet focus on 
just accomplishing a job, but must learn how to do it. This delayed early implementations 
in the Far East. Once people became more experienced, they develop routines (Pentland & 
Rueter, 1994; Stinchcombe, 1990). These compress work cycles:  
 
“Through all these experiences we learn. Every plant that we convert, we encounter 
some issues. So as we move forwards, a lot of these things we encountered before, 
we know exactly what the issue is and how to resolve it. And that is why initially our 
schedule to us is aggressive. But as we bring up our knowledge, we know that we can 
make it. Because then your life cycle, through your training, your learning curve, the 
time taken is much shorter.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
§ 9.2.4.2  Work Unit Size 
The size of a work unit refers to the number of people or organizational units involved in a 
single activity, like a project. In DiskCo’s Oracle project, geographical distribution of 
implementation site led to a larger number of participating units (not necessarily people). If 
DiskCo had operated a huge plant in Singapore, the project would have demanded huge 
local departments, but only one of each. With distributed operations, each site needed its 
own IT and non-IT departments. This increased the number of project contributors.  
HHT described that local IT is responsible for their own implementation. They represent in 
a sense a layer between the core team in Singapore site A and local users. According to 
HHT, the larger number of parties involved in the project enhances coordinating activities: 
 
“The local IT is the main coordinator for their projects, because it is their country. So 
the core team (HHT’s team in Singapore site A - author) acts more or less as a 
resource, as a consultant to them a lot of time. Of course we try to tell them what are 
things to watch out for, things like that. But it all depends on how they want things to 
be done, and what are the requirements that they need. So I would say that there is 
more coordination to be done. Because there is one more channel, one more party to 
deal with.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
The scale of the Oracle project increased the importance of formal coordination modes. 
The myriad of parties called for extensive planning information so that they knew what 
was expected from them. More formal communication patterns would ensure coherence in 
such a large scale undertaking. Looking back, HHT admitted that she had preferred more 
comprehensive planning and more formal communications. Maybe because of the project’s 
novelty, people sustained a somewhat informal mode of operating that did not fit its scale: 
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“Maybe we can build up a more formal type of communication channel. Because so far 
what I have seen it's really quite an informal way. In certain cases if we can do it in a 
more formal way then sometimes we can get things done better. People can also 
expect what needs to be done in a more formal way. I would say the problem I have is 
when I was first putting on the project I didn't really know what to expect. And then a 
lot of things is like: we do one step and then just take ahead one step of what needs 
to be done. So if I had an opportunity to do it again, of course with my experience I 
have, definitely we want to have a more formal type of planning in the sense that we 
can have a better, complete plan on all the activities that need to be done. So that 
each site that is responsible for doing certain tasks is better informed beforehand. So 
I think that is something that I want to do.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
A key user from Malaysia site A confirms HHT’s point of view. She explained that 
elaborate planning before the actual conversion reduces complexity and coordination 
efforts during subsequent phases: 
 
“The key lessons that I learnt from this project is that whenever you want to do a 
project of this big scale, we have to plan it very well. Because a good planning can 
avoid a lot of problems, and can eliminate some of the issues from occurring. That is 
the first thing that I learnt, that we must work on a detailed plan.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
Finally, size impacts the role of management. Supposing that managers’ span of control is 
fixed, larger projects demand more management involvement. In the case of DiskCo, CPW 
observed that the scale of the Oracle project had changed his role. Before this project, he 
was used to smaller ones that did not demand close involvement: 
 
“Last time with the smaller project, I don't really have to be involved. (…)It was on a 
small scale, which means you only need a manager and a team to work with them 
(users - author) directly. We don't even need to know anything at all. (…) And my 
involvement used to be (…) neglectable.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
With the Oracle conversions, the project scope became much larger. It involved multiple 
parties and sites, all working within a single global planning. While local directors were 
responsible for their implementations, an additional management layer was needed to 
oversee everything on a meta level, i.e., on a regional and global scale (Penrose, 1959): 
 
“When you come to a global project like this, you have to have a person to oversee 
the whole thing. Because everybody oversees only their part. I'm another layer on top 
who sees the important things. Not all the details, but I can see everything. And I think 
that helps a lot.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
§ 9.2.4.3  Operational Differences and Commonality  
For years, DiskCo sites around the world had run their local business and IT operation in 
their own way. IT departments adapted their version of MANMAN to user needs. 
Financial information systems were setup according to government regulations in countries 
like Malaysia, China and Thailand. The Oracle project changed all that. DiskCo top 
management had a vision of globally integrated operations and information systems. This 
would accelerate product life cycles and supply chains, and make the company more 
competitive. Says HHT: “(…) The non-IT management try to emphasize a lot of 
commonality” (DiskCo-B-1).  
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At some point, the push for commonality would have to meet the reality of a multi-site 
company with diverse operations. This section explores the nature and impact of 
operational diversity in the context of the Oracle project. We discuss first diversity 
between the US and Far East, and continue with differences within the Far East region. 
Towards the end of the section, we pay brief attention to diversity and remote support. 
 
 
Far East - US sites 
Diversity between the US and Far East is caused by the fact that the former focuses on 
R&D, while the latter deals with large scale manufacturing. The difference surfaced when 
US sites assisted the Far East with customizations. IT staff from Singapore site A and 
Malaysia site A tried to explain - often remotely - their local situation. This was hard to 
grasp for their US counterparts. JNL from Malaysia site A: 
 
 “I guess maybe one of the differences is because in terms of our DiskCo business in 
the US, they are more on the Research & Development side, whereas in the Far East 
here we are more in the manufacturing kind of business. So they may not fully 
understand our way of business, and we may not understand their environment there. 
So sometimes when we ask some questions, they may not be able to visualize what is 
the scenario that we are working on. So that could explain why sometimes we need to 
make sure we ask the right questions.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
A key user from Singapore site A (ST) commented that her American colleagues just could 
not imagine the problems she encountered. With their background in R&D, they lacked a 
framework for understanding the unicity (i.e., specific nature) of her site’s operations and 
system requirements. Bridging these different thought worlds required additional effort on 
both sides (Dougherty, 1992). US colleagues questioned issues that were brought up by 
ST. This led to additional interaction loops to clarify reciprocal points of view. 
 
“Because Singapore site A is a main manufacturing firm, we have huge volumes. To 
them (US - author) it is mainly for R&D. So usually when we have some issues, they 
will not see the problem. Usually IT (from US - author) will say: “How come Singapore 
site A you have that issue?” The volume is different, we have a higher volume. There 
is a difference here, but they will not really see our problem. Because sometimes 
there are some system problems, their sites do not have the problem, but our site has 
the problem.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
HHT described similar issues. During the gap analysis in Singapore, the team there 
identified many differences and customization projects. These were initially questioned by 
colleagues in the US who were not aware of manufacturing processes in Singapore. They 
assumed that requirements would be more or less the same, and need little attention from 
their side. HHT then engaged in numerous conversations with US counterparts to bring 
them up-to-date on her local context, and the background of customization requests.  
 
 “(…) A lot of a time especially when we were defining the gap, we had a hard time 
convincing them why we need to do this way. They always say: “But we are not doing 
things this way, why do you need so special a type of treatment? Sometimes I have a 
hard time trying to explain to them why we cannot do things the way they do, because 
of the difference in culture, and really the way we do things, the practice here. (…) So 
I would say, initially we had a problem there. They would still question things in the 
sense that we just had to be very sure that we know what we want, and we are not 
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asking change for the sake of changing. So they always double check and counter: 
“Are you sure you want to do it this way?” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1  
 
Far East region 
Within the Far East region, DiskCo operated different types of operations. Like Drive 
manufacturing plants in Singapore, China, and Malaysia; media and tape manufacturing in 
Singapore; a distribution center in Singapore; a head factory in Malaysia (e.g., for hard 
disk drives); and a plant for Printed Circuit Boards in Singapore. Operationally, the drive 
plants were setup in a similar way. This simplified the implementation process: once the 
process was understood in Singapore, they could implement the same approach at the other 
drive plants. HHT commented on the drive plants: 
 
“The way they run the factory (in China, Malaysia - author) is similar to the [Singapore 
site A] factory. So the processes will be more or less the same. So we needn't have to 
go through the detail of the current process study.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
At the same time, local teams in China and Malaysia identified differences that could be 
traced to unique government regulations in these countries. These surfaced early in the 
project, and were taken care of by local teams and the core team from Singapore site A: 
 
“I think the remote sites are quite OK, because the [Singapore site A] operation is 
quite a representative of how the other drive plants are being operated. So that didn't 
give us too much criticism on that part. Of course there are here some quite unique 
requirements that [Malaysia site A] needed because of some government regulations. 
So those are already been highlighted quite upfront when they are aware that they 
need to highlight new and unique features; and then similarly that was done for China. 
So I would say that there are quite a number of them that is unique because of 
country requirements” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
An example of Malaysia’s unique requirements concerned a local system that was written 
by their IT group. They did that because before Oracle, each site operated more or less on 
its own. With the new Oracle system coming in, they had to write interfaces between the 
systems they were keeping and Oracle. At times they faced problems with these custom-
written interfaces. Yet when they needed help, the unicity of their system and requirements 
became apparent. The core team from Singapore site A did not understand their situation. 
This led to back and forth discussions that delayed progress. SKL from Malaysia site A 
explains: 
 
“Before this global IT project, each of these sites was having their own IT. Some of 
the project functions were written by the local IT. (…) When we do the conversion, the 
interface job is written by the local IT here, but then sometimes when it doesn't really 
work well that's when we need other sites to help us like [Singapore site A]. But they 
are not that familiar with the way our site is doing things, so sometimes the IT 
progress is a little bit stuck. (…) Certain issues are very (interviewee emphasizes - 
author) unique.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
The same key user pointed at situations where Singapore site A proposed a certain way of 
handling document flows that seemed correct from their understanding. Yet it did not take 
into account the fact that Malaysia site operated differently in some respects: 
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“We face the problem here that we may make a mistake on the ways that we handle 
our […] (technical term - author). Just for example: we asked them (Singapore site A - 
author) how to do a certain set-up of an instance in Oracle by email and even through 
the phone. And they would tell us to do it that way. But later on we found out that 
there is a better way for our environment. Because the way we handle the document 
flow is a little bit different from [Singapore site A].” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
Resolving these diverse approaches required effort from both sides to identify differences. 
To some extent, this could be achieved on a distance through phone and email. For more 
complicated issues, visits by the Malaysian team to Singapore site A appeared necessary. 
This way, they could observe, discuss and learn how the latter site operated (von Hippel, 
1994).  
 
“So that is an instant that we have to have a better understanding. Maybe that we go 
to their site to understand exactly how the whole flow is through the documentation. 
Because that will affect the setup. (…) If I have a problem in facing the setup (…) I 
think the different views (Singapore site A versus Malaysia site A - author) can be 
resolved through email and phone. But however, when it comes to handling the data, 
especially like the document flow, I think email is very difficult. Because different sites 
have different ways, so the best way is we go there to see exactly how they do it. 
Let's say I create an invoice. If I want to void it, what is the best control how to void it. 
So these things we have to learn from other sites.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
On-site visits seem appropriate when people must learn about another way of doing things. 
After some point, documentation or remote communications cannot accomplish this. 
People need rather temporary immersion in that other context to gain understanding. This 
was also the case with the data conversion team from Malaysia site A. That team 
commonly supported drive operations. For the first implementation in the Far East, they 
were expected to assist with the media plant in Singapore. They would take care of the data 
conversion side of that conversion, but were not familiar with operations of the media 
plant. In order to understand requirements from that type of business, they flew down to 
talk with key users and IT.  
 
“They (data conversion team from Malaysia site A - author) came down once because 
we had some training here (…) And initially also because we needed to setup some 
so-called conversion rules as to how you want to bring data over from the old system 
to the new one. So there is a need for them to understand, especially because they 
are from [Malaysia site A] and that group is supporting drive operations. So I would 
say they are quite familiar with the drive operation and the requirements. But because 
the first time we converted is the media group, they came down twice to talk to the 
local IT and the user group on some of the requirements.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Diversity and remote support 
Diversity of operations returned in a discussion with the data conversion project manager, 
JNL. The Oracle project led to a environment with common business processes and IT 
infrastructure. This would facilitate remote support, where for instance a regional expert 
center could offer IT services to various sites. When we talked with JNL about this setup, 
she pointed at requirements to make this happen. First, that central team should be very 
knowledgeable about the application. Second, from JNL’s point of view, some differences 
between the sites would persist even after the Oracle implementation. Assisting a site 
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requires understanding of that context. This could be a challenge, depending on the level of 
local unicity.  
 
“The first thing is obviously they have to know about the application that they are 
supporting. That would be something that is common to everybody in the team. And 
on top of that, they would probably have to understand to a certain extent the different 
environments of the other sites. Because sometimes the way they do business is 
different, which will affect the way you troubleshoot problems, or you advice to them 
as to how to resolve a particular problem according to their environment.” - JNL, 
DiskCo-F-1 
 
§ 9.2.4.4  Urgency and Criticality 
The criticality and urgency of a task is defined by its importance in workflows, combined 
with time pressure. Criticality implies that a task is considered vital for the 
accomplishment of certain output. Urgency is a related concept and depends on time 
pressure. In our research, both constructs appeared to influence the choice of coordination 
and control mechanisms. Yet far as we know, criticality and urgency have not been 
addressed in literature on coordination and control, or in research on distributed work 
environments. We consider them therefore an add-on to the current list of contingencies as 
discussed in the theory section.  
 
Urgency refers here to the situation that activities from two or more persons are 
interrelated, combined with time pressure. It leads to an instantaneous need for interaction. 
When people work at different sites, a potential problem emerges. They must connect to 
another context without awareness of what is going on there (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). An 
IT professional from Malaysia site A expressed this tension when she tried to contact 
people in Singapore site A: 
 
“So far our other site IT (Singapore site A - author) has been giving us very good 
support, so I don't feel there is any difference. Except that sometimes when we on one 
end have an urgent issue that we address, it's frustrating when we cannot get them on 
phone because they may be away from desk.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1  
 
Urgency demands real-time contact to avoid unnecessary time lapses. On a distance, 
people’s media preference shifted from asynchronous media like email towards phone calls 
and teleconferences. Because of time zone differences, instantaneous calls are often 
unfeasible between sites in the Far East and US. As Table 24 and       Table 30 show, 
between Singapore/ Malaysia and US sites there is only a window early in the morning Far 
East time, and late in the afternoon/ evening in the US. JNL from Malaysia site A indicated 
that for urgent cases, she would sent a note to the US to arrange for an early morning 
teleconference: 
 
“Email is a very common way of communication for us. So if there is not a very urgent 
case, we normally write emails even those who are local here, maybe a site in 
Malaysia. For local sites, sometimes we call them up because they are on the same 
time zone. For US for urgent cases, normally what I will do is I will send them a mail 
to make an appointment with them to have a teleconference so that the next day when 
we come in early in the morning we are able to catch them in the US.” - JNL, DiskCo-
F-1 
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For these situations, MC from JNL’s team mentioned that she would contact people at 
home. The combination of urgency and time zone differences thus demands adaptive 
communication behaviors, here on the side of US staff who are called at home.  
 
“We have not a procedure for dealing with delays. But instead, if there is a really 
urgent issue, then we will contact them (US counterparts - author) at home.” - MC, 
DiskCo-E-1 
 
US colleagues adapted also in another sense - their local priorities. When Singapore site A 
was working on the first gaps analysis, they received priority attention from the US for this 
critical stage. Later on, they continued to synchronize their priorities in accordance with 
Far East needs. SCC from the core team in Singapore site A comments: 
 
“During the period that they (US counterparts - author) are concentrating on the Far 
East gaps (analysis), they act on immediately (…) They also help in the 
implementation of other sites, also writing programs for them. (…) We prioritize 
projects by urgency - whether it is high priority, medium or low. So they will go 
according to this for the development.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Adaptation could also occur on the Far East side. GP working from Singapore indicated 
that he would stay late to catch US colleagues early in the morning. He would create an 
artificial window. By staying later or arriving earlier at work, he could connect real-time to 
the US (Table 24,       Table 30, and especially Table 31). 
 
“It depends on how critical the issue is. If we say that it is a critical issue and the US 
person has to support us, then we really stay back till late and we try to call and solve 
the problem over the phone. When the problem is critical you can solve it very fast.” - 
GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
Within the Far East region, time zones do not play an important role as most DiskCo sites 
are located in the UTC +8 zone (China, Singapore, Malaysia). In this region, task urgency 
shifts electronic media use from email to phone calls. This real-time communication mode 
expedites problem solving: 
 
“(With China - author) Every time there is a great need and they should communicate 
immediately and get the things done, then I will make a direct call. I would say that 
talking directly to them, communication by phone is not very much, maybe 20-30% of 
the total communication.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
MC mentioned that she would initially use DiskCo’s email application to identify the 
urgency of a task. Beyond a certain level, she would also switch to phone calls: 
 
“But if there is an urgent issue you will surely indicate in the email heading that it's 
urgent. If it's really urgent, something that needs immediate attention, then we will call 
them.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
For critical phases of a project, people emphasized the role of collocation. This lowers the 
threshold for communications with colleagues when they are needed most. Co-presence 
ensures richness and interactivity of exchanges. It boasts information processing capability 
so that people can handle complex or novel issues straightaway. ET from Malaysia site A 
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related this aspect to assistance from the Singapore site A core team to her site around the 
conversion phase: 
 
“(…) the project team (from Singapore site A - author) should be here for 
presentations before, during and even more often when we are approaching the 
conversion, and also after the conversion.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
Hierarchy and urgent, critical tasks 
Urgency and criticality alter the role of hierarchy. They pull managers’ attention strongly 
to the work floor to monitor and facilitate progress there. CPW compared the Oracle 
implementation to earlier smaller IT projects. He indicated that Oracle was a high profile 
project where failure was not an option. Should the program fail, no backup would be 
available. The project was also time pressed with only a few days for the actual 
conversion. He mentioned that this increased pressure on his role, and necessitated close 
involvement. CPW stressed the importance of on-site presence to interact with his 
subordinates and monitor progress:  
 
“You can’t just sit in your office, waiting for something to happen. Because the impact 
is so great, when you turn on and it fails, there is no way to go back. And in our 
conversion, there is no such thing as a parallel run (i.e., running simultaneously the 
old MANMAN system and new Oracle ERP - author). It's cut. So when they cut, you 
move on from one week, there is no way to move back anymore. Since the 
consequences are a lot more serious, I cannot just sit there and wait for people to tell 
me all the good news. I have to be in there to see it. And also an important thing is 
our conversion schedule is so tight. It's all 24 hours or sometimes 2 days, 2 nights 
continuously. So you have to be there to give them the support, and they know that 
they are having it, they know that when they have a problem, the big boss (CPW - 
author) is there to help them to make the call. They don't have to worry. They just do 
what they are supposed to do.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
From a subordinates’ point of view, criticality and urgency bring hierarchical relationships 
to the fore. For instance, the author sent an email to HHT after on-site empirical research. 
Since she was not I, an automated message was returned with the following text: 
 
“Subject: [HHT] is out of the office  
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 1999 18:43:32 +0800  
From: [HHT]  
To: [Author]  
 
I will be out of the office from 06/05/99 until 06/22/99. I will respond to your message 
when I return. Any urgent matters, please refer to my boss, CP W.  
 
Regards.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-4 (Automated Lotus Notes message - author)  
 
In her absence, urgent communications are re-routed to her boss, CPW. Similarly, a key 
user from Malaysia site A indicated that critical and urgent tasks leave little room for 
waiting. She would hierarchically escalate an issues beyond a certain due date, in the 
assumption that a person’s boss would know his current situation: 
 
“If we don't see any response within the time that we required them before the due 
date, we have to escalate up to a higher level. And then we understand the situation 
and whether they are working on it.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
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In a polycontextual environment, awareness of someone else’s situation comes less 
naturally (Chute & Wiener, 1995, 1996). This increases pressure in case of critical tasks 
that involve dispersed actors. Thus, people have to pay more deliberate attention to 
updating others on their absence and work progress. Alternatively, people will move up the 
hierarchy when they have not been provided with updates, like alternative contact 
information:  
 
“On critical projects you better update others when you are not in because if let's say 
you don't solve the problem and we don't get a reply and it's very urgent we will go up 
one level higher. So normally we have the habit of informing each other on the project 
that we are on.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
§ 9.2.5  Learning, Documentation and Technology 
A key challenge in the Oracle project was to ensure that IT staff with implementation 
responsibility would know how to implement and use the system. Next, users from 
different departments and sites would the capabilities to deploy the new system in their 
day-to-day jobs. As interviewees stated repeatedly, they did not know anything about the 
Oracle system before the project. Both IT staff and users had to become acquainted with a 
system that was totally new to them. They were confronted with a new generation of 
technology in a project environment that was very international. Says the project champion 
CPW: “In fact none of us knew anything of Oracle. None of us knew anything of SQL, or 
Oracle database. No knowledge at all. We are only VAX” (DiskCo-A-3). This section 
explores how people bridged that gap. It shows that DiskCo adopted various ways to 
enhance knowledge and problem solving across the multiple locations that implemented 
Oracle. Among these are classroom and on-site immersive training, development 
methodology, documentation, remote communications and use of Lotus Notes groupware.  
 
§ 9.2.5.1  Training 
When US sites started implementing Oracle at the first sites in 1996, CWP decided to get 
his staff involved. This would position them for learning the new system and 
implementation process. He emphasized a structure of remote counterparts, meaning that 
people would connect to a colleague in the US with the same job. From Singapore IT core 
team members and key users were sent over to the US. Representatives of the Malaysian 
data conversion team went as well. Onsite presence of these people was considered 
important in this early stage of the learning process. While being there, they could just 
participate in the processes. In this phase, it appeared not wise to have US counterparts 
report on their experience through electronic media. They did that rather after a certain 
‘discovery’ stage through Lotus Notes databases. Lack of experience at this early stage of 
Oracle implementations would make it hard for US staff to define what they learnt and 
represent that in a coherent manner. 
 
“When the US started their conversion we sent people from here to there to kind of go 
through their conversion process. We also sent people from the data conversion team 
to work with the data conversion team and the programmer there for them to explain 
to us everything about the program and we do everything hands-on there. We go 
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through their live conversion for one of the plants to observe how they do the 
conversion and what kind of problems they encounter. So that is what we refer to 
when we talk about the transfer of knowledge. Before we do anything we send people 
there to learn from them. There are Operations people sent there for 2 weeks to sit 
with their Operations people, and of course the US sites also established some 
standards, like how the configuration should look like, this is the hardware that we 
want, this is how we gonna organize the files, the databases and things like that. 
These are some standards that we will follow. The program changes that we need to 
follow are also sent. This is one part of the transfer of knowledge: go there, work with 
them, know, learn from them.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Conversely, US representatives joined their Singaporean colleagues for the first 
implementations there. Through their onsite presence, US experts could watch how things 
were going in Singapore. They could interact instantaneously and solve problems if need 
be. This made more sense than supporting an inexperienced crew from the US. In that 
case, Singaporeans would have to spot mistakes or inefficiencies, and initiate remote 
contact to the US.  
 
“When we converted the first plant (in Singapore - author) we also get people from 
there (US - author) to come here to help us and do the conversion. In fact they came 
for the first 3 plants. Not all of them, but 1 or 2 of them came over to sit through 
together with us. So only after the 3rd plant we really stand alone all the way.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-3 
 
After the third Singapore implementation, the core team members and key users from 
Singapore and Malaysia could take on the role of experts for their Asian colleagues. Their 
experience enabled them to distill a core body of knowledge for novices. They could 
structure and economize the knowledge transfer process for the unique Asian contexts 
(Kumar & van Dissel, 1996). This was not yet possible in the ‘discovery’ phase as CPW 
explains:  
 
“We believe that once we have acquired enough knowledge we know what knowledge 
to pass on. Last time we started off one whole year of training. The problem is that 
when you don't know anything, you go learn everything. But you really need to be 
trained only on this part. So we kind of filtered that down and prepared all the material 
for training. By then we know who needs to be trained, what needs to be passed 
down, so the crash course is on the job training.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
It appeared necessary to tailor Oracle know-how to site requirement. Those not involved in 
the US learning phase had to go to local Oracle training courses. These offered a generic 
view on the system, regardless of attendees industrial background. A key user from 
Singapore site A sat through sessions on for instance HR modules while these were not 
relevant to her case. She preferred interaction with colleagues who had become experts in 
Oracle. These people ‘speak the same language’ from an organizational point of view 
(DiskCo-H-1). Leveraging on that organizational advantage reduced novelty for her and 
thus facilitated absorption of Oracle knowledge (Grant, 1996b; Williamson, 1975): 
 
“When we attended the Oracle in house training at Oracle company (in Singapore - 
author), we didn't find that very useful. But the CRP when we go through actual 
business processes, we find that more useful because it's what we are doing day-to-
day. So we find that training from the US site to our users here is better than the one 
from the outside company. So maybe on the training, they should train key users, then 
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you come down and train us that would be much easier. Because we speak the same 
language. When you go to the outside company, they use the Human Resource data, 
and it's not relevant to [DiskCo].” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
For Malaysia, CPW decided on a multi-stage strategy to get users up to speed. Initially, 
key users attended local Oracle training, like the one in Singapore. With this general basis, 
they flew to Singapore to interact with core team members there. Then the key user group 
returned to Malaysia to setup their own test facility. They use that for getting more 
acquainted with the system and use local data. Subsequently, the key users pass on their 
knowledge to users, to ready everyone for the implementation. SKL, a Finance key user 
from Malaysia site A comments: 
 
“In order to get to know more about the system, the key users attend a training course 
conducted by the Oracle people. And that is on the training side. But that is where we 
learn to understand the Oracle module. Subsequently the key users will go to 
[Singapore site A] to learn there live how they do it. So that is the phases that the key 
users have gone through.  
And finally when they come back, the key users will go through an Oracle test 
database. That means they will create a platform for us to do the testing. So the key 
users are going through the system, and play with the system. And after that the key 
users will compile some materials to teach other Finance users how to run the 
module. So this way, the key users start basically as learners, after that they 
experience the system as a user and then they become an instructor. So in that way 
we ensure that progress is done smoothly.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
Setting up training in a geographically distributed setting has its challenges. Because 
traveling is resource intensive, onsite training is often attended by site representatives. That 
person must fill in his colleagues upon returning. An executive working for DiskCo in 
Singapore describes this situation:  
 
“If 3 guys are involved in the same project, ideally you would like to send them all 
away (from Singapore to US sites - author). [This is of course unfeasible] so you send 
one guy and the other 2 are not there, they have to pick up what happens from this 
guy when he comes back.” - Executive, DiskCo Information Technologies, Singapore
46
 
 
According to CPW, indirect training has its disadvantages. When people who stay in the 
office receive information from colleagues attending a training seminar, they depend on 
these persons’ memory and interpretations. This reduces the effectiveness of their training 
compared to people joining in the original session, comparable to the telephone game. For 
that reason, CPW prefers direct training, with as many people as possible attending a class. 
For the Oracle project, he reserved a considerable budget to this end. Core team members 
and other IT staff and users attend basic courses outside the company. This is 
complemented with DiskCo- specific knowledge: 
 
“Now the one thing that I always believe with regards to training: you send someone 
out for training, they come back and train another person. In between there is always 
something missing. When you go for a course you maybe absorb 70%. You come back 
                                                 
46 Transcribed from interview by Professor K. Lee, Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore in 1994. Used by kind permission.  
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and conduct the same course for somebody else. And somebody else may absorb only 
70% from you. So the net gain is much less learning because it is all discounted. So 
we have a very big budget for training. Even before we go down to a site and transfer 
knowledge, we send the people already to basic training conducted by Oracle or by 
SUN. (…) What we transfer over to them is our actual experience and the issues that 
we encountered and resolved throughout all these implementations. We pass down to 
them customizations, the program changes that we make, what are the things that 
changed and how our Oracle operates slightly different from the generic Oracle. That 
is the knowledge we are talking about.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Directness not only means that people attend courses themselves instead of receiving 
second hand information from colleagues. It also implies that they experience the new 
system hands-on. Users from different sites and countries were sent over to Singapore site 
A to get immersed in the new setup that was already in place there. Their presence on-site 
was considered important to trigger the learning process: 
 
“Every CRP we send our people, the project team plus the key users to help them. 
Every conversion, the live conversion we send our people there for one week. That 
means on the day of the data conversion, turn on on Monday, one more week, on site 
helping them. For most of the sites 2 weeks before the conversion we send people 
here for a week on the job training. That means I'm the shipping guy, I need to log on 
to use Oracle to do shipping. So they are here work here in the shipping department 
as though they are the shipping person who does his job. So by the time they are back 
there they really know exactly how to do it. Because I always believe that when you do 
a training, you just have to go through all these trainings, practice on a test database, 
that is a neat way for you to start off. But for you to really understand, you have 
experience it hands-on and use it, and encounter problems, know how to resolve the 
problem. And that is the completeness of the training. So we call it OJT, On-the-Job 
Training.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
From CPW’s point of view, effectiveness of people’s learning process depends on their 
own participation in a session so that they do not depend on peers. And on-site immersion 
in a new setup for a complete experience. This approach suggests a minimal role for 
distance learning. Especially the on-the-job training experience cannot be replicated to a 
distributed setting: “I think you can't do on the job training remotely. They have to be 
physically here” (CPW, DiskCo-A-5).  
Still, remote training has a role. DiskCo used NetMeeting and Proxy to conduct remote 
training sessions between Singapore and China. CPW noticed that these sessions work 
mainly for small groups. The rooms with meeting facilities cannot accommodate large 
groups. Besides that, technology does not really cater for interactive sessions with 
questions and answers, or alternation of instruction and hands-on practicing (Abel, 1990). 
This reduces the role of distance learning to one-way instruction on basic topics for small 
groups.  
 
“You can do remote training for a small group. Like for example there is a training on 
order entry. We use NetMeeting. NetMeeting is very widely used here or we use 
Proxy. Proxy is software that works like: this guy gets a computer screen that I can 
see or the guy can also move the mouse. So then we use a conference plus 
NetMeeting to conduct some training when we think that is possible and effective. (…) 
It's kind of limited in the sense that NetMeeting is one-to-one or can be one-to-many. 
But we cannot get in the same room if we are too many people. NetMeeting is not so 
interactive. It's like I keep talking - talking - talking, and users don't really have a 
chance to practice because it's instructive on how to do it. So only when you stop, 
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then the user can start to practice. But it's not so real-time, not so interactive. So for 
certain simple applications, simple entries we can do.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Table 28 summarizes DiskCo’s strategies for knowledge transfer in the Oracle project. The 
rows capture the local versus remote dimension; the columns direct versus indirect 
(liaised) training approaches.  
 Cell A depicts a traditional setup. Experts and participants conduct sessions in a 
collocated setup. This was the preferred approach for DiskCo. For instance, core team 
members from Singapore worked with US counterparts on initial implementation 
projects. They trained locally users and IT staff, and organized on-the-job training. 
Before that, Far East staff attended external training sessions on Oracle and SUN.  
 Cell B refers to situations where people are trained locally, and transmit that 
knowledge to peers, hence indirect. Inevitably this occurs in a distributed project 
where representatives instead of large groups attend training. For DiskCo, knowledge 
transfer followed a multi-node route between US experts and Far East staff members 
who did not participate in on-site sessions. It also happened between core team 
members and local users. Key users were expected to function as linking pins between 
these groups to reduce pressure on the core team.  
 Cell C strategies - direct remote training - played a limited role in the Oracle project. 
Technology supported only small groups and little interactivity in the instruction 
process. This made the approach only suitable for one-way training on basic topics.  
 Cell D with the least information processing capability was not used.  
 
Table 28 - Learning strategies in the Oracle project 
 
 Direct training: Expert to novice Indirect training 
Face-to-face, 
collocated 
training 
 
Cell A 
 US experts train Far East 
DiskCo core team members in 
US/ Singapore 
 Local Oracle company trains IT 
staff, users 
 Far East DiskCo core team 
members train local IT staff, 
users 
 On-the-job training in Singapore 
site A or China site A 
Cell B 
 Training US experts vis-à-vis 
local Far East IT staff, users 
 Training Far East core team 
members vis-à-vis local users 
 Avoided, risk of telephone game 
Remote, 
electronically 
mediated 
training 
Cell C 
 Limited role: NetMeeting, Proxy 
sessions for small groups on 
simple tasks 
Cell D 
 N.A. 
 
§ 9.2.5.2  Development Methodology 
DiskCo adopted a development methodology for implementing Oracle ERP. Initially, they 
used Oracle’s in-house methodology called Application Implementation Method (AIM). 
Later they switched to Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), a more generic model 
that they customized for internal use. The methodologies offered DiskCo IT staff a 
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documented blueprint of how they should implement and adapt a system like Oracle ERP. 
It is a generic prescription, like a recipe: 
 
“This methodology helps a lot in the sense that because we had never done such an 
ERP implementation before, not for my self. (…) I think it is quite a structured way, a 
method, and it really fits very well. I think the method is really derived in such a way 
that it is a good fit for any organization who wanted to do the Oracle ERP 
implementation.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1  
 
The methodologies document any implementation process, outlining steps people have to 
go through. They also assist in documenting actual steps in an implementation trajectory. 
To this end, the methodologies come with a myriad of (electronic) document templates. 
Implementors have just to select the appropriate template for their task, and fill it in. 
Structuring a process - like methodologies intent to do - helps the novice. It enables him to 
leverage on others’ distilled experience from prior occasions that is rendered in an explicit 
format (Adler & Borys, 1996). Documentation separates know how from the people who 
developed the methodology. With DiskCo’s intranet and groupware technology, it 
becomes electronically available to the company’s IT staff members, anyplace, anytime.  
  
“The AIM methodology puts on emphasis on documenting the processes. And it also 
helps us in identifying the difference between our existing system and the Oracle 
system. They also have a lot of documents templates that we can use for our 
documentation purposes.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Along with the AIM methodology came training from Oracle consultants. They guided 
DiskCo IT staff through the initial phases of the project:  
 
“The applications consultants they are quite well versed on the method itself. So with 
their help it is a good guidance for people like us who have no formal training on how 
to manage such a project. So they help us to know what to do next, what needs to be 
done, and there are a lot of documentation templates that help us to generate all the 
necessary documentation through all the stages.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Like AIM, SDLC offers numerous document templates, ready to be filled out. OBT from 
Singapore site A explains that US HQ decided at one point to switch from AIM to SDLC, 
making it a new corporate wide policy.  
 
“Initially we were using the AIM, then subsequently we - it’s a kind of world wide policy 
- have to follow the SDLC method. So I think now we start using SDLC and we stop 
using AIM. So for SDLC we also have a lot of document templates. So it depends on 
what type of documents you have to prepare, then you just follow the templates and 
they have certain format. Last time I know was that someone came from the US and 
conducted a class for some of the IT staff here. But I was not involved at all. But 
subsequently we were asked to use this all the new documentations, using the SDLC 
format.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
DiskCo enforced the use of a single methodology across its international operations: 
“Everybody should follow the same way according to SDLC” (DiskCo-J-1). This 
homogeneity helps when there is a need for site-crossing assistance or reference. People 
can refer to the same set of procedures and documents (Grant, 1996b). This makes 
distributed operations more transparent.  
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At the same time, commonality excludes other ways of doing things (Adler & Borys, 
1996). It may contrast with people’s past experience (Ciborra et al., 1996), and offer an 
approach that does not fit a particular situation. Seasoned staff may dread the sequentiallity 
and formality of a methodology. SCC from Singapore site A reports: 
 
“For a developer to pick up the tools in MANMAN or Oracle I think it's easier to pick 
up the tools using MANMAN. You write a very simple report in just probably half a 
day. If you want to compare this report to Oracle it may take sometimes a week. The 
tool is not easy. Because now we have to follow SDLC. Everything must go step by 
step. We cannot skip the design specs before you do the coding. It takes longer time 
also.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
§ 9.2.5.3  Knowledge Database 
When US sites completed the first conversion projects, they realized that many of the 
issues they encountered were relevant to other sites as well. For that reason, they started a 
so-called knowledge database in Lotus Notes. The database is intended for DiskCo’s 
worldwide groups of IT professionals involved in the Oracle project. Experts from the US 
and later Singapore select insights and experiences with potential relevance to counterpart 
sites (Goodman & Darr, 1998). They document their knowledge in a problem - resolution 
format. Like a heading stating: “Printer issues in Oracle Finance Module”, then a 
description of the problem, and steps to solve it. This explicit knowledge is represented 
independent of the person who encountered the problem. It is then automatically replicated 
to other sites. Peers from around the world can access the database from different angles, 
like problem area, modules, people, or location.  
 
“At a later stage when we had more sites turned on, we setup another database setup, 
called knowledge database. That one is more for support for those sites that are 
already turned on. When you turn on live there will be a different set of problems that 
we face. And then of course there are different resolutions that go with it. So that's 
why later on we set up another knowledge database. It's basically for knowledge 
transfer and experience sharing. It applies to all the areas. It can be an application 
problem, it can be PC problem, and even printer problems. We are advised to try to 
document all the problem phases and the resolution that was taken to resolve the 
problem, and put it in the knowledge database. That applies to those problems that we 
solve that we think is worth sharing with the other sites. These are supposed to be 
documented in the knowledge database.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
A knowledge database in Lotus Notes stretches the role of documented know-how (Van de 
Ven et al., 1976). Traditionally, documentation referred to paper-based notes and 
procedures that were copied, mailed and perhaps faxed. Digital documents combined with 
database and communication technology offer a stand-alone, integrated environment. 
People can participate in the same electronic environment anytime, and from anywhere. 
This gives a distributed work environment holographic properties. Morgan (1997) 
discussed holography in the context of the brain metaphor in his book Images of 
Organizations. He states: “Holography demonstrates that it is possible to create processes 
where the whole can be encoded in all the parts, so that each and every part represents the 
whole” (Morgan, 1997: 75). Multi-site groupware enhances holographic capabilities. It 
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absorbs and combines insights from different locations, and makes these available to 
anyone with access to the database environment.  
It should be noted, though, that the database contains brief descriptions of a problem and 
resolution process. It pre-supposes that ‘entrants’ share a certain professional background 
and range of experiences to navigate, digest and apply the information. Finally, while the 
groupware reduces interpersonal communication needs across sites, it shifts the burden to 
people expected to enter information into the database.  
 
§ 9.2.5.4  Documentation 
Documentation embodies know-how. In the Far East region, the core team in Singapore 
site A collected built substantial knowledge and experience on the Oracle conversion. They 
had worked with US counterparts, and experienced a number of local conversion 
trajectories in Singapore. Transmission of that expertise to other Far East sites relied 
strongly on documentation. Elaborate checklists, templates and procedures were 
developed. In addition, local projects were planned in the timeline dictated by US HQ. 
CPW explained that his site developed in fact documentation that enabled local core teams 
to plan and document their project. The teams received a sort of do-it-yourself kit and 
became then responsible for setting up their own conversion process (Adler & Borys, 
1996): 
 
“We (Singapore site A - author) are the resource for them (other sites - author). So we 
know the plan, we deal with the plan, with the things that we know they will need, we 
organize all this for them. But the rest they have to organize. Like they have to come 
up with a check list, they have to come up with a schedule. But for all these things 
there is a template given to them. They just fill in their own timing, they fill in who are 
the persons and some additional local stuff. They are responsible but they always 
have us to support them.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Documentation accelerated local implementations. At the beginning of the Oracle project, 
DiskCo staff in the Far East region knew virtually nothing about the new system, and how 
to handle its implementation. Since the Singapore site A core team was the first to acquire 
know-how, they covered the first phases of the learning curve. The team reflected on the 
path they had followed, and documented relevant facets. This collection of explicit know-
how reduced novelty for other sites. It informed processes, structured and accelerated 
them. A key user from Singapore site A explains: 
 
“During the [Singapore site A] conversion we have gone through so many bad 
experiences, and good experiences as well, so we know a lot of things, we already 
know the process very well. So when we come to other sites that they want to convert, 
we can help them. If you gonna do it this way, you will face this problem, and what is 
the correct way that they should take. So it shortens a lot of time. Even the conversion 
table that we set up, they follow us closely. Because if you don't do it, then you face a 
lot of problems. And also, we have established a lot of reports so when they convert 
they can just pick up whichever they want. So the time required for them to convert is 
relatively shorter compared to [Singapore site A].” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
Once a local team picked up documented standards, it could assess whether and how their 
situation differed from the generic approach. This simplified and focused local conversion 
projects. MC explained this for documented data conversion standards:  
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“We have documentation on each module, what are the conversion rules that we are 
currently using. And also the changes that we have made for other sites. The local IT 
staff has to review all this documentation together with the users to see what is apart 
to them and what is not.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
Similarly, documented experience from Singapore site A economized the generic 
implementation process, and therefore local implementations. People could use 
documentation to compare their operations with the ‘default’ setup in Singapore site A. 
This revealed possible differences that would require additional attention. As long as 
things mapped one-to-one with the documented process, people could follow an 
accelerated trajectory. This facilitated multi-site implementation of the same application: 
 
“Of course for the other sites we did not go through so many steps. Mainly for the 3 
main business units: the media, [Singapore site A] and the customer repair center we 
have gone through the full cycle. And for the other sites Malaysia sites and China, we 
didn't really do the business process baseline, but we did ask them to review what we 
have documented. Let's say for the drive plant, they have to look at the [Singapore 
site A] business process to see whether there are any differences. So they don't had 
to redo the whole documentation. So from there they roughly know whether there are 
any differences between their drive and our drive operation. So then they did the 
Conference Room Pilot, and from there they also make sure that there are no 
additional differences that is not been catered for by the [Singapore site A] drive.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Documentation also played an important role for the data conversion group in Malaysia 
site A. Their responsibility was to assist other Far East sites with the data conversion 
aspect of Oracle implementation projects. They received documentation from a team in the 
US team with a similar role. This covered most technical aspects of the data conversion 
process as the Malaysian project manager points out: 
 
“I was involved somewhere in the middle of last year. And my responsibility was to do 
the data conversion for the Far East sites. They have a similar group in the US and so 
what we did is we get all the necessary programs and files from the US and do the 
modifications for the Far East plants. (…) The US team came up with conversion 
document. I don't think they used any special methodology, but they did document 
down. It is a very technical kind of document. So they specify the programming that 
was used for the extraction of the data from the legacy system. And they also 
document down for the loading portion, what are the programs that were used and 
what are all the scripts that have to be run. It's basically a technical kind of 
document.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1  
 
The Malaysian group developed checklists applicable to the Far East sites. These were 
passed on to local key users, and drove local testing and validation efforts: 
 
“What we did was to supply them with some checklists, we have a spreadsheet that 
documents down some testing that they can do. And what they did is they would pass 
this to the users, and the users will perform the test or the validation. And they will 
then put in the comment whether they found something wrong or whether the check is 
fine and everything is OK. So they will update the checklist back for us, and we will 
just take a look them.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1  
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Checklists remained dynamic documents. Experiences from subsequent sites in the Far 
East were used to improve the list. The checklists thus represented an aggregated body of 
knowledge that facilitated each new conversion project: 
 
“I would say the checklist was quite comprehensive to a certain extent. And as we 
have converted a few plants before right up till now, we are able to fine-tune the 
documents with helpful feedback from the first few sites that were converted. So it 
was updated periodically and I guess we have a good checklist at this moment now for 
the other sites to put on.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
JNL, project manager for the data conversion team, stresses the advantage of 
documentation for local teams. In the early stage of a new conversion trajectory, the data 
conversion process represents a novel challenge to the local core team. At that time, 
documentation gives an overview of phases, areas and activities. It makes expectations and 
priorities clear from the outset: 
 
“I think we need a set of rules to a certain extent so that at least the local people will 
know what to expect. For example when we start to take on a new site for conversion, 
what we will is we will provide them with some documents that explain to them what 
will be the requirements to do the conversion. And for each conversion module what 
are the criteria that have been set for. And they are expected to review the criteria 
and the rules. And they will have to come back to us to say if they agree with the rules 
or they need a change. So I think we need a set of rules and procedures for every 
start off with a new conversion.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
Guidelines provided by the Malaysia data conversion team improve local understanding of 
the different phases. It helps people to setup their own project, and control their work. This 
reduces their dependence on the Malaysian team. Documentation thus substitutes in part 
for remote communications (Mintzberg, 1979; Van de Ven et al., 1976). 
 
“Distinguishing project phases and documenting these makes more sense if you are 
working remotely. Then you would help the people from the remote sites to know the 
different phases or to monitor their work. They will know what is the expectation from 
them, that they have to complete a certain task within a certain timeline. So that would 
give them a rough schedule of the whole project, and they know the different phases 
that they are going to expect. That’s helpful because you don't communicate to them 
on a regular basis maybe.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
Documentation not only reduces interactions between local sites and the data conversion 
team from Malaysia site A. It makes them more structured, and helps the Malaysian team 
to handle its involvement in multiple projects: 
 
“We also have a checklist for our conversion process. So we document down all the 
activities that have to be done. And that could also include activities that are not 
related to data conversion. But we have to (interviewee emphasizes - author) 
document them down in a checklist together so that we know the timing, and at what 
point we can start which loading data, etcetera.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
One of the members of JNL’s team - MC - commented on the role of documentation in her 
job. She explained that each local implementation presents her with similar tasks. This 
makes documentation important. By documenting the first few projects, she can re-use her 
experience in subsequent ones: 
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“What I learnt from this project is that it is very important for us now to document 
down what we have communicated with the first site, because very often this 
communication will have to be repeated with other sites. So it makes our job much 
easier if we have documentation. (…) So I learnt to document things down that I did 
not have to previously, because of the repetition of the job function. And also to come 
up with a checklist of what to do.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
§ 9.2.5.5  Issues Database: Digital Documentation and Process Representation 
The multiple Oracle implementation teams used Lotus Notes not only for email exchange, 
documentation and knowledge databases. They also built a more dynamic environment to 
bring up issues and manage the problem resolution process. Users could enter issues they 
struggled with in the conversion process. These were grouped and prioritized in a 
standardized manner. These so-called issues databases were initiated in the US. People 
there encountered a myriad of issues while learning the Oracle system and adapting it for 
DiskCo operations. When Singapore site A started on the first Far East projects, they 
started their own issues database. One reason for keeping two separate databases was that 
issues in the Far East and US were supposed to be different. Sharing them would not be 
very useful under these circumstances (Goodman & Darr, 1998). Later, it appeared that 
some overlap existed, meaning that US experts could contribute to resolving issues from 
the Far East sites. This led to the merger of the two databases so that all issues from all 
sites were available to any IT professional or key user involved in the Oracle project. HHT 
describes the early phase of the issues databases: 
 
“In fact they (US implementation teams - author) have started using it (i.e., issues 
database - author) when they started the project. So when we started the Far East 
project, initially we had a separate one, just to keep track of the Far East issues. But 
then the US was requested to also look at the issues we have and help us along. At 
that time the US is also still doing quite a lot of new sites. And their set of problems 
may be quite different from ours. So initially we have different issue databases. Along 
the line we later on decided to merge them. So we now have one common database.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
The issues database became a central platform for raising questions and knowledge 
contributions. Like a market place, it electronically connected problem owners and experts 
from any DiskCo site. Once issues were resolved, the database functioned as a digital 
library. It showed factual descriptions of problems and steps that were proposed for 
resolving these. The environment evolved into a permanently available representation of 
project-related know-how. According to HHT, the database was a principal means for 
transferring technical knowledge across sites.  
 
“We organized knowledge transfer across sites not so much for personal management 
skills. But I think we did try for technical knowledge, like the issue database. I think 
that's the way how we transfer knowledge to the other sites.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
The database enhanced accessibility of documentation. JNL from the data conversion team 
explains that her unit pasted checklists in the environment and updated them according to 
the latest insights. Management and staff at project sites could easily pull this information 
 299
from the database. Automated replication of the Lotus Notes databases implied that the 
most recent version of documents became available to anyone with access:  
 
“I think that checklist helps very much because it is distributed evenly to the users, to 
the local IT, and to the management as well. So when we start the conversion process 
we make sure that we cover every step that has been listed on there. So everybody 
will have the latest update on what's going, what has been completed and so on. And 
we also publish that checklist so that everybody can have a look at it and can get 
updated. It's a Word document and we have put it into a comment Lotus Notes entry, 
so everybody can access it.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1  
 
The issues database grants access to key users, unlike the knowledge database which is 
only for DiskCo IT units. In fact, the issues database functions as a digital interface. It 
substantiates cross-functional contact between users and IT. Key users can enter problems 
into the system, like a serving hatch: “For the issue database the key users are also allowed 
to access so they can put in their problems” (HHT, DiskCo-B-2). This kicks off 
discussions amongst dispersed IT professionals. If need be, they initiate separate projects 
to resolve the issues. JPL from the core team in Singapore site A comments: 
 
“Normally, if Malaysia thinks it's a big problem they will put it is as an issue into the 
database. China can contribute by putting their solutions to it. And then if Malaysia 
thinks China's solution is not acceptable, they will assign someone and raise a project 
request to have something changed to the system. Because normally the person who 
raises the issue is the one who suffers the most.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
Since people from different sites have access to Lotus Notes, it becomes a virtual level 
playing field. They can look at textual notes that represent problems-to-be-solved. The 
system represents work in progress. It mirrors operations within the IT function to other 
communities like key users.  
From JPL’s angle, the environment lowers the threshold of information access and 
participation. Information asymmetries between people or sites become less likely. The 
moment someone represents a problem or document in Lotus Notes - and that is an 
important condition - it is replicated and open for multi-actor involvement. This triggers 
more involvement and contributions like a snow-ball effect, until an acceptable solution 
has been found and entered into the system. JPL describes: 
 
“The good thing about Lotus Notes is participation - because once you go in, you look 
at the problem, you can participate. You can just click the button or discuss issues, or 
you put your comments in. Everybody can do that. It's open to all. So this the place 
where commonly people will share the information. As I said about documentation just 
now - I don't think it's likely that someone would have it and someone would not have 
it. Unless the person never pasted it into the database.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
As indicated, the effectiveness of the database environment depends on participation. 
People must look at the system, paste their documents in it, and help others. The 
environment thus embodies explicit representations of knowledge and collaborative 
processes. Figure 50 illustrates this setup. An expert (bottom left) encounters an issues and 
resolves it. He makes that insight explicit in textual/ graphical format. This document is 
then pasted into Lotus Notes, and categorized. From there, replication takes it to anyone 
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having access to the system. Problem owners (there are 2 depicted here) can pull the 
documentation and apply it to their setting.  
 
Figure 50 - Knowledge exchange in groupware environments 
 
All this relies on experts pushing explicit know-how into the environment. This is enforced 
top-down. JPL indicated that his boss - CPW - expects everyone to contribute documented 
know-how to the system: 
 
“In the [DiskCo] environment, everybody must paste their documentation in a standard 
database so that everybody can see. So that you share whatever you have. (…) Our 
VP wants us to log whatever we do - should we have a white paper, or design 
documentation to go along with a project. (…) We have a Lotus Notes database that 
just replicates to all sites after a few hours. So that's how we communicate.” - JPL, 
DiskCo-I-1 
 
Proactive pushing of information into the database environment has an important role in 
dispersed knowledge sharing. If a person in site A has a problem, and someone in site B 
knows the answer, the question is how these people connect. HHT explains that this 
occurred when US sites were ahead of her site, Singapore site A. History repeated itself 
when Singapore site A became the expert for other Far East sites: 
 
“A lot of times we tend to forget how to inform people. Initially, when we first started 
we always had this hard feeling: US have already experienced certain things, they had 
this problem before, why did you not tell us. Until we decided to avoid that and we’d 
say: “Oh this is a problem.” And it happened to us again when other sites want to start 
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on the project, and then they also face some problems and then they say things back 
to us again: “Oh you in Singapore have encountered the same problem before. And 
then it was not told to everybody”.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
The initiative to connecting person B’s resources with person A’s needs could come from 
both sides. One way is for person A to raise an issue. This approach may require 
substantial effort for someone with little experience and a myriad of issues at hand. An 
alternative is that experts - the persons B - are supposed to translate their experience into 
documentation that is pasted in the groupware system. This taxes their schedule. But an 
advantage is that gradually a comprehensive stand-alone resource emerges that is 
accessible to any problem owner, independent of the experts. To HHT, this seemed the 
preferred and main mode of knowledge transfer in the Oracle project:  
 
“I think the issue database is the only and the best way I'd see. So without that, of 
course we tend to forget. Even myself, I have to keep reminding the staff and my boss 
(CPW - author) keeps reminding me: “Any thought on this, please fill into the issue 
database”. that is the only way that people have a chance to know it and learn from 
you.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
HHT continued to stress the initiative from experts to push information into the virtual 
environment. Like her boss, she pressed her expert-subordinates (core team members). To 
the expert, this process requires some effort. But in the end that is supposed to be well 
worth the benefits for others in need of know-how: 
 
“I also reminded the team that we have to take the initiative to really inform people 
and help them with what we have done. Not wait until people ask when they have 
problems. We are all humans, we tend to forget. It's just sometimes maybe it's just a 
small little problem and then if we just solve it very easily then we tend take it for 
granted: “Oh yeah, it's just a simple thing”. But sometimes it's really beneficial if you 
just document it down, put it in the issue database. Although it may take us just less 
than a day to resolve it, but once you document it down it benefits a lot of people to 
go forward.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
The issues database evolves as knowledge accumulates. MC from the data conversion team 
in Malaysia site A remarked that with each new implementation, her team learns more. 
They represent that in the system, and make it thus accessible to other sites facing possibly 
similar problems. Once the experts like her team have pasted information in the database, 
it becomes the problem owners’ responsibility to retrieve it.  
 
“Every time when a new site is coming in, we make sure that we paste every issue in 
the Lotus Notes database. We have an IT enterprise issue database where we posted 
all kinds of issues so that every site will have the knowledge of what's going on, even 
if it doesn't happen to their organization. So eventually it is up to the individuals to 
read that.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
Patterns of use: Problem owner perspective 
Scholars have started to document some of the ways in which people use groupware 
(Ciborra et al., 1996; Majchrzak et al., 2000a, 2000b). These systems formalize work 
processes and make them more explicit. They offer remote communications capabilities 
with extensive documentation functionality, often in an integrated manner: 
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“We communicate through Lotus Notes all the time. Every site would have Lotus 
Notes. So what happens is that we write an email to someone maybe in China, and 
they see there is a link to this database here (in Singapore - author). So when they 
receive the link they double click on this link and they go straightaway to the 
document.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
In this section, we explore how people use the system in combination with remote 
interpersonal exchanges. The extensive collection of resources in the issues database 
encourages people to look first of all in the system for answers to their questions. Others 
may have encountered a similar situation and already initiated a resolution process. If that 
happens, it is represented in the system. This avoids reinventing the wheel and avoids 
redundant communications, as JPL points out: 
 
“Normally we keep track of the project by issues of the project in Lotus Notes by 
modules. Like for AP (example of Oracle module - author) these are the issues. So 
when you have a problem, the first thing is you go to the issues database to check 
whether that problem has already been logged in by somebody. Whether that problem 
has already been discussed with our vendor Oracle. And they could say: “Yeah it's a 
problem”, and they are creating a patch for it. So the Lotus Notes database is the first 
point of contact normally, before we post any issues.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
GP from the same Singaporean team confirms that when he faces an issue, he starts 
looking at the documentation available in Lotus Notes. Only when that resource does not 
suffice, does he contacts peers: 
 
“What I do is when I face a problem like this is I go through the Lotus Notes database 
where they just put in all the issues they faced and how they solved them. So I try to 
look into that. And if I get anything meaningful there, then I use that. Otherwise I just 
call directly to the people.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
According to HHT, people commonly look first at the Lotus Notes database for entries on 
similar problems. They may also call more experienced counterparts for assistance. This 
could be in-person, where the expert tells the problem owner on the phone or by email how 
to resolve an issue. Or the expert refers to a part of the Lotus Notes database that the 
problem owner could not find on his own. Like Majchrzak, Rice et al. (2000) asserted in 
their research, people use groupware not as an exclusive platform for collaboration (see 
Figure 32). It constitutes rather a sophisticated, person-independent documentation 
environment (Figure 33). In that role, it helps people to find information that would 
otherwise require elaborate interpersonal exchanges. Groupware thus substitutes in part for 
(remote) communications. It substitutes in part for remote interpersonal contact and 
economizes it:  
 
“The various sites are able to communicate in the sense that the US may have 
encountered the problem before, and then they document it and then they may already 
have found a solution. So when we have a problem, either we go in and look for 
similar problems or (...) we just ask them on this. And they may say: “Oh yeah, OK 
this happened before and it was documented”. So they just need to point us to the 
documentation, that is in the issues database. So that is how we share and learn 
experiences from them. So the issues database is (...) a very good tool for us. Even 
now we still do it. Although we implemented already, but they may still have new 
problems, new issues that come along, so we just document it and then we just ask 
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around whether anybody has seen this before, then we can share experience.” - HHT, 
DiskCo-B-1 
 
While talking with JPL, he focused our attention also on another side of groupware. 
Explicitness and transparency seem to get another connotation in a hierarchical 
organization structure. Since the system clearly shows priorities and pending issues, 
management may start using it as a control tool. By checking the system regularly, they see 
progress of tasks. In a sense, they are looking electronically over the shoulders of 
subordinates (Ciborra et al., 1996). As JPL pointed out, this makes them hesitant to raise 
issues. If for any reason there is little progress, management may not be aware of that and 
only look at the system. This makes subordinates not look good and leads to circumvention 
of Lotus Notes. People prefer to contact counterparts by phone or email to retain a sort of 
informal lateral process, rather than entering their problem in the open virtual environment.  
 
“We try not to raise too many issues in the database because this level (points 
managerial and executive level on a chart - author) is always looking at these kind of 
issues. So what you do is normally by experience we know people from the same 
project team doing the same kind of system. So we write an email to them, to see 
whether they faced this kind of problem in that kind of environment. If they do, how to 
solve it. Normally, we solve things on that level first (i.e., team member level - author) 
before you put it up as an issue. Because once you have an issue everybody is 
looking at the issue. And it's not good to have an issue open for so long. (…) If they 
cannot solve it, they think they need to proceed further, then they will put it up as an 
issue. Or maybe it's a problem and they are not sure what it is, could be a bug in the 
system. Then after a few times they say: “Oh it's serious. We should better put it up 
as an issue”. Then we put it up as an issue.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
§ 9.2.5.6  Limits to Coordinating by Documentation 
Documentation is a means of impersonal coordination mechanisms that include operating 
procedures, plans, and standards (Blau & Scott, 1962). Scholars have argued that this 
category of mechanisms applies to tasks that are structured, i.e. known in advance (Kumar 
& van Dissel, 1996; Van de Ven et al., 1976). Conversely, the limitation of structured 
mechanisms lies in the nature of tasks that are coordinated. If work becomes less 
predictable, structured coordination becomes less relevant (Galbraith, 1973; Victor & 
Blackburn, 1987).  
In the Oracle case, documentation practices faced a related constraint. US sites had 
implemented first, so most documentation reflected their experience. They had developed 
elaborate procedures for the implementation process and data conversion. This information 
applied generally speaking to the Far East setting. However, on some occasions, the unique 
local situation limited their usefulness. For instance, in Malaysia, several interfaces had to 
be developed between Oracle and legacy systems (Galbraith, 1973). This changed the data 
conversion process compared with US sites. As JNL, manager of the data conversion team 
explains, her team had to develop novel procedures to handle these situations: 
 
“The US team came up with conversion document. (…) So they specify the 
programming that was used for the extraction of the data from the legacy system. And 
they also document down for the loading portion, what are the programs that were 
used and what are all the scripts that have to be run. It’s basically a technical kind of 
document. (…) Most of the time for most of the cases it is applicable. They gave us 
the programs that they have used, but what we needed to do was to review each of 
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the programs to see what are the criteria that have been incorporated in the program 
to see if they fit our requirements. Most of the time it does, but for specific sites and 
countries we have to make all the changes.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
A key user in Finance from the same site - SKL - echoes her point. Knowledge posted in 
the Lotus Notes infrastructure has been derived from operational contexts that differ from 
the Malaysian site. Unique local requirement thus make that infrastructure less relevant 
(Goodman & Darr, 1998): 
 
“The Lotus database does not fully cover our needs at [Malaysia site A]. Because all 
these special needs are very unique to the site. So it's very difficult to post all these 
things into the Oracle database.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
Structured coordination mechanisms have another limitation. Even though sites operate in 
a similar manner, documentation from one location may not suffice for another one. It may 
not reflect the full measure of tacit and explicit know-how that is required for 
accomplishing a certain task (Polanyi, 1967). An expert’s competence could be reflected to 
a limited degree in a set of procedures. The novice attempting to achieve a desired output 
merely from represented activity procedures may therefore fail. Kogut and Zander (1992) 
point at this constraint of formal mechanisms like recipes or checklists:  
 
“(…) a blueprint favors much more a description of information than know-how. 
Knowing how to do something is much like a recipe; there is no substantive content in 
any of the steps, except for their capacity to produce a desired end. The information is 
contained in the original listing of ingredients, but the know-how is only imperfectly 
represented in the description” (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 386-387) 
 
In the Oracle project, documentation did not enable a sort of do-it-yourself conversion 
process. It rather emphasized formal dimensions and milestones that people would 
encounter. They could use it to sort of benchmark their local processes. For instance, the 
data conversion group in Malaysia site A came up with extensive checklist for other sites. 
These were not intended to let local sites do their own data conversion, but “more for 
validation of data that was converted” (DiskCo-F-1).  
 
Another example concerns the approach of the go-live date. Until that time, DiskCo staff 
in locations other than Singapore site A could pull most information from the databases, 
following templates and the like. But after a certain point, they had to switch to mutual 
adjustment (Mintzberg, 1979). In a distributed project like the Oracle conversion, this 
implied face-to-face contact with more experienced staff in the US or Singapore site A. 
SKL from Malaysia site A comments:  
 
“For certain things we can refer to the database. Like for testing we can refer to the 
library (digital Oracle library in Lotus Notes environment - author) and the issues 
database. But when we are going to convert, that means we are going to migrate to a 
new system, then we will arrange a trip with the key users to Singapore site A to see 
how things work out with the live database.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
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§ 9.2.6  Face-to-face versus Remote, Electronically Mediated Collaboration
47
 
 
“We use virtual teams all the time. But there are other projects where because of the 
length of the project, and complexity it may make more sense for people to go there 
for this project.” - Executive, DiskCo Information Technologies, Singapore
48
 
 
“If you do a cross-country type of project, it is more challenging, and of course you 
have more problems to look after.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
Work division in the DiskCo project created multiple remote dependencies:  
 
 US sites supported Malaysia site A and Singapore site A. They helped Malaysia with 
data conversion, and Singapore with the overall Oracle implementation process 
 Malaysia site A and Singapore site A supported Far East sites in Singapore, Malaysia, 
China, and Japan.  
 SysCo staff in India worked for Singapore site A.  
 
Technically speaking, people could handle these workflows remotely. They could make 
phone calls, check emails, and use groupware for remote communications and data 
transfer. In reality, however, interviewees preferred sometimes co-presence over mediated 
communications. This triggered our interest in questions like: What is the difference 
between remote and local collaboration? Why and when do people want to see their 
counterparts face-to-face? This intrigued us in particular since traveling is associated with 
additional costs, like time and money. We seek to answer these questions in this section. 
We grouped our analysis around five main perspectives.  
First, we focus on the way people from Singapore and Malaysia site A experienced local 
versus remote collaboration with US sites. Second, we expand on the perspective of people 
in Singapore on collaboration with other Far East sites. Third, we focus more specifically 
on how they experienced working with people in China, either locally or remotely. Fourth, 
we explore how people at Malaysia site A perceive local versus remote collaboration in the 
Far East. Fifth and finally, we do the same for collaboration between Singapore site A 
team members and vendor staff from SysCo, India.  
 
§ 9.2.6.1  Experience with US Sites 
 
“After you have seen the person (US counterpart - author) it's easier to work with 
them. They know you!  Let's say you write an email to someone you don't know. But 
after you have talked to them and you worked with them, you know the people well, so 
it's easier to work and communicate with them. Sometimes they will just ignore you 
                                                 
47 We assume here that people working at the same site have the opportunity to see each 
other face-to-face. Exceptions occur, but are not considered here, like local colleagues 
travelling or teleworking.  
48 Transcribed from interview by Professor K. Lee, Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore in 1994. Used by kind persmission.  
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because they don't know who you are. You have to introduce yourself and what is your 
responsibility.” - SCC (IT project member Singapore site A), DiskCo-J-1 
 
The relationship between US sites and Malaysia and Singapore site A was crucial for the 
Far East implementation. The data conversion team in Malaysia contacted peers in the US 
who had been responsible for similar tasks there. Similarly, the team in Singapore 
connected to US counterparts to learn from their overall Oracle implementation 
experience.  
 
People at different levels and areas connected to the US with their questions. Not only did 
they need general know-how on Oracle and DiskCo customizations. To some extent, the 
Far East sites had also unique requirements that were channeled for US approval through 
Singapore site A. These had to be prioritized and possibly translated into requests for 
Oracle customizations. As a result, duplex knowledge and information dependencies 
emerged. First, Far East sites learned and pulled knowledge from the US.  
Second, their demand for new customizations required explanations to US staff. The 
challenge there was that US staff did not know Far East operations in detail. They needed 
first of all insight in the background of Far East user requirements. The diversity of Far 
East and US sites thus led to novelty and uncertainty on the US side. This in turn triggered 
knowledge flows from the Far East to the US. Interviewees from Singapore and Malaysia 
responsible for channeling these user requirements indicated that they preferred a face-to-
face meeting with US staff for the initial phase of explanation and knowledge transfer.  
 
One IT member of the Singapore site A team pointed out that users from Far East sites 
identified many gaps for the module she handles. This means that the Oracle ERP does not 
map perfectly to current business processes. In order to explain these gaps to her US 
counterparts, she arranged a visited. While subsequent phases of the review process are 
handled remotely, this initial part required co-presence: 
 
“Different modules were handled in different ways. For myself I flew to the US to 
discuss the user requirements with them. So they can have a better understanding. 
And then they would write up the detailed design specifications and ask for a review 
before they proceed. (…) They want to have a better understanding because there are 
quite a few gaps for the module that I am handling. So I flew down. Because for the 
past I was in charge of this pay bill module in MANMAN. So I know the requirements 
very well. I went down there and briefed them on the existing requirements, and see 
how can we fit these requirements into Oracle, (…) and write the customization in 
Oracle. Or probably they can propose some alternative way of doing things. (…) I flew 
down there, so it's quite easy. I mean face-to-face we talk to each other, it's easier to 
explain. (…) Normally we will try to write out specifications and we give the 
specifications to the US to review through email.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
This team member faced the challenge of getting people from another context (here: US) 
understand and act on local (Far East) user requirements. The difficulty is that this 
concerns unique, location-specific know-how. It is ‘sticked’ to the site (von Hippel, 1994), 
and embedded in local routines. These properties imply that asynchronous, textual 
transmission or phone calls do not suffice. Instead, a rich and interactive face-to-face 
discussion is preferred to present local requirements and frame them for US staff. Back and 
forth discussions help to express and align people’s different points of view. This is 
supported by a range of supportive resources, like documents. Remotely, it would be 
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difficult to achieve a similar compressed effectiveness as the Project Manager of the Data 
Conversion Team (Malaysia) told us: 
 
“(Face-to-face meetings) are very helpful. When I setup a planned meeting with the 
person in the US, I have some preparation to do on my side. That means, I have to 
compile the things that I want to discuss with her. And I have all the documents that I 
need to show her, which is something that you can't do through email. So I can really 
get the right message across to her with all the examples at the same time.” - JNL, 
DiskCo-F-1 
 
The efficiency of co-presence meetings is echoed by an IT team member from Singapore 
site A. She liaises with US sites and compares face-to-face meetings with remote email 
contact. According to her, co-presence facilitates direct and fast collaboration cycles. She 
values the instantaneous question/ clarification cycles that may include all kinds of 
supportive resources. Remote contact, on the other hand, is more time consuming. People 
must represent their thoughts and resources in a textual/ graphical mode. This 
communication approach is not only lean and therefore more likely to trigger counter 
questions for clarification. It is also asynchronous. While the minimal cues require more 
exchanges, the asynchronicity then stretches these into a chain of back and forth messages.  
 
“With email you need to draft out what you have to write. Because sometimes they 
read your message but may not understand what you are trying to say. Then they will 
write back again to ask some specific questions. But if you sit down face-to-face, 
anything that we are not sure of, we can maybe draw all the charts for them so that 
they can see. If you write an email you have to draw all those graphic things, it takes 
time.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Co-presence not only facilitates a particular meeting itself. It establishes some form of 
working relationship that affects posterior collaboration instances in a positive manner 
(Gabarro, 1990). The Director Applications Development describes this process for her 
relationship with US counterparts:  
 
“Because through the meeting you also get to know them, by discussion, by the 
meeting we have. (…) . Through the communication - I don't know how to describe it - 
but you feel the difference. After seeing them and just talking to them it is much 
easier. And then through this Oracle project, quite a number of some of the key US 
people also have been charged to travel over here either to do some training for us, or 
to come here to revise things. Because like doing the gap development we have the 
various groups of people helping us to do the development. So some of them do come 
fly over here to work with the users here and to talk to the core team. So from there 
we get to know each other better, so it helps in the project.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Because of these effects, DiskCo organizes bi-monthly a world wide meeting in the US for 
global IT management. People with local managerial roles in the IT function meet face-to-
face. Co-presence of this group promotes interactions and mutual understanding that would 
be difficult to accomplish remotely.  
 
“Of course [remote communication] is not as effective as local meetings. So we also 
have at least once every 2 months a so called worldwide meeting in the US, where all 
the various sites directors will have to fly in to the US to have a meeting there. Not all 
directors actually, but representatives. Like for [Singapore site A] normally CPW will 
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have to be there for all this meeting. And then sometimes I was also invited to be 
there to also see how things are done, to experience it.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Even with visits and electronic communications, people found it difficult to build 
relationships with US counterparts like they did within the Far East region. The project 
manager data conversion from Malaysia site A points out that contacts in the latter region 
are more frequent and thus conducive to establishing rapport: 
 
“I travel to Singapore quite often. So when I am there, I interact with them very 
closely. I join them for lunch, sometimes they take me out for a dinner. So I guess that 
builds up our relationship. Sometimes you don't talk just about work, it's also about 
our personal live, our families. (…) I guess it is very good to know a bit of their 
background. (…) With the US it's not like that I would say. Unless you really 
communicate very often. Otherwise I think it is quite difficult to achieve that.” - JNL, 
DiskCo-F-1 
 
§ 9.2.6.2  Singapore and Far East Sites 
 
“If you understand the background of people, it's much easier to work them. If I know 
what term they should be using and what type of environment they are in, it's much 
easier for me to communicate to them. (…) You can understand roughly what type of 
problem he or she will be facing. It's much easier that way.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
Mr. GP has been IT member of core team in Singapore site A. He was stationed in a 
responsible position at Singapore site E to handle the local implementation project. In that 
role, he encountered complex, unique requirements for which he often contacted 
colleagues in Singapore site A and the US. This broadened his experience in local and 
remote team collaboration. Here, he compares these modes in a teleconferencing interview 
between Singapore site A and E. 
 
“The difference is communicating with them, and (…) pass on to them information (…). 
And the problem solving, sometimes it gets delayed. Sometimes what I find is that 
when you talk face-to-face you see a lot of facial expressions that show how important 
it is to the other person. But you don't get this chance when you talk over the phone, 
or send an email. So that makes a difference when you work with remote projects: you 
need to be more systematic and you have to know precisely what you are going to do 
and how you are going to communicate to them and how you are going to use them.  
But if you are having a project that is local, and if the persons - project team members 
and the project people - are around in the same place, in the same location, then 
there is a natural tendency (interviewee laughs - author) to keep things a little bit cool, 
and we always have a saying that ‘OK anything that happens can immediately be 
solved’. Whereas in a distributed, remote project you have to be very careful when 
you handle a project and you have to plan everything properly.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
GP claims that when people meet face-to-face, they can utilize a range of cues that are not 
available with electronic media. These visual cues represent comprehensively someone’s 
communicative behaviors. Collocation also allows for informal work and interaction 
processes. Issues can be resolved when they emerge in an impromptu fashion.  
 
With remote collaboration, this changes in multiple ways. People lack the richness of face-
to-face interactions. Their assessment of counterparts is therefore less precise. They simply 
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know less of other people, contexts, activities, priorities and so on. Contacts are also less 
frequent, informal, and at random. They have to be setup more deliberately. Overall, 
collaboration becomes more formal, and pre-coordinated. The coordination moment shifts 
to an earlier moment. People make expectations explicit as early as possible. They plan 
collaborative processes, and by doing so, they reduce uncertainty. As a consequence, 
communications become more focused, complete, fault-free and functionally oriented than 
in collocated settings. People attempt to leave little room for questions to minimize 
communication loops. This demands careful preparation and ex ante knowledge 
acquisition. GP continues:  
 
“In remote projects you have to be more systematic than working in a local project. 
That is, proper plannings, proper procedures, and your documentation should be up-
to-date. Before you really start telling people and to explain the procedures, we need 
to make sure that we understand the context very well. Communication between sites 
should be complete. And there should be very minimum errors and very minimum 
clarifications coming from the other site. What I'm saying is: your documentation and 
whatever you explain through phone or email should be more precise compared to the 
local projects you handle.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
Economizing on remote communication loops is important. In local settings people can 
easily interact and clarify at little effort. This is often unfeasible in a distributed setting. 
Exchanges are often asynchronous because of the medium (email), or because people are 
not available for time zone differences or other reasons. Handling uncertain tasks this way 
stretches the problem resolution process into a chain of back and forth communications. 
Compared to face-to-face communications, time lapses between exchanges tend to be 
longer. GP explains this difference:  
 
“Sometimes it happens that if the person is around with you in the place you are 
working, it is easy to explain and get the things done fast. Rather than talking through 
the phone or to explain through mail and get them to understand. There is always a 
time gap, and you face little bit of a problem on that. (…) If people work at the same 
site, it goes like this: I'm asking a question and trying to clarify the question and solve 
the problem and work with them. (…) When you work remotely I have to send a file 
and it would be slow, unless they talk over the phone. If the person is sitting in the 
same place, same location, maybe within Singapore itself, things can be readily 
solved and we can come to a conclusion very fast.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
Still, the work can be done remotely. But this demands more attention to communicative 
behaviors as earlier indicated. And it delays problem solving: 
 
“For some of the problems, yes, it's always better to talk face-to-face and get it 
solved. Most of the problems that you face can be solved through email also. But as I 
earlier mentioned, it is just a time delay, that's all.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
The VP from Singapore site A shares GP’s view on the difference between local and 
remote collaboration. Compared to face-to-face discussions, he experiences a gap between 
him and a remote partner when using electronic media. This is caused by the limited cues 
transmitted remotely. The lean representation constrains proper assessment of the 
counterpart’s attitude, behavior, and situation. The resulting lack of knowledge and 
awareness makes remote interaction difficult. One way to resolve this challenge is to rely 
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on earlier common collaboration experiences. This establishes a working relationship that 
obviates communicating with minimal cues (Gabarro, 1990).  
 
“At least within the same organization (i.e., collocated - author) you see each other, 
you know each other fairly well. When you start working together you see each other 
every day. But when working remotely, we ‘see’ each other through the phone, we 
don't really see each other every day. So if we don't have that kind of relationship 
which is built up beforehand, then it's kind of difficult. If you are working with remote 
sites, you never see each other, and you only work through email, voicemail or 
telephone. You always have a gap there. Because even over the phone when I talk to 
you, I never know whether you are really happy, when you say something whether it's 
a joke, or you mean it, or something. Its different. And without working with you for a 
while, I cannot judge how you will behave, and whether you are offended if I say 
something like this.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Typically, interviewees emphasize the role of visits and face-to-face meetings to get to 
know people and gain an intimate understanding of remote contexts. For an executive like 
the VP, this awareness is important. He comments on his investments to sustain close 
interpersonal contacts with people at remote sites: 
 
“We use a lot of voice mail, a lot of email. We have very close contact, I would say. 
Not so much on the lower level, but on the higher level, director level. We have very 
close contact with our counterparts in the US and also with the rest. I think for the Far 
East, the good thing is that all these people here are helping me personally to run the 
operation there. And I visited them very regularly to understand the people, to know 
the people there. All this comes in and plays a very important role. And on top of just 
knowing the IT people, my personal relationship with their management people there, 
director level, execution level, is very good. Because like for [China site A], I am 
personally involved.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
Connecting to remote sites is also important for project members at Singapore site A. Their 
job is to support local implementations. In order to fine-tune their involvement, the 
Singapore team must know context specific issues. They must be aware of diversity 
between local operations and those in Singapore. Like earlier described for the relationship 
between Singapore and US, people transfer and build this understanding of a remote 
setting through visits, i.e., face-to-face meetings. Otherwise, people reach a catch-22 
situation, where local people may not know the difference because they don’t know 
Singapore. And staff in Singapore don’t know either because their information on the 
remote site is incomplete. As this interviewee suggests, information obtained remotely 
differs from local insights. The former type of information represents relevant parameters 
to some extent. But being locally there achieves an insight that is more precise and 
complete.  
 
“Sometimes we can talk about one thing, and end up they are doing something else, 
differently. So it's good that periodically you can visit them and see what is going over 
there. (…) Some of the countries the people like China they will follow whatever you 
say, whatever you have the subsystem they will try to accommodate. But the thing is 
their operation may be slightly different. But they didn't feedback to you. So if you go 
there and visit them and you kind of talk to more people, then you get to know more. 
Then you see that that is not the way they operate. It deviates slightly, and maybe we 
have to have some workaround for that. If I'm talking about feedback, that is when I 
go and talk to them during on-site visits. That is the feedback that I gather. So that's 
why I say it's important to me that I visit them every 3 months or 6 months.  
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I have to do work both locally and remotely. I cannot say - I just sit here (in Singapore 
- author) and know what's going on outside there. The information you get remotely 
might be different from what you get when you visit them. So the first one is that I sit 
here, I look at the system, what reports they have. And I look at the system inside, 
what they have in the data. But I also need to talk to them (on-site - author).” - JLL, 
DiskCo-G-1 
 
Know-how pertaining to a local context tends to remain there (von Hippel, 1994). This is a 
potential problem for site-crossing interdependencies if a context differs from what an 
‘outsider’ is used to. If someone in Singapore tries to help counterparts in China, unique 
dimensions of Chinese operations may not be available in Singapore. This complicates 
inter-context collaboration. In this spirit., a key user from Singapore site A comments on 
her involvement with China:  
 
“Some of the sites have different practices that we are not aware of until we go there 
for the training. Then they realize that “Oh, we are doing something different from 
[Singapore site A]”. Some customs they cannot apply Singapore standards identically 
to China. So they must fine-tune and adjust something to fit their government.” - ST, 
DiskCo-H-1 
 
Visiting sites in China helped her identify local problems. While she was there, she could 
also help people solve problems faster then remotely.  
 
“[Visits to China are] important because I can contact them there. When they have any 
problems they can bring the report to you straightaway, and tell you what type of 
problems they have (…).” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
This experience was shared by another key user from Singapore site A. She stressed that 
working at the same site as users makes it easier to gain understanding of their issues. This 
is because communications are more synchronous and interactive then when 
communicating across sites:  
 
“The final result - yes it's the same, but sometimes you have to go through 2 or 4 
exchanges (with remote users - author). I mean with the mail (email - author) you 
have to clarify so many times. So that is a bit time consuming. But with the local user 
you can talk face-to-face, and understand their operation immediately. (…) I can still 
get the same result, but it does affect. The thing is that it takes longer.” - JLL, DiskCo-
G-1 
 
Remote support makes it harder to contact people. Distance raises some form of barrier. 
Instead of walking to someone’s cubicle, people must invest more effort in connecting to 
remote counterparts. People’s awareness and contacts are most strongly tied to their local 
place of work. Their involvement in remote dependence relationships shows that such ties 
are less across sites, and more difficult to achieve. The combined effect is that people 
experience some form of - what could be referred to as - curtain between contexts. 
Remoteness is perceived as a more indirect form of collaboration as indicated by an IT 
member of the Singapore site A team:  
 
“If he (remote counterpart - author) is in the same physical location, you can walk to 
the person directly. But sometimes when we work in different locations, you may have 
slight difference in terms of like you call them, they are not at their desk, or having a 
meeting. So you can't get them immediately. And you don't know when to call them 
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again. Because you can't see them. You don't know when they will be back at their 
desk.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Collocation not only accelerates problem resolution while people work together in a face-
to-face fashion. It also helps subsequent remote support. One key user from Singapore site 
A remarked that she understood quickly the issue at hand, probably faster then when she 
had supported all the time remotely: 
 
“[Visits facilitate remote contact afterwards:] You can understand roughly what type of 
problem he or she will be facing. It's much easier that way.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
The relevance of on-site visits is echoed by the Director Applications Development. 
Looking back on her experience in the distributed Oracle project, she emphasized the 
importance of getting to know remote contexts better:  
 
“[I would prefer] to have more exposure on how the other plants run their business. 
Especially for China I haven’t time because of the project to go there and look at the 
factory itself, to understand the people, and to know more people in the China plant.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Apparently, visits enable better connections to local people and practices than working 
remotely. People need that connection that encompasses knowledge of remote counterparts 
and possibly relationships with them. Especially with intense dependencies across sites, 
this become important (Gabarro, 1990; Van de Ven et al., 1976).  
 
§ 9.2.6.3  Singapore site A and Chinese Sites 
The core team in Singapore site A was not only responsible for local implementations. It 
was also assigned a supporting role towards other sites. We zoom in on the way they 
assisted DiskCo locations in China. They did that in part remotely and sometimes on-site. 
The question we seek to answer here is how to chose between these two options. Before 
doing that, we explore in more detail the form of dependence between the teams in 
Singapore and China.  
 
Assistance is a variant of agency dependence. The latter implies a delegation relationship: 
the principal delegates a task to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989a). This triggers a workflow 
from the agent towards the principal, i.e., the main performance. On a different level, the 
principal and agent participate also in knowledge and information exchanges. The 
principal must receive information on the agent’s behaviors and/ or outputs (Govindarajan 
& Fisher, 1990; Kirsch & Cummings, 1996). Before that, the agent needs to know the 
principal’s preferences.  
 
Assistance (dependence) is conceived here as a form of agency relationship. The person-
to-be-assisted maps to the principal role, the person-assisting is seen as the agent. The 
difference is that the agent performs a task for the principal, while the person-assisting 
helps the other actor to do his job. It is like person B helping A in the kitchen, versus B 
preparing a complete meal for A. The two relationships overlap in the sense that (parts of) 
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a job are accomplished by someone other than the person ultimately responsible and 
receiving the job’s result. 
 
We can map the agency dependencies discussed above to the assistance relationship (Table 
29). The table shows in the first two rows knowledge and information dependencies. The 
third row represents the workflow dependence, while the gray row at the bottom shows the 
roles for teams in Singapore and China. Arrows depict the direction of the various flows.  
 
Table 29 - Agency and assistance dependence 
 
 Principal/ person  
to be assisted (A) 
Direction 
of flow 
Agent/ person assisting (B) 
A provides information/ 
knowledge on his expectations/ 
context to B 
 
 
B needs information/ 
knowledge on A’s 
expectations and context 
Knowledge & 
information flow 
A needs information on B’s 
assistance/ performance  
 B provides information on his 
assistance/ performance 
Flow of activities 
 
A receives assistance/ 
performance from B 
 B assists/ performs for A 
DiskCo: Sites China, Malaysia  Singapore site A 
Outsourcing: Singapore site A  SysCo India 
 
Applied to DiskCo, assistance dependence implies that the Singapore team provides an 
assistance workflow to China (and Malaysia). Fueling that process is a knowledge and 
information flow from China to Singapore (the top row in Table 29). In other words, 
people in Singapore must understand the intricacies of China operations to customize their 
support. In that context, local visits played an important role. One IT team member from 
Singapore site A explains why: 
 
“I spent a month there (China - author) doing some system study. It's something 
requested by myself. Because (…) I want to know more about the business and see it. 
So that's why I requested that I started on a fresh site, that's China. (...) So he (the 
VP - author) assigned this task for me. I spent about 3 weeks there trying to learn 
about MANMAN and overall what's going on. So I tried to be a coordinator for this, 
tried to do the mapping (i.e., of current business processes to Oracle ERP 
functionality - author). (…) Basically what we do is we just pass our experience to 
them. We have gaps analysis, we have CRP, we liaise with the users there. We just 
pass on to them what we know, what we do here (Singapore - author). (…) I think the 
most important thing is to pay them a visit, look how they look like. So when you talk 
to them on the phone it's easier to visualize, it's easier for us to work. (…) If I don't 
know you when you start talking on the phone, I can't visualize how you smile and 
when you are angry how it looks like. I think it's important to meet them at least once. 
It's a very important thing to get an impression of the person. So when you liaise with 
them on the phone it's so easy, it's much easier.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
The team member stresses the role of on-site visits. When working face-to-face, he 
absorbed local impressions. For subsequent remote support, these complemented the 
minimal cues provided by electronic media (Carlson & Zmud, 1999).  
 
The visit itself connected him closely to local people and their ways of working. He could 
look at documents and other resources that represent the local situation in a straightforward 
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manner. Remotely, people would have to put effort in representing these to him. Being 
there also allowed for extensive meetings that could not be conducted as easily on a 
distance: 
 
“If you gonna do an interview with someone overseas it's harder. But if you 
(interviewee gives an example and refers to interviewers at this point - author) can 
see me you can get more information. I can draw this (interviewee points at earlier 
made drawings - author); clearly you know what I'm trying to tell you. And I use less 
words to explain because I use more visual (ways) to explain to you.  
So it's the same thing there. When I go there I ask them all: “How do you ship this 
thing (the drives manufactured in China - author) out?” And they say: “Oh we have to 
go through Shanghai customs.” But if you show me the paper with this information it's 
OK (clear), straightaway.  
On-site is important if you want to have longer days of meeting, and it's important to 
see the thing. Unless maybe we come at a stage where the technology is so advanced 
that we don't see time lapse between the lips and the words, and things are moving 
very normally. But to me, I think to be closer to the person is always nicer than seeing 
them on TV. So this kind of thing, technology cannot replace it, no, no. That's what I'm 
saying: the meeting and all this is important. You must at least see the person once.” - 
JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
Meeting counterparts from another company context in person implies a closer connection 
to the people in that place, and resources like documents. On a distance, people must 
represent their world. This costs in itself more effort and appears less complete - even with 
advanced IT - than having someone from abroad submerge in another context and 
experience its nature for himself.  
 
JPL continues reflecting on his decisions to support remotely or fly down to China. 
Situations that justify investments in co-presence include: long meetings and large groups 
of people that need to work on cross-functional, novel issues. For instance, the conference 
room pilot requires intense collaboration between users and IT. His local participation 
allows for interactive discussions on resolving pressing issues on the spot. From 
Singapore, it would be difficult for him to be involved in a similar manner in these group 
problem solving events:  
 
“Get together I think it would help a lot. Because if we have a group of people together 
they understand each other better. But subsequently you don't have to travel all the 
time. And if you think you need to go down again, I mean is that necessary? Like for 
example I went there for a systems study, I think it's necessary. I can't do a remote 
study because it takes time. I was there for a classroom pilot, CRP, I was there 
because I need to be there. Because it's easier - everybody is in the classroom. (…) 
We have business people from Materials and Finance, with people from Storage and 
whatever, together in a room to do a whole week of business testing. I think we have 
to be there, it's quite difficult to support them remotely. Because they may have 
pressed you on the spot if they need. Sometimes the lease line is quite difficult to get 
through. So we have to be there. I mean track down most of their problems, try to 
have a workaround solution and get back to them. So this is important. Because we 
have the experience here. (…) And I went there when they implemented. So these are 
the 3 times I need to be there: system study, CRP training and business test, and 
implementation. But in between there are just basically emails and phone calls. (…) I 
visit when I think physical presence would be better than just a phone call.” - JPL, 
DiskCo-I-1 
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An important phase in the implementation process is training. In terms of Table 29, this is 
part of the basic workflow from Singapore site A towards China. Visits play an important 
role for this activity too. Remote training is less suitable for large groups and instances 
where experiential learning is required:  
 
“You can do remote training for a small group. Like for example there is a training on 
order entry. We use NetMeeting. NetMeeting is very widely used here or we use 
Proxy. Proxy is software that works like: this guy gets a computer screen that I can 
see or the guy can also move the mouse. So then we use a conference plus the 
NetMeeting to conduct some training when we think that is possible and effective. So 
those are the trainings that we also have. But we also send people down there to 
conduct training. It's kind of limited in the sense that NetMeeting is one-to-one or can 
be one-to-many. But we cannot get in the same room if we are too many people. 
NetMeeting is not so interactive. It’s like I keep talking - talking - talking, and users 
don’t really have a chance to practice because it’s instructive on how to do it. So only 
when you stop the user can start to practice. But it’s not so real-time, not so 
interactive. So for certain simple applications, simple entries we can do this.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-5 
 
More specific on the job training close before the turn live date also relies on co-presence. 
People fly down to Singapore site A to experience hands-on working with the new system. 
Giving people that immersive feel is apparently unfeasible on a distance. The process of 
discovering and learning very novel skills cannot be replicated remotely (CPW, DiskCo-A-
5). On-site presence plays also an important role for the last phase of the conversion, 
around the turn-live date. For this critical stage of the projects, IT staff and key users from 
Singapore site A come down to local sites to assist. Their presence allows for time-pressed 
response to any remaining issues:  
 
“The IT people (from Singapore site A - author) are really helping the local IT. (…) 
When I know the conversion we will have people from here over there, helping them. 
The key user also go over there to help them. And we stay 1 week after the turn live, 
just to make sure that all the initial issues we have enough people there to help them. 
(…) We believe that within a week any problem they can see will pop up by then. Do 
not forget they already have a local IT group that is also fairly involved in 
understanding the Oracle application. So basically this is the same structure that we 
apply to every plant.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5  
 
§ 9.2.6.4  Malaysia site A and Far East Sites 
The IT team in Malaysia site A was responsible for data conversion in the Oracle ERP 
project. In that role, they assisted sites in Singapore, Malaysia, China and Japan. They also 
liaised with the US to tap into their experiences. The project manager for data conversion 
in Malaysia gives her perspective on working with remote sites. She observes that working 
with people at the same site creates natural opportunities for sharing day-to-day issues. 
With remote sites, the impromptu character of these exchanges is lost to some extent. This 
means that people remain unaware of things going on at distant locations, leading to 
information and knowledge gaps. Without dependencies across sites, people do not 
experience this phenomenon as problematic. Yet in a distributed project environment like 
DiskCo’s Oracle ERP implementation, dependencies across sites demand much closer 
connectivity (Galbraith, 1973; Thompson, 1967). This is because local implementations 
are embedded in regional and global project plannings. And they utilize common 
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resources, like the team in Singapore site A, and the data conversion team in Malaysia site 
A. The project manager from Malaysia comments on how this connectivity can be 
archived:  
 
“I think you have to adapt a little bit if you are working with people on a remote site. 
Because you don't meet them physically, so I think you have to put more effort in 
trying to keep them in contact with you. Keep them updated with whatever information 
that you have. (…) I guess you have to do that so that they feel that they are being 
updated. (…) Because you are not able to discuss with them any issues at any time of 
the day. If you are working with a local team, you can chat with them during lunch, 
during tea. So I guess the difference is there. It (information sharing - author) has to 
be two-way. Because if they are working remotely, then quickly things are happening 
over there that you are not aware of, but that may affect your schedule or your work. 
So I guess it has to be two-way.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
The project manager emphasizes local attitudes and efforts that help overcome knowledge 
and information gaps between sites. Sustaining a network of updated sites relies on local 
players who keep their counterparts in mind and share information (Weick & Roberts, 
1993). As the quote reveals, avoiding knowledge and information gaps is especially 
important for polycontextual environments that combine cross-site dependence and 
uncertainty. Dependence spreads the impact of uncertainty across sites. In fact, this is an 
application of March and Simon’s (1958: 169) insight in the combination of uncertainty 
and predictability. Even with the remote networking capabilities earlier described, the 
project manager data conversion sees a role for collocated interactions. Group meetings 
with people from different functional areas may benefit from co-presence. This facilitates 
interaction which may not be necessary for other communication instances: 
 
“I would say it's a situation dependent kind of thing. If you are trying to go through the 
conversion checklist to try to finalize what are the activities you are going to do for the 
particular conversion with them, then if it involves different people from different 
areas, setting up a face-to-face meeting definitely helps very much.  
But if it's just trying to convey an issue over to a local group, even to a person from 
the other site, I think an email is sufficient if you can convey your message correctly 
and clearly.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
For her involvement with the implementation in Japan, she describes the advantage of 
meeting IT staff in person. Face-to-face interaction speeds up uncertainty reduction and 
problem resolution. Clarification loops are instantaneously handled, instead of being 
converted into asynchronous communication cycles. 
 
“I think meeting a person is very helpful. Even during the time when I met up with the 
IT person (from Japan - author), I was able to discuss many things with him. But it 
was unplanned. If you are communicating with the person by email rather than directly 
(face-to-face - author), sometimes you post them some questions and you have to 
wait for them to reply. So meeting them in person really speeds up. I think it is not 
necessary (to meet face-to-face - author), we can still get what we want without 
meeting them. But I guess if you do have a chance to meet them in person, that will 
help.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
One of JNL’s team members in Malaysia reflects on participation in the Oracle ERP 
project. Her role is to work with local staff on the initial stage of data conversion. She 
points at the tension between a tight project schedule and working in a distributed 
 317
environment. A contributing factor here is the fact that she works with new people at each 
implementation site. To these people, data conversion is a novel task. Consequently, a lot 
of (remote) communications are needed for analyzing requirements and briefing 
procedures.  
 
“If you need a tight schedule then for a distributed environment we cannot afford that. 
It's harder to have a very tight schedule because of the distance. Key factor is for the 
distributed sites (…), they have to start from the beginning. All this takes time: I have 
to explain the whole thing, and communicating with them causes delays. If you are 
working with the same people, let's say when we are working for Singapore, the 
manufacturing in Singapore, but the IT people if they have assigned the same person, 
then I find that it's much easier when we are converting the next site. Because we 
don't have to deal with the same thing again. So when the person understands what 
the requirements are, everything can speed-up. If even the users we communicate 
with are people who have been through the conversion before, they will be more 
effective and they can understand the procedure and give us faster feedback.” - MC, 
DiskCo-E-1  
 
In this environment, she prefers minimal face-to-face exchanges. This applies in particular 
to complicated data conversions that are time-pressed. Face-to-face meetings are richer and 
interactive. This speeds up the conversion process since it allows for on the spot problem 
solving. It also makes subsequent remote support easier:  
 
“I would think it is possible to work from a distance and convert rapidly, but I think we 
need to have at least one meeting face-to-face to become familiar with people, get to 
know them well, and also to learn and understand their requirements. (…) If it is 
complex, like if you are talking about this Singapore site - because of the short timing 
I would have preferred to work locally with them. It will be much faster.  
The previous sites that we converted there is no issue because the time span is quite 
reasonable. So we are given like 3 months to convert one site. We have 2 - 3 trial 
conversions. But for these sites we are really really short of time, so when we want to 
get something done it's not as fast as we want to. (…) I think that at least once during 
the project, the people from various sites who are supposed to work together, should 
meet. After you've met the person, when we talk on the phone or email later it's easier 
to communicate. With face-to-face it's easier to express ourselves. And then when we 
are together it's easier if let's say an issue involves a user then we immediately get 
somebody in, and we can all discuss together and find on the spot what we think. It's 
more interactive.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
Still, she could do without these advantages if need be. When we were interviewing, she 
was working with counterparts in Japan whom she had so far never met before: 
 
“Currently we are converting for Japan. I never met anyone from Japan. So we still 
can get the job done. In fact when I write an email I don't know whom I'm writing to. 
It's just the name and the title.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
During the actual conversion of most sites, she preferred to fly down to assist on-site. 
Apparently, the criticality of the period around turn-live demanded local presence to ensure 
fast responsiveness at little effort: 
 
“With local IT staff we communicate using phone, and emails. And when it comes to 
the real life conversion, we went down personally for a few of the sites. For the life 
conversion, especially for those very critical modules, we went down. Because 
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communication wise it will be faster and easier. And system performance will also be 
faster down at the local site.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
Finally, this IT member from Malaysia site A comments on control challenges in a remote 
project. In a collocated setting, she could observe her counterpart and exert pressure if 
need be. Distance constrains such direct control modes (Staples, 1997). As a consequence, 
more weight is put on people to function autonomously and control their own behavior 
(Dimitrova & Salaff, 1998).  
 
“I think the important thing is that because we are so far away from each other, people 
have to be responsible for what they are assigned to. It's different from when we are 
dealing with local people. If they don't do something, we can always come up to them, 
personally, face-to-face and tell them: “Ah we need this to be done as soon as 
possible”. But when we are far from each other, if the person is not responsible and 
does not want to pick up the phone, or doesn't reply email, yeah, then we have a 
problem. People should be responsible.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
We also had a teleconference with ET - a key user in Inventory Control from Malaysia site 
A - and a couple of her colleagues. They reflected on their experience working with 
Singapore site A staff, both locally and remotely. During implementation at their site, IT 
staff from Singapore site A supported them. According to ET and colleagues, the success 
of that relationship depends on a mixture of visits and remote collaboration technologies. 
They appreciate visits at points in the project when tasks are novel and/ or critical, like 
around kick off and the turn live date. 
 
“We definitely need to have good communication media, we have Lotus Notes, phone, 
lease line and all those things so that we can easily communicate with these people. 
Second thing is that we need to have a database so that we can share the problems 
and information, and where each site is in. And third, the project team should be here 
for presentations before and during the implementation, and even more often when we 
are approaching the conversion, and also after the conversion.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
When Singapore staff is supporting remotely, ET and colleagues experience more of a 
barrier. They may not reach their counterpart directly, and have to divert to other persons 
(colleagues in Singapore), communication moments (calling back later), or media (email 
instead of phone).  
 
“There is some difficulty if we are not able to locate them, or if they do not respond. 
That's when we have some problems that we constantly remind them or check with 
them what's the status, and whether they are working on our project we are not sure. 
(…) We have sometimes difficulty in getting them, sometimes they have their own 
thing to do. And even through a call you might not be able get them. So we have to 
send them a note. At least in this company we are kind of advanced, we are equipped 
with all the Lotus Notes, and the phone lines so that we can get hold of them. If we 
can't get hold of their manager, we try to get hold of the person in charge in their 
office. So basically we don't really have much problem in that sense. In fact we do 
have good support from Singapore.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1  
 
Ideally, ET and colleagues would prefer local, on-site IT support. This would facilitate 
more informal, impromptu access to IT resources. It would also allow for interactive face-
to-face discussions instead of remote communications that are often asynchronous (vmail, 
email) and textual (email). 
 319
 
“We prefer to have local people supporting here rather than remote of course. If we 
have a support team locally we can get hold of them as and when we need to. And 
also the problems will be more or less resolved easier and faster. Also at the same we 
probably save a lot of back and forth emails in Lotus Notes, conference calls, and 
phones and so on. (…) [Using electronic media] is definitely not as effective in terms 
of the prompt response of face-to-face. But that is the only other way we deal 
effectively with remote communication.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
With remote support, formalization of all user requests - even small ones - is more likely. 
People must make their requests explicit by entering it into Lotus Notes groupware. They 
must follow pre-structured standards for prioritizing and problem solving (Ciborra & 
Patriotta, 1996). All this increases the ‘costs’ of collaboration. Compared to that, local IT 
staff could probably solve smaller problems in more low-key fashion that is faster.  
 
“If you are talking about certain requests that you do not have to put in the Lotus 
Notes (e.g. smaller problems - author), then if you have to work with [Singapore site A 
team] you probably do that, you'll ask support (by entering the request in Lotus Notes 
- author). But if we have local support here, this means that we can just pop in their 
office and say “Hey we want this, just help to resolve it” then maybe it is just a quick 
fix. But for certain requests (larger ones - author) we need to set up an official Lotus 
Notes [request] supporting the project, then we will have to do that for local and 
outside, external support.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
  
Local support means less dependence on Singapore site A’s priority setting and time 
frame. This would streamline the process of handling user requests from Malaysia site A:  
 
“I would prefer that the programmer is in [Malaysia site A]. Based on the experience 
that we have is that if [Singapore site A] is supporting the plants of DiskCo, there are 
4 plants they are looking at. So of course they're gonna set all the priorities for project 
enhancements and things like that. If we can have our own programmers here who 
can do the same thing or just maybe coordinate our work with Singapore, then I think 
that would be fast. It would really help us resolve a lot of things that we meet from day 
to day.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
SKL is another key user from Malaysia site A, in the Finance department. She points out 
that remote support from Singapore site A has its boundaries. When operations in both 
sites differ at important points, remote communications are not an effective collaboration 
mode. The risk is that people in Singapore assume that Malaysia operations are similar. (In 
fact, US staff faced a similar problem with Far East sites). In reality they are not. 
Therefore, Singapore staff gives incorrect advice, based assumption that are disconnected 
from real operations in Malaysia. Using Table 29, more information transfer is needed 
from the site-to-be-assisted (A) towards the site that assists (B). The more diverse 
operations in A and B are, the stronger that need will be. After some point, this implies that 
remote communications will not suffice because of limitations like richness and 
interactivity. Instead, on-site immersion is inevitable, either site A representatives visiting 
site B, or vice versa. SKL explains this issue for the relationship between Malaysia site A 
and Singapore site A:  
 
“We face the problem here that we may make a mistake on the ways that we handle 
our […] (technical term - author). Just for example: we asked them (Singapore site A - 
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the phone. And they would tell us to do it that way. But later on we found out that 
there is a better way for our environment. Because the way we handle the document 
flow is a little bit different from [Singapore site A].  
So that is an instant that we have to have a better understanding. Maybe that we go to 
their site to understand exactly how the whole flow is through the documentation. 
Because that will affect the setup. If I have a problem in facing the setup (…) I think 
the different views (Singapore site A versus Malaysia site A - author) can be resolved 
through email and phone. But however, when it comes to handling the data, especially 
like the document flow, I think email is very difficult. Because different sites have 
different ways, so the best way is we go there to see exactly how they do it. Let's say 
I create an invoice. If I want to void it, what is the best control how to void it. So these 
things we have to learn from other sites. For finance we can understand it by email 
and by phone. But we come to a point of time that we feel it would be much better that 
we personally see how they (Singapore site A - author) do it when they turn on Oracle. 
So that we prepare ourselves for that situation when we turn on Oracle. So the key 
users will go to [Singapore site A] to see what exactly they do. And then they come 
back and likewise they will change the rest of the stuff.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
§ 9.2.6.5  Singapore site A and SysCo 
The IT project members in Singapore site A outsourced parts of the development work to 
SysCo, a large software vendor from India. Initially, SysCo programmers worked on-site 
in Singapore. The Director Applications Development told us the reason for this 
comparatively expensive phase: 
 
“I think it would be better for them to come down here to understand the environment. 
They are all experienced Oracle developers. But to do the development for Oracle 
ERP is quite different because you have to follow the standards, and you need to 
understand a little bit on how Oracle ERP is designed, the architecture. We also have 
some [DiskCo] standards that need to be followed, that they need to briefed on. So 
there is always the practice that for maybe the first 3 to 6 months they will come here 
to work on site. It's either on a short project basis. But if it's for a long term project, 
normally we will let them work here for 6 months and then later on they will go back 
there and support from there.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Outsourcing to SysCo can be seen as the creation of an agency or delegation relationship. 
It implies that SysCo staff - as agents - work for DiskCo, the principal. As shown in Table 
29, this creates workflow and knowledge/ information dependencies (see bottom row for 
the outsourcing relationship discussed here). On a workflow level, SysCo staff delivers 
programming services, with completed codes as output. On the second level, DiskCo 
receives information on SysCo’s work progress. Vice versa, in an earlier stage, SysCo staff 
must understand DiskCo’s requirements. Following the Director’s quote, this knowledge 
and information ‘gap’ encompasses a number of areas. First, they must understand the 
overall DiskCo project environment. Second, they must learn and apply DiskCo standards 
for project management and software projects (among these probably the SDLC method). 
Finally, DiskCo staff must become more familiar with Oracle ERP design and architecture. 
 
On-site immersion in DiskCo’s environment was considered necessary to equip SysCo 
staff for the delegated task. At the beginning of such an endeavor, reciprocal dependencies 
coincide with information and knowledge gaps, i.e., novelty. This combination results 
from a deliberate decision (outsourcing/ delegating), and unfamiliarity of agent and 
principal. Concerning the latter, SysCo staff are used to different ways of working, a 
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different organizational context, and even another country. Engaging in a collaborative 
delegation relationship thus requires first of all getting the agent understand the principal’s 
environment. Since that knowledge is somehow embedded in and sticked to a geographical 
location (von Hippel, 1994), on-site immersion during the initial project phase is almost 
inevitable. This enables SysCo staff to explore interactively the new context, and get 
connected there. They can establish working relationships and acquire knowledge on the 
specificity of the principal’s context.  
 
After this initial phase, remote collaboration is feasible for two reasons. First, the DiskCo 
context presents less novelty and thus information processing needs to SysCo staff. 
Second, the nature of the task changes from requirements analysis towards more 
independent tasks, like coding. This reduces interdependence between SysCo staff and 
DiskCo project members. And finally, familiarity with DiskCo’s environment implies that 
lean media suffice for even demanding collaborative tasks (Carlson & Zmud, 1999; 
Gabarro, 1990). The Director Applications Development comments on the reasons for 
having SysCo staff on-site and the transition towards remote support. As a side note, 
DiskCo has equipped SysCo offices with extensive IT infrastructure since they are 
considered a long term partner. But even with this technical connectivity in place, there 
were reasons for on-site presence of SysCo:  
 
“I think the communication was quite efficient through mails and phone. Of course it 
would be preferred that everybody is residing here, but I think that is not possible. It 
was quite OK, although they are stationed there (In India - author). Initially we have 
them all on site. So that basically we get them to learn the environment and to also 
know the people and then understand what needs to be done. And then slowly we 
phase them out by sending them back there to continue doing some more coding. Plus 
it's more expensive to keep them here. Anyway, towards the later part of the project 
they support remotely. Because there is also a big group of people in [SysCo] India 
who support the US in other projects. So we have hardware, and all the network 
infrastructure setup in there for them. So they can work from their own office in India.” 
- HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
An IT member from DiskCo’s team in Singapore site A comments on transition between 
on- and off-site as well. As a reason for on-site presence of SysCo staff, she points at their 
need for understanding the DiskCo environment and requirements. Once this has been 
accomplished, work can be continued from a distance:  
 
“So far, the 3 [SysCo] persons we have they start on site. Because I think that if you 
can work on-site for the start, then you can get to know more of the basic 
requirements. When you work remotely it's probably to provide subsequent support. 
So the most important thing is they must understand the requirement before they work 
remotely.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
She continues with more details on working remotely with SysCo staff. In reality, it 
seemed that SysCo staff were not sufficiently familiar with the Oracle application, despite 
their proficiency in Oracle development tools. After they returned to India, this lack of 
knowledge triggered an extensive communications need that taxed DiskCo staff. They 
attempted to transfer remotely Oracle application knowledge that was required for the 
development work. The DiskCo IT team member explains the burden of this process, 
compared to the preceding collocated phase in Singapore:  
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“Initially we have 3 [SysCo] persons working on-site for us. Later on we only have 1, 
and the other 2 went back to India. After some time, one of them they engaged him in 
another project. So it stopped. And we have 1 working remotely. And there are some 
problems when they provide remote support. Maybe because of communications, you 
cannot really get your message across. Probably because they cannot understand you 
completely. So we need to spend a lot of time explaining through email, or through 
phone.  
When they work here, you can use a lot of diagrams to help them to understand. 
Maybe they are good in the development tools, but they are not familiar with Oracle 
apps (applications - author). So if you need to do customization to be used in Oracle 
apps, you also need a little bit of Oracle apps knowledge. So because of the distance 
you need to use a lot of description and explanation. Actually, when you need to 
prepare some diagrams and you send it through email, you need more time to prepare 
that. But if you are explaining on the spot and using a diagram to help up, you will 
save more time.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Remote communications demand knowledge on both sides. Lack of common task know-
how exacerbates communication needs. Electronic media seem burdensome to support the 
process of building a common frame of reference. This is because each actor must 
represent his understanding and context in a format that can be transmitted electronically. 
Locally, people can share clarifying resources and interact more fluidly.  
 
§ 9.2.7  Using Electronic Communication Media 
 
“If we communicate face-to-face, I guess it's much easier to make things clear. But 
anything through remote communication - I suppose that we have to communicate in a 
very explicit way” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
Electronic media sustained elaborate patterns of remote, interpersonal connectivity at 
DiskCo. This section explores how people used media during the Oracle project. It starts 
with comparing conditions for usage of phone versus e-mail. Then, the role of audio- and 
videoconferencing facilities is assessed. After these single media categories, we look at 
forms of remote multi- media contact, like application sharing. The section concludes with 
factors that surround the use of electronic media, including remote communications 
behaviors.  
 
§ 9.2.7.1  Phone Calls and E-mail 
Of the electronic media at the disposal of DiskCo employees, phone and email were most 
commonly used. In this section, we explore how DiskCo interviewees used these media in 
the Oracle project. They emphasized properties of each mode that defined the conditions 
under which it could be deployed effectively.  
 
Telephone technology support real-time, two-way representation of a person’s voice to 
someone at another site. Compared to e-mail, people do not have to translate their 
communication intention into a textual format. They can just talk like they would if their 
counterpart were in the same space. Email on the other hand supports textual exchanges, 
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and document attachment. It supports predominantly asynchronous exchanges (unless 
people work at the same time and are constantly monitoring their mailbox). 
 
An IT staff member from the core team in Singapore site A experienced phone calls as 
more direct. He appreciated the almost instantaneous feedback loops. Issues that leave 
room for interpretation and questions can be clarified within a single phone conversation. 
With email, interpersonal exchanges become more stretched. They leave more room for 
guessing as feedback loops take longer or are incomplete.  
 
“[With email] sometimes you cannot picture whether he (the interviewee’s counterpart 
- author) understand the things in there, and whether it's clear English. Whereas when 
you talk it will be so interactive and you can explain and you can quote some 
examples. Because when you write to the person, you think (emphasis in interview - 
author) that whatever I'm writing can be understood by the other person, but you 
really don't know what kind of understanding the other person has got, and what kind 
of questions he wants to ask on this. So basically there is a lot of difference when you 
put the whole thing through email versus when you talk to the person directly.” - GP, 
DiskCo-D-1 
 
Similarly, SKL - a key user from Malaysia site A - indicated a slight preference for calling. 
According to her, people can transmit a topic more comprehensively than through textual 
exchanges. This facilitates the job of the person on the receiving end.  
 
“I do not really have a preference for different media. They (remote counterparts - 
author) can either write us an email or go by phone. Preferably we talk over the 
phone. Because it's clearer. Because if you talk over the mail, there are some things 
that they answer to us that we may not really catch. We may not really understand the 
fullness of it. So it's better to communicate through the phone.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
Phone calls encourage people to give examples and elaborate on a point that is not self-
explanatory. JNL from the Malaysia data conversion team prefers calls for demanding 
technical topics. Email seems less suitable for explaining and understanding their 
complexity. 
 
“I do experience that I cannot explain something through email. When you come to 
things that are very technical and you need to give them an example of something. So 
I'll try my best to use email, but in any case that I feel it is not practical I call them 
up.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
GP echoed the economy of calls for complex topics, especially when multiple actors are 
involved. In his experience, this would lengthen the time required for explaining and 
resolving issues. Since email transmits only texts and documents, it takes considerable 
effort to express complex topics in that format (Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Kraut & 
Galegher, 1990). On top of that, messages are sent and received in an asynchronous mode. 
With multiple actors, this leads to confusion and delays. People may jump in a discussion 
chain at different points, and misunderstand what is going on (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
From GP’s angle, a single teleconference avoids these concerns to a great extent: 
 
“What drives the decisions whether you write through email or want to talk over the 
phone is the complexity and criticality of the issues and the problems. The complexity 
I came across in the whole thing, (…) makes email not very effective. And especially 
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when there are 2-3 plants involved (…) I find that it is better to have at least one 
teleconference then trying to communicate everything through email. If it is a one-to-
one contact, like if I want something from the US, and there is only one person 
involved, then email is also effective. Then it's not necessary that we have contact 
over the phone. But if three plants are involved to solve the problem, like I need some 
help from [Singapore site A], from [US Pacific site], and from [US Central site], it 
doesn't really work if you just write through emails.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
SCC, IT core member in Singapore site A, expressed a similar concern on the use of email 
for complex issues. Task uncertainty triggers multiple requests for clarification that could 
better be resolved in a single phone conversation: “With email, sometimes it can take a 
week just to complete a very simple task because of the email flows. And then for the 
clarifications it takes time also” (DiskCo-J-1).  
 
A key user from the same site - JLL - shared similar experiences. When she asked a 
colleague for assistance, the answer may not fully answer her question. It may concern a 
more complicated form of assistance dependence that requires elaborate interactions, not 
just one question and one answer. Input from her side is needed for clarifying her problem 
to another colleague. In these situations, email delays problem solving: 
 
“It can sometimes be for a complex problem that you have to go through email. But 
then they come back to you and tell you: “OK this should be this way”. Then you have 
another question, you will say: “If I'm doing it this way well I'm gonna face another 
problem in this way”. So you have to wait for them to reply again.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
It happened frequently that people used email for complicated tasks. One reason was the 
time difference between the US and Singapore site A. In the early stage of the Far East 
project, Singaporean core team members were not yet familiar with Oracle and the 
implementation process. They had to rely heavily on US counterparts for assistance. 
Mostly, people used email for these exchanges because of the time difference, leading to 
the back-and-forth cycles earlier described. We elaborate on time zones in § 9.2.9  . 
 
Advantages of e-mail 
Some interviewees stressed advantageous aspects of e-mail technology. If for instance 
multiple persons are involved, it may be difficult to arrange a single slot for 
teleconferencing. Asynchronous communications allow people to maintain their local pace 
of working without interrupting them: 
 
“If let's say you want to make a teleconference, you must get all the people at the 
same time. So it depends, sometimes you cannot get everybody that you want to talk 
to at the same time. But with email, you just send and they can read it. Instantly they 
can receive it also, it's not that it takes 2 hours to reach them, it's just in less than 2 
minutes or 1 minute” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
A key user from Singapore site A - ST - complained about phone calls that sometimes 
disturbed her work processes. This happened when people called her for issues that had 
already been resolved. They picked up the phone too easily in a sense, thereby intervening 
in ST’s tasks. She would rather have preferred them to look at documentation or send an 
email, instead of opting for a real-time medium like the phone: 
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“Sometimes we are very busy, and I still see a lot of calls from [Malaysia sites A and 
B] and so on. Unless I'm fully available to sit there to answer the calls, sometimes I 
feel a bit disturbed. If they have any problem, they will just pick up the phone and call 
you. Sometimes I direct them to the relevant update that they should look for. 
Sometimes I ask them to write me a mail. Sometimes it's OK that they are calling me - 
I mean it depends on whether you are very busy or it depends on that person whether 
he keeps on calling you and asking you the same question again and again, and then 
you feel very frustrated. So it depends on the person that calls. Sometimes it's really 
just for convenience sake, they will just call. Or sometimes maybe they really do not 
understand. I mean it depends on case” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
Email applications like Lotus Notes offer new functionality like broadcasting (Markus, 
1994). People’s email addresses can be subscribed to a community that is created around a 
location, department or topic area. HHT explained that DiskCo used several of these lists 
for local IT groups, and dispersed communities of key users in the same area (like 
Finance).  
 
“If you talk about email communication we have distribution groups built up for each 
location, that is for IT. And we have a special a list of key users for the different sites. 
So that is how we make sure the right people are being informed on different issues.” 
- HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
Distribution lists economize multi-actor communications. With a single email, someone 
can reach one or more communities. This facilitates updating groups of people, whether 
locally or internationally: 
 
“We usually do not have [information asymmetry]. We have a distribution list, all the 
information will be distributed to the list of people. The same applies for the US sites - 
When you send to them it's a long list, a distribution list.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
Email lists helped coordinate people involved in modifying the Oracle source code. When 
for instance someone in the US adapts Oracle, he must check out the code in CCC/Harvest. 
Once he has completed his job, the code will be promoted for testing and eventually 
production. Through email lists, he will update IT colleagues from around the world, so 
that they can prepare the dispersed implementation of the new code. In addition, users are 
notified through separate lists. CPW explains: 
  
“We have different teams and all of us are inside different groups. So when it comes 
to a promotion, the US guy will do a promotion, he knows which address group to 
send a notification to. And all these people will know that it's a promotion and they will 
do their job. So there are groups of Oracle IT people, and Oracle users. Certain things 
we send to this group (i.e., users - author). We establish an address group in Lotus 
Notes so that they can send to these other people who must be notified.” - CPW, 
DiskCo-A-4 
 
Finally, a key property of e-mail technology is documentation. On the one hand, it 
increases the costs of communications, especially for complicated topics (Kraut & 
Galegher, 1990). People must spend time and effort translating their message into textual 
or graphical format. Yet on the other hand, documentation becomes a point of reference for 
ex post tracing of communication patterns: 
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“Phone and email are almost the same. Except that we have to wait for each other's 
reply. Sometimes email is in fact better than through the phone. Because we have it 
black and white, for reference later.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
Documentation of exchanges may be necessary as a mnemonic device. SCC from 
Singapore site A referred to situations in which people denied requests they made at some 
point. This could complicate her position since she had spent considerable effort on that 
task. To avoid this, she adds email messages to other documents relating to a project 
request. If need be, she has a comprehensive representation of communications and 
resources (Markus, 1994:  
 
“Email also has its good points. Because sometimes we really need to document some 
things. Sometimes, if you just talk to each other, then they may say that you never 
mentioned this requirement to them. So email is also a proof of that. Normally for 
those important emails we attach them to the project (i.e., small projects for handling 
issues with the Oracle implementation - author). So the important ones normally we 
will keep it attached to the projects, also as a proof.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Combining phone calls and e-mail 
Some people blended the use of phone calls and email to take advantage of each medium’s 
distinct properties. A key user from Malaysia site A (ET) explained that when she had to 
contact Singapore site A, she would sometimes call them first. This is convenient and fast. 
For complicated topics, however, she preferred to submit first an email with 
documentation and examples so that her counterpart could prepare for a talk on the phone.  
 
“We use both (email and phone calls - author). If we can reach them through a phone 
call we will call them first. And second thing, if we need to elaborate more and give 
them some time we will write to them. We use email of course when we need to send 
our measurement table, and when we need to talk about some conversion plans. And 
we use email if you have an example: we can put it in the email as an attachment so 
they have more clue of what we are talking about.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
Email provides her counterpart with documentation that represent a question or request. 
During a subsequent phone call, ET would complement that information. She could 
elaborate on the background of a requests, and discuss a topic interactively.  
 
“When we have a request for [Singapore site A], normally we definitely do show them 
the reasons why we need them. At the same time - if it's a major report - we try to 
create a new report the way we want it to be, and we update that in Lotus Notes and 
show them. And then we have to follow up with some phone calls to make sure that 
we understand each other.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
A key user from Singapore site A indicated a similar approach. She submits documentation 
on for instance a data set by email, and follows up with a call. Explaining the context of an 
issues would require more effort by email (Kraut & Galegher, 1990). This is because of the 
translation into textual format, and asynchronous nature of this medium. If her counterpart 
had questions in return, a range of subsequent email loops would be triggered. With a 
phone call, these exchanges are compressed in a single conversation.  
 
“I use 2 types of communication. Sometimes I will send data information by email; if I 
need to explain then I will call.” - ST, DiskCo-H-1  
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§ 9.2.7.2  Audio- and Videoconferencing  
Audio conferencing connects two or more parties through advanced desktop telephone 
equipment with an external speaker. It enables multiple persons in a single room to group 
around the equipment and listen to remote counterparts. At DiskCo sites, many telephones 
features these capabilities. People could easily setup a teleconference call. They could 
program their equipment for speed dialing. Because of the lease lines, DiskCo paid a fixed 
charge so that (international) phone calls within the organization were not charged. While 
conducting research at Singapore site A, we often heard people setting up a conference 
call, mostly with one remote partner.  
 
People used teleconferencing for multi-party conversations on novel or complicated topics. 
For instance, ET’s user group at Malaysia site A needed assistance from experts in 
Singapore site A and somewhere else. Setting up a teleconference offered the advantage of 
real-time dialogue between her group and the experts, and amongst the experts. This 
interactivity speeds up problem solving compared to flying people in or using email. At the 
same time, she indicated that the audio-only property of a conference call makes it difficult 
to interact with more than about 5 people or sites. Above that number, it would be 
challenging to figure out who is who in a discussion. 
 
“We use conference for example if you want to ask whether Singapore (site A - 
author) and maybe some other plant that is going to convert to Oracle but not yet, 
face the same problem as our plant (i.e., Malaysia site A - author). And sometimes 
because the person for Oracle support wasn't in their (Singapore site A - author) plant 
but somewhere remote. So we do conference in such cases. We never really come up 
to the max level, we can conference up to about 5 persons, 5 parties. But we normally 
do not conference more than that. Then it's not so effective because we do not really 
know who is talking.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
GP made a similar point on teleconferencing. He set up a call to receive interactive 
assistance from two or more sites. During these electronic meetings, back and forth 
discussions allow for instantaneous clarification. Experts can complement each other’s 
point so that a more complete picture emerges of a problem situation.  
 
“(…) When there are 2-3 plants involved (…) I find that it is better to have at least one 
teleconference then trying to communicate everything through email. (…) But if three 
plants are involved to solve the problem, like I need some help from [Singapore site 
A], from [US Pacific site], and from [US Central site], it doesn't really work if you just 
write through emails.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
Alternative remote communication modes could not accomplish this. Separate phone calls 
between GP and the different experts would lack interaction between the experts. Using 
email would result in chains of messages and delay the collaborative process.  
 
Videoconferencing 
Videoconferencing offers one of the richest remote communication experiences available 
at this time (Abel, 1990; Daft & Macintosh, 1981). Multinational firms like DiskCo have 
invested considerably in videoconferencing rooms and high speed audio/ video 
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connections between their key site. DiskCo had videoconferencing rooms available in 
Singapore site A, Malaysia site A and B, Thailand, and a couple of US sites.  
 
As researchers, we took a look at such a room in Singapore site A. It features a large TV 
set that is connected to a movable camera. On the main table in the room, a control unit 
enables directing the camera to cover different people in a group of up to 20 - 30 persons. 
The unit also shows a list of sites that can be dialed with speed dialing keys. Sophisticated 
audio conferencing equipment supports voice communications. The room is available for 
DiskCo staff and must be booked in advance through Lotus Notes.  
 
People mentioned several factors that impeded extensive use of the facilities. In fact, no 
one really liked used the system extensively. JLL, a key user from Singapore site A, 
pointed at a basic constraint of this medium. She remarked that the technology is not yet 
widely available at DiskCo sites. Because of the expenses involved in setting up a room 
and connection, videoconferencing lacks the “critical mass” required for widespread 
adoption (Markus, 1990).  
 
“Videoconferencing we seldomly use that, because we don't have the facility for 
videoconferencing everywhere. I may have it and the other site doesn't have it. So it's 
not so convenient - in China they don't have it, in Malaysia I have no idea whether 
they have it or not. So I can't use it.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
CPW referred to a more fundamental issue. When asked by email about the use of 
videoconferencing, he claimed that visual contact does not add much value to remote 
communications. At the same time, the costs - in a wider sense (Kraut & Galegher, 1990) - 
are high: supposed that a site has the facilities, it takes effort to book a room and make 
other arrangements for the meeting. This makes phone calls and audio conferencing more 
attractive, since everyone has a phone, and most of these support multi-party connections.  
 
“We use teleconference much more than video conference. There is no need to have 
video conference because we don't really need to see each other face-to-face. I think 
another reason is that it is more difficult or troublesome to set up video conference 
than teleconference. No other particulate reasons. By the way, we don't have video 
conference facility in China.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-6 
 
A key user from Singapore site A commented that she experimented only once with 
Thailand. She did not perceive the added value of that session. The connection was slow 
and the camera positioning was not flexible enough. While videoconferencing is 
multimedia in the sense that it combines visual and audio contact, she missed resources for 
drawing.  
 
“We did have videoconferencing but it is a bit slow, and you talk first, then you can 
see them. So after one time we gave up. We did it once with Thailand, (…) talking 
about standard cost process. For them I don't know, they didn't complain, but for us 
we didn't find it very effective or efficient. The conference room we don't really have a 
whiteboard, we can't draw. And you must sit very near. It's a bit slow. You cannot 
picture so many people. The camera is fixed there, you cannot zoom in” - ST, DiskCo-
H-1 
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A similar concern was aired by JLL. During a videoconferencing session, she could not 
show documentation that supported a particular discussion. For that reason, she preferred 
email:  
 
“I need to use email because a lot of time, let's say when you want to show an 
example, I can even scan some of the graphs or the report and show them: “Hey this 
is the problem that we have”. But with videoconferencing we can't do that.” - JLL, 
DiskCo-G-1 
 
JPL from the core team at Singapore site A asserted that videoconferencing could be useful 
for short meetings with not too many people and interactivity. Like Abel (1990) found, the 
medium does not support large meetings with elaborate discussions and social processes: 
 
“I think for videoconferencing, my experience is that you only go for short meetings. 
But if you have a course or a long meeting, a few days or a week I think it's better to 
be there. Maybe you need just a few hours or one day, then you can use 
videoconferencing, I think that is acceptable. But I think if you want everybody 
together in a room, I think to get the rapport, you have to be onsite. I think that is 
more important if the thing will last for 5 days.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
§ 9.2.7.3  Multimedia 
Electronic media represent elements of one context to another one. They do that 
selectively. Phone calls transmit only audio conversations, email supports document 
exchange, and videoconferencing facilitates audio/ visual contact. When people start 
collaborating remotely, they realize how multi-media face-to-face contact is. In a single 
conversation, they see their partner, hear him, and they can work simultaneously with the 
same resources. This defines the economy of such meetings that is difficult to replicate in a 
dispersed setup. JNL from Malaysia site A described her experience by comparing face-to-
face meetings with email contact: 
 
“(Face-to-face meetings) are very helpful. When I setup a planned meeting with the 
person in the US, I have some preparation to do on my side. That means, I have to 
compile the things that I want to discuss with her. And I have all the documents that I 
need to show her, which is something that you can't do through email. So I can really 
get the right message across to her with all the examples at the same time.” - JNL, 
DiskCo-F-1 
 
OBT from Singapore site A struggled also with the limitations of remote media. She 
needed to explain issues relating to the Oracle application to a remote counterpart. To 
accomplish that, she would like to show the application, submit documents, give a verbal 
explanation, and answer questions - all in one session. Using either phone calls or email 
does not suffice. Email lacks interactive talking, and with phone calls she cannot show the 
resources.  
 
“I will send them my Lotus Notes, then I paste the screen from Oracle, and send it to 
them. So I just ask them to look. A diagram itself is not good enough if you haven't 
any explanation. And sometimes you may also need to show them the applications. 
How it will affect the application. Some of the applications, the features you may want 
to show them through demo. But through the phone you can't (emphasis interviewee - 
author).” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
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OBT’s colleague from the same site came closer to simulating a face-to-face meeting. She 
used NetMeeting to demonstrate the application, while talking to people on the phone. This 
combined instantaneous access to a common resource with an interactive conversation.  
 
“We can have this setup on our PC called Windows NetMeeting where we can run an 
application and they can see what I am doing here. So I can give a demo to them. It's 
quite good. Anytime they can take over control of the application. So if they want to 
show me something, sometimes it's very difficult for them to tell me over the phone 
what they have done and what problems they have encountered. So they can simulate 
and we can see on the screen after which step they will hit this problem. It's a very 
good tool. We use the speaker, we can just talk like that.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
§ 9.2.7.4  Factors Contributing to the Use of Electronic Media 
Using electronic media requires special skills and behaviors. Scholars have suggested an 
interactive process of adaptation between technology and people’s behaviors (DeSanctis & 
Poole, 1994). With remote communication media, people experience a similar process. 
They develop their unique mode for deploying videoconferencing technology (Abel, 
1990), multi-site email exchanges (Cramton, 1997; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998), and 
groupware (Ciborra et al., 1996; Goodman & Darr, 1998; Majchrzak et al., 2000a). We are 
interested in distinguishing patterns of adaptation. These are behaviors or conditions that 
relate to the use of electronic media, and seem to recur in different studies and individual 
situations.  
In this section, we apply this angle to DiskCo members of the Oracle project. We look at 
factors contributing to the effective use of electronic media. We start with the role of 
working relationship and knowledge, and continue with contributing behaviors, like 
preparation, explicitness, regular contact, and more. 
 
Working relationships 
CPW established our attention on the connection between collaborative relationships and 
electronic media. He pointed out that people working at different sites do not meet each 
other as they would in a collocated office environment. Communications become less 
frequent and rich, leaving more room for interpretation and - perhaps - guessing. People 
need supplemental cues to ensure reciprocal understanding. From his perspective, these 
cues are supplied by collocated collaborative experiences that precede a period of remote 
contact: 
 
“At least within the same organization (i.e., collocated - author) you see each other, 
you know each other fairly well. When you start working together you see each other 
every day. But when working remotely, we ‘see’ each other through the phone, we 
don't really see each other every day. So if we don't have that kind of relationship 
which is built up beforehand, then it's kind of difficult.  
If you are working with remote sites, you never see each other, and you only work 
through email, voicemail or telephone. You always have a gap there. Because even 
over the phone when I talk to you, I never know whether you are really happy, when 
you say something whether it's a joke, or you mean it, or something. Its different. And 
without working with you for a while, I cannot judge how you will behave, and whether 
you are offended if I say something like this.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
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Working together for some time in the same location establishes mutual knowledge and 
rapport (Krauss & Fussell, 1990). This reduces the threshold of initiating remote 
conversations, and makes them more economic (Gabarro, 1990): 
 
“I always believe before the project starts, these people have to know each other, they 
will need to have some working relationships beforehand. That will help a lot because 
once you know each other it will be very easy to talk over the phone. And they also 
feel very easy to pick up the phone and just call you to say: “Hey, there is an issue 
how are we gonna deal with it”. The relationship is very important because that helps 
to improve the communications. Many times we hesitate to talk to somebody we are 
not familiar with. Especially you feel very uncomfortable telling them that you have a 
problem because you don't know what he is gonna think of you. But we really know 
each other so well since we were involved in all these projects. They all know that this 
guy is a master in this area, and this guy always helps us when we bring up an issue, 
and so forth. So that kind of understanding is already there, and that helps a lot 
because the communication flow is very smooth.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Common knowledge 
Common knowledge impacts remote communications in an important way. It means 
people can focus on the novel or special aspects of a topic instead of covering basic know-
how (Grant, 1996b). Distributed expertise provides a common framework and coding 
scheme. It allows for limited media richness and interactivity. People can rely on minimal 
communications to transmit information and coordinate their jobs.49  
In the case of DiskCo, one interviewee from Singapore site A (SCC) mentioned knowledge 
as an important facet of remote collaboration competence. She worked with experts in the 
US who assisted her with designing Oracle customizations. In that relationship, design 
specifications played an important role as a boundary object (Karsten et al., 1999; Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). From her side, she needed substantial insight in the particular Oracle 
module to understand and eventually sign-off the design documentation. 
 
“Talking about skills you need for remote communications. I think the technical 
knowledge about this application is also quite important. Because our design specs 
are quite technical, it includes a section on the (...) codes of the program. So normally 
we need to understand what they (US counterparts - author) are writing, because we 
have to sign off the review of the design before they can proceed.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
The same applied to her relationship to less experienced IT staff in the Far East region for 
whom she functioned as expert. Knowledge on the Oracle module streamlines remote 
communications. It avoids exchanges on top of the issue at stake: 
 
“Of course if he (Far East counterpart - author) is the person in charge of the module I 
expect that he has some knowledge on this application. Otherwise it would be very 
difficult to communicate. Even if you write an email to him you would have to 
elaborate a lot to make him understand probably just a small piece of thing.” - SCC, 
DiskCo-J-1 
 
                                                 
49 Take, for instance, the brief phrases that are exchanged between Air Traffic Controllers 
and pilots (Wiener et al., 1993). 
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Common knowledge played also a role in SCC’s contact with SysCo staff in India. At 
times, she encountered misunderstanding with vendor staff. This was not caused by 
distance, but depended on the competence of a particular programmer: 
 
 “I did experience misunderstanding with [SysCo]. I think it's not because of the 
distance, it's because of the quality of the programmer, the developer. If you have a 
good one, even though they work remotely it's still all right for us.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Preparation, explicitness and comprehensiveness 
Remote contact demands prepared, precise exchanges. This stretches the usefulness of 
media with limitations in the sense of cues and synchronicity. A key user from Singapore 
site A expects counterparts in the Far East region to prepare exchanges with her, instead of 
just picking up the phone: “I expect them to do some homework before they come and ask 
the question to me. It's much easier” (DiskCo-H-1).  
 
From Malaysia site A, MC pointed at the fact that remote contact lacks many features of 
face-to-face meetings. People cannot easily walk in someone’s cubicle, ask questions and 
talk for a while. On a distance, they engage in more compressed communication instances 
with someone who is perhaps less familiar with their situation than a local colleague. 
Dealing with these parameters calls for very clear, comprehensive exchanges: 
 
“Communication at your own site is much easier because in local sites you can meet 
face-to-face. For other sites we have to make sure that whether in email or through 
the phone we have to be very clear. And we have to have immediate and frequent 
follow-up to make sure that the other guy (remote counterpart - author) understands 
what we are asking for.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
SKL, key user at the same site, echoes MC’s point. In her experience, remote interactions 
call for great clarity and explicitness as compared to face-to-face settings. In a sense, 
electronic media offer a connecting layer between sites that is at the same time necessary 
and demanding. Distance can be bridged but at a price: people must invest in familiarizing 
their counterpart with their own context and situation. In the process, they rely on media 
that support a limited range of cues, and sometimes require conversion into a documented 
format: 
 
“We have to be more explicit when communicating with [Singapore site A]. If we don't 
make ourselves very clear to [Singapore site A], I guess it's very difficult for them to 
really help us. Because all communications are through phone and email. If we 
communicate face-to-face, I guess it's much easier to make things clear. But anything 
through remote communication - I suppose that we have to communicate in a very 
explicit way” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
On a distance, people’s expectations seem less self explanatory to their counterparts. They 
must be stated explicitly, e.g., due dates and urgency of an activity: 
 
“When we send a mail to them, normally we say: “Please reply by this date”, or 
“Please reply ASAP”. We will call at some other time if things are right. Because there 
are some due dates on the time line that we look forward to.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
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“Email is the main communication with other sites, especially for those sites that have 
time differences. We just need to state very clearly the urgency of the project and the 
date by which we need it.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Some interviewees go even one step further. They communicate not only their expectations 
in a clear manner, but format email messages to structure their counterpart’s response. JNL 
from the Malaysian data conversion team adopted this approach when contacting teams at 
other Far East sites: 
 
“I think one of the most effective ways is to give them the format that you want them to 
give you the information. Prepare the format for them so that they would not have to 
think about how they should prepare the data for you. That would speed up your 
work.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
JPL from the core team at Singapore site A formats text of email messages bullet-wise. He 
denotes exactly what he expects from whom. This reduces - according to him - chances 
that people would overlook elements of a request:  
 
“I try to put up my requests in point forms. So when you look at points, people tend to 
answer to each. But if you put in a paragraph, it's very difficult for people to answer 
the question. Because he may miss out the question in between the lines. So I think 
the best communication is: put in point forms. So when people reply, they will answer 
the point forms. They will put answers to each point form. I think it's always very 
helpful, because if you go by point form, you don't miss out anything. But if you tend 
to put a question in a paragraph, then it's harder to answer it. So if you do have that in 
a form, if somebody never answers that question, I know that that question is not 
answered, straightaway. This way, you make sure that you don't miss out anything. If 
there are 10 points, then people know there must be 10 questions on that. For each 
question it's best that you direct it to the person, put a name in front.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-
1 
 
In fact, his approach resembles the way bureaucracies tend to communicate with 
customers, like applications for an insurance (Galbraith, 1973). These organizations pre-
format exchanges to fit their internal processes. This ensures consistency, completeness 
and efficiency. Apparently, remote exchanges may need to some extent a similar level of 
formality and structure (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; Majchrzak et al., 2000a; NASA, 
1999). 
 
Regular communications 
In a dispersed work environment, people operate in different contexts. They are not 
automatically aware of what is going on outside their local work setting. This information 
gap surfaces when activities are interrelated across sites. People facing this situation 
emphasize regularity of exchanges, especially in a high profile project like the Oracle 
conversion. They need regular (and often frequent) interactions to update others or receive 
updates.  
CPW, head of the Oracle project, emphasized the importance of regular remote contact. 
Over the years, he and his staff have gotten used to regular meetings or asynchronous 
messages. These provide staff with an opportunity to identify problem areas. At the same 
time, CPW in his role as project champion, remains systematically aware of what is going 
on at dispersed locations:  
 
 334
“In the Eastern environment (DiskCo Far East - author) we have been working 
together for a long time, so that we have already established some reporting 
mechanisms and some expectations. Like for example, when you talk about the 
conversion, I will expect my director to give me voice mail at every stage of the 
conversion. They will give me a voice mail and report the status. And as I say, every 
week we have a meeting. We check the status and cover all areas.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-
3  
 
CPW mentioned that regular pacing of communications was already established when his 
former boss was still at Singapore site A. That person valued regular, frequent updates 
under all circumstances, even when nothing new could be reported. This practice became 
engrained in the DiskCo Far East organization and facilitated remote communications 
during the Oracle project.  
 
Like myself and my boss - the CIO now, he worked here for 2 years - we had a norm 
that during my conversion (an earlier IT implementation project - author) every 2 -3 
hours I will leave him a voice mail. Whether it is good news or bad news, I definitely 
will. And he will also feel very uncomfortable if I leave him a voice mail and say “Yeah, 
I won't give any more status reports, because everything is going on fine, so no news 
is good news.” He wouldn't feel comfortable. It's the same for me. And because of 
that, every time with my staff we do some major project, and they never leave me any 
messages or anything, I don't fire them but I will remind them many times. And they 
know, they will be very upset, when they don't give me the status. So that is a 
standard practice, a procedure we need there” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
As it seems, regular contact serves in particular people in managerial roles like CPW. In 
Malaysia site A, JNL expressed a similar point of view. She heads the local data 
conversion team that assists other Far East sites. Once local teams are starting on the data 
conversion process, she appreciates regular updates. It helps her monitor progress at 
different sites. Without pushing regular updates, she must ‘chase’ local teams for 
information, a practice she obviously does not like:  
 
“I have one team that has been providing me the information on a regular basis, while 
the other one I have to chase them very often. Of course it causes some 
inconveniences. What we have to do is we just have to pick up the phone and give 
them a call every day, or every hour of the day.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1  
 
Interestingly, people emphasize remote communications that are not necessarily related to 
information processing needs (Scott, 1990). What counts is the combination of hierarchical 
relationship with geographical dispersion. This leads to communication needs to sustain 
situation awareness. Especially during an important phase, managers value recurrent 
contact with their remote subordinates (Kurland & Egan, 1999). 
 
Asynchronous media and feedback loops 
Asynchronous media like email and voice mail play an important role in dispersed project 
settings (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998; Meadows, 1996b). They sustain communications when 
real-time connectivity is inconvenient or hardly possible because of time differences. At 
the same time, asynchronicity leads to lack of awareness. In face-to-face or 
teleconferences, feedback loops are automatically part of communication exchanges. 
People comment almost instantaneously on what the other person says. With asynchronous 
media, more deliberate attention must be paid to these loops.  
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SCC, an IT core team member at Singapore site A, explained that she depended on US 
experts for assistance on her Oracle module. She contacted these persons mainly by email, 
probably because of the time zone difference. In some cases, her emails remained 
unanswered for a while. This left her wondering what was going on. Unlike with local 
colleagues, she could not walk by or just pick up the phone to check on the status of her 
request. This caused concern since she worked under time pressure.  
In response, she used the “return receipt” feature of the email application, or sent 
subsequent emails to remind them. But instead of doing that, she would prefer her 
counterparts to tell her that they received her message and by when they could possibly 
reply:  
 
“We also sometimes don't know whether they read our mail. So sometimes we have to 
put in “return receipt” in order to ensure that they read their mail. But even with 
“return receipt” sometimes they may not reply you after a few days. Some developers 
are good: they will tell you that they are busy with something. So they will say: “We 
will look at it and do you specification after some time”. But some they will just keep it 
there. So sometimes you have to write back a mail to them again to check for the 
status.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
According to SCC, a (short) feedback note should not wait until people actually elaborate 
on the topic of a message. It must follow an initial email quickly, independent of the 
receiver’s schedule. This informs the sender on the receiver’s situation and thus reduces 
his task uncertainty: 
 
“If they request something through email, and I'm not able to attend to it in a moment, 
normally I will try to reply, instead of just putting it there and ignoring it. Normally we 
will try to do that. Even the US people they will try to write back to me and say they 
are busy with something, and they will attend to it probably some time next week. This 
is important because sometimes we are just wondering what happened, whether they 
have read the email.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
OBT, working for the same team, also appreciates fast replies to messages. She mentioned 
the fact that people have different patterns of reading their email. This leads to varying 
response times and less predictability. OBT also indicated that within the Far East IT 
community more homogeneity exists. Within that region, people have an additional 
advantage: because of the same time zone they can easily place a phone call if need be. 
 
“Some people they have a habit of reading their mail very frequently, because in our 
mail we can have some kind of alert when you have new mail it gives you a pop-up 
box telling you: “You have new mail”. Some people may - it depends on their habit - 
just say: “Oh, I have mail, very good, let’s look at what mail is that”.  
But some people may not, they maybe read their mail like in the morning, and in the 
afternoon they read another time. But I believe for IT practice, we read our mail quite 
frequently. So within Far East we don't really see much problem. And of course, even 
through the phone we can always leave a message. And when the person come back 
to their desk they can read their phone mail and then they will just pick up the phone 
and give you a ring.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Proactive attitudes and pushing information 
Dispersion impacts interpersonal communication patterns as compared to collocated work 
environments. People tend to interact less frequently (Cramton & Webber, 1999) and in a 
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more formal manner (Kraut & Galegher, 1990). This promotes information asymmetries 
between sites (Vaughan, 1997). It seems a challenge to keep people updated in a 
polycontextual setting, especially when they encounter new tasks. Ideally, a sort of 
dispersed holographic system emerges, where information on everyone is available to 
everyone (Morgan, 1997). Each site would have a similar knowledge base and be 
constantly aware of what is going on at other locations.  
 
This was not really the case at DiskCo. The Oracle project led to asymmetrical availability 
of knowledge and information. US sites initiated Oracle conversions and accumulated 
experience in the process. Next, Singapore site A was depending on that know-how to 
implement Oracle there. And also to assist subsequently other Far East sites. We assess 
here how people’s remote communications behaviors accomplished dispersion of 
information in a changing multi-site environment.  
 
Faced with knowledge asymmetry, one could think of two response strategies. On the one 
hand, the site with accumulated knowledge resources could push information to less 
endowed sites. This requires effort on their side to anticipate needs from the latter sites and 
push information through electronic media or visits. An inverse approach depends on 
novice sites to indicate knowledge requirements and pull information. They would have to 
understand what they need from whom, and act on that. We elaborate these strategies here 
for the Oracle project.  
 
A. Expert pushes to novice 
Like many multinational firms, DiskCo has certain sites that hosts centers of excellence. 
These are mostly located in the US, with primary regional spin offs in Singapore and 
Europe. New concepts, standards and rules - like the SDLC methodology or core team 
setup - are usually invented and customized in the US, and from there passed on to 
regional centers and remaining sites. For the latter category, information pushing is key to 
being kept updated. They expect the centers of excellence to come up with new resources 
and distribute these proactively to the relevant DiskCo community. Technologies used for 
this purpose include intranet, Lotus Notes databases, email lists, and email messages.  
 
ET from Malaysia site A shared our view as someone from peripheral site as far as know-
how is concerned. She appreciated the fact that the core team in Singapore site A updated 
her group on modifications to procedure:  
 
“Document sharing is very important. In fact, every time they change rules or certain 
mappings or encounter any problems, they (core team Singapore site A - author) do 
keep us posted. So that sharing of information is very important.” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
From the side of Singapore site A, JLL indicated that she felt responsible for keeping her 
counterparts in Malaysia and China posted: 
 
“For let's say China, Malaysia and the plants in Singapore that I closely communicate 
with, I make sure that we have the same understanding. If I have anything new, 
anything that I think is useful to them, I'll let them know.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
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JLL’s manager - HHT - stressed the importance of proactive information sharing by her 
team. This attitude ensures an even distribution of knowledge since it does not depend on 
demands from peripheral sites.  
 
“I normally will emphasize that we really encourage more communication. Because 
last time (before the Oracle project - author) we did talk quite a bit but maybe not as 
intensive as we should. But especially the core team I need to encourage the group to 
be more proactive on talking to them (people from other sites - author) and then 
transfer knowledge. More an active role than passive in the sense that only when they 
ask then you tell them things.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
B. Novice pulls from expert  
Interviewees adopted also a converse strategy. Core team members in Singapore and other 
Far East countries considered proactive ‘hunting’ for expertise vital for meeting the 
demanding schedule. They used electronic resources and leveraged their contacts locally 
and abroad. GP from Singapore described his approach: 
 
“I would say yes, you have to be pretty proactive. I can give some examples like I 
found something which is not working. I can take a little bit more time to know what is 
happening, but what I see it's better to just send a mail to a person from whom I know 
that he knows this area pretty well. I send a note with: “Hey I'm doing this testing and 
I'm not coming out successfully. Meanwhile I need help.” But I don't stop at my site, I 
just continue until I have an answer. If I have it soon, I just let them know. It depends 
on what kind of problem I face and how critical the problem is, and whether the person 
is willing to help or not.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
SKL - a key user Finance from Malaysia site A - underlined the usefulness of individual 
initiative and proactivity. She related this to the time pressure on the Oracle project. When 
facing an issue, she would pull on her network of Finance counterparts at other sites. For 
technical issues, SKL worked through local IT.  
 
“The other thing that I learnt is to be always proactive at our site. This means that if 
we have a problem and the core team doesn’t have an answer, we try to get the 
answer by ourselves by checking two other key users. Or maybe we can get hold of 
any help at our site. I guess that everybody in the core team is very proactive. This is 
important because we have a timeline to follow up - each week what is to be achieved. 
If we are not proactive that means our site can get stuck. Certain things like if it's a 
Finance issue it has to be resolved over the Finance side. If we are talking about 
things to do with the system like instability, IT can solve it. But certain things that are 
exclusively pertaining to Finance issues, we have to resolve it. So every key user 
must be proactive.” - SKL, DiskCo-L-1 
 
C. Blending of pushing and pulling strategies 
In fact, people pushed and pulled to avoid asymmetrical distribution of knowledge and 
information updates. On the one hand, experts would push the latest standards to their 
counterparts through homogeneous communities. Experts in Finance would update their 
dispersed peers with new corporate standards. This ensures distributed cognition on a 
generic level. On the other hand, local people with a specific problem would pull 
knowledge. They would contact experts in their functional (user) area. For cross-functional 
problems, they would also ask for support from the local IT department. Together, push 
and pull strategies formed a distributed exchange pattern that relied on proactive 
contributions from experts and novices alike. HHT observed this as follows: 
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“I think it works both ways. If we try to talk to them (problem owners, novices at other 
sites - author) more and try to share knowledge more actively, then it's also quite 
natural in the sense that they know that the core team is the support group that they 
can rely on for technical aspects of consultancy knowledge. So they will normally 
come back to us for problems and issues that they have.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-3 
 
§ 9.2.8  Experiencing Technology 
Technology played a pivotal role in the Oracle roll out. The project itself concerned a 
technology transition program: DiskCo implemented an ERP system as a replacement for 
the MANMAN legacy. In the process, technology sustained connectivity in a multi-site 
project environment. DiskCo could dispose over a variety of tools, such as intranet, Lotus 
Notes groupware, email, phone, audio conferencing and for some locations 
videoconferencing. In this section, we focus on people’s experiences with availability and 
quality of some of these technologies. It should be noted that the situation at the time of 
this study (1997) may have changed considerably.  
 
Connectivity at zero variable costs  
People appreciated the fixed fee telecommunications facilities at DiskCo. For a fixed fee, 
the company’s main sites are permanently connected through lease lines. This eliminates 
variable costs of phone calls, email exchanges, remote database access and the like. ET 
from Malaysia site A comments:  
 
“Of course it's very important that people have multiple ways to connect to other sites. 
That's why I told you it could be Lotus Notes and phone calls. And it's a lease line so 
it's cheap to call” - ET, DiskCo-K-1 
 
The VP Information Technologies asserted that with variable costs, people refrain from 
regular and prolonged tele-conversations (Kraut & Galegher, 1990). They realize the costs 
and budgets associated with telecommunications. With zero variable costs, absence of 
these concerns promotes more frequent and extensive remote exchange patterns.  
 
“Sometimes the costs of communication kind of prevents you from communicating too 
regularly. Because like for example if you need to meet a person from another site, it 
will costs you a certain amount. So you don't want too many meetings the whole day 
or week. But within [DiskCo] all our infrastructure is so good that we can talk to each 
other any time for any number of hours. The costs are already there, it's really fixed.” 
- CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Concerns 
At the same time, interviewees aired some concerns on the existing infrastructure. They 
commented that the lease line capacity was insufficient at times to handle traffic between 
sites. Like JPL from Singapore site A prefers testing on-site for the Chinese sites instead of 
working remotely. Co-presence facilitates interaction and avoids reliance on lines that are 
occasionally overloaded: 
 
“We have business people from Materials and Finance, with people from Storage and 
whatever, together in a room to do a whole week of business testing. I think we have 
to be there, it's quite difficult to support them remotely. Because they may have 
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pressed you on the spot if they need. Sometimes the lease line is quite difficult to get 
through.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
Between Singapore and US he experiences the same problem. This time, time zone 
differences lead to a peak load during the only window available - Singapore morning and 
US afternoon (Table 24,       Table 30): 
 
“For us (in Singapore - author) solving the problem early in the morning is the best 
thing we can do. So that's why you can see that most of the time you can't get through 
the lease line to the US is early in the morning (Singapore time - author). So there are 
a lot of conference calls always happening about 7 o'clock in the morning which is 
their 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
Speed of lease lines affected not only phone traffic but also remote system access. MC 
from the data conversion team in Malaysia site A preferred to come down to a site for the 
life conversion. This facilitated communications with the local team, and ensured fast 
performance of Oracle:  
 
“For the life conversion, especially for those very critical modules, we went down. 
Because communication wise it will be faster and easier. And system performance will 
also be faster down at the local site.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
 
For the Oracle development environment, lease line capacity made remote system access 
for testing difficult. Since DiskCo applied a single source code, any changes affected all 
sites. Key sites - including Singapore - had to be involved to test modifications. To this 
end, modified versions of Oracle were replicated to sites with testing facilities. DiskCo 
decided not test remotely, e.g., from Singapore to the US because of speed issues. CPW 
described this point as follows: 
 
“US sites may say “OK this week we gonna do a promotion to testing”. So it involves 
all of us (DiskCo sites from around the world - author) that over the week we pull the 
code from the US. There is a hub, all the code we'll get here is pooled. When we pool 
we will apply to our test environment. So all the software for testing is the same all 
across the [DiskCo] world. So I don't have to log on to the US to try testing from here. 
That is slow. That's why we have our own test base. The program will be exactly the 
same, and we test over here.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-4 
 
Finally, the core team in Singapore site A outsourced some development work to SysCo 
from India. Staff from this vendor were initially located at DiskCo premises in Singapore. 
Later on, the moved back to India and supported from there. To DiskCo staff, this was 
challenging at times. They found phone lines to India noisy, and the English accent from 
vendor staff difficult to catch: 
 
“Lines from Singapore to DiskCo West Coast HQ are not too bad, because our 
telephone system is quite good, the sound was quite clear. It's just like talking to 
anybody else in Singapore. But the sound to India, the lease line is very noisy to 
them. And their English is also very difficult to understand. It’s very difficult to work 
with those people.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
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§ 9.2.9  Time Zone Differences 
 
“Before you collaborate, you've got to coordinate. Trouble is, when your customers are 
spread across time zones, scheduling a meeting through email can quickly dissolve 
into online Ping-Pong.” - (Quain, 1997) 
 
Parties involved in the Far East project were mainly clustered in Singapore, Malaysia, 
China, Japan, US, and to some extent India (outsourcing partner). Our perspective for time 
zone differences is mainly Singapore site A, since from there most activities were 
coordinated (      Table 30).  
This section is setup as follows. We start with the windows that exist between sites in the 
Far East and US. Then, we focus extensively on issues related to minimal window between 
Far East and US sites. We conclude with global conferences that connect real-time 
multiple sites across different continents. 
 
§ 9.2.9.1  Windows for Collaboration 
For the Far East region, time zone differences played a minimal role. Singapore and 
Malaysia are neighbor countries and in the same time zone - UTC +8. Singapore and China 
are about 1 hour flying apart but also in the same zone. Singapore and Japan are 
geographically further apart, but with only 1 hour time difference (Japan is UTC +9). India 
(SysCo’s location) is in UTC +5½, hence 2½ hours apart from Singapore. The US is 
geographically and in terms of time zones substantially further away. US Pacific is in UTC 
-8. Since Singapore is in UTC +8, the time difference is 8 hours (see       Table 30). With 
US Central sites (UTC -6) this difference is even 10 hours. 
 
Time zone differences are here considered as one of the gaps between sites. We analyze 
their impact as perceived by DiskCo interviewees. First, we discuss the role of time 
differences in the Far East, including India. Then we zoom in on the relationship Far East 
and US. The section concludes with the challenge of triple continent communications. 
 
For the Far East region (India not included), time differences are absent or minimal. 
Working days overlap almost completely, allowing for anytime contact across sites. As 
one key user from Singapore site A aptly noted:  
 
“(…) the time zone is exactly the same. So when we work, they work, they knock off, 
we knock off.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
Technically, DiskCo’s strong infrastructure allowed people to connect remotely 
instantaneously and without limitations. Combined with the limited time differences, this 
reduced the perception of distance. The Director Applications Development in Singapore 
site A remarked:  
 
“Distance wise, for Malaysia and for China I think the communication is not really a 
problem. Because for us it is just a phone call away. It is quite convenient because we 
have all the infrastructure set up. And, they are all in almost the same time zone.” - 
HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
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The low threshold for communications enabled almost instantaneous remote contact with 
little effort. As the need arose, people could setup up conference calls and solve issues 
quickly:  
 
“If there is a time zone difference then it takes longer, but if it's Malaysia, Singapore, 
and China we are on the same time zone, it's not a problem. (…) We have many 
activities going on because of the same time zone.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
Another interviewee, member of the core team in Singapore site A echoes the short cycle 
times: 
 
“Within the Far East, our time difference will be one hour at the most. So if it is a 
straightforward problem you can probably resolve it within a few hours.” - OBT, 
DiskCo-C-1 
 
An IT staff member from Singapore compared media choice for connecting to the US or 
Far East sites. In her perspective, the opportunity to connect real-time in the Far East leads 
to use of synchronous media, like phone calls and teleconferences.  
 
“The main tools we are using is email to communicate with the US. We hardly ring 
them because of the time difference. If let's say other sites like China, Malaysia 
normally we will try to call them instead of writing an email. It's faster that way in the 
sense that you are able to reach them.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
At the same time, phone contact does not substitute for asynchronous media like email. It 
rather provides a convenient fall-back option for urgent cases. For the bulk of regular, day-
to-day communications people use email, also with people in the same time zone. The 
project manager for data conversion in Malaysia remarked: 
 
“Email is a very common way of communication for us. So if there is not a very urgent 
case, we normally write emails even to those who are local here, maybe a site in 
Malaysia. For local sites, sometimes we call them up because they are on the same 
time zone.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
  
From India, SysCo employees supported the DiskCo team in Singapore site A. IT 
professionals in Singapore receive user requests that they translate into small projects and 
delegate to SysCo. Staff in India then work on program customizations to the Oracle 
package. This agency dependence concerns tasks of limited complexity and scope.  
 
Earlier in the project, SysCo staff worked on-site in Singapore as we explain in a later 
section. Here, we focus on remote collaboration between Singapore and India. Table 24 
shows extended working days at both sites. The 2½ hours difference allows for substantial 
overlap in working hours. Given the limited complexity of the delegated task, 
asynchronous communications usually suffice. User requests are relayed by email and 
document attachments. Sometimes, these communications may leave uncertainty for 
SysCo staff. If DiskCo staff anticipates this, they complement the emails with a richer and 
synchronous medium: teleconferencing. From SysCo’s side, staff may also initiate phone 
calls to resolve uncertainty. A DiskCo IT professional summarizes these practices:  
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“In India they have only about 3 hours time difference from us. So if they really need 
something like verbal explanation, they can contact us. I do have some user requests 
that they work on where we do it this way. We will feed back our test results to them 
through email. And if we think that it is required to give them more explanation so that 
they really know what we want, then we will call them also” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Even just 2½ hours difference may prevent instantaneous contact for site-crossing issues. 
For instance, issues arising in Singapore in the morning have to wait until SysCo staff 
comes in the office. The reverse case is worse. While this delay is only a few hours, 
problems in India’s late afternoon remain unattended until the next day Singapore morning 
(Table 24). This interrupts local workflows and lengthens cycle times:  
 
“(…) We loose time in delays because of the time difference. So your communication, 
also because of that, you wouldn’t get instant response. (…) So the only problem I can 
see working in this type of relationship is you need more time to develop a program, to 
complete a program.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1  
 
Finally, time zone differences have the strongest impact on collaboration between sites in 
the Far East (China, Singapore, Malaysia) and the US. Far East sites are all in UTC +8 (      
Table 30). US Pacific with DiskCo HQ is in UTC -8, while US Central - a site with 
important IT resources - is in UTC -6. People in Singapore often contacted counterparts in 
the US for assistance. Since the US started implementations, their know-how was more 
advanced and need in the Far East.  
The dotted horizontal boxes in       Table 30 show windows between Singapore and US 
Pacific or Central. An extended working day from 8:00 until 19:00 results in a 4-hour 
window between Singapore and US Pacific. The window is only 2 hours between 
Singapore and US Central. In the next sections we expand on the impact of time 
differences on collaboration between Far East and US sites.  
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§ 9.2.9.2  Impact of Limited Windows (Far East - US Sites) 
The windows offer very little opportunity for real-time contact. Says an IT professional 
from the Singapore site A core team: 
 
“Sometimes if you really need to talk to them, it depends on which site. Like [US 
Pacific] normally if we come in early, it will be their evening and we can still talk to 
each other. But [US Central], the people who are working in that time zone, we can 
hardly meet each other.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
Limited synchronous contact affects issues that involve people from both sides and 
demand quick attention. Like staff in Singapore needs help with the setup of an 
application. Or in the US people want to explain a new standard to their counterparts in 
Singapore. If these site-crossing dependencies and workflows originate in the US before 
Singapore’s working day commences, people in the US must wait until their late afternoon. 
Conversely, the potential delay for Singapore is more severe. Issues surfacing there after 
the US sites close must be submitted asynchronously and wait until the next working day 
in the US. Real-time communications must even wait until US Pacific afternoon 
(Singapore morning).  
 
“Because US is few hours behind us - when I have a problem now, I write mail to 
them. Well, we can't call them: they will be sleeping, nobody will be answering the 
phone. So I'll have to write mail. And I need to wait for a few hours until they start 
working and until they start reading their mail. And when they read their mail, probably 
I'm sleeping. So that is why because of the time difference, we cannot really resolve 
problems in a shorter time. (…) When you work with US people, then because of the 
time difference you need days [emphasis] to solve the problem. It's some unnecessary 
delay.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Soon, a form of remote ping pong emerges to which Quain (1997) refers. The minimal 
opportunity for synchronous contact conflicts with the need for back and forth 
communications. This need is driven by contingencies like task dependence (Van de Ven 
et al., 1976), uncertainty (Galbraith, 1973), and diversity (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b). In 
traditional organization theory, these factors increase information processing needs, and 
lead to direct, interactive interpersonal contact. This is not really feasible when multiple 
time zones separate the actors involved. We explore in the following paragraphs the 
tension between communication needs and opportunities.  
 
§ 9.2.9.3  Diversity, Novelty and Uncertainty (Far East - US sites) 
 
At DiskCo, people in the US and Far East work in contexts that differ on an operational 
level. From both sides, insight lacks in how the counterpart context functions. This lack of 
mutual knowledge affects the way people communicate. They have difficulty framing 
questions intended for their counterpart. Similarly, answers from remote sites cannot be 
easily understood (Watzlawick et al., 1967). Diversity requires attention to building 
reciprocal insight so that counterpart’s communicate behaviors can be interpreted and 
framed according to the context they originate from. From Malaysia, the project manager 
for data conversion told us: 
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“When you read their mails you find that they are very open and they are also very 
helpful when you ask them information. They share them freely with you. But you have 
to make sure that you ask them the right questions. Sometimes I find that if you do not 
ask the right questions, then they will come back to you with more questions. So you 
have to make sure you ask them all the questions together so that you don't waste 
time to read for them to come back with other questions again. I guess maybe one of 
the differences is because in terms of our DiskCo business in the US, they are more 
on the Research & Development side, whereas in the Far East here we are more in 
the manufacturing kind of business. So they may not fully understand our way of 
business, and we may not understand their environment there. So sometimes when we 
ask some questions, they may not be able to visualize what is the scenario that we 
are working on. So that could explain why sometimes we need to make sure we ask 
the right questions.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
In DiskCo’s case, US sites focus mainly on R&D. They simulate production runs to 
improve process technologies. Far East sites on the other hand produce daily thousands of 
products. This volume leads to very different issues. Operational diversity complicates 
mutual understanding between Singapore and US sites. It increases uncertainty and 
clarification cycles. In DiskCo’s case, the driver for this need is the form of agency or 
assistance dependence that exists between the US and Singapore/ Malaysia. On top of that 
dependence, the system is very novel for everybody. And operations differ across sites. 
Hence, a mixture of dependence, uncertainty, and diversity emerges that exacerbates 
remote coordination needs (March & Simon, 1958).  
As a consequence, people (e.g. in the US) must reply to a question (from e.g. Singapore) 
with more questions to understand the background of their counterpart’s issues. This 
triggers more information that allows the person in the US to reframe the issue in his 
experience and provide an adequate answer. These back and forth loops are in collocated 
settings familiar and usually resolved through meetings and discussions. Yet time zone 
differences squeeze this process into a chain of asynchronous communication blurbs.  
 
We use      Table 30 to show how the need for an interactive discussion works out in an 
environment with minimal or no windows. Suppose that IT staff in Singapore comes up 
with a question on Monday. Since no one is available in the US, the send an email and go 
home. Next morning, US staff arrives in their US Pacific or Central office. They look at 
the question and do not understand exactly what the problem us. At that time, it is night in 
Singapore. So they will write an email back with more questions.  
 
Singapore staff arrives Tuesday morning, to find only more questions to theirs. Most US 
staff however will be leaving the office at that time, triggering another loop of emails:  
 
“If they (US counterparts - author) need any clarifications they will write back to us, 
because US and our time is different. By the time they receive my reply they are not in 
the office.” - SCC, IT team member Singapore site A, DiskCo-J-1 
 
When US staff understands and resolves the question with this new information, and reply 
so that Singapore staff can proceed Wednesday morning. As becomes apparent, this leads 
to substantial delays: 
 
“Sometimes if the problem can be solved in a day it takes 2 days because it’s in the 
middle of the night (Singapore time - author) and when they receive it’s the next day 
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for them, and then they send a mail back and again it’s the next day.” - GP, IT team 
member Singapore, DiskCo-D-1 
 
If things are still not clear to staff in the US, they fire off more questions for clarification. 
The chain of email exchanges substitutes for local modes of coordination. Though the end 
result may be the same, time zone differences change the process. As a key user in 
Singapore site A remarks: 
 
“The final result - yes it’s the same, but sometimes you have to go through 2 or 4 
loops of email exchanges. I mean with email you have to clarify so many times. So 
that is a bit time consuming. But with the local user you can talk face-to-face, and 
understand their operation immediately. Especially with US, that is more difficult 
because the time is different. So it takes more time. We can send them one mail and 
it’s the end of our day, they come back, it’s still not clear, you have to wait for another 
day, for another reply. So that part is the difference if you compare with local.” - JLL, 
DiskCo-G-1 
 
Time zone differences thus lengthens problem solving especially for people collaborating 
remotely on ill-understood tasks. Several factors may underpin this novelty. People may be 
new to their job or the organization. Or their counterpart may work in a different context, 
like in DiskCo’s case with US and Far East operations. This novelty triggers exchanges to 
build up mutual and thus common knowledge. Without that knowledge, (remote) 
communications are hardly feasible (Grant, 1996b; Watzlawick et al., 1967).  
 
§ 9.2.9.4  Task Urgency (Far East - US sites) 
Task urgency refers to the importance of a task in a work process. Urgent tasks define a 
project’s critical path. Delaying them jeopardizes project cycle time (Lock, 1996; Turner, 
1993). Our interest in urgency centers on tasks that require contributions from a remote 
counterpart. (Not those that require purely local inputs). Local critical paths thus become 
dependent on remote efforts. Here, we consider the role of time differences. In the case of 
DiskCo’s Far East and US sites, these differences allow for a minimal window. Hardly an 
opportunity exists to connect real-time for contributions from remote counterparts. Says a 
key user from Singapore site A:  
 
“I can have a very high priority, but at the time when they are sleeping they won't 
answer me. It's not that they have to wait for my mail to come in 24 hours and 
immediately reply me. Same thing with me: when I'm not working, I'm not reading my 
mail.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
A tension thus emerges between minimal windows and time-critical inputs from another 
site. Since people at remote sites cannot be expected to stay stand-by all the time, 
workflows are simply delayed. One member of the data conversion team in Malaysia also 
works with US staff. She explains the difficulty of connecting to experts in the US: 
 
“Yeah, it's all by email. Once a while by phone. Because of the time difference. So we 
usually use email instead of phone. Yes the time zone differences delay. Especially 
for urgent issues we have a lot of difficulty. (...) Sometimes we cannot get hold of 
them then we have to loose one day. (…) We have not a procedure for dealing with 
delays. But instead, if there is a really urgent issue, then we will contact them at 
home.” - MC, DiskCo-E-1 
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Beyond a certain level of criticality, people swap from asynchronous messages towards 
connecting real time. Even when their counterpart is at home or perhaps on the road.  
Another IT staff member from Singapore describes how he alternates between 
asynchronous messages and real time calls. He describes the delays caused by cross-site 
‘ping-pong-ing’. Depending on criticality, he adapts his own working patterns. For very 
critical tasks he stays late until US morning. This way, he can exchange emails with US 
staff to answer their questions and avoid the loops earlier described (see       Table 30).  
 
“Sometimes if the problem can be solved in a day it takes 2 days because it's in the 
middle of the night and when they receive it, it's the next day for them. And then they 
send a mail back and again it's the next day. So it is based on the criticality. We used 
to stay back in the evenings and send a mail and usually they read it in the morning 
(US time - author). In the morning it is around 8-9 PM or somewhere around that on 
our time (Singapore - author), and they see it, we receive a reply, send a mail 
immediately and go. If the issue is not very critical then what I used to is just send a 
mail in the evening and then next day morning I just come and see.” - GP, IT team 
member Singapore, DiskCo-D-1 
 
This person stretched his working hours to deal with minimal windows, instead of 
contacting people at home. We focus on these and other forms of adaptation to time 
differences in the next section. 
 
§ 9.2.9.5  Adapting to Time Zone Differences (Far East - US Sites) 
DiskCo interviewees adapted to the minimal windows between Far East and US sites. 
They found ways to deal with different working hours. First, by choosing particular media, 
and modifying the way these are used. A second, more far reaching mode is to adapt 
working hours. We discuss both strategies.  
 
First, people rely strongly on asynchronous media like email. This medium is convenient 
to use and allows for attaching documents. On the other hand, it is asynchronous and lean, 
thus less convenient for extensive communication needs (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). An IT 
team member from Singapore site A emphasizes the fact that email is a next best solution 
when time zones are involved. Without time differences, phone calls would be preferred to 
expedite cycle times. 
 
“The main tools we are using is email to communicate with the US. We hardly ring 
them because of the time difference. If let’s say other sites like China, Malaysia 
normally we will try to call them instead of writing an email. It’s faster that way in the 
sense that you are able to reach them.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
She also indicates how email is used. Email is not only asynchronous but also lean. That 
element necessitates the sender to pay more-than-average attention to the clarity of his/ her 
message.  
 
“Email is the main communication with other sites, especially for those sites that have 
time differences. We just need to state very clearly the urgency of the project and the 
date by which we need it.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
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Time differences force people to use email for communications that would normally rely 
on interactive, rich exchanges. This appears feasible but at a price. People must stretch this 
medium’s capability. They become more explicit and structured in their messages. An IT 
member from Singapore site A describes the way he uses email for connecting with US 
sites. He is responsible for helping colleagues in China when they face a problem that 
cannot be solved locally.  
 
“Time zone may be different, so there is always a delay in getting answers. With 
China we do not have much of a problem, but between US and Singapore we do. 
Sometimes when they (colleagues from China) ask me a question I may not be able to 
answer them, I have to forward it to the US. By the time they give me a reply, it's 
already night there, it's day here. He may not understand my question properly. So he 
may not give the right answer. He may just come up with: “Please elaborate more,” or: 
"Give me please one day since I have to go back.” (…) So I have to be very very 
careful in my approaches. I try to put up my question in point forms. When you look at 
points, people tend to answer to each. But if you put it in a paragraph, it's very difficult 
for people to answer the question. Because he may miss out the question in between 
the lines. So I think the best communication is: put in point forms. When people reply, 
they will answer the point forms. They will put answers to each point form.” - JPL, 
DiskCo-I-1 
 
This person pre-formats and structures messages extensively to minimizes uncertainty for 
his counterpart. He anticipates possible questions and thus circumvents superfluous email 
loops to clarify issues, or elaborate.  
 
An alternative is using email to arrange for real-time calls. The project manager for data 
conversion in Malaysia mentions that under special circumstances she chooses this option: 
 
“For US for urgent cases, normally what I will do is I will send them a mail to make an 
appointment with them to have a teleconference so that the next day when we come in 
early in the morning we are able to catch them in the US.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
Second, people adapt their working hours. They come earlier and/ or stay later than normal 
local working days. Or they sacrifice private time (evening, weekend) to reach remote 
colleagues.  
A key user from Singapore site A works with US sites for a project related to Oracle ERP. 
Seeking to avoid email loops, she mentions how her working hours have changed:  
 
“(…) I have to communicate a lot with the US site. So now my working time has 
slightly changed. After work I start work again at 10 PM to 2 AM. I have to do that 
because I get a lot faster response by just writing mail at my 12 o’clock (Singapore 
night - author) and they receive it at 8 o’clock (US morning - author). They reply me 
and let’s say I need clarification, I can immediately write back. I can even call them at 
the time when they are working. I can get faster reply.” - JLL, DiskCo-G-1 
 
Singaporeans were pressed to finish tasks quickly. So they decided to create artificial 
windows with US sites. They worked for instance Saturdays when it was still Friday in the 
US (see       Table 30, Table 31).  
US counterparts also accommodated at critical times. They allowed Singaporeans to call 
them at home during Singapore working days.  
 
 350
“We have to adjust ourselves sometimes. Sometimes we even come back on a 
Saturday morning. Because our Saturday morning is their Friday afternoon actually. 
And if we don’t solve it on Saturday that means we can’t solve it on Monday because 
Monday is their Sunday. Then we only get an answer on Tuesday. But sometimes 
people are kind enough: when they hear there is a problem to be solved, they give us 
their home number. And during our live implementation, they are on stand-by, we have 
their home number to call. They are also stand-by on email and so. So they 
understand there is a job to be done. So we sign them in during the dates and so on. 
So everybody is on stand-by.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
Similar experiences are shared by the Director Applications Development, Singapore site 
A. For the regular teleconferences with US sites, she called from home or came in very 
early:  
 
“As compared to US of course we have more problems there, because it’s in a 
different time zone. So the communication is not as easy (as in the Far East region - 
author), it’s not really a phone call away in that sense. Because when I call them they 
are sleeping. And then when they want to have a conference meeting, it’s always we 
have to either come very early to the office so that they are in the evening time, or 
very often we have to have conference call from home. So that the call is in their day 
time. So that can be a bit of inconvenience(…). I would say the first year (of the 
Oracle ERP project - author), we were having conference call every weeks. And this 
could take hours.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
An IT staff member in Singapore site A explains the two options people have there to 
create artificial windows with US sites.  
 
“We have to go back late, or come in early. Because about 10 or 11 o'clock evening 
here is about 7 o'clock AM in the US maybe around there. So either you may have the 
habit of coming early in the next morning (Artificial window 2 - author), or you stay late 
through the night (Artificial window 1 - author).  
(Artificial window 1 - author) But staying late through the night is not a good 
suggestion because when they come in early they are fresh, they may do not want 
start on your issue. You need to understand their culture - they first want a cup of 
coffee, they do not want to do their work that early.  
(Artificial window 2 - author) So it's better you come early in the morning (Singapore 
time - author), maybe about 6 or 7 o'clock to solve the problem while it's 4 or 5 PM 
there. So you have given them the time to look at the problem. And this is important 
for them to understand the problem. Then they get back to you. This is much more 
fruitful rather than to interrupt them early in the morning. Their early morning is our 
midnight, you say "Hey I stayed back in the office, can you solve this” - it's quite 
difficult.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
In Table 31, the bold dotted boxes show the two artificial windows between Singapore and 
US sites. The solid lines indicate working days for the respective sites.  
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§ 9.2.9.6  Real-time Contact across multiple site and continents  
For a global project like DiskCo’s Oracle ERP implementation, synchronous 
communications across multiple sites and continents is sometimes necessary. In the early 
stages of the project, many questions and issues had to be resolved that involved sites in 
Europe, US and Far East. This required special arrangements as the Director Applications 
Development explains:  
 
We used the AT&T conference facility. We just called in through AT&T. They have to 
make some bookings, it's not the normal lease line. We call through the lease line, but 
we don't call to the US office directly. Because there are so many parties involved. 
Even in the US itself there are 3 main groups (…). Then in the Far East normally it's 
Singapore, and Thailand, and then Europe would be group in The Netherlands. So it's 
like at least 6 parties involved. And then of course you involve more than 20 people. 
In my case, most of the time, we either call in through our office, then mostly we will 
gather in CPW's (VP Information Technologies, Singapore site A - author) room. 
Because CPW's room has conference facility to call in. And then if I call from home 
that will be only myself, I just dial my normal phone. So we were given a phone, they 
told us what number to call and which PIN number to use.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
Initially, people tried to split up the parties in two conferences: US - Far East, and US - 
Europe. Since many issues had a global impact, they changed to a single real-time global 
conference (US, Europe, Far East). Consequently, some adaptation was required to enable 
this window:  
 
“Initially we started with 2 different conference days: US with Far East one, and US 
with The Netherlands which is for Europe one. Because it's very hard to schedule. The 
time we normally did was early our morning which is late US time, and then they have 
another time for Europe. Then later on, we find it's not as efficient as we wanted to. 
We preferred to have one conference. So later we turned to our night. So our late 
night which is US early morning and in Europe it is in the afternoon. So that's the time 
when we had 3 groups at the same conference at the same time.” - HHT, DiskCo-B-1 
 
§ 9.2.10  Diversity: Culture, Language and Operations
50
 
People from many different countries and sites worked together on DiskCo’s Oracle 
implementation. Table 23 shows locations relevant to this study on the Far East region. In 
this section we explore some issues pertaining to the role of diversity in distributed work 
settings. People become dependent on counterparts with different cultural, experiential and 
lingual backgrounds. We explore these dimensions of diversity, and assess how they 
impact the way people handle remote collaborative relationships. The section starts with 
Singapore, China, and Malaysia, and continues with a brief exposé on some other cultures 
playing a role in the Oracle project..  
                                                 
50 This section reflects interviewees’ perspective on cultural diversity in the Oracle project. 
It may contain very subjective views that generalize and stereotype categories, groups or 
individuals. These are described here for research purposes only, and are not endorsed by 
the author in any way. It should be noted that the author is Dutch and brings a North-
Western European perspective to this research.  
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§ 9.2.10.1  Singapore, China, and Malaysia  
 
“For China I must speak to them in Mandarin” - ST, DiskCo-H-1 
 
Within the Far East region, people from Singapore and China experienced little cultural 
diversity. Emigrants from China moved to Singapore in the 20th century, bringing their 
customs and language with them. As China has been opening up to business with other 
countries, these emigrants’ children and grand children connect with people who have 
stayed in China. In the case of DiskCo, representatives from Singapore site A have the 
advantage of knowing their counterparts in China. They have helped built up local IT, and 
developed relationships with people they encounter again in the Oracle project:  
 
“I don't face this problem (cultural diversity of people from different sites - author). 
Because even before this project, I knew all these people. I have already some 
working relationships with them before. For China I feel that way. Maybe when you 
ask me to go to Germany I will feel some cultural difference. But most of the culture 
here in Singapore is very similar to China, because our grandfathers are all from 
China. So we do know some of their likes and don't likes. So this won't be a problem.” 
- JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
In Singapore, many Chinese communities have maintained proficiency in Mandarin. When 
collaborating with mainland Chinese, Singaporean professionals can therefore easily fall 
back on that language. They do not suffer from some of the Chinese who do not have a 
strong grasp of the English language. A DiskCo professional comments:  
 
“I speak Mandarin so I have no problem in communicating with people from China. 
Because even if they don't speak English I can understand what they are talking 
about. So Malaysia itself is not a problem because they just speak English.” - JLL, 
DiskCo-G-1 
 
With people in Malaysia, English is usually the language of choice for Singaporeans. On 
top of that, some people from Malaysia site A know Mandarin because of their Chinese 
background or otherwise. This offers an additional common knowledge base if need be 
(Grant, 1996b): 
 
“When we say remote sites, we consider other countries. Because within Singapore 
we don't really feel the difference. So for us to work with Malaysia site A, we don't 
really have a problem. Because language wise, they can speak English, they can 
speak Mandarin. So we can use either one of the languages. So we don't have this 
communication problem.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Even though many of the Singaporean DiskCo speak Mandarin, the VP Information 
Technologies stresses the importance of English. In an international (American) firm like 
DiskCo, English is used as a common language. People simply need proficiency in this 
area to understand corporate documentation and participate in distributed communities. For 
this reason, proficiency in English is an entry requirement for new Chinese staff. 
(Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998) found a similar situation in their research on international 
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student teams.) The VP points out that when he was involved in setting up Chinese plants, 
he selected people meeting this standard:  
 
“Now as far as language is concerned, when we first set up the China plant we really 
made it very clear anybody we cope with must know English written and spoken. So 
language wise it is not a big issue in that area.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-3 
 
From Malaysia site A, the project manager data conversion echoes this view. According to 
her, command of the English language is a basic skill people need when participating in an 
international project. Usually, communications are in English in these environments. If 
people did not really master that language, others would misinterpret their 
communications, and vice versa.  
 
 “I think in relation to emails, the person at least have a good basic knowledge of 
English if English is the language that was used. Because sometimes if you don't 
conform your ideas or your questions in a correct manner, people may misinterpret it. 
So I think there is some skill required there.” - JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
Actual experiences with Chinese colleagues differ somewhat. One interviewee from 
Malaysia mentioned little problems when dealing with IT staff in China: “Chinese is not 
much of a problem. We are very fortunate that our IT staff their English is not bad.” (MC). 
Other interviewees held a different perception. JPL from Singapore site A prefers to use 
Mandarin with them. He indicates that his Chinese counterparts are reluctant to use 
English, especially with oral communications. So he interacts with them in Mandarin on 
the phone and when visiting their site. English is used for email exchanges.  
 
“We have phone, and we use email. And sometimes we also use Microsoft NetMeeting 
if you want to show them some screens. Most of the time we communicate in 
Mandarin. Because these people are quite shy to use English. Except for email. 
Because I myself I do speak Chinese, so there is no problem. So most of the time we 
communicate in Mandarin. In fact when I'm over there, we use Chinese when we 
communicate amongst ourselves.” - JPL, DiskCo-I-1 
 
From the Malaysian data conversion group, JNL comments that she experienced difficulty 
understanding IT staff members from China. This seems to concern also oral 
communications: 
 
“There were no special issues that were unique to them. So I can't recall them. The 
only problem was really on the communication side. It's a bit difficult for me to 
understand what they are trying to say. (…) Their use of the English language is 
slightly different.” - JPL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
With her Chinese background, SCC points out that she prefers Mandarin instead of English 
when dealing with Chinese counterparts: “China people … because the people we deal 
with can't write very good English it's easier to talk to them. I speak Mandarin” (SCC).  
 
Some members of the Singaporean IT group did not have a Chinese background. They 
could not speak or write Mandarin, like GP. In his case, oral interacting in English with 
Chinese counterparts was further complicated by his strong Indian accent. To work around 
this, he exchanged mainly emails. The textual format of this medium transmits a sender’s 
point explicitly, independent of verbal cues and accents.  
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“Most of the times I used emails, but a couple of times I used phone also. I use email 
because I cannot understand Chinese, their local language. So I found that when I 
write emails it's very clear to them. (…) I would say that talking directly to them, 
communication by phone is not very much, maybe 20-30% of the total 
communication.” - GP, DiskCo-D-1 
 
Colleagues from GP confirmed his communication challenge with Chinese IT personnel 
(DiskCo-J-1). OBT explained that their colleagues in China are more comfortable using 
Mandarin. Since she and most of her colleagues share fluency in Mandarin, they have in a 
sense a backup protocol. GP does not have that luxury:  
 
“China people they are more fluent in using Mandarin. So if you want to explain 
something to them in English, you find a little bit of difficulties. Because we can speak 
Mandarin, somehow we can overcome that. But for example GP, one of our team 
members, he's an Indian, so he can't speak Chinese. He can only use English. So 
China people they are not so fluent in English. So they may find some difficulties in 
understanding each other.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
§ 9.2.10.2  Other Cultures and Operational Diversity 
The core sites in Singapore and Malaysia maintained frequent contact with US 
counterparts. In DiskCo’s organization setup, new Information Technologies and 
procedures were commonly first introduced in the US. From there they spread out to the 
Far East region and Europe. This led to multiple communities around functional areas, 
consisting of people knowing colleagues with a similar role in another DiskCo location. 
For the Far East, key users and IT personnel had been exposed to cross cultural contacts. 
Often they had visited the US to work directly with their counterparts. In addition, DiskCo 
sent American expatriate executives around the world (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). This 
practice not only builds their international experience. It also familiarizes local temporary 
subordinates to Americans and their culture. All this greatly reduced the impact of cultural 
diversity in the Oracle project as JNL from Malaysia reports: 
 
“I think we do not have a problem (with cross cultural collaboration - author) because 
we are quite open to communication with people from the US. So when we take on 
this project, it’s something that we are already familiar with. (…) On and off we work 
with them, sometimes we check back with the US on certain issues. And I have 
worked under some US directors before. So I guess that gives me some experience.” - 
JNL, DiskCo-F-1 
 
HHT from Singapore site A brings another perspective. Through her extensive experience 
with US counterparts, she has observed considerable differences between American and 
Singaporean or Asian culture. People have different ways of working and thinking that 
impact how they relate. An additional issue between US and Singaporean sites was that 
their operations not the same. Singapore specializes in high volume manufacturing, while 
US sites do mainly product development. Americans were often not aware of Singapore’s 
local situation, and assumed that worked in the US should work there too. Together, 
cultural and operational diversity added to strain in the relationship between sites in the US 
and Singapore (Hinds & Bailey, 2000). Multiple communication loops were needed to 
clarify and resolve dissimilarities, see also § 9.2.4.3  (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b).  
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For the first time, Singapore site A worked with a Japanese DiskCo location. So far that 
site had been supported directly from the US. But for the Oracle project, expertise 
available in Singapore was to be deployed there. In an interview, CPW explained that the 
Japanese have a very unique culture. They are used to quite formal, polite interactions. His 
challenge was to initiate - despite these differences - IT and key user communities between 
Singapore and Japan. The strategy he pursued consisted initially mainly of face-to-face 
visits. Japanese IT representatives were invited to Singapore for training and to get to 
know local IT there. Then, Singapore IT staff from the core team went over to Japan. They 
met not only their IT counterparts but also users. Subsequently, contact lists were 
elaborated and people started to contact each other electronically. CPW emphasized the 
gradual build-up of these new relationships, and the role of face-to-face contact. 
Reciprocal immersion in each other’s context seemed indispensable for enhancing mutual 
awareness and building cross-cultural rapport (Meadows, 1996b).  
 
“You have to deal with them differently, very politely (...). So we have training (in 
Singapore - author). Then when we come back here there is some training that needs 
to be done locally (in Japan - author). So the key user will be sent over (Singapore 
key user to Japan - author). Again this time we come over not only to know our IT 
people better, but also introduce them to the key users, who will be going there to 
help them during the first week of the conversion. So that is how we can slowly 
establish a relationship.” - CPW, DiskCo-A-5 
 
Singaporeans working with Japanese counterparts noticed that their oral command of 
English was not very strong. This time, however, they did not have a fall back option, like 
Mandarin for the Chinese colleagues. They reverted to textual exchanges to obviate this 
problem. Written English was a skill most Japanese mastered sufficiently to make 
themselves clear and understand others’ messages.  
 
“We worked for the first time with Japan. In Japan they can speak English, but when 
you come to oral communication, you find some difficulties. But if you use email, there 
is no problem. Their return in English is OK. So if you can't understand you read it and 
then you can understand. But through oral communication it's a bit difficult. So you 
need more time.” - OBT, DiskCo-C-1 
 
Finally, some members of the Singapore site A core team worked with SysCo vendor staff 
from India. SysCo assisted DiskCo with Oracle programming tasks. Remote oral 
exchanges suffered from noisy lines and the fact that the Indians’ use of English appeared 
challenging to understand for Singaporeans. As it seems, remote connections and voice 
communication technology must be in good shape to deal with different dialects or modes 
of utilizing English. 
 
“Because they are in India, whenever I call them up through phone it’s very noise. And 
their English is also very difficult to understand. It’s very difficult to work with those 
people.” - SCC, DiskCo-J-1 
 
The DiskCo case is concluded and cross-analyzed with the CarCo case in Chapter 11  . 
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Chapter 10  CarCo Case: Offshore-Outsourced IS Development Project
51
 
 
In the CarCo case, we describes and analyze an IS development project that involved 
CarCo and a vendor firm (SoftHouse). The study traces subsequent phases in the 
development process. With our research framework as a point of departure, we analyze the 
project’s evolutionary process. Next, a thematic analysis elaborates on tensions and 
adaptations. The next part contains a more positivist-oriented analysis that frames this case 
study and the DiskCo case.  
 
§ 10.1  Description 
 
The CarCo case Goldd project is described here along several lines. We start with 
companies, actors and sites involved in the project. Then, time zone differences are 
explained for project locations in India, Germany and US. We lay out the project time line, 
including planned and realized milestones. The situation before Goldd is sketched, and we 
outline key dimensions of the project’s setup.  
 
§ 10.1.1  Companies, People and Sites  
CarCo is the focal organization in this case study. The company is a US manufacturer of 
cars and trucks with global presence. This study zooms in on CarCo marketing units in 
Europe (Cologne, Germany) and the US (Detroit, MI) that were in need of a new dealer 
information system. They were assisted by CarCo’s Marketing & Sales System (M&SS) 
group, also located in Cologne and Detroit. For this new system, a project was started 
called Goldd (Global On-Line Dealer Database). Table 32 shows the key players in this 
project. Names are represented by 2 or 3 letter combinations to maintain confidentiality. 
AC stands for Ms Amanda Cijntje. 
                                                 
51 The author gratefully acknowledges cooperation from CarCo, and Amanda Cijntje. 
Research executed by Amanda Cijntje has greatly contributed to the case study, including 
interviews, weekly logs, CarCo documentation, and her thesis. All names in this case study 
have been disguised to maintain confidentiality. The case study is intended for generating 
knowledge on distributed work, rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective 
handling of an administrative situation.  
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Table 32 - Companies, sites and actors involved in CarCo case 
Company Unit & Site People & Role 
HH, Project Leader 
HN, Senior Analyst 
MB, Data modeling 
Marketing & Sales System, Project 
Team Cologne, Germany 
AC, Project Administrator and co-researcher 
Marketing Europe, Cologne, Germany Users Marketing 
ST, Initial senior analyst, team leader 
JF, Replacing senior analyst, team leader 
BM, Data modeling 
Marketing & Sales System, Project 
Team Detroit, USA 
Other team members: CS, CK, DM, CP, LF, SK 
CarCo 
Marketing USA, Detroit, USA Users USA 
Management 
BW, Initial independent consultant, onshore 
liaison, Cologne, Germany 
Site UK  
BJ, Replacing independent consultant, 
onshore liaison, Cologne, Germany 
NK, Independent consultant, offshore liaison 
India 
SA, Executive 
SM, Offshore Project Manager (before him RG) 
SPB, Offshore senior team member, later 
also onshore liaison 
MD, Offshore senior team member, later 
also onshore liaison 
Team leaders (e.g. VA) 
SoftHouse 
Site India, Project Team Bangalore, 
India 
Team members 
 
The M&SS group outsourced parts of the project to a company referred to as SoftHouse, a US 
firm. SoftHouse has a branch office in the UK, and its main programming resources in Bangalore, 
India. CarCo’s German M&SS group worked with SoftHouse’s UK branch which delegated the 
project work to its site in India. It also hired independent consultants from the UK to link the team 
in India to CarCo’s US and German sites. Initially, one consultant was stationed in India (NK in 
Table 4) and one in Cologne, Germany (BW). NK left the project in its early stage without 
replacement. BW also left the project. His role was divided between a new consultant (BJ in Table 
4, also English), and Indian team members (SPB and MD).  
 
§ 10.1.2  Time Zones and Windows 
CarCo and SoftHouse sites span three continents and a large number of time zones. Table 33 uses 
the format for showing time zones that was introduced in the Theory Section. Horizontally, the 
same moment in different zones is shown. The columns depict time zones as compared to UTC. 
CarCo’s USA site in Detroit is located in Eastern Standard Time, UTC -5. CarCo Cologne 
Germany is located in UTC +1. SoftHouse UK is UTC, their Indian site is located in UTC +5.5.52
                                                 
52 Although the site in India is UTC +5.5, we use UTC +5 for practical reasons. 
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The bold dotted lines show windows for synchronous collaboration across the sites. (UK 
site is not included since it was not operationally involved in the project.) We assume a 
somewhat extended working day from 8:00 o’clock in the morning until 19:00 (7 PM) in 
the evening.  
 
This results in the following windows: 
 USA site - Germany site: from 8:00/ 14:00 until 13:00/ 19:00, i.e. 5 hours 
 Germany site - India site: from 8:00/ 12:00 until 15:00/ 19:00, i.e. 7 hours 
 USA site - India site: from 8:00/ 18:00 until 9:00/ 19:00, i.e. 1 hour 
 Triple sites (USA, Germany, India): 8:00/ 14:00/ 18:00 until 9:00/ 15:00/ 19:00, i.e. 1 
hour 
 
§ 10.1.3  Project Timeline 
The need for a new dealer information system arouse in CarCo’s US marketing group in 
1994. They were still using a system from the 1970s that did not longer meet business 
needs in the 1990s and beyond. Following a strategy of globalization, CarCo decided to 
setup an international project. European sites became involved although they used a 
different, more advanced system.  
 
1994 and 1995 were used to define the project. In Spring 1995, the project was approved 
and received a budget of US$ 1.8M. Around winter 1995 CarCo M&SS staff developed an 
initial data model. Table 34 summarizes events in separate columns for CarCo and 
SoftHouse. 
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Table 34 - Timeline CarCo Goldd project 
 
Date CarCo SoftHouse 
1994 
Summer  
 USA urgent need for new dealer 
information system 
 
1994 Fall    
1994 Winter   Feasibility study for global system  
1995 Spring  Project approval, budget allocation  
1995 
Summer  
  
1995 Fall   Data modeling  
1995 Winter   Decision for offshore development  Vendors invited to bid. SoftHouse 
involves independent consultants 
BW and NK 
1996 Spring  Development of first PC-based 
prototype 
 European workshop to introduce 
project 
 HH and HN to USA for feedback 
workshop - called ‘Model Office 1’ - 
on PC-based prototype, with IT staff 
and users. 
 Acceptance of SoftHouse bid, 
development contract signed 
 BW and NK collaborate with 
CarCo IT staff and users 
1996 
Summer  
  Start programming in India. 
 NK stationed for only a few 
weeks in India to liaise offshore 
with BW onshore in Germany. 
1996 Fall   CarCo dissatisfied with deliveries 
 CarCo Germany warns SoftHouse, 
escalates conflict, pressures BW 
and SoftHouse UK. 
 Initial deliveries little progress 
from original prototype. 
 Subsequent deliveries were often 
late, buggy, not according to 
expectations. 
1996 Winter   Model Office 2 in USA with HH, BW 
and SPB. Twice delayed because of 
late deliveries.  
 CarCo change requests not 
relayed to India by BW. 
1997 Spring  Scheduled final delivery for end of 
January was not accomplished. 
 CarCo discovers change requests 
have not been relayed to India by 
BW. 
 Need to redo requirements analysis 
for Sales and P&A codes 
functionality.  
 Model Office 3 skipped because of 
delays 
 BJ joins project and replaces BW 
after a couple of weeks 
 SPB visits German site for 
assisting in technical issues. 
Upon returning replaced by MD.  
1997 
Summer  
 Core system deliveries and launch 
scheduled, delayed for Fall 1997. 
 
1997 Fall   Expected system launch in USA  
1998 Year  Expected system launch in Europe  
1999 Year  Expected system launch in Europe  
2000 Year  Expected global roll out  
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In Winter 1995, CarCo decided to outsource major parts of the Goldd project. After a 
bidding period, they selected SoftHouse in 1996. A PC-based mock up version of the 
eventual system was developed in Germany and presented to users in Europe and the US 
during a Model Office session. These sessions bring users and M&SS professionals 
together to present the current version of the system and receive feedback. Liaisons 
(independent consultants BW and NK) worked 6 months with CarCo M&SS professionals 
and users before offshore development was started. They were expected to channel and 
bridge collaboration between CarCo and SoftHouse staff in India. NK left in summer 1996, 
leaving BW to liaise from his German site with staff in India.  
 
In Fall and Winter 1996, the project started to escalate. Staff in India indicated lack of 
insight in CarCo requirements. BW was challenged by the task of connecting on his own 
the CarCo and SoftHouse project communities. Numerous change requests was CarCo 
M&SS and users were not passed on to the team in India. Deadlines were missed and 
deliveries did not satisfy CarCo. Around Christmas 1997, a second Model Office was 
scheduled in the US with users, CarCo M&SS staff (USA and Germany), and SoftHouse 
representatives from India.  
 
Early 1997, BW was replaced by BJ. In addition, two members from the India team (SPB 
and MD) were alternatingly stationed in Germany. They assisted BW in liaising with the 
team in India. This new setup improved offshore collaboration. The third Model Office 
was skipped because of the delays in deliveries. The Goldd core system was therefore 
launched without further user consultation in the USA in Fall 1997. The project plan was 
to improve the system, and roll it out across CarCo’s global sites in the period 1997-2000.  
 
§ 10.1.4  Situation before the Project 
In the early 1990s, new collaborative technologies were widely adopted in organizations. 
People could email, teleconference and videoconference across corporate units in different 
countries and continents. They could also do that with other firms, leading to the first 
offshore outsourcing attempts (Kotabe, 1992; Krepchin, 1993). With new opportunities for 
remote collaboration, multinational firms became aware that many of their local processes 
were quite similar yet independently organized. They realized that a more global approach 
could yield distinct advantages. It would make the company more flexible, cost efficient 
and integrated (Manheim, 1993). Common business processes and technology avoid 
redundancy in a multi site environment. While in the past each location or region was self-
sufficient, many services could now be consolidated and concentrated. Sites could focus on 
a particular area, and contribute from their strength. On a network level, they tap into a 
distributed network of interconnected centers of excellence (Chiesa, 1995). For 
multinational firms, this implied a considerable shift with strategic, organizational, and 
operational implications (Marschan, 1996).  
 
This novel strategy applied to CarCo as well. Early 1990s, the company developed a global 
car, and started to consolidate North American and European operations. It intends to 
create a single global organization and management team by 2000. A strategic initiative 
was launched to implement this vision. According to their web site:  
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“[The initiative] has allowed the company to eliminate duplication, initiate best 
practices, use common components and designs for the advantage of scale, and 
allocate resources to wherever they are needed to best serve market needs. [The 
initiative] combines the power, resources, and reach of a world company with the 
immediacy, the intimacy, the agility, and the spirit of a small one. This was 
accomplished with the creation of five vehicle centers.” - CarCo web site
53
 
 
The initiative was implemented by means of about 20 ‘Global Strategic Projects’. In 
different areas, management identified opportunities for commonality, globalization and 
cost reduction. One example was the Marketing & Sales System (M&SS) group with main 
offices in Detroit and Cologne (Germany) for North America and Europe respectively. 
M&SS develops, implements and maintains information systems for CarCo’s marketing 
and sales organization. This user group is connected to CarCo dealers that sell the various 
brands to end customers. Within the CarCo organization, they work with units related to 
car sales, like manufacturing and finance.  
 
Early 1990s, M&SS operated different systems in North America and Europe. In North 
America (US, Canada, Mexico), a system called Centralized Dealer Database (CDDB) and 
Customer Information System (CIS) were used as a central source for dealership 
information. These were text-only, mainframe systems from the 1970s. They did not 
support current business processes in an adequate manner, and were no longer supported 
by their supplier. Replacement therefore became an urgent issue. In Europe, M&SS had 
implemented a somewhat more advanced system called Dealer Information Database 
(DID). But besides this system, national sales companies in Europe worked with their own 
IS and local files. In his presentation, HH mentions ironically:  
 
“World-wide there are only 674 ways to define information about dealerships whom we 
authorize to sell our products to retail-customers” - HH, CarCo-A-4 
 
From a global point of view, CarCo thus operated different information infrastructures that 
were in part outdated. This proliferation resulted in data redundancy that made little sense 
from a business point of view. in data redundancy that made little sense from a business 
point of view:  
 
“Looking world-wide [the] list can be extended easily to 500-1000 files, holding 
redundantly the same information, but formatted slightly different and adapted to some 
local, individual requirements.” - HH, CarCo-A-4 
 
Diversity of information formatting becomes a problem when other units - like 
manufacturing - need aggregated data for their own processes. At CarCo, this led to 
extensive remote communications to ensure data consistency:  
 
“This situation leads to a substantial administrational overhead as different areas are 
pursuing the similar processes and are communicating via phone, paper or e-mail in 
order to ensure the consistency and accuracy of these processes or to manage 
exceptional drawbacks in this process. A typical deficiency of this situation is that 
vehicles cannot be scheduled, build or delivered, due to some incomplete or 
                                                 
53 Web address omitted for reasons of confidentiality. 
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inconsistent information and quite a number of people have to undertake exceptional 
investigations to resolve the problem.” - HH, CarCo-A-4  
 
In 1994, the M&SS group suspected that many local business processes were quite similar. 
This marked the start of the project studied here. A team was setup to explore the level of 
commonality in North America and Europe. They assessed the feasibility of a single global 
dealer information system, called Goldd - Global Dealer Online Information Database. 
Confirmatory results from this team’s study led to the formation of the Goldd development 
team in the second quarter of 1995: 
 
“A high level of commonalities of business processes in Europe and North America 
regarding dealer information encouraged the idea to approach to a common Global 
Dealer Online Information Database Goldd. The feasibility was reconfirmed by 
detailed investigations and beginning 2Q1995 a global team was formed to start 
system development. The guideline is: if we can manage to commonize European and 
North American requirements we will have prepared the foundation to implement 
Goldd in all [CarCo] locations world-wide.” - HH, CarCo-A-4 
 
The Goldd project transformed the urgent replacement need from CarCo North America 
into a global project with the objective “To develop and launch a common global 
repository for dealer information and to reduce costs by eliminating redundant sources of 
dealer information” (AC, CarCo-K-2) . The project leader formulated three ‘Key Business 
Objectives’ in one of his presentations (HH, CarCo-A-4):  
 
 Support the management of our world-wide distribution network 
 Implement a reliable, centralized warehouse for dealer information 
 Concentrate development resources for a single global application 
 
In the next section we discuss main features of the proposed system and how the project 
was setup. 
 
§ 10.1.5  Project Setup 
In the early 1990s, companies in North America and Europe were very short of qualified, 
affordable IT personnel. Labor markets there could not supply adequately because of the 
year 2000 problem and implementation of integrated business applications like ERP (Kay, 
1998). Consequently, other regions with ample supply became interesting partners for 
software development, upgrade and maintenance tasks. Examples of such geographical 
areas include Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, India, and countries in the Far East 
like China and the Philippines. For the first time, offshore outsourcing to these areas 
became a large scale phenomenon (Ravichandran & Ahmed, 1993). The Goldd project is 
an example of an outsourcing relationship between CarCo (with project sites in the Detroit, 
US and Cologne, Germany), and SoftHouse (with locations in the UK and India). In this 
section, we explore the setup of this offshore project in three stages. First, we discuss the 
outsourcing relationship between the two companies. Second, we zoom in on the 
organizational setup of the project, both on a site and meta-site level. Third, we describe 
project phases and the development process. An assessment is made of work division and 
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dependencies. Finally, technology used in the project is discussed. This concerns the 
Goldd system, and tools used for system development.  
 
§ 10.1.5.1  Outsourcing Relationship 
Late 1995, CarCo invited vendors to bid for the project. Having obtained project approval, 
project teams from M&SS North America and Germany were formed. They started to 
work on data modeling and a PC-based prototype. Among the vendors was SoftHouse, a 
major US-based IT vendor. SoftHouse runs offices across the world to connect to local 
clients, and channel projects to its programming base in Bangalore, India. The UK office 
coordinated their bidding process. They hired two independent IT consultants - BW and 
NK - to estimate the project work and for CarCo costs. The consultants’ bid document was 
accepted and led to a contract between SoftHouse UK and CarCo. The document described 
the functional requirements, GUI standards, and deliverables for both parties. It specified 
project activities like planning, reporting, testing and change management. Payments were 
tied to milestone deliverables that had to be accepted according to certain quality criteria.  
 
SoftHouse UK subcontracted the Goldd project to operations in India. Among the factors 
that contributed to this decision were ISO certification and a record of successful projects. 
SoftHouse convinced CarCo that it worked with an elaborate set of quality control 
mechanisms. Apart from that, offshore outsourcing was cost efficient in the 1990s because 
of the huge IT work force in India (Ravichandran & Ahmed, 1993).  
 
In his presentation, the CarCo project leader mentioned that “The offshore supplier is 
committed to a fix price budget and timing for each development phase. A 15% portion of 
the budget is reserved for unexpected complexity or additional requirements” (HH, CarCo-
A-4). Probably to win the contract, SoftHouse UK formalized financial and temporal 
obligations from the outset, with some possibility of escape for work that fell outside scope 
of the contract. HH mentions in an interview that they would assess whether unexpected 
work would fit in the original contract framework. If not, CarCo would arrange for 
additional funding: 
 
“The contract had certain criteria in it like a 15% flex that would cover any work that 
we couldn’t foresee. And we had a mechanism of change requests. When something 
turned up that we would not have estimated, we would see whether it fits within the 
original contractual scope or not. And if it didn’t then we would try to find extra funding 
for that. We did that on two occasions.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Interviewees mentioned that the complexity of the project was underestimated. 
Requirements were not known in detail - not even by CarCo M&SS - when the contract 
was signed (CarCo-G-1). Hence, specifications of the system lacked detail and realism, 
leading to an incomplete contract situation (Hart, 1991). To handle this uncertainty, parties 
adopted a prototyping methodology to develop the new system stage-wise through 
interactions between CarCo users and CarCo/ SoftHouse IT staff.  
 
A contradictory outsourcing situation appeared to emerge. Drawing on Transaction Costs 
Economics, contracts can be distinguished in classical, neo-classical and relational (see 
also theory section) (Ben-Porath, 1980; Macneil, 1978; Williamson, 1979). Parties 
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commonly strive for a match between one of these contract forms and the uncertainty of 
the work undertaken under the contract (Table 35). With classical contracts, precise 
definition of reciprocal obligations suffices to govern the exchange. This transparency is 
reflected in MacNeil’s (1974: 738) quote: “Sharp in by clear by agreement; sharp out by 
clear performance”. Neo-classical contracts allow parties to handle a certain level of 
uncertainty since they can fall back on some form of relationship (Williamson, 1991). With 
relational contracts, reciprocal performances can remain ill-specified since parties know 
each other and may have a sustainable interest in future exchanges (Ben-Porath, 1980; 
Kumar & van Dissel, 1996).  
 
Table 35 - Contract modes and work uncertainty 
 
  Classical contracts Neo-classical 
contracts 
Relational contracts 
 
Low 
(Anticipation) 
Transparency: 
“Sharp in by clear by 
agreement; sharp 
out by clear 
performance” 
(Macneil, 1974: 738) 
  
 
Medium 
 
 
 Combination of 
semi-structuring and 
relationship for 
making adjustments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty 
of 
contracted 
work 
 
High 
(Reality) 
 
 
  Adjustive contracts 
that rely on parties’ 
identity and 
relationship (Ben-
Porath, 1980).  
 
The outsourcing contract between CarCo and SoftHouse seems a hybrid arrangement. The 
contract pins down some key performance criteria (budget, planning). This was probably 
based on the inappropriate assessment of the contractual situation. Parties assumed low-
uncertainty, leading to a classical contract situation. But in reality, the project was more 
uncertain and complex (see cells for low and high uncertainty in Table 35). This suggests a 
relational contract mode. This mismatch not only affected the contract mode adopted here. 
It also led to a project organization setup that was not equipped to handle extensive 
communication and knowledge transfer needs. We elaborate on these themes in part in the 
following description sections. A more in-depth investigation follows in the interpretive 
analysis section.  
 
§ 10.1.5.2  Project Organization 
Operationally, three sites were involved in the Goldd project: CarCo Detroit (USA), CarCo 
Cologne (Germany), and SoftHouse Bangalore (India). We use an organization chart from 
the project leader as a starting point for discussing responsibilities and communications 
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across sites (Figure 51).54 The top rectangle shows CarCo’s involvement. In Europe, HH is 
project champion for the overall Goldd project. He also leads the M&SS unit working on 
the Goldd project. His subordinates include HN as senior analyst, and MB for data 
modeling. Their involvement and expertise was needed because Goldd would be based on 
the DID.  
 
In North America, JF (M&SS North America) is directly involved in the Goldd project. 
She coordinates on the US side, working with marketing users and IT staff from other 
departments (shown in the figure right from M&SS North America). The reason for 
involving different IT groups in the US was that Goldd would first of all replace two old 
systems in North America: CDDB and CIS. Teams responsible for these applications had 
to contribute to the requirements analysis process and (eventually) data migration. Besides 
that, the Goldd global server database would be physically located in North America. The 
existing database administration of M&SS would therefore be involved for “providing 
physical platforms for development, integration test and production and performance and 
access optimization” (CarCo-A-4). 
 
CarCo has an integrated international management structure as shown in Figure 51. HH 
and JF eventually report to the same boss for M&SS. Soon after the project started, HH 
became manager of JF (not shown). 
 
 
                                                 
54 Abbreviation of names follows Table 4. 
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Source: adopted from presentation by HH, CarCo-A-4 
 
Figure 51 - Organization chart CarCo Goldd project (project leader version) 
 
 
The CarCo project organization is linked to SoftHouse, the bottom rectangle in Figure 51. 
At least one liaison - initially BW - from SoftHouse is physically stationed ‘on-shore’ 
where HH, HN, and MB work in Cologne, Germany. This person reports to SoftHouse 
UK. In Bangalore, India, NK (not shown in Figure 51) functioned as counterpart for BW 
during the first month of the project. NK worked with offshore project manager SM who 
headed the Goldd team there. This team was split in two units, each headed by a team 
leader. One group works on the Oracle database system (8 people), the other one focuses 
on Visual Basic (28 people) (CarCo-E-1).  
MB
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HR
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HH
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DM
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FR
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(M&SS North America)
CK
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BJ BW
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Germany
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We use the communications diagram in Figure 52 to illustrate the initial setup of the Goldd 
project.55 (There are four phases in total.) BW functioned as first liaison in Germany. NK 
is shown as offshore liaison between the IT group in India and his counterpart onshore, 
BW. The latter works with CarCo’s M&SS unit in Germany. That team works with users 
in Europe, and the M&SS unit in Detroit with a similar role for North America. 
Connecting the three main sites was supposed to rely mainly on electronic communications 
as HH indicates in his presentation: 
 
“The co-ordination between the above mentioned activities located on 3 continents will 
be mainly supported by document and file exchange procedures within PROFS (IBM e-
mail system - author) and audio/video conferences. Travel is limited to a minimum and 
reserved mainly to key persons of the team in order to conduct presentation of the 
system to customer areas.” - HH, CarCo-A-4  
 
NK left after about a month, so that BW had to work directly with SM and the team in 
India. Figure 53 shows this second phase of the project setup. During that period, BW 
visited the group in India to work with them on-site.  
 
                                                 
55 These diagramd clarify communication lines, not hierarchical positions. They are also 
used in the analysis sections. Some direct contact existed between the onshore liaison and 
JF as representative from the US team. This link is not shown in the figure. 
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By the end of 1996, BW took a month vacation and preferred to leave the Goldd project. 
He was replaced by BJ - also an independent IT consultant - in January 1997. Since BJ’s 
expertise was predominantly in project management and communications, he needed 
assistance for technical matters. SoftHouse stationed two senior team members from the 
team in India in turns: SPB - specialized in Visual Basic - and MD, responsible for 
development. HH summarized this new setup in his presentation:  
 
“The Cologne Office of European Marketing and Sales Systems will have a lead role 
to coordinate the development of the new application by support of an offshore 
supplier, based in India. As offshore supplier [SoftHouse], based in United Kingdom, 
has been selected and will develop the system together with [SoftHouse] India located 
in Bangalore. The co-ordination between [CarCo] in Cologne and [SoftHouse] in 
Bangalore will be ensured by 2 [SoftHouse] onshore managers in Cologne. One will 
focus on project management, the second will be responsible for communicating 
business requirements and technical concepts. These onshore managers will 
communicate with at least one offshore manager who leads the development team in 
Bangalore, India.” - HH, CarCo-A-4 
 
Figure 54 represents the communications diagram for the third phase. BW is shown as 2nd 
on-shore liaison. His role is strengthen by team members from India who work directly 
with the CarCo team in Germany.  
 
The positioning of team members from India in Germany facilitated direct contact with the 
US team. This was necessary for several reasons. The second Model Office session in 
Detroit was attended by Indian team members to receive feedback from American IT staff 
and users. The team in the US provided test data for the team in India. They also worked 
on the first implementation of Goldd and were preparing their launch site. This required 
interaction with experts in India (Figure 55).  
 
Comparing the diagrams 1 to 4 suggests several changes. First, the initial setup with two 
independent IT consultants offshore and onshore was reduced to a single liaison. After that 
phase, Indian team members reinforced in Germany the connection to the SoftHouse 
development team in Bangalore. Apparently, direct inclusion by representatives from India 
in the CarCo context was needed, rather than someone coming to them.  
Second, the original structure channels exchanges between the teams in India and the US 
exclusively through the German site and liaisons. Gradually that connection became more 
direct. Overall, a triangle-shaped structure emerged instead of a chain.  
 
§ 10.1.5.3  Project Processes and Planning  
From early 1996 onwards, operational work started on the Goldd project. In the US, 
M&SS staff worked with users to clarify new requirements and business rules. They also 
worked with staff supporting the two older systems - CDDB and CIS - to understand the 
current situation. Based on these efforts, the M&SS team headed by JF worked on the data 
model and process modeling. In parallel, HH’s team in Germany connected to European 
marketing and sales users to elicit requirements there. The European DID system was used 
as a baseline for Goldd since it was implemented quite recently and met most user needs. 
US staff went over to Germany to discuss the modeling results from both sides and come 
to a common data model. The German M&SS team then developed a PC-based prototype 
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of Goldd. A European ‘Goldd awareness’ session was organized in April 1996 for the 
M&SS user base in Europe. They could give comments on the demo system.  
 
The team then joined up with their American counterparts and organized Model Office 
session 1. These sessions “are organized as one-week-workshops focusing both on the 
expert needs of key business areas, and the large number of occasional read-only users. 
Comments received out of these workshops will be incorporated into the next release of 
the application. It is planned to go for 3 Model Office sessions before Goldd can be 
launched in the first location” (CarCo-A-4). During the first session, North American users 
were invited to look at the proposed system and provide feedback. Around that time, 
SoftHouse was on board as an offshore outsourcing partner. The team in India received the 
prototype. They were expected to use CarCo’s data model to complete the design of the 
system and build it. Apart from the data model and business rules identified by CarCo, 
SoftHouse was supposed to design workflow and security features. In these areas, CarCo 
lacked expertise. MB - database expert from CarCo Germany - explains work division in 
this area:  
 
“The DM design was done by [CarCo], except for workflow and security. Those are the 
only area where [SoftHouse] does the design. The design was originally proposed by 
[CarCo], but India needed to amend this to make the proposal in line with Visual 
Basic. This was all new at [CarCo], especially workflow. With workflow and security, 
India prepared the database, then it went to Germany and back to India to amend” - 
MB, CarCo-C-1  
 
CarCo and SoftHouse decided to use a Rapid Application Development (RAD) 
methodology. This approach relies on recurrent contact between users and the 
development team (Beynon-Davies et al., 1999). It is used for ill-defined situations where 
requirements are not known and/ or change quickly. In feedback sessions, users can 
visualize the system and suggest changes. The project leader - HH - comments on the 
motivation for RAD in the Goldd project: 
 
“The problem starts with our users. They would not, and I found that many times, read 
a specification and put their signature under it. Because they wouldn’t understand it. 
They have not the grasp that requires them to imagine something that’s on paper and 
how it would work. So you’re almost bound to have a prototype, and then collect the 
comments, and go ahead with that.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
The prototype was submitted to the SoftHouse team in India in summer 1996. There it was 
used as a starting point for the development of Goldd. While the data model and physical 
database development and setup is handled by CarCo, SoftHouse would provide the front-
end GUI modules and the back-end server modules (CarCo-A-4). The team in India was 
connected to CarCo US and Germany through the linking pins BW (onshore) and NK 
(offshore). These consultants had worked over the Spring with the CarCo teams. They 
were supposed to transfer their knowledge to the team in Bangalore, and handle all 
communications needs between Germany and India. Two Model Office sessions were 
planned in Detroit where SoftHouse representatives from India would team up with US 
and German IT staff and M&SS users. These sessions would further clarify user 
requirements and provide feedback to the CarCo and SoftHouse development groups. HN 
explains this initial setup of the Goldd project:  
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“It was a prototype approach and the assumption was that doing these Model Offices 
would be sufficient for the Indians to do the knowledge transfer from the user side, 
from the business requirements to the programmers in India. That was the 
assumption. Based on that we did a prototype on a PC (…) that was presented to the 
users. First of all just as a demo version, then later on we went ahead to watch their 
feedback and reaction to that. That was the kind of development approach which was 
chosen to do it. In that sense it was planned that we have two Model Office sessions, 
we do the first prototype on the PC, then we go ahead with two Model Office sessions 
and then we receive the final product and test it and evaluate it and improve it and 
launch it.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Things worked out differently. NK left the project soon after development started. This left 
BW with the task of building understanding in Bangalore for CarCo’s context and 
requirements. No one from the team in India had been involved in the requirements 
analysis phase, or even visited sites in North America or Europe. From their perspective, it 
appeared challenging to develop a system based on the minimal information they were 
provided. Looking back, the project leader realized that members of the Bangalore 
development team should have joined early on in the project, when the prototype was 
developed:  
 
“I would want to have a different balance of people right from the very beginning, more 
Indians senior Indian people who would participate in the prototyping and the 
functional analysis.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Based on the resources at their disposal, the SoftHouse development team constructed a 
first version of the Goldd application. These initial deliveries were late, and according to a 
CarCo team member not satisfying:  
 
“They made an approach which was quite on the software of the system. I mean it was 
more a presentation prototype than a functional prototype. The emphasis was always: 
do we have all the screens, do they look nice and do we see information on it. But that 
is not a system. So the real backend of it the functions and the business rules which 
are run behind the surface were not evaluated or analyzed in detail enough in order to 
make the system launchable in the production.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
This lack of quality was a result of a number of factors, such as lack of knowledge transfer 
between onshore and offshore sites, late involvement of Indian software professionals, and 
time pressure. We elaborate on these factors in § 10.2  and § 10.3  .  
While the Indian team was working on the first version over Fall 1996, CarCo users 
(especially those in the US) and IT staff initiated numerous change requests. These 
impacted the data model and had to be taken into account by the SoftHouse team. The 
requests were communicated to the German onshore liaison, BW. The process for handling 
change requests and other development issues is shown in Figure 56. Often, an issue 
started in the US (top left corner). It was documented and sent to the European team 
(Germany). This group checked the requests and fed back questions of need be (direct 
feedback loop). An assessment was made of database impact. MB (German team member) 
or North American (NA) database staff was consulted (bottom left loop). Eventually the 
German team relayed issues via the SoftHouse liaison to the development group in India 
(top right corner). These asynchronous messages that went from hand to hand often led to 
questions in India. Requests for clarification traveled the same route back to German and 
the US 
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Source: adopted from CarCo-B-1 as prepared by AC 
 
Figure 56 - Change request process CarCo - SoftHouse 
 
In Fall 1996, somehow BW did not pass on many change requests to the team in India. 
CarCo found out about this negligence by Winter 1996. All the changes were then submitted 
at once to the team in India, causing a tremendous setback there (see § 10.3.4.4  ).  
 
Eventually, a first version was completed for Model Office 2 by December 1996. German 
and Indian staff traveled to Detroit to meet with US counterparts and users. Over the 
following months, deliveries became quite regular. The CarCo teams in US and Germany 
divided testing tasks. This was needed for acceptance and to provide SoftHouse with 
feedback. Time lacked for a third Model Office that was originally planned in Spring 1997.  
 
Parallel with the development and testing process, the M&SS team in Detroit worked on 
data conversion from the current legacy databases. Their responsibility was to provide test 
data to the team in India and prepare conversion to Goldd from CDDB and CIS. This task 
leads to dependencies with the team in India that develops the database system. Rules for 
data conversion must be common across sites. However, both teams did not realize the 
need for coordination, especially with respect to so-called Sales and P&A functionality 
(see further § 10.3.4.3  ). 
The launch of Goldd was divided into five phases (CarCo-A-4).56 First, the US launch was 
planned for Summer 1997, but delayed to the Fall of that year. Goldd would replace 
CDDB and CIS in US, Canada and Mexico. The second and third implementation phases 
were in Europe where DID would be replaced. This demanded fine-tuning of North 
American and European requirements. Phase four - ‘enhanced European / North American 
                                                 
56 Our research on the Goldd project finalized in Summer 1997. This data is derived from 
HH’s presentation CarCo-A-4 and may not reflect accurately actual events. 
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launch’ (CarCo-A-4) - provided additional functionality to users in these regions. The final 
stage covered remaining CarCo locations across the world.  
 
 
§ 10.1.5.4  Technology 
In this section we focus on the technology built and used in the context of the Goldd 
project. We start with the features of Goldd as compared to the systems it replaces - 
CDDB, CIS, and DID. The section then continues with the Goldd technical platform and 
concludes with technology used for (remote) collaboration during the development 
process.  
 
Goldd system features 
Goldd replaces two systems in North America and one in Europe. In the first region, 
CDDB (Centralized Dealer Database), and CIS (Customer Information System), and in the 
second one DID (Dealer Information Database). The North American systems were no 
longer supported by their supplier. The team there was responsible for understanding the 
logic behind the old systems. This was necessary to model business rules, but not easy as 
JF explains:  
 
“It was very difficult to find out the rules and practices of the older system (CDDB). 
The system is over 20 years old, built somewhere in the '70. There was nothing on 
paper, there were no people who built the system.” - JF, CarCo-D-1 
 
Other than these old systems, Goldd operates in a client/ server environment. It has 
Graphical User Interfaces (GUI), and operates on-line instead of in batches. The scope of 
the system is global rather than regional. It supports the management of CarCo’s world 
wide dealer network by offering a centralized warehouse for dealer information (CarCo-A-
4). According to the project leader: 
 
“The new database will become the world-wide repository for all dealer related, static 
information and will serve global business processes with authorized and consistent 
information. It will be an enabler for the vision of global ordering and delivery where 
any product or service offered can be ordered by any authorized dealer in the world 
without considering the location of production” - HH, CarCo-A-4  
 
Goldd contains two main groups of functionality: Dealer authorization & contract 
information, and Distribution network & dealer performance. The first area focuses on 
basic dealership information (CarCo-A-4). This concerns both CarCo owned dealers and 
franchisers. The second functionality area - Distribution network & dealer performance - 
supports information management on dealers’ operations (Table 36).  
 
Table 36 - Goldd functionality 
 
Dealer authorization & contract information Distribution network & dealer performance 
 Name & addresses 
 Sales agreements 
 Authorized products/ services (for 
franchises) 
 Summary of sales/ stock/ market share 
performance 
 Summary of customer satisfaction program 
results 
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 Local market area responsibility and 
organizational Alignments (country, regions, 
districts, zones, sales points) 
 Ownership and dealer cooperations 
 Marketing and advertising enrollment 
 Finance & accounting  
 Dealer development and appearance 
improvement actions 
 Business management information 
 Facilities & property information  
 Staff and training 
 Traffic and routing Information 
 Hardware/ software vendors & applications  
 
Goldd contains workflow functionality for the dealer appointment process that was 
designed by SoftHouse’s team in India. Candidate dealers must be checked along various 
criteria before they can be accepted and appointed.  
 
All in all, the requirements for Goldd were incompletely known in advance. The system 
rather emerged from an evolutionary process. The co-researcher - AC - who participated 
for months in the German team stresses this fact in her ex post report: “The system is 
characterized by high ambiguity of the functional requirements, as even the system 
analysts cannot always specify the requirements in detail” (CarCo-K-2). A senior member 
of the same team confirms this perception. He admits that the new system was considered 
simply as some functionality around a database - an underestimation of what the system 
ultimately encompassed (CarCo-B-3). 
 
Technical platform 
Goldd is programmed in Visual Basic with GUI. The application runs in a client/ server 
environment on Window-clients and one global Oracle Unix server (CarCo-A-4). This 
server is located in the US and interfaces with three satellite databases in CarCo’s major 
data centers. Figure 57 shows the global setup of Goldd’s technical platform with the 
master server in the middle. Arrows depict data links to satellite servers in US, UK and 
Germany. The master server is also linked through intranet and internet connections to 
LAN of national and regional sales offices (bottom of figure).  
M&SS personnel in North American was responsible for setting up and optimizing the 
global master server and satellite server in the US. They also worked on the first 
conversion towards Goldd, including migration of existing data to the new environment. 
Goldd was intended for about 2000 users in at least 5 countries (CarCo-G-2).  
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Source: adopted from presentation by HH, CarCo-A-4 
 
Figure 57 - Global technical platform Goldd 
 
Tools 
The development teams in US, Germany and India used a variety of tools for 
collaboration. They used email for messages and document exchange. Microsoft office 
applications (Word, Excel) were used at all sites. However, connecting to the Indian site 
was at times problematic. People could not use FTP57 for corporate policy reasons, and had 
difficulty getting PROFS email system. Phone connections were often very noisy, and it 
appeared hard to reach someone. Linking to the team in India was usually done through the 
onshore SoftHouse liaison. More towards the end of the project, the teams emphasized a 
more global communications setup. They managed to organize a three party conference 
call in which the teams from US, German and India participated.  
 
                                                 
57 FTP stands for File Transfer Protocol, a protocol that makes it possible to transfer files 
between servers over the internet. 
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Within CarCo, technology was more varied and advanced. The US and German M&SS 
teams shared a real-time calendar utility so that they knew who was doing what. The teams 
also shared an issue database that was located in Detroit. They used it to keep track of 
pending and past major issues in the Goldd project. Both teams had videoconferencing 
facilities at their disposal and used that very frequently, sometimes daily. Through the 
CarCo intranet, units could share and upload files on a global scale. Locally in Cologne, 
the team had access to the same server drive for file sharing.  
 
For data modeling a tool called IEF was used initially under the responsibility of MB 
(Cologne). This tool had been the standard in Europe, but not in North America. Later they 
changed to ER-WIN with ST in the US in charge. At that time the US had the master 
database and most expertise on this tool. The team in India experienced difficulties getting 
licenses for the tool. 
 
§ 10.2  Interpretive Process Analysis, Fall 1996-Spring 1997
58
 
 
In the period Fall 1996 - Spring 1997, the core system was developed in India (see Table 
34). During that same period, our co-researcher - AC - participated in the Goldd project in 
the German team. She held an administrative position while being allowed the research 
project through logs, interviews, meetings, and documents. In this section, we report on her 
experiences when the Goldd system was developed. We rely on her weekly logs (CarCo-
K-1) and ex post report (CarCo-K-2) as data sources.59 The logs were prepared during her 
participation in the project, while the report was written several months afterwards. Based 
on these resources, we provide a close-up view on what happened during the 
abovementioned period. The reason for following this process is that CarCo and SoftHouse 
changed the organizational setup of Goldd repeatedly. As we will show, these dynamics 
coincide with underlying problems of communications, formalization and control.  
 
The section closely follows AC’s logs and uses quotes from this document. It is organized 
important events in the period Fall 1996 - Spring 1997. The section concludes with themes 
that emerged from the process description and other empirical data sources like interviews. 
These are elaborated in detail in the next analysis section. 
 
                                                 
58 The following sections follow as closely as possible interviewees’ perception of their 
experience with culture and diversity. It may contain stereotyping of people based on their 
culture, and way of working. However, these experiences should be seen in the light of this 
case study context and do not necessarily have generic value. The author does not 
subscribe to, or endorse any of these views, and represents them as authentically as 
possible for the sole purpose of this research. 
59 Data used from the logs and report is represented as authentically as possible. Some 
sections are modified, shortened or omitted for clarity and relevance. Dates have been 
reformatted to US standards to achieve consistency, e.g., ‘January 8’ instead of ‘8th of 
January’. 
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§ 10.2.1  First Deliveries (September 2-6, 1996) 
Early September 1996, SoftHouse started to deliver the first module codes. AC reports on 
the mixed experience this evoked in Germany: 
 
“The first delivery made on September 6 did not work fully. Installing was difficult and 
new, and probably something went wrong there, afterwards it was reported that the 
modules did run. Additional specs were delivered (submitted from India to Germany 
along with the deliverable - author). The interest in the specs (in Germany - author) 
was not very high: the specs merely consisted of screen lay outs, and about what 
would happen if you would press a certain button. After a while it was decided that 
[SoftHouse] would not deliver specs anymore, but ready made screens, that would 
serve as specs. This made the project easier for [CarCo] to review, and cost less work 
in India. (…) As this was the first real delivery everybody was very exited, but 
disappointed. The first deliveries resembled the prototype: it seemed that it was just a 
dumb copy of the prototype.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
Based on the contract, the review in Germany was important. It determined acceptance of 
SoftHouse’s deliveries and thus payments. Work division in the Goldd project defined this 
workflow dependence. In addition, as the log suggests, an information flow was needed 
that accompanied the software deliverables. This would clarify the product and facilitate 
the German team’s review activity.  
 
Unfortunately, the first deliveries added little to the prototype developed by CarCo earlier 
that year. In an interview with AC, SPB - a senior Indian team member - would later reveal 
that the SoftHouse team lacked information and specs from CarCo. One of the reasons for 
that appeared to be the ‘knowledge’ link between onshore and offshore. After NK left, BW 
did not have a remote counterpart whom he could easily connect to. Instead, from 
Germany he faced a team in India waiting for information to start working on the system.  
 
§ 10.2.2  Crisis (September 9-20, 1996) 
In these two weeks, the crisis and conflict between CarCo and SoftHouse became more 
visible. Between September 9 and 13, some deliverables were made but these could not be 
installed. From SoftHouse’s side, issues with development tools were reported:  
 
“This week must have been the prelude to the crisis in the next week. No progress 
was made on the modules or specs, only some progress on the database. Apparently 
(progress report) modules have been delivered, but could not be installed properly at 
[CarCo]. [SoftHouse] India seemed to have quit a lot of software problems: with 
Oracle and Designer 2000 bugs. Also the GUI standards were not incorporated in the 
screen design.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
The following week, tensions escalated. The project leader confronted BW with below-par 
performance from the SoftHouse side. BW’s onshore presence as a liaison positioned him 
to receive the first wave of client pressure:  
 
“Date of a crisis. A lot of discussions were made in HH room. All of them followed the 
same topic: [SoftHouse] did not deliver. According to BW the team in US (JF) and the 
team in Germany did not deliver either (i.e., any material to work on). Everybody 
started blaming each other, loud discussions would follow. HN was very dissatisfied 
with the way work from [SoftHouse] was handed over. BW handed over material that 
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he had not seen himself before, he would present it in a meeting and already notice all 
kinds of things that were wrong, instead of seeing these things first and 
communicating them to India. This of course was due to the enormous time pressure. 
BW just wanted to deliver things without taking notice of the quality. So the things that 
were delivered were mostly bad in quality and this irritated the German team. The 
insults started to become very personal, and tension was everywhere. No progress at 
all was reported in this week. HH invited HN, MB and BW to his home, to discuss 
everything in another environment.” - AC, CarCo-K-1  
 
Reciprocal blaming referred to key dependencies and flows between CarCo and 
SoftHouse. These are depicted in Table 37. They underpin the agency relationship between 
CarCo (principal), and SoftHouse (agent) that was created with the outsourcing contract. 
The table shows two categories of flows: knowledge/ information, and activities. The 
former relates to insights that are needed by one party, and delivered by the other one. We 
distinguish flow 1 towards the agent SoftHouse on CarCo’s preferences. And a second 
reverse flow that clarifies SoftHouse’s deliverables. The white row depicts generic needs 
and flows in agency relationships, while the light gray row applies those to the CarCo case.  
 
The second category - activity flows - consists of two contractual performances. One 
where the agent delivers to the principal (SoftHouse deliverables). And the final row with 
counter-performance by the principal, often payment but also results from testing.  
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Table 37 - Agency dependence and the CarCo case (1/ 2) 
 
  Principal (A) Direction 
of flow 
Agent (B) 
  CarCo  SoftHouse 
A provides information/ 
knowledge on his 
expectations/ context to 
B 
 
 
B needs information/ 
knowledge on A’s 
expectations and 
context 
Flow 1 
  Specifications, knowledge of CarCo context   
A needs information on 
B’s performance  
 B provides information 
on his performance 
Knowledge & 
information flow 
Flow 2 
  Information on SoftHouse deliverables   
A receives performance 
from B 
 B performs for A Flow 3 
 
  SoftHouse deliverables   
A performs for B  B receives performance 
from A 
Flow of 
activities 
Flow 4 
 
  Financial resources, testing results   
 
The flows from both categories are obviously related over time. A service-based principal/ 
agent relationship usually starts with flow 1 (like a customer sitting in a haircutter’s chair 
and telling his/her preferences). Then the agent starts to work and delivers flow 3, possibly 
accompanied by flow 2. In turn, the principal fulfills his side of the contract (flow 4).  
 
The log entry cited here points to multiple disruptions of the generically described process. 
To start with, BW accuses CarCo for not delivering sufficient information (flow 1). 
According to him, this affects SoftHouse’s capability to perform well, i.e., on time, on 
budget, and according to expectations (PMI, 1999). Conversely, CarCo, as the principal, 
reproaches SoftHouse for not delivering quality output (flow 3). This could be traced to a 
combination of on the one hand the Indian team’s performance. On the other hand, BW 
neglected his quality control task as an onshore liaison. In this stage, the project leader 
channeled his complaints and pressure to BW. Later, he would escalate hierarchically.  
 
§ 10.2.3  Changes (September 23-27, 1996) 
The situation reported in the previous period led to some changes. AC mentions that 
communications within the German team are modified and that handovers between BW 
and the CarCo team are formalized:  
 
The situation was (apparently) better this week. Measures were taken to improve 
communication. (Ironically, the lack of efficient communication seemed to be a 
problem within the German team as the measures taken only affected the German 
team. This causes the impression that there was no lack of communication between 
the German and the American team.) All handover had to take place in an official 
meeting, and had to be recorded and tracked as handover by AC. (This practice - both 
the official meeting and the tracking - was quickly forgotten though.) Not a lot of 
progress yet, only some specs (which were replaced later on).” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
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From information on the crisis, it seems that these measures hardly address the underlying 
issues in the principal - agent relationship. Much earlier in the process, it appeared that the 
SoftHouse team in India lacks knowledge on the product to be delivered. Moreover, the 
connection between BW and the offshore team does not function properly. (This is not a 
surprise since NK left the project.)  
 
Even though the formalization measure offers a partial resolution, it was not enforced. Like 
in the research by Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998), some temporary groups attempt to 
institutionalize routines but fail to embed them in their operational process. Here, the 
project leader did not or could not (because of the lateral relationship with SoftHouse) 
implement standard practices for handing over software. Contractual relationships make it 
often difficult for one party to impose his standard to the counterpart (Bradach, 1997).60 In 
the case of CarCo and SoftHouse, standard practices were not part of the contract. This 
made it difficult to adopt and enforce them in a later stage. 
 
§ 10.2.4  Liaising with Indian team (September 30-October 4, 1996) 
People in Germany started to become aware of the Indian team’s difficulty to understand 
CarCo’s expectations. BW left for India to fill the group there in. Doing that remotely did 
not work as effectively. While he was there, AC logs that time zone differences 
constrained communications with the US (see Table 33).  
 
“Beginning October 1, (…) BW starts working in India doing knowledge transfer. (…) 
BW was not in the opportunity to communicate with the US, as the time difference was 
too big (9½ hours). Some urgent issues with JF could not be solved due to this.” - AC, 
CarCo-K-1  
 
On a more structural level, HH and HN wanted BW to stay closer to the team in India. At 
this stage, they considered his inclusion there more important than his staying in Cologne. 
Interestingly, this was discussed with BW’s bosses in the UK, rather than with BW 
himself.  
 
“On Monday, HN and HH discussed the possibility of BW staying in India with the 
[SoftHouse] management. BW would have to review the progress there and especially 
do more knowledge transfer. This option was researched by [SoftHouse] management, 
but in the end they decided not to station BW in India. All this was discussed at first 
without BW knowing about it. The [SoftHouse] management pointed out that he also 
had the right to know and to (jointly) decide. As not a lot could be done for Goldd, HN 
and AC spent most of their time working for DID.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
                                                 
60 Unless one party has a strong comparative powerbase, like Boeing’s influence on Baan 
ERP in te 1990s.  
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§ 10.2.5  Waiting (October 7-18, 1996) 
Like the preceding quote shows, people often waited during these weeks in Germany. The 
Goldd work division assigned development work to SoftHouse India. During this period, 
the German CarCo team waited for the codes to arrive in order to start testing.  
 
“HH on Holiday. BW returned on October 11 to report on progress in Progress 
Meeting. No progress was reported. (…) HN and BW on holiday. The rest of the team 
could do nothing else but wait. HH was not informed very well, as he did not talk to 
HN or BW. The week was filled with waiting. HH had a talk with [SoftHouse 
management] about the final version 1.0 release date: October 25.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
The Progress Meeting was a recurrent US - Germany videoconferencing session in which 
at least BW, HH, HN and from the US side JF participated. Every Friday, this provided the 
backbone of cross-Atlantic coordination. In preparation, BW was expected to prepare and 
share a progress report. Afterwards, AC logged and submitted the meeting minutes.  
 
Attempts were made to establish other procedures, like the formalization of BW’s 
handovers. Or standards concerning communications within the German M&SS team. 
These were not adhered to, as AC points out:  
 
“Other official meetings have been setup (both in Germany and cross-continental), but 
were never complied to for a long period of time.” - AC, CarCo-K-1  
 
§ 10.2.6  Core Model Version 1.0 (October 21-November 1, 1996) 
The first version of Goldd’s core system was slated for October 21. This delivery was a 
couple of days late and incomplete. In response, HH expressed his concerns to his boss in 
Germany, SM (see Figure 51):  
 
“October 21 was the date for installing Core system 1.0. Nothing was delivered. 
Finally the deliveries arrived on Friday and they were installed on Saturday, meaning 
that everybody (at least HH and BW) had to work on this day. The delivery consisted 
of only 20% of the committed content. This triggered something … A letter exists in 
which HH writes to his boss SM about the fact that [SoftHouse] has not made a 
delivery since September 27, mentioning that he is considering a new supplier. (I do 
not know if this letter has been sent in effect on October 26, but it sure shows how 
critical the situation was. [CarCo] had no confidence at all that [SoftHouse] was 
capable of delivery.)” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
In addition, HH escalated the performance issues to SoftHouse management in the UK. He 
had notified them before, but increased pressure now in a more formal way:  
 
“HH contacted [executive] at [SoftHouse] UK to tell him how disappointed he was with 
the material he had received until now. He warned him that he would write an angry 
letter and that his boss was informed about all this. He mentioned or hinted that he 
might stop using [SoftHouse] as a supplier. The letter mentioned that a firm plan had 
to be delivered before Friday, or else …” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
Using an organization chart developed by AC (CarCo-K-2), we can show how HH handled 
the vendor’s performance issues (Figure 58). The chart shows four geographical sites 
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involved in the Goldd project (USA, Germany, UK, India). It depicts for each site and 
sometimes across sites hierarchical relationships (vertically). SFTH stands for SoftHouse, 
the software vendor. The chart can be compared with the project leader’s version, Figure 
51.  
 
HH increased pressure first of all BW, the onshore liaison. This person was readily 
available on-site and responsible for SoftHouse’s operational interface to CarCo. On the 
other hand, BW was an independent consultants without any CarCo affiliation, and limited 
hierarchical ties to SoftHouse UK. BW, in turn, attempted to improve performance through 
the SoftHouse project leader in India. He tried to remotely and while visiting Bangalore.  
Second, HH notified his boss with responsibility for M&SS Europe.  
Third, he exerted pressure on executives from SoftHouse UK. He had contracted this 
company, and could attempt to exact compliance with the contractual stipulations. 
SoftHouse UK executives could use their association with BW to some extent. They did 
have an influence on operations in India through management there.  
Finally, the project leaders in India were challenged by BW and their local management to 
submit intermediate deliverables.  
 
All in all, CarCo warned and threatened SoftHouse to accomplish according to the 
contract. It could not fall back on elaborate working relationships or hierarchical triggers to 
accomplish this, but relied mostly on the outsourcing relationship (Bradach, 1997). 
While ultimately, the objective was to improve performance of the teams in India, HH’s 
pressure worked very indirectly. He depended on multiple nodes. Looking at Figure 58, he 
could only work through either BW, or SoftHouse executives. Whichever way, people 
from outside India never contacted the local teams. They always went through the offshore 
project manager or leaders. These persons handled interaction with local staff. Thus, 
pressure was exerted through a combination of lateral, contract-based contacts, and 
hierarchical relationships within an organization. 
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Source: adopted from CarCo-K-2 
 
Figure 58 - Organization chart CarCo Goldd project (co-researcher version) 
 
Events from the past weeks led HH to communicate on a strategic level only with 
SoftHouse UK executives, and not BW. It seemed that their influence on the Indian 
operations worked effectively. Meanwhile, the Model Office and delivery of the core 
model were postponed:  
 
“All ‘strategic’ tinted decisions were made by HH and [SoftHouse] UK. BW was told 
that he did not have to deal with this level of issues anymore (by HH). The response 
received from [SoftHouse] UK must have been OK, because the project stayed on 
track after Friday. On Thursday another delivery had been made, totaling 38% of the 
promised deliveries. Friday a discussion followed with the management of 
[SoftHouse], BW, and HH. New planning will be delivered by next week, Friday 
November 8. This Monday the decision had to be made whether to do the Model Office 
from November 18-22. The decision was negative. New delivery date for the core 
model: November 7.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
§ 10.2.7  Further Delays (November 4-15, 1996) 
Early November, deliveries were late again. AC observed uncertainty in CarCo’s 
willingness to continue the outsourcing relationship with SoftHouse. She also noted that 
HH’s pressure on SoftHouse UK executives seemed effective. He had used his contractual 
relationship to trigger hierarchical control processes within the SoftHouse organization. 
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This appeared to work: the teams in India were eager to meet expectations from 
management in India and the UK.  
 
“Delivery was late again: this time on November 8 instead of 7. To me it still was not 
clear if [CarCo] wanted to continue with [SoftHouse]. (…) November 15: 4 working 
modules were delivered just before the start of the Progress Meeting. Again there was 
some stress whether or not [SoftHouse] would deliver. Mainly because the big bosses 
( SoftHouse - author) were watching the project, they had to be kept satisfied. Next 
Monday (November 18) the decision would be made whether to go ahead with the 
Model Office in December.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
§ 10.2.8  Second Postponement of Model Office? (November 18-22, 1996) 
The decision on Model Office 2 was important, but difficult to make. It was important 
because many people were involved. In addition to Goldd project members from India, 
Germany, and US, the main group consisted of marketing and sales users who represented 
North American requirements. Delays and lack of information on activities in India made 
the decision also difficult.  
HH was upset about BW’s unawareness of progress in India. When he escalated the issue 
to the UK, it was confirmed that interaction between the offshore team and BW did not 
function properly:  
 
“Monday no decision was made as after the delivery on Friday there was too little to 
decide on (re. the Model Office - author). HH gave [SoftHouse] another chance to 
deliver the software on November 21, so that the decision could be made before the 
Friday Progress Meeting. Delivery by [SoftHouse] was supposed to arrive on 
Thursday. Delivery was finally made just before the progress meeting on Friday. HH 
made calls to [SoftHouse] UK, asking why BW did not know that the deliveries were 
late. There appeared to be a problem: either India was not willing to tell BW, or BW 
did not contact or he could not contact India to make absolutely sure.” - AC, CarCo-K-
1  
 
AC logs that HH decided to postpone the Model Office. He could not risk a session when 
deliveries were delayed and still needed testing:  
 
“Based on this very important delivery, a decision had to be made whether the Model 
Office would take place, or whether it would be postponed until the second week of 
January at the earliest. Considering the fact that the delivery was late (what already 
made the German team loose its temper (HH and HN)), and that there was no time left 
to check the delivery before the Progress Meeting, HH took the decision to postpone 
the Model Office. BW had tried to install the application, but the very important test-
data could not be loaded, so no significant testing could be done. 
The atmosphere in Cologne was quite bad. When announcing the fact that the Model 
Office had to be postponed for the second time, the only reactions in Detroit were 
some silly jokes. [An IT staff member from US] said that is was more important to 
deliver a good product that would take some more time. The atmosphere in Detroit 
was resigned (…)” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
§ 10.2.9  Planning Model Office 2 (November 25-29, 1996) 
Earlier, we noted that standards and procedures for communications were setup but not 
adhered to. The same applied to the planning of Model Office 2. In the past week, HH 
wanted to postpone the session; this week he decided to proceed with Model Office 2 in 
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December 1996. A range of factors are suggested that contributed to this shift. Among 
these practical preparations, like flights booked and meetings scheduled. Feedback from 
this session was needed for the Indian team to continue on the project. Given the RAD 
methodology, this constitutes an updated Flow 1 as depicted in Table 37. On a strategic 
and political level, HH and SoftHouse executives wanted to keep their stakeholders 
satisfied: 
 
“On Monday the decision was made to go ahead with the Model Office. Most important 
reason seemed to be that the team could not afford to lose face again. HH had 
already requested special permission to fly to Detroit, as all flying was not paid 
anymore during the last months of the year. Telling his boss (…) that he did not need 
the special tickets after all, would have been a disgrace. So on Monday HH got BW 
and HN to his room and discussed the matter. Also the senior management of 
[SoftHouse] was involved in the decision making. They also had a lot at stake at 
making it work this time. The timing plan was already delayed so many times. The 
decision was made.  
Other factors that may have played a role: the team in Detroit had made preparations 
for the second time for the Model Office (including invitations and such I suppose). 
Postponing the Model Office would cost at least 4 weeks time, due to Christmas and 
New Year. The Indian team would keep on working during these days, but if there 
would be no feedback from the Model Office there would not have been so much work 
left. Postponing would also be bad for the motivation of the team. Maybe personal 
feelings of HH played the bigger role in this decision (“not looking silly”).” - AC, 
CarCo-K-1 
 
§ 10.2.10  Testing (November 25-December 6, 1996) 
Late November 1996, final deliveries for the Model Office session were made. These were 
tested by the German CarCo team. Testing results in a reverse workflow where the German 
team feeds back testing results and requests for adaptation. In terms of Table 37, these are 
examples of Flow 1 (information on CarCo requests) and Flow 4 (testing results). When 
the German team took on the role of testing, they represented CarCo user groups. This 
made it somewhat difficult for them, since they were not fully aware of the users’ context, 
routines and expectations. 
 
“During the week the system had to be tested. Testing was not very easy for the 
German team, as they were not the users. They could insert the information, but were 
not really familiar with a “system” that the user would follow. No major bugs were 
discovered, some errors that made the application crash, but all these were easy to 
fix. Sometimes during the entering of information one would get stuck, and there was 
no way out. The critical errors (those that would bother the users the most, not 
necessarily the “severity one” errors) were sent to India to be fixed.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
The first week of December, change requests had been processed in India. They responded 
timely and precisely so that a workable version was ready for the second Model Office 
session in Detroit: 
 
“On Monday a new version of the application was delivered. It had to be checked only 
for the errors that were chosen to correct. This means that it was decided that some 
errors could stay in the application for the Model Office. The testing seemed to be OK, 
a lot of errors had been corrected. Of course, some other errors did also show up, but 
the team was quite satisfied with the deliveries. Probably everybody was a little bit 
surprised, the Indians really handled the error corrections well and quickly. December 
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4 a new, “final” Model Office version was delivered, this appeared to be a draft one 
though. There still was some room for improvement, and I suppose that the last 
critical error corrections were reflected in the delivery of December 6. This was the 
delivery that was going to be used in Detroit, starting next week …” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
§ 10.2.11  Model Office 2 (December 9-13, 1996) 
In Detroit, the second Model Office session took place with North American users. From 
the Goldd team, BW, SPB (from India), HH and American M&SS team members 
participated. SPB appreciated direct contact with North American users, instead of 
receiving information through a chain of M&SS CarCo in the US - Germany - onshore 
liaison - offshore leaders. On his way back, he stayed a week in Cologne for talks with BW 
and HN.61  
During the Model Office session, AC worked in Cologne on the comments database 
containing requests from North American users. She was concerned that many comments 
were not processed. Apparently, responsibility for this process was not clearly assigned to 
someone and monitored.  
 
“Model Office 2 with users in Detroit: BW, HH, plus SPB. I did some checking of the 
old comments DB (database - author) with the latest version. This was disappointing 
though, a lot of things were not yet corrected. The users must also have experienced 
this in Detroit, and might have had a feeling like: “They do not listen to me”. This 
checking of the comments DB should have been done much earlier in the progress. 
This week there was not a lot of Goldd activity in Germany. Here everybody was 
waiting for news from Detroit. (…) The Model Office appeared to be a success 
(according to the Progress Meeting). A considerable diversity of users was available, 
working on 20 different working stations and they were all impressed by the system. 
This year turned out to be a success after all.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
§ 10.2.12  Christmas Break (December 16-27, 1996) 
Over the Christmas break, the team in India elaborated feedback from the Model Office. In 
the US, the M&SS group was preparing data loading. While these teams continued over 
the Christmas break, German team members were on leave. This asynchronous availability 
complicated situations where members of the US team needed to reach them:  
 
“In this week the holiday more or less already started for the Germans. Not a lot of 
work was done this week in Germany (…). HH was off two days. (…) I did some 
archiving of files, there was not a lot of work to be done. December 20 a delivery was 
made, but nobody had time left to look at the delivery. (…) The Indians would be 
working on comments for the remaining weeks of December. The Americans were very 
busy with setting up the data loading. They would not have a holiday. As nobody was 
available at the German Office this made things more complicated.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
                                                 
61 AC held interviews with SPB when he was in Cologne after Model Office 2, and also 
late February 1997. We analyze these in the themes section.  
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§ 10.2.13  New Year (January 6-17, 1997) 
The New Year started with a kick-off video meeting between Cologne and Detroit. By 
request from JF, the Progress Meetings would include less people from both sides to 
enhance its effectiveness. AC comments on the trade-off of this new setup: it may facilitate 
the meeting itself, but increases efforts on both sides to update people.  
Like on earlier occasions, work was slow in Germany. Since the first implementation was 
planned for Detroit, most dependencies were in fact between that site and India (e.g. for 
data loading). The work in Cologne centered mainly on coordinating, planning and testing 
for acceptance. This suggests some inconsistencies in the organizational setup during this 
phase: while teams from US and India needed to talk, communications were routed 
through the German team and the onshore liaison(s). This discrepancy probably drove 
changes in the communications structure as depicted in Figure 54 and Figure 55 
respectively.  
 
“On January 7 we had an informal videoconference with JF, CK and CS. A lot of 
issues came up, a lot of work still had to be done. JF proposed to hold the weekly 
Progress Meeting with less people, so that it could be more focused. (Other members 
of the team would have even less connections with the work to be done.) 
Consequently, I was not invited to the next meeting on Friday. On Friday BW would 
also leave for Britain, to go to India. (…) Due to some technical difficulties the 
progress meeting did not take place, at least not by videoconferencing, maybe by 
audio conferencing. BW had already left before any meeting had taken place. It was 
very important for BW to be in this meeting, as he would take all open issues to India. 
But this did not happen. This week a new [SoftHouse] project manager would come to 
[CarCo] (i.e., BJ - author). He did not show up. I did some testing of the newest 
delivery, whether the comments had been incorporated. (…) The new [SoftHouse] 
manager would join BW to India, he probably did. Again not a lot of work was done in 
Germany. (…)” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
Initially, BJ - the new SoftHouse onshore liaison - would complement BW. But as things 
turned out, BW left the project. In her report, AC mentions some of the reasons known at 
that time for BJ joining the Goldd project: 
 
“In January BW went to India again to discuss all open issues. BJ, a new [SoftHouse] 
manager, accompanied BW to India. [SoftHouse] hired BJ because the work BW was 
doing was too much for one person to handle. Besides that, BW would leave for a four 
weeks holiday and somebody had to be present from the [SoftHouse] side.” - AC, 
CarCo-K-2  
 
§ 10.2.14  Onshore liaison (January 20-24, 1997) 
After their trip to India, BW and BJ arrived in Cologne. He would complement BW’s 
technical expertise with his project management skills. BW would leave for 4 weeks, a 
surprising initiative given the stage of the project: 
 
“The new [SoftHouse] manager arrived this week, BJ. Actually he is a replacement for 
BW. BW will be doing the more technical things and BJ will be doing the actual project 
management like tracking, change request and such. BW told me that SPB is maybe 
also coming to Germany in the four weeks he will be on holiday. (Strange to leave the 
project for four weeks when it is almost finished.)” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
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On Friday that week, AC observed from her desk how BJ made a conference call to India. 
It was characterized by confusion, caused in part by the bad telephone line:  
 
“First thing I heard on Friday was BJ trying to set up a conferencing call with India. He 
was talking to the secretary to get to talk to one of the project leaders. He did not 
really succeed. He did try to talk slowly, but apparently the secretary talked too 
quickly for BJ to understand as the line was bad (echoing). Sometimes he would not 
hear anything on the other side of the line and started to scream: “Hello”. Then he 
asked the secretary to what room the participants had to go to, in order to be in the 
audio conference. More confusion followed. Probably BJ had gone red by now, he was 
almost screaming. Finally he did get a hold of whom he needed to talk to. 
Communication with India is not an easy thing!” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
Before the Progress Meeting on that same Friday, HH talked with HN, BW and BJ. The 
SoftHouse liaisons made clear that deliveries were late again. This would delay CarCo’s 
testing activities and impact the launch date: 
 
“BJ and BW did not bring good news to Germany: the promised delivery was again not 
there and the launch date would be postponed. This meant that [SoftHouse] would not 
deliver the total system by the end of January for testing as committed.” - AC, CarCo-
K-2  
 
HH was seriously concerned about these developments, and the fact that BW would leave 
for ‘holiday’ for 4 weeks on a row. HH probably felt the limits of his relationship to BW 
since he could do nothing about BW’s choice on a structural level. AC reports in her log:  
 
“Before the progress meeting, HH, HN, BJ, BW held an discussion. HH was totally 
pissed off, as the promised delivery for today was again not here. He really started to 
scream at BW. He also told BW that it is was not right to go on holiday for 4 weeks in 
a row. There was some problem with the module numbers not being the right way to 
track progress. (It's the only way we have). The meeting ended with HH throwing 
everybody out of the room. It seemed like the bad performance of [SoftHouse] had 
started again.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
The report on the meeting also mentions that “(f)or the first time, the roles and 
responsibilities of the team members were documented” (CarCo-K-2). Like earlier 
indicated, it appeared difficult in the Goldd project to formalize (and enforce) processes. 
The reason for this could have been a lack of emphasis by the project leader, or the nature 
of the relationship between CarCo and SoftHouse.  
 
The Progress Meeting videoconference included team members in Cologne and Detroit. 
Uncertainty in SoftHouse’s deliveries dripped through in the planning. HH seemed 
challenged to handle the situation. He decided during the meeting to skip the Model 
Office. This in turn caused concerns in the US where Goldd team members had prepared 
users for a third session. Without BW, it became clear that BJ lacked content knowledge 
that was relevant for maintaining a meaningful connection to India. SPB’s temporary 
stationing in Cologne was intended to compensate for this.  
 
“During the Progress Meeting, the new timing plan was presented, without any space 
for the Model Office. HH told something very unclear about the Model Office. BJ 
presented the timing plan, naming all boring things that had to be delivered. It was 
very clear that he had no idea about what the things meant. It is maybe some help 
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that SPB will come in place of BW. BJ does have a very firm way of handling, but 
some knowledge will definitely have to be there before he can manage Goldd. The 
tension that was there in the afternoon after the screaming meeting made place for 
total despondency after the Progress meeting. In the US the participants did not have 
any comment or question on HH’s unclear statement about the MO (Model Office - 
author). Only [an IT staff member from US] seemed to be affected. He said: “Now 
there won't be another MO with [name] and [name]! !  How can I explain that to them. 
We'll need to have our own mini-session”. Out of this I guess that HH had said that the 
MO will be the launch of Goldd. The systems will be run in parallel and that will be the 
last real testing of Goldd. (…).” - AC, CarCo-K-1  
 
§ 10.2.15  When BW Left (January 27-31, 1997) 
BW went on vacation officially, but wanted to stay away from the team in Germany. In his 
place, BJ worked on the comments database. When he tried to give AC a central 
administrative role, he clashed with HH. Like on other occasions, the contractual 
relationship caused issues on an operational level. From a CarCo point of view, HH was 
responsible for the overall project. In SoftHouse’s perspective, he just represented a 
customer’s point of view. Contractual stipulations between the two companies rule the 
operational relationship.  
 
BW left an unwelcome legacy. He had failed to communicate many change requests from 
the US and Germany to India. Since BW had handled exclusively communications to 
India, the CarCo team did not have a way to notice BW’s negligence in an earlier stage. 
This was the risk of relying on a single link to connect the two contexts (Burt, 1993). 
SoftHouse blamed CarCo for initiating many changes that were unnecessary.  
 
“BW left this Friday before the Progress Meeting. He told me in confidence that he 
would not return to Germany because he could not handle HH. (…) He told me he 
would ask his bosses at [SoftHouse] to either work in Detroit or India. This week BJ 
concentrated on cleaning up the comments database. He made me ‘Queen of 
comments’. This was not received very well by HH and HN who argued that I could not 
be the one to decide how things had to be arranged, and that they were not planning 
to tell me every comment they wanted to see in the comments database. So in 
meetings that I could not attend they decided what had to happen with the comments. 
I took the job of getting all comments together and putting them in one database. The 
database model was frozen. There was quite a crisis surrounding the data model. 
From India we first got the notice that 320 changes had not yet been incorporated and 
that it would take probably 80 man-days to solve this. After that it was found out that a 
lot of these changes had to be made in November (1996 - author), but were not. Then 
BJ told me that at [CarCo] a lot of changes had been made that were not necessary 
from a business point of view, like naming conventions etc. And that some things had 
been changed several times around. At the end the decision was made to copy to the 
master data model at [CarCo], and not bother with the change requests anymore. 
However the model was frozen and no changes could be made without the consent of 
HH. BJ went to India this weekend.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
§ 10.2.16  Formalization and Priorities (February 3-28, 1997) 
Mid February, AC took some time off. During that period, HN worked on the comments 
database without her knowing about it. This job was quite important since change requests 
fed into the development process. However, somewhat surprisingly, it lacked a formal 
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setup and monitoring process in a much earlier stage, see also AC’s log from December 9-
13, 1996, and January 27 - 31, 1997. 
 
“While I was away, HN took the liberty of developing a database application in Access 
to take care of the comments. It was quite a difficult model, but it was OK, I agreed 
with it after some time. Then we had to look at all the comments and make them 
conform to certain standard entries. I warned HN not to change anything without my 
agreement as I was the one responsible. It took him quite some effort not to change 
anything.” - AC, CarCo-K-1  
 
SoftHouse delivered new codes that required testing. When AC was working on that task, 
she overheard HH and HN having an argument about testing priorities:  
 
“BJ and SPB left on Friday, so nobody was in Germany. It is really more calm and 
relaxed when BJ is not here. There was no progress meeting this week, HH was away 
on Friday. I started testing the new delivery, the type tables. At night, when I was still 
in the office HH and HN had a fierce discussion on why HN was testing the code 
tables as there were so much more important things to test. (…) I (…) think testing is 
a boring job, as it takes very long for the system to get the data from the server in 
Detroit.” - AC, CarCo-K-1  
 
§ 10.2.17  MD in Germany (March, 1997) 
Early March, MD from India replaced SPB as on-shore technical liaison. BJ initiated triple 
site audio conferences to boast information processing between the US, German and Indian 
teams. This was important as the project was moving to the launch phase in the US. The 
team there was working on data conversion and loading, while SoftHouse was getting the 
codes and manuals ready. Setting up the conference call was challenging for reasons 
similar to those mentioned on BJ’s earlier attempt, see log January 20 - 24, 1997. Different 
expectations on the side of Germany and India led to confusion and delays.  
 
“MD has arrived in Germany. (…) On Wednesday we held a third time ‘historical three-
way audio conference’ (to speak with HH’s words). It took very long to get the 
connection to India, mainly caused by confusion both on our side and Indian side. 
Then we could call JF and put her in the conference too. Germany was really doing 
the coordinating part. This meant: making sure that all parties heard each other, and 
that they would not talk at the same time. The subject of the meeting was the loading 
of the test data in India. The process seemed to go well. I talked to MB who told me 
that the data model was frozen and that only workflow and security was an issue. Kind 
of sounded that he did not have a lot of work left for the NA (North American - author) 
part of the data model.” - AC, CarCo-K-1 
 
AC concludes her report with some of the events in March and April. Lack of interaction 
between the teams in India and the US caused problems in the so-called Sales and P&A 
code functionality. A triple site task forced was setup to sort out and commonalize 
requirements, somewhat late at this stage. 
 
“During March and April India made regular deliveries and Germany tested the 
deliveries. While testing, they discovered that the Sales and P&A codes functionality 
was not properly designed. This meant that HN had to redo all the work on Sales and 
P&A codes, trying the understand the requirements. At the end, they made a separate 
task force and HN flew to the US to discuss the functionalities all over again. Two 
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Indians also came to the US to discuss with the users and to look into the current 
system how the codes work in practice. This, and some trouble with the database 
itself, caused some delays. In June, the expectation was that the system would be 
launched in August 1997.” - AC, CarCo-K-2 
 
§ 10.3  Thematic Interpretive Analysis  
 
As a sequel to the process analysis, we applied an interpretive-thematic angle to the case. 
This second perspective was loosely coordinated with the DiskCo case and our theoretical 
focus. This resulted in a couple of key themes: ex ante situation; underestimation; 
planning, managing, controlling; organizing for distributed collaboration; development 
methodology; face-to-face versus remote, electronically mediated collaboration; time zone 
differences; and diverse cultures and ways of working. 
 
§ 10.3.1  Ex Ante Situation 
Looking at the situation before Goldd started helps to understand what happened during 
the project. Here we look at some of the coordination and control practices at CarCo and 
SoftHouse. 
 
CarCo  
CarCo is a global manufacturer that operates increasingly on a globally integrated scale. In 
the past, remote collaboration occurred but less on an operational level. Managers roamed 
the globe for multinationals to sustain a sense of coherence (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). 
But now, operations have become closely intertwined. Correspondingly, management 
structures have been transformed into global networks of people knowing each other and 
reporting ultimately to the same bosses. People pursuing a career in the same organization 
build relationships and skills to handle international assignments. The Goldd project leader 
- HH - is an example of such a manager. He is embedded in CarCo’s distributed hierarchy 
for M&SS. Members of the Goldd team in the US formally report to him. He reports to his 
boss in England: 
 
“My boss is in England, he has some local people in the US and part of my group is 
JF, CS, [other US Goldd team members] (...). They formally report to me. (…) We 
have always had a [transnational management structure]. It's global now, but it used 
to be European.  
In a previous assignment I had 7 people in England, 7 people here (Cologne - author). 
And I spent half of my time in England. [CarCo] is moving to global business 
practices. Certainly the systems organization has been globalized.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Over the years, CarCo has built international agreements and reporting standards that can 
be leveraged in a global project like Goldd. HH has a counterpart in the US to fall back on 
should he experience problems with Goldd team members there. That manager reports to 
the person who is also HH’s boss in England. Issues arising in the US on an operational or 
managerial level can therefore be easily escalated to England.  
 
“I have management mechanisms in place that would ensure that if they (Goldd team 
members in the US - author) don't perform or if they have problems that I need to help 
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them with, then there is a management structure that allows me doing that. Because 
my boss is also the boss of someone in the US. There is [CarCo] management 
structure and agreements that have been in place for quite some time as a working 
pattern between England and here.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
To illustrate the way this works, HH refers to people working in the same office space in 
Cologne. While they formally report to someone in England, HH has a front-end role. The 
person in England may not be aware of issues emerging in Cologne, or he cannot respond 
rapidly enough. For those instances, HH complements the remote supervisor’s role. He 
does that in a coordinated fashion - through regular exchanges with his counterpart in 
England.  
 
“People in the next cube for example have always been managed by an English 
supervisor. Still I am the local front-end so any problems with pay, sick-leave, 
vacation, all these kinds of things are done by me. Also the performance appraisal 
and so on and so forth - they are all my responsibility. Now I wouldn't do anything 
serious (…) without discussing it with their functional manager. Still there is a 
management structure here onsite that guarantees that things are going as they 
should.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Likewise, HH cannot manage his US team as he would do locally. He depends on his 
buddy in the US to compensate for his physical absence. HH met this person face-to-face 
on prior occasions. This established some form of relationship that makes it easy to 
connect remotely. On top of that, both report to the same boss.  
 
“I have that supporting structure in America. If somebody is sick or if there is a 
problem that I can't solve on 5000 miles away, I call one of my pals and say “You 
gotta help me buddy”. And they will do. (…) I have been there a couple of times and 
we have met. We have regular staff meetings with my boss, because we have a 
common boss and that's very simple. If I don't get anywhere I phone him (HH’s boss - 
author) and say: “Boss I have a problem”, and then he will make it happen. See, there 
is the management structure that supports that, I'm assured of that. In India (i.e., HH’s 
involvement with SofHouse operations there - author) that's not the case, I'm not their 
boss, not by any standard” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
All in all, CarCo’s management structure defines and integrates global and local 
responsibilities. Such a fine-grained network does not exist between CarCo and SoftHouse 
because the companies never worked before. We elaborate on that topic in the next section. 
 
On an operational level, interviewees experienced often for the first time cross-site 
collaboration within the CarCo organization. They noticed that people from other sites had 
different backgrounds. Local operations also differed, although some people noticed a 
CarCo way of working. From the US, JF comments on her first experience working with 
the German CarCo group. The kick off phase appeared very difficult, partly because it was 
remote:  
 
“At the beginning there was a very big difference. I even thought it was scary, it did 
not know how long we could last working together. They are very rigid, very 
controlled. Later they were more relaxing, they were more open after I had been there. 
(…) We really had to grow into it.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
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From JF’s perspective, CarCo has a distinct culture and way of working. This makes it 
easier to collaborate, even on a distance. It seems that this way of working is tied to CarCo 
contexts (von Hippel, 1994). It is an organization-specific advantage (Williamson, 1975). 
This complicates collaboration with other firms, like the Goldd outsourcing contract with 
SoftHouse. Across organizational boundaries, each firm’s unique way of operating adds to 
the challenge of those interactions on an operational level. 
 
“The [CarCo] culture is the same worldwide. This depends a little bit on recruitment, 
but not much. A lot of people who work here are agency people, and they work here 1 
or two years and are gone again. (…) I think the biggest thing is learning the [CarCo] 
style of working. It is easier and you can work faster if you know how to get things 
done. I do not want to call it politics though. And [SoftHouse] will never learn the 
[CarCo] way, because you have to be there to learn it.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
From Germany, HN echoes the existence of a CarCo culture. At the same time, he points 
out that project participants come from diverse backgrounds, and bring different levels of 
knowledge and skills: 
 
“We all speak different languages, although we all speak English, it is very different. 
Besides, we have different educations and different experiences. (…) We do have a 
[CarCo] culture. (…) We don't have the same training. (…) We have the same 
products and the same knowledge, but not for this product, probably the learning on 
the job is the same. There is a big gap between [CarCo] US and [CarCo] Germany and 
India, also in skills.” - HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
SoftHouse 
SoftHouse is a much less mature organization. It was started only a few years ago, 
compared to CarCo’s decades of history. Consequently, SoftHouse does not have a strong 
culture or elaborate set of standards to work by. When he was in Germany, SPB 
commented on operations in India. Compared to Germany, the knowledge base is similar, 
but operations are less structured and standardized.  
 
“I think Indians have as good skills as here, but maybe not properly channeled. I think 
they are equally competent, but they do not work the standard, German way. The 
Germans want to work with standards, baselines for example, and documentation. (…) 
In India we do have our own internal standards but they may not be as strong as in 
Germany.” - SPB, CarCo-E-2 
 
His colleague from India - MD - indicates that SoftHouse follows internal rules and 
standards, although many are not explicit.  
 
“We do have internal standards. (…) I am sure that there are rules that I follow, but I 
would not know what they are. [CarCo] has not set rules to follow, except that a 
document should have a header etc. We do have internal [SoftHouse] rules like with 
every delivery there should be a delivery note.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
Looking at SoftHouse India operations from a German point of view, HN expresses 
concern on their lack of structure. He would have liked more effort upfront to select a 
quality supplier and align standards. As things turned out, SoftHouse lacked internal 
experience and standards to handle the project. They rather had to define the project along 
the way. CarCo embarked on the project without being sufficiently aware of this situation.  
 398
“I wouldn't say they [SoftHouse operations India] have any [local standards and 
procedures]. They have to build it up from scratch, they can’t take anything off the 
shelve. Freshly hired people come in, and then they somehow have to form a team. 
And then they build several rules on how to cooperate. But [SoftHouse] doesn't 
provide too much coherence.” - HN, CarCo-B-3  
 
HN expands on the lack of coherence. In part, that is caused by SoftHouse’s workforce. 
Although IT professionals there have a strong technical knowledge base, they lack 
collaborative experience:  
 
“I think it is not a cultural problem, it is more or less an experience problem. They 
(SoftHouse India employees - author) are simply hired from the university. It is maybe 
their first or second job, when you do not have much experience, working in larger 
projects, maybe also not in working in a group, as a group. So they are individuals, 
have good knowledge in technical skills, as individuals, but I think the gap is the 
organization, the procedures, the standards, the working together, how do we 
approach a project. They do not have experience in that area and that’s causing major 
problems.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
§ 10.3.2  Underestimation 
When SoftHouse signed the contract, they committed to a fixed budget and time frame. 
Usually, a vendor does that when the project work is well understood in advance, and 
matches experiences from prior occasions. Williamson (1979, 1991), building on MacNeil 
(1974), refers to these situations as classical contract relationships. Parties are aware of 
their own and their counterpart’s performance expectations, and they are able to comply 
under normal conditions. In its extreme form, parties do not even have to know the identity 
of their partner (Williamson, 1991). Since parties know tasks in advance, contractual 
enforcement is a matter of following explicit stipulations.  
 
§ 10.3.2.1  Classical Contract? 
In the case of CarCo’s Goldd project, it seems that both parties assumed something like a 
classical contract situation. From the side of SoftHouse, people proposed a fixed budget 
and planning of phases. CarCo did not fully understand the outsourced work. (In fact, that 
was one of the reasons they hired a vendor.) But they trusted that the vendor would 
understand the project. SoftHouse was selected for its ISO quality control mechanisms and 
track record of successful projects (CarCo-A-3). CarCo thus knew that it did not have in-
house capabilities to accomplish Goldd. From that position it trusted the supplier’s routines 
to handle the project. Project uncertainty thus depended on an organization’s competence 
and experience, and not so much the work itself. This agency relationship could resemble a 
patient’s visit to a doctor or dentist. The person trusts these professionals to recognize and 
solve a problem. The CarCo project leader used the following metaphor to describe his 
relationship with SoftHouse for Goldd: 
 
“If you compare that to a production supplier doing air-conditioning, all you ever see is 
the salesman and the engineer. The engineer to discuss technical details, the 
salesman to discuss the price.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
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HH perceived the Goldd project work as something known to the supplier, i.e., SoftHouse. 
All that the latter would have to do is come over, look at the situation, make a deal, 
develop the product independently, and deliver. This suggests a rather ‘clean’ interface 
between supplier (agent) and customer (principal). The agent connects only during an 
initial phase to the principal’s context. After that, the principal waits for the agent’s 
deliveries, and counter performs (e.g., payments) (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Jensen & Meckling, 
1986). CarCo and SoftHouse thought that Goldd resembled this situation, and structured 
the project accordingly.  
 
§ 10.3.2.2  Reality
62
 
The reality in the case of Goldd looked differently. Uncertainty was not only a matter of 
CarCo’s competence. It traced back to highly ambiguous requirements, and unawareness in 
the CarCo organization of its needs. AC writes in her report: “The system (i.e., Goldd - 
author) is characterized by high ambiguity of the functional requirements as even the 
system analysts cannot always specify the requirements in detail” (CarCo-K-2). The role of 
these requirements and preferences was more important than CarCo anticipated. It was not 
a matter of inviting a vendor during a brief window, and letting them develop a perfectly 
matching system. Instead, the situation resembled more that of a sophisticated hair cutter 
(in the role of agent). The end results depends on the interaction between the customer’s 
preferences and the professional expertise. This makes the agency relationship highly 
uncertain (see also the bottom row in Table 35). Principal and agent work on a joint task 
that is characterized by close, almost continuous interdependence. In turn, the nature of 
this relationship (should) drive coordination and control processes.  
 
Table 38 attempts to depict what has been said so far. The columns show two 
contingencies (uncertainty and dependence), and coordination and control processes. The 
rows illustrate perception and reality of these constructs. In the case of CarCo, there was a 
difference between perception and reality. The perception was that SoftHouse could work 
for a while with CarCo, develop the system locally in India, and implement Goldd after 
processing feedback from some Model Office sessions. Indirect contact between sites 
through the onshore and offshore liaisons would suffice. In reality, SoftHouse depended 
strongly on CarCo’s requirements and preferences. They needed a more frequent and direct 
connection to CarCo contexts. The resulting mismatch undermined the success of the 
Goldd project. 
                                                 
62 ‘Reality’ is used in this section as inter-subjective understanding. That is, the reseacher’s 
interpretation of empirical data from multiple interviewees. 
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Table 38 - Perception and ‘reality’ of collaborative relationships 
 
 Uncertainty & dependence Coordination & control 
 
Perception 
 ‘Air-conditioning 
supplier’ 
 Limited uncertainty and 
dependence 
 ‘Clean’ interface 
 Indirect communication 
channels 
  
Difference   
 
 
  Impact, mismatch 
 
 
‘Reality’ 
 (Preferential) ambiguity 
 Strong, reciprocal 
dependence 
 Intertwined operations 
 Direct interaction 
needed 
 
We illustrate this reasoning with empirical data. A recurrent theme in the interviews is that 
Goldd confronted both CarCo and SoftHouse with a number of ‘firsts’. That is, they tried 
things they had never done before. From the German team, MB explains that the project 
represented a considerable challenge. For the CarCo units it was the first project with 
colleagues from across the Atlantic. Goldd was also the first outsourcing experience, and 
the first time people worked on a client/ server application. This made for an uncertain 
work environment that lacked (explicit) structure (Van de Ven et al., 1976): 
 
“As this is a pathfinder project for [CarCo], there are a number of firsts: first 
outsourcing, first global, first client/ server. There are no standards. We have to find 
our own path and rules from day to day. The standards change from day to day. (…) 
The roles are not stable. I have never seen written work specifications. One commits 
to this, one commits to that.” - MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
In a similar vein, SoftHouse’s onshore liaison - BW - finds it remarkable that goals have 
been achieved “despite the number of ‘firsts’ being attempted on the project” (CarCo-G-1). 
He also expresses concern on “unrealistic expectations from senior management both 
[SoftHouse] and [CarCo]” (CarCo-G-1). This is echoed by HN (senior analyst in the 
German CarCo team). As for CarCo’s role, he points out that management underestimated 
the project. They thought that Goldd would encompass basic functionality around a 
database. Besides, it relied on the successful European DID system.  
 
“I clearly admit that it was certainly an underestimating of the complexity of the dealer 
database. It was more seen by [HH] or management generally here as a very simple 
task. I mean you get a database, you have a table, you stick in information, and 
retrieve it, and that's it. You don't have too much processing, which is true if you 
compare with other systems which we have here in manufacturing, which have much 
more complexity in terms of logic and algorithms, and calculation and volume behind 
it. So it's a simple task, a simple system for [CarCo], but it is still in some areas quite 
complex.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
This underestimation had sore effects on (1) the contract and (2) the project setup (see 
Table 38). First, the contract left little room for adjustments that had to be made during the 
project. It fixed price and timing as if parties had a solid, realistic grasp on what it would 
take to develop and implement Goldd. That was not the case, resulting in a gap between 
the formal outsourcing relationship, and the day-to-day actual work.  
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“The fixed price and given time without specifying functionality caused aggravation 
throughout the team. If any idea was raised the answer would be: “This was not in the 
bid document, this was not included in the price”. I am not opposed to fixed price as 
such, but fixed price in phases. I.e. fixed price for the prototype, fixed price for the 
reviewing the prototype, etc. Fixed price over the whole project gives no room for 
prototyping. There was endless fighting about what was in the bid, sometimes based 
on either misunderstandings (you can interpret a document in 100 ways) or wordings. 
With the prototype approach, there were endless discussions. Fixed price and 
prototyping is a contradiction in itself. The bid document was unrealistic with the 
whole process” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
A second effect of underestimation was that the project setup lacked realism in certain 
areas. To CarCo staff, working with an external partner - let alone offshore - was a new 
experience. Yet instead of introducing and gradually setting up the remote partnership, 
people were expected to start straightaway. This rushed project kick off backfired later on 
when it became clear that Goldd’s complexity was underestimated:  
 
"The argument was always: we want to quickly launch something. Quality is second 
priority. But at the end you see how long it takes. You end up with a lot of 
embarrassment, and conflicts which don't help. You must start doing it well from the 
very beginning, to say: “OK this is what it takes”. You must have a realistic evaluation 
of the complexity.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
HN’s colleague in Germany echoes these concerns. He was surprised that rapport with 
Indian counterparts was not established, while the American team came over to Cologne.  
 
“In the project we have not been given time to get information about India. We only 
have time for the project. From the company there is no intention, like: “We have a 
new strategy “outsourcing”, your partner is in India and we will give an introduction. 
We did have something with the American colleagues when they were in Cologne, a 
social event, dinner together. It could be helpful to do the same with partner.” - MB, 
CarCo-C-3 
 
Underestimation also concerned SoftHouse. A senior US team member from CarCo adds 
her perspective on their role. In her view, the company embarked on the Goldd project 
with little awareness of what was expected and needed. CarCo expected them to play an 
expert role, but this was not clearly communicated or picked up:  
 
“They (SoftHouse - author) need to understand what they try to accomplish. They took 
the contract without knowing what was required. As this is the first time for [CarCo] to 
do client/ server development, we also expected some expertise and suggestions 
about this development, and until now we have seen very little of this.” - JF, CarCo-D-
1 
 
One reason for this lack of assistance was that direct contact between the US and India was 
avoided (see Figure 52). Communications between these sites were channeled almost 
exclusively through Germany. Rather late in the project did parties realize that a direct 
connection was needed, as Figure 55 depicts. An example of this was the Model Office in 
December 1996. From India, SPB traveled with German team members to the US and 
worked directly with users there. He explains that this contact provided him with a better 
understanding of user needs. In turn, he could now give suggestions on ways to improve 
the system, based on his expertise. This changed the relationship between the SoftHouse 
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team and CarCo users. Instead of the pre-supposed, quite simplistic connection, parties 
realized to some extent that a more intertwined process was appropriate (Table 38 from 
‘perception’ row to ‘reality’ row). SPB comments: 
 
“Users (North American users he met during the Model Office - author) do things 
because they are used to do things, they have certain practices out of habit. The user 
does not know why he does certain things, he only knows that he has been doing it 
this way always. Programmers have a more global overview and they can ask users 
why they do things in a certain way. And often programmers can propose an easier 
way of doing things, the user would not think of the easier solution.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
  
AC adds in her comments that “SPB sighed as if this would be the ideal solution” (CarCo-
E-1). As the project is already in a late stage (December 1996), she continues: “Of course, 
it is already too late to built in new business practices in the program. So I ask him if it is 
not too late already to see the users. SPB agrees that it is very late to see the users, it would 
have been better if he had been there at the first Model Office” (CarCo-E-1).  
 
What this perspective suggests is that dependencies are more complicated than assumed in 
a traditional agency relationship (Table 37). More precisely, this concerns the knowledge 
and information flows. Not only does the principal provide the agent with information on 
his requirements (Flow 1, Table 37). It is a more interactive process of exchanging ideas, 
based on the principal’s needs and the agent’s expertise. Flow 1 is therefore spitted as 
shown in Table 39. Flow 1a is similar to the one depicted in Table 37. Flow 1b adds a 
reverse knowledge and information flow. B (SoftHouse) provides A with ideas and 
suggestions based on his expertise.  
 
Table 39 - Agency dependence and the CarCo case (2/ 2) 
 
  Principal (A) Direction 
of flow 
Agent (B) 
  CarCo  SoftHouse 
A provides information/ 
knowledge on his 
expectations/ context to B 
 
 
B needs information/ 
knowledge on A’s 
expectations and context 
Flow 1a 
  Specifications, knowledge of CarCo context   
A needs suggestions 
based on B’s expertise 
 
 
B provides suggestions 
based on his expertise 
Flow 1b 
 
  SoftHouse expertise   
A needs information on 
B’s performance 
 
 
B provides information on 
his performance 
Knowledge & 
information 
flow 
Flow 2 
  Information on SoftHouse deliverables   
A receives performance 
from B 
 B performs for A Flow 3 
 
  SoftHouse deliverables   
A performs for B  B receives performance 
from A 
Flow of 
activities 
Flow 4 
 
  Financial resources, testing results   
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§ 10.3.2.3  Roller Coaster 
Reflecting on his experience, the project leader compared the project to a roller coaster. 
When asked for crises and achievements in the Goldd project, he commented in a more 
pessimistic moment: 
 
“It is all a crisis…Did we have successes? The contract, the bid …Will the roller 
coaster suffice?” - HH, CarCo-A-1 
 
From his angle, the early phase of the project went wrong. The setup with an on- and 
offshore liaison did not work. This disrupted the knowledge flow from CarCo to the Indian 
team members, and undermined their efforts (Flow 1a in Table 39).  
 
“I think the start went wrong. We got off on the wrong foot. I think basically the two 
people who were supposed to transfer the knowledge to the Indians did not function 
for whatever reason. I think one of the reasons was that they were not employees of 
[SoftHouse]. They were freelancers that had been hired in on a contractual basis. 
What would have been there incentive to make it happen, other than making a lot of 
money in a very short time.” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
Conversely, one of these liaisons (BW) stresses the complexity of the project and number 
of ‘first’ attempted (CarCo-G-1). He points out that the project was challenging because of 
its geographical scope, and technical and organizational complexity. Given these factors, 
BW criticizes unrealistic expectations from SoftHouse and CarCo management. This 
resulted in a stressful work environment, and late deliveries.  
 
§ 10.3.3  Planning, Managing, Controlling 
In this section we look at three themes that are closely intertwined. Starting with planning, 
we look at local and cross-site contributions to the planning process. The section then 
focuses on management and control. We assess control modes and management 
responsibilities in a multi-site, multi firm project environment. 
 
§ 10.3.3.1  Planning 
The Goldd site in Germany is responsible for coordinating and planning the overall 
project. This is one of HN’s tasks, together with the project leader HH. In our interview 
with HN, we probed for the role of planning in a global project like Goldd. We were also 
interested in the division of responsibilities and contributions to the planning process.  
 
HN makes a clear distinction between planning on a local versus multi-site level. Across 
sites, the project is planned in major milestones and phases. HH and HN communicate that 
plan to the US, and discuss it with the onshore liaison. In the US, local planning efforts 
complement and elaborate the master plan. Their detailed plans are not shared across sites. 
HN explains why:  
 
“On a very detailed level, planning is down to the local responsibilities. They (US team 
- author) have detailed plans how they do the conversion from CIS or CDDB to 
GOLDD. That's not really of interest for the other sites, that's for their local 
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organization how they want to work together in that group. It's more or less day-to-day 
or weekly business, that's down to the local site. (…) Nobody in India is interested in 
work in the States on a detailed level as long as their work is not impacted. Then they 
have nothing to do with it on a very detailed level.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
From HN’s angle, local work packages are only loosely coupled across sites (Orton & 
Weick, 1990). Assuming limited dependencies between project locations, he relies on 
high-level plans on a meta-site level: “Across sites there is just coordinating the major 
tasks, targets and milestones” (CarCo-B-3). To this end, the German site uses project 
management tools only “on a high level, milestone level and major task level, not on a 
very detailed level” (CarCo-B-3). CarCo plans are linked to SoftHouse through milestones. 
These provide a minimal level of coordination between the two firms as HN explains: 
 
“In the plan we also define the contents, like what one should deliver with some 
milestone. We only do planning for [CarCo], we link the planning with [SoftHouse] 
through the milestones. They have to finish on the same date as we for certain 
milestones” - HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
The project leader makes a clear distinction between his site and CarCo US, versus 
SoftHouse. In his view, he is responsible for planning activities at these sites, not India. In 
that role, he uses Microsoft Project to prepare and communicate basic activity charts. 
These are shared locally in Germany, and in the US: 
 
“I use the Microsoft project tool which for me is adequate because my team is 
relatively small. Basically five people, two guys here and three guys in the US, and it 
doesn't take a lot of work to juggle those resources. (…)For me the project plan I 
develop with Microsoft project has two aims. One to get a full picture of all the 
activities, and second to communicate that. And anything more complicated than that 
is difficult to comprehend by the user activity. So a bar chart or a GANTT chart is a 
fairly neat way of communicating a plan to people. I can send this (points at an 
example of a chart - author) out and it is pretty self explanatory. It doesn't take a lot of 
guessing to what the symbols mean. So I'm using that to plan the people and basically 
also to communicate the status of the project. Usually I write a letter and highlight any 
major achievements or any setbacks’” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
To CarCo’s US and German teams, HH presents himself clearly as the owner of the 
planning process and plans themselves. He emphasizes clarity and simplicity in his 
planning approach these groups. Recipients of the plan have the opportunity to feedback 
requests. The plans function as a point of contact between sites. They can be seen as 
information boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989).63 Plans provide minimal task 
representations of local activity contexts. For a polycontextual project, they show where 
these contexts come together (Engeström et al., 1995).  
 
“That's (the chart he shows during the interview - author) the total work planning 
including the US people. (…) I send a file every once in a while. I try to be simple, I 
                                                 
63 ‘Information’ is added to Star and Griesemer’s (1989) construct boundary object to 
emphasize the non-physical nature of plans. Rather, they represent a process of pre-
conceiving work, much like the specifications in the work of Henderson (1991), and 
Boland and Tenkasi (1995).  
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own that paper, I send it around to people asking “give me comments”. I work that in. 
See if there are any written comments, or any need for a discussion, and that's it. 
(…)You don't use complicated project management tools when you have a team of six 
people including yourself. You don't need to have any complicated communication 
mechanism. You do the plan, have a daily meeting, or a meeting every two days or a 
meeting every week to discuss the plan and any issues. Come back to me. I believe in 
simplicity. Keep it simple stupid, keep it simple for the stupid.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
MB - data modeling expert in Cologne - explains that he uses the overall plan for 
identifying milestones. Apart from that, he plans work with peers from the US who are 
also involved in data modeling. Furthermore, the onshore liaison works with a more 
detailed list of tasks.  
 
“We have the project plan by HN and also on the data model side we have a plan. On 
more detailed level, BJ provides lists with tasks but not everyday.” - MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
Planning is thus an activity with multiple scopes. It can be seen as an effort to pre-conceive 
tasks, and tie these to actors and time. A distributed work environment then leads to 
multiple forms of planning. On a meta-site level, HH plans for US and German CarCo 
project members, and sub-communities that cross sites have their planning activities. 
Besides that, local contexts have their own activity structure and planning. Not a single, 
comprehensive plan and task list covers Goldd activities. On the other hand, people 
connect their planning activities to some extent. Plans are at least coupled through 
milestones.  
 
For the US site, JF explains that she uses the overall plan, and prepares a detailed work 
schedule for her own team. Plans inform her site of activities that are expected. At the 
same time, she does not take them too serious because of an apparent lack of realism:  
 
“We have our own schedule. I make a work plan for this team (5 persons). And we 
also use the overall schedule. Of course we do not meet the schedule, but you have to 
have it to know what we need to do.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
Separate contexts 
The integrated operation that exists between the US and German CarCo units does not 
include SoftHouse India. Even though the teams in Bangalore play a key role in the overall 
Goldd project, their activity planning remains separate and largely unknown to CarCo. 
From the start of Goldd onwards, SoftHouse operations were minimally connected to 
CarCo while their activities are centrally embedded in the overall project workflows. The 
precise reason for this discrepancy remains unknown. It could be that the exclusive routing 
of collaborative exchanges through liaisons constrained relationships across sites 
(Meadows, 1996b). Or BW had difficulty building rapport with the team in India while 
being stationed in Cologne, especially after NK left. Or HH kept the teams on arms length. 
As indicated, he was one of the key persons underestimating the complexity of Goldd, and 
therefore the nature of the relationship between his organization and SoftHouse (see his 
metaphor of the air-conditioning supplier, CarCo-A-3). Since he did not see the complexity 
and close dependencies between the work accomplished by his organization and the 
vendor teams, he felt no reason for connecting to people in Bangalore: 
 
 406
“I have never been involved in selecting any of the team, or managing the team, even 
knowing the names. Basically I didn't care too much. The question is should I have 
cared more than I did? I don't know. (…) If I know more than what is the value added 
of knowing that. And if I know less, how much more can I concentrate on value added 
things? I don't know, I can't say that.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Similarly, he was not aware of their planning activities or tools: 
 
“What they (SoftHouse - author) use (for planning - author) I don't know, they present 
me with a Microsoft project work plan every once in a while, but whether they have 
any other tools, I don't know.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
The frequent use of “I don’t know” in the interview seems to confirm the minimality of 
ties between the supplier and customer organization. HH seemed not interested in crafting 
a closer connection to SoftHouse. Only closer to the end of Goldd did the relationship 
change (see Figure 52 through Figure 55). This was because SoftHouse started to invest in 
strengthening ties. They sent SPB and MD over to Cologne in December 1996 and Spring 
1997. Conversely, BW and later BJ visited Bangalore.  
 
In the later stage of the project, MD from the Indian team worked on-shore in Cologne, 
together with BJ. She points out that HH as CarCo representative, and BJ as SoftHouse 
representative elaborate the Goldd plan. Subsequently, MD connects to her counterparts in 
India to check their time frame. She brings back that information to the onshore group to 
complete the planning process. (The ‘prayer meeting’ mentioned in the next quote refers to 
a daily meeting at 10 AM in which CarCo and SoftHouse discuss work progress.)  
 
“[CarCo] tells what they want, we give an estimate in days, they give expected days, 
we discuss and together we get a date. Overall planning is done in the prayer meeting 
by BJ and HH. I have the opportunity to say something if I like.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
One remarkable feature of the project is the short planning horizon. This could be due to 
the ‘many firsts’ that were tried in the project (CarCo-C-1, CarCo-D-1, CarCo-G-1). The 
novelty of tasks limits the scope of the planning process to just a few steps ahead. For the 
longer term, people give only vague indications of tasks to be done.  
 
When he left, BW criticized this situation. He mentions the “Lack of detail, consistency, 
completeness and topicality of plans, both from India and from [CarCo]” (CarCo-G-1). 
Especially in multi-context projects that are geographically distributed, plans fulfill an 
important role (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998; Meadows, 1996b; Staples, 1997). They 
complement the difficulty of interpersonal coordination. Plans specify and clarify tasks in 
these environments that include often very diverse contributors. In the case of CarCo, plans 
played such a role only in a limited sense because of their incompleteness and limited 
scope. Task novelty and complexity may have contributed to their incompleteness. The 
limited scope refers to both the planning horizon and the inclusion of sites in the planning 
process. Inclusion of SoftHouse in the Goldd planning process was minimal and mediated 
through the onshore liaisons. The two worlds operated independently, a situation that 
evoked a critical comment from CarCo senior analyst HN:  
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“There should be a common project plan between here and India. (…) The project ran 
on an exceptional basis, always on crisis and urgency. Management by exceptions. 
Like: “Fix something that hasn't been done yet”. This is only for the Indian site. The 
American team is always reliable.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
He suggests a more closely coupled operating mode between the SoftHouse and CarCo 
sites. This would be reflected in a joint planning process that creates more transparency 
across sites, even though task uncertainty and complexity make detailed planning not 
possible. A common planning process or at least more document exchange would enhance 
mutual awareness of work progress. In practice, this would be challenging, though. As we 
elaborate in a later section, the offshore team put less emphasis on formal planning and 
documentation.  
 
§ 10.3.3.2  Managing and Controlling 
 
“I have always been THE person responsible for Goldd and that has not changed” - 
HH, CarCo-A-1 
 
Scholars suggest that distributedness alters management and control processes. For 
instance, Staples (1997) and Kurland and Egan (1999) document challenges for managers 
to operate in a teleworking environment. Perin (1991) and Wiesenfeld, Raghuram et al. 
(1998) discuss novel forms of control for distributed work environments. These substitute 
for older ones that applied in single-context operation modes built around co-presence of 
actors.  
 
In this section, we assess the role of management and control processes in the Goldd case. 
We give insight in the multiple forms and contexts in which people enact these processes. 
We start with CarCo, looking at local management and control structures in Cologne, 
Germany and Detroit, US. We then focus on controls within the CarCo organization but 
across these two sites. This is followed by a similar piece on SoftHouse, with attention for 
operations in India, UK, and liaisons in Germany. The section concludes with an analysis 
of cross-organizational controls. We explore the interface between CarCo and SoftHouse 
operations.  
 
CarCo 
AC - co-investigator for the CarCo case - talked with the project leader on his control 
modes. As a starting point, HH perceived control processes as offensive. Or rather, he 
assumes his subordinates would perceive explicit control processes as intrusive. When 
someone controls another person, it could be interpreted as a signal of mistrust. While all 
he does not like to discuss control processes, HH stresses his overall responsibility for the 
Goldd project (CarCo-A-1). This could be considered somewhat paradoxical: someone is 
in charge of a multi-actor project but downplays the role of controls.  
 
The control environment relies on several aspects. People’s individual competence and 
professionalism: “It is even more important that you have good people, mature people, 
motivated people in the other country 5000 miles and six time zones away” (CarCo-A-3). 
Their membership of the same organization and project environment: “We are all working 
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towards the same goal really” (CarCo-A-3). And last but not least, HH’s formal position of 
authority: “I’m their boss, you see, and that’s a fundamentally different thing. I have 
management mechanisms in place that would ensure that if they don’t perform or if they 
have problems that I need to help them with, then there is a management structure that 
allows me doing that (CarCo-A-3).  
 
These factors underpin HH’s trust in his German and US CarCo team. Trust has its 
foundation in these mechanisms, and enables, in turn, minimal explicit controls during the 
project. These controls would have a role if some of the factors mentioned were 
insufficient to support trust. Since that is not the case here, HH can downplay explicit 
control modes. Instead, he emphasizes self control and only under exceptional 
circumstances outcome controls.  
 
“A lot of it is self-control, or outcome control also. If things go bad, it's outcome 
control, if things go well: self-control. And that is the way I do it. It is offensive to 
control. You have to trust people to control themselves. This is for Germany and the 
US. To India we have outcome control on daily basis, a formal ‘prayer’- meeting every 
morning at 10:00 for an hour, an hour and a half. And that is a good way to check and 
ensure that things are going as they should. [I usually do not use] behavior control” - 
HH, CarCo-A-2 
  
Trust-enabling factors are less prevalent in the relationship with SoftHouse. Obviously, the 
companies connect laterally, not hierarchically. Common goals are also not self-
explanatory in a contractual relationship (Ouchi, 1979, 1980). For this reason, HH 
perceives a clear difference in his control approach towards SoftHouse. He stresses regular 
meetings to present and discuss outputs.  
 
A similar distinction is observed by HN, one of HH’s closest subordinates. In a separate 
interview, he echoes his boss’ view quite closely. People have a formal hierarchical 
relationships, and they feel responsible for the work they accomplish. These factors justify 
trust and reliance on self control where people define and monitor their own work. Some 
degree of outcome control is used to maintain coherence and handle problem situations. 
On the other hand, for SoftHouse, outcome plays a major role. The factors mentioned for 
CarCo are absent with SoftHouse (hierarchical relationship), or cannot be taken for granted 
(common goals and responsibility).  
 
“HH controls the whole project, I control the content and the timing. (…) We have a 
hierarchical relationship. A lot of it is self control or outcome control. People feel 
responsible for their tasks and that is why they use self control. Only when things go 
wrong, HH is expected to step in. The expectation however, is to use self control. We 
use both self control (define smaller steps for yourself) and outcome control (time and 
expected delivery/ contents are checked). For India, we use outcome control.” - HN, 
CarCo-B-2 
 
A final perspective on controls in Cologne is offered by MB, HN’s peer. He mentions that 
HH officially controls his work (CarCo-C-3). People seem to consider hierarchical control 
relationships as a basic premise of the control structure in the Goldd project. Operational, 
they experience the vertical element not as very prevalent. It is more something that 
underlies collaborative relationships. In day-to-day practice, a mixture of hierarchical 
position and more laterally oriented participation emerges:  
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“HH is above the team, but there are exceptions, like on detailed items on the issues 
list he puts his name. Normally a project leader would delegate everything. [The 
hierarchical difference] is big for some tasks and for some not. If HH is asking me or 
BM (Detroit, see Table 32 - author) for the status of the DM (data model - author), 
there is hierarchical difference.” - MB, CarCo-C-3  
 
More importantly than his hierarchical relationship with HH, MB points at the role of 
lateral peer controls. He works in a sort of distributed team setup with CarCo people 
working on the data model for Goldd. Participants include HN locally, and some team 
members in the US, especially BM and ST. Controlling in this environment helps 
participants to ensure the quality of their contribution. The complex tasks associated with 
the data model necessitate reliance on peer reviews. The sometimes negative connotation 
of control does not apply here, as MB explains:  
 
“My work is not per definition checked by someone. But you double check with 
colleagues like HN, BM, ST to avoid misunderstanding because the data model is very 
complex. Major milestones are checked like the database freeze, but that is 
supervision, not checking. HH delegates that either to HN or to myself.” - MB, CarCo-
C-1 
 
People involved in the data modeling work have developed a common understanding and 
agreed on standards. The lateral control process ensures conformance with these. Unlike 
hierarchical control, the role of controller and controllee rotates here freely, depending on 
“whoever feels competent” (CarCo-C-3): 
 
“At the end my work is always double checked, in agreement with colleagues in the 
US. Whoever (me/ ST) feels competent can change something, but only in agreement 
with the rest. (…) I check data from US, double check if the information is in line with 
what is agreed, check it with what we think is common understanding. It has occurred 
that somebody sent a file that was not in line, that created confusion. So all 
documents that are sent (from the US - author) are checked in Cologne. Or they are 
sent to India and .cc to the rest, just to make sure.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
The peer control process operates primarily within CarCo, but connects to SoftHouse. 
CarCo receives deliverables in Cologne for checking and approval. On a high level, HH 
checks whether these comply with earlier agreements. Detailed control tasks are divided 
between MB, HN and US colleagues: 
 
“Either HN or BM /ST comment and review my work. For workflow for example I will do 
the basic control of SoftHouse work and HN the more detailed control. Somebody like 
HH has to do the control like: right product, timing… (…) We work together in a team, 
if there is a task to do, we divide the tasks in a meeting.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
CarCo US 
In Detroit, JF plays a central role as coordinator of people contributing to Goldd from 
different departments (Figure 51). In her position at the M&SS department for North 
America, she works on Goldd and a few other systems. She has a local boss (RF, and 
above that FR) to fall back on for issues and questions. For her day-to-day work, she 
functions to a great extent on her own: 
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“I do have a manager, but he is only for problems or special requests, not for 
supervision. (…) My bosses are RF, and above that FR. They are there for problems 
and issues, if I need to know things or need help in doing things.” - JF, CarCo-D-1, 
CarCo-D-2 
 
Locally in Detroit, JF functions as a central node. She liaises with business users and 
ensures quality of the IT staff involved in Goldd. She does not have a formal hierarchical 
position, but took on a central role because of her expertise and experience in the CarCo 
organization.  
 
“For my staff, I am the control person in the US, the majority of the work is checked by 
me. I am the person to have all the information, on the business and applications 
side.” - JF, CarCo-D-2  
 
Control in this local peer group is informal. Controller and controllee roles are not fixed, 
though JF is positioned to initiate control processes if need be. People know their job and 
seem dedicated to do it well, so there is little need for strong hierarchical controls.  
 
“Most of it is outcome control, there is no high level of control, no hierarchical/ 
management control. Everybody does what he has to do and if there are problems we 
arrange a meeting. However the outcome of the work defines everything else, like 
timelines. It controls where we are and what we do. The work is divided in a group 
decision, everybody will do a piece of the work. Some times I have something to say, 
but not very often because everybody knows what to do.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
For Goldd, she formally reports to HH. This was arranged a few months after the project 
started. HH frames the overall project, also for JF and her colleagues in the US. JF then 
uses local meetings to translate that for her group into their own planning scheme. HH 
trusts JF for taking care of local business (self control). He relies on outcome control to 
ensure formal coherence between the US group and others involved in the Goldd project: 
 
“My work is controlled by HH, mostly through outcome control, when do we get it 
done. But also self control.” - JF, CarCo-D-1  
 
We have status meetings of the work and disseminate it at this side. HH will tell what 
we need to accomplish and by when. HH is doing the controlling on a high level” - JF, 
CarCo-D-2 
 
We elaborate on control processes between the US and German CarCo sites in the next 
section. 
 
CarCo Germany and US 
So far, we discussed some management and control practices between the German and 
American Goldd sites. First, HH, the project leader, could fall back on a transnational 
CarCo management structure. His boss is in England, and he also heads managers in the 
US who are formally responsible for Goldd team members there. Second, on a project 
level, HH was appointed as official boss of some US Goldd members (among them JF, 
CS). Third, HH has established rapport with JF in Detroit. She is the lead person there. In 
one of our interviews, HH emphasized the importance of having a strong, competent and 
motivated individual who coordinates at a counterpart site. The relationship with this key 
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person substitutes for direct managerial involvement with that site. It reduces remote 
communication needs and makes it possible to deal with limitations of cross-site contact.  
 
“It is even more important that you have good people, mature people, motivated 
people in the other country 5000 miles and six time zones away. It is even more 
important. I don't have to talk to JF on a day-to-day basis. She knows the plan, it has 
been reconciled with her and she makes sure that it's executed. But if she wasn't as 
strong as she is, I'd have one hell of a problem. If she'd be here I could kick her 
around every day. Not that I would, but it is the right kind of people, who do the right 
kind of jobs, you can always do these things - they almost run automatically. It cannot 
fail. But if you get the wrong kind of people, then no matter how good you plan it you 
gonna fail.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Over the course of the Goldd project, a number of factors have contributed to good 
working relationships and trust between the US and German teams, and the fact that things 
run “almost automatically” (HH, CarCo-A-3). People are part of the same organizational 
entity, even though they work from different locations. Formal reporting relationships 
provide the backbone for solving specific issues. And visits establish reciprocal awareness 
and bonds that facilitate subsequent remote contact.  
 
“What I’m fairly proud of is that over the duration of the project, and it started in 1995, 
the [CarCo] team has kept an excellent working relationship with each other - HN, MB, 
JF, CS, DM and a couple of people on the sidelines like BM, SK both in the US, and 
their bosses, we have very very good working relationships.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
HH is not the official boss for the complete US team. Still, managing these people appears 
not difficult. As Figure 51 shows, they report eventually to the same boss in the US. This 
person reports to an executive in England, who heads also HH’s unit. This formal structure 
facilitates task prioritization and resource allocation across sites. In this case, it also seems 
to create a positive social climate:  
 
“I am officially the boss of JF, CS and DM. CP and LF from Process Leadership 
Customers Services have other manager, as do BM and SK (see Table 32 and Figure 
51 - author). [That does not create conflicts with their bosses.] They have good 
objectives set to work with GOLDD and there is mutual respect. They are not difficult 
to control. It always works on a consensus basis for all the group. If JF cannot do 
something, she will tell me.” - HH, CarCo-A-2 
 
Together, the factors mentioned here constitute a multi-dimensional basis for remote 
collaboration. That is, the CarCo teams can rely on formal and informal, task and people 
oriented mechanisms for ensuring integration of task accomplishment in a polycontextual, 
geographically distributed work environment. All this allows for minimal remote 
management and control efforts:  
 
“For the US the level of control is less. So there is more trust for them to self-control. I 
do not want to micromanage a team at 5000 miles distance.” - HH, CarCo-A-2 
 
So far, we focused primarily on hierarchical management and control. We found that HH 
could leverage on a solid base for handling the US team. Now we zoom in on lateral 
controls. Interestingly, people point at extensive control needs there. Goldd presented the 
CarCo IT staff with a number of ‘firsts’, i.e., task novelty. Moreover, portions of the new 
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system were ill understood and poorly designed (Sales and P&A codes). Other pieces - like 
the data model - were quite complex, in part because requirements from different business 
units in North America and Europe had to be integrated. 
  
“You double check with colleagues like HN, BM, ST to avoid misunderstanding 
because the data model is very complex. Major milestones are checked like the 
database freeze (…).” - MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
Distance between CarCo’s US and German team makes this job not easier. In fact, it seems 
to increase the need for controls. People experience constraints when collaborating 
remotely. They can establish a channel with only limited capabilities compared to face-to-
face discussions. Also, collocation would allow two or more persons to use a tool and give 
feedback in a short time span, instead of having to work in a more asynchronous mode. 
These limitations of remoteness necessitate careful checking to detect misunderstanding 
and errors.  
 
“There is so much controlling because the only medium is telephone and profs. With 
telephone you cannot see words and profs is only one way. When discussing face-to-
face, with a PC or pen and pencil and you can draw a diagram and make them see 
what you mean, or you can use the tool immediately instead of waiting for reports from 
the tool. That would work easier.” - MB, CarCo-C-3. 
 
SoftHouse India 
Like many software houses in India, SoftHouse built a successful business in the 1990s. 
They hired technically educated people fresh from the university and put them on projects 
for customers in Europe and North America. MD talked about this environment when she 
was in Cologne for Goldd. She is a senior team member from SoftHouse operations in 
Bangalore: 
 
“We do a lot of overtime work, but this is only for the software branch, only at 
[SoftHouse]. Indians are hard workers, they work on Saturdays and also on Sundays. 
But that is not really a problem because most of us are young and unmarried, and 
they do not have anything to do on Sundays. (…) We have a lot more fun. Each 
person of the team brings something to eat and we fight about it, we sing, we listen to 
the radio and we get the work done. And teasing is a big thing too, they are teasing all 
the time. (…) The office environment looks like this (CarCo Cologne site - author), but 
more people in the same space so that they can see what you are doing.” - MD, 
CarCo-F-1 
 
The local style of working is informal. People work in teams and control each other’s 
work. They prefer oral communications over written plans and documentation. The 
hierarchy in these project environments is not as structured as common in Europe and 
North America. Interviewees draw organization charts that are different. BJ - the second 
onshore liaison with extensive consulting experience in India - explains why: “The reason 
why everybody sketches a different organizational chart is because the hierarchy in India is 
not very strict” (CarCo-H-1). MD echoes this view on hierarchical control. She seems 
somewhat puzzled when asked who controls her work:  
 
“Nobody controls me ... VA? (team leader, see Table 32 - author) (…) Yes maybe to 
VA. No, I report to SM. The hierarchy is not very fixed, it is all very informal. (…) VA 
will give me a date, I will tell him that it is done. If I did not do it, I discuss with him 
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why I did not do it. The work is controlled according to standards by VA. And also by 
the user, the user comes back and tells that he doesn't like that screen.” - MD, CarCo-
F-1  
 
In her team, MD plays a central role although she is not the team leader. From her position, 
probably achieved by working for longer time in the Goldd project, she is one of the key 
persons to control work accomplishment. At the same time, controller and controllee roles 
are not assigned to people in a very fixed manner. They rotate in the team (Barker, 1993; 
Smith, 1997).  
 
“I am the person who says: “Okay”, I tell if it is right or wrong. If I say it is okay it will 
be integrated in the system. But it is not so formal, we work like a team. Maybe it is 
team control. If there is a difference between two people, than a third person will solve 
it. It is not strict.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
MD’s colleague from the Indian team - SPB - explains that formally the team reports to a 
team leader, and he reports to the offshore project manager (SM and before him RG). This 
manager is officially responsible for the contribution of SoftHouse India to Goldd. If need 
be, he could escalate to a SoftHouse executive. The main mechanism for control, however, 
is the group.  
 
“I am supervised by SM, he reports directly to SA. (…) We control in the team. The 
team leader controls what we do and when he's not there we do it ourselves. SM is a 
point of escalation if we have problems. VA is the team leader and he controls what 
we do.” - SPB, CarCo-E-2 
 
When people have participated in the Goldd project for a while, their value increases 
within the SoftHouse operation and on the labor market. Especially in the mid 1990s, the 
labor market was tight, and many IT professionals were looking almost weekly for a 
change to improve their job prospects. This led frequently to turnover. In Germany, the 
perception existed at CarCo that the Indian Goldd team and their contribution suffered 
because of this phenomenon. HN shares his view in February 1997:  
 
“We had the breakdown of the Indian team. They never came up to speed. The 30 
people were never there. At maximum there were 10 people. People were moved from 
Goldd to other projects. There was never a real Goldd team in India. There should be 
a common project plan between here and India. A lot of deliveries were late because 
there was no proper team.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
From the Indian team, SPB admits that it is challenging to retain experienced IT 
professionals: 
 
“People who start with the Goldd project are improving by working for Goldd and this 
means we cannot hold them at this project.” - SPB, CarCo-E-2 
 
Another perception was that the Goldd team members needed stronger management 
involvement. Many of these recent graduates lacked business experience. They could have 
benefited from a more structured and professionally managed work environment than the 
informal, team-based practices described above.  
 
 414
“The team now consists of 18 people. 18 people need strong management. They don't 
have a leader. [SM is the project leader] Before SM we had RG. RG was sent away 
because the data model did not come. Now we have SM and the software doesn't 
come.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
SoftHouse UK and onshore liaisons 
CarCo signed the contract for Goldd with SoftHouse UK. From there, liaisons were 
stationed offshore in India and onshore in Germany. The offshore liaison - NK - soon left 
the project. His counterpart, BW, worked until early 1997 in Cologne. While working from 
there, he reported to his boss in the UK who was responsible for the CarCo account.  
 
Similarly, BJ worked for this person once he started on the Goldd project. In his view, he 
worked quite independently, with little involvement from the UK office. Occasionally he 
reports to his boss who has defined only some key parameters like BJ’s budget. 
 
“There is no control. I send a management report to [my boss] when I want him to 
know something or when he asks for it. (...) I am not really controlled in the work I do, 
because [my boss] doesn't understand it. But there is a budget I have to work with.” - 
BJ, CarCo-H-1 
 
In a later phase of the Goldd project, Indian team members came over to Germany to assist 
BJ. Once they worked from Cologne, they reported no longer to their boss in India, but to 
the UK office. In practice, this meant that they worked with BJ onshore. 
 
“Now that I am in Germany I work for [SoftHouse] UK. So now I work for BJ. In India I 
would report to SM.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
SoftHouse onshore and offshore 
SoftHouse UK and India both operate under a holding structure of a US-based firm. 
Officially, they have a non-hierarchical relationship. At the same time, SoftHouse UK 
connects to the European customer base and feeds orders to the Bangalore operations. To 
SoftHouse India, it is important to satisfy customers since this is in interest of them and the 
UK unit. Looking at the management and control theme, one can remark that management 
remains a local responsibility. As indicated, SoftHouse India manages local operations and 
customer contacts. At the same time, the UK office closes contracts with European 
customers. Their account managers monitor project progress and customer satisfaction. If 
need be, like in the CarCo case, UK management can intervene in the project. In our case, 
they repeatedly pressed SoftHouse India management to improve performance (see AC’s 
log entries from November 1996). At that time, deliveries from India were late. ‘Big 
bosses’ from SoftHouse UK had pressed Indian management to speed up and enhance 
quality. In turn, this pressure worked through within the Indian hierarchy (see also Figure 
58). 
The SoftHouse liaisons had also some role in the control process. They were directly 
involved in Goldd on an operational level. Based on their formal position, they had little 
influence on work accomplishment in India (Galbraith, 1973). Local teams and leaders 
were responsible for the functioning of the SoftHouse there. BJ explains: 
 
“I am not really controlled in the work I do, because [my boss] doesn't understand it. 
But there is a budget I have to work with. I set a plan, but I do not want to 
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micromanage what is happening in India. SPB and SM do the controlling in India.” - 
BJ, CarCo-H-1 
 
Liaisons had to rely on a more lateral, relationship-based control mode. In practice, this 
appeared quite a challenge. It seems that especially BW acted as if he did have formal 
authority over operations in India. This clashed with local expectations there and 
undermined the effectiveness of BW’s liaison role in Germany (see logs from November 
18 - 22, 1996). 
In Cologne, HH and HN share some information on the background of the deteriorated 
relationship between BW and offshore groups. They point at the fact that BW acted as if he 
had authority over Indian operations. Not only that, his approach seemed authoritarian. 
This contrasted with the organizational structures in India and led to indignation. Part of 
this seems the British background of BW that may have contributed to post-colonial 
sentiments (HH, CarCo-A-3).  
 
The end result was that the Indian Goldd team operated quite independently. Their 
exclusive link to CarCo did not function well because NK had left and they did not like 
BW. Things improved somewhat when HH pressed UK executives. These people could 
use their hierarchical position in the global SoftHouse organization. They worked through 
local management layers to improve India’s performance (Figure 58). A next step that 
offered a more sustainable solution was when BJ replaced BW. BJ was assisted for 
technical liaising by SPB or MD. These persons were strongly included in the Indian 
teams, and could leverage on that relationship, also remotely. Still, these people have a 
limited say in India because they are senior team members and not local management. HN 
explains: 
 
“BW and NK were hired by [SoftHouse] UK, they had never seen [SoftHouse] India, 
they had probably never been in India. The British - Indian culture: they were fighting 
each other. The Indian team would say that they are independent, they won't listen. 
They are annoyed by someone there telling them what to do. NK and BW had no 
authority, they were not the boss of the team, SM and later RG were. It is the same 
structure there as here. HH with his team in [CarCo]. HH is not BW’s boss and BW is 
not HH boss. In India the same structure. They could only give advice. SM was 
independent of NK. NK had no authority to hire/ lay off/ restructure the team. Good 
advice from [CarCo] would never arrive at SM’s team, this is still the situation. BJ has 
also no formal control, but he is in a better position because of SPB, but SPB is not 
the boss of the team. Indians are very proud, they don't want outside advice (…). 
Maybe offshore/ onshore managers of [CarCo] would be better. But they would not 
accept that in this situation.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
The suggestion to use [CarCo] managers for the onshore/ offshore link may seem to make 
sense from a content point of view. These people could fill in Indian operations on CarCo 
expectations, and offer suggestions for how things could be accomplished. On the other 
hand, from a control point of view, they would experience similar problems as the British 
liaisons. Perhaps even worse since CarCo personnel would have no formal relationship to 
the SoftHouse organization but the project contract. We further explore the CarCo - 
SoftHouse relationship in the next section.  
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CarCo - SoftHouse controls 
Having focused on controls within the customer and vendor organizations, we now look at 
the interface between CarCo and SoftHouse. As a starting point, Goldd was initiated by 
CarCo’s M&SS units in North America and Europe. They were responsible for developing 
the system and sell it to CarCo business users. To the latter group, M&SS was primarily 
responsible for the system, like an agent is accountable to his principal. The person 
ultimately in charge of Goldd from CarCo’s IT side was HH: 
 
“I have always been THE person responsible for Goldd and that has not changed” - 
HH, CarCo-A-1 
 
This responsibility was complicated when CarCo decided to outsource the project to 
SoftHouse. With this firm, no prior relationship existed. The contract was closed when the 
Goldd project work was incompletely understood, both by CarCo and SoftHouse. The 
vendor seemed to impress CarCo with ISO certification and a track record of successful 
projects. As things turned out, this image was only in part based on solid organizational 
practices. SoftHouse assigned Goldd work to a group of junior IT professionals without - 
as it seems - providing adequate managerial and organizational support. CarCo was 
unaware of this situation, presumably because they kept SoftHouse as a vendor at arms 
length (see the earlier described air-conditioning metaphor, CarCo-A-3). 
 
“At the side of [SoftHouse] standards and procedures were missing. They had nothing 
there for guidance, they did not have a former project like this, so everything was new. 
One should check the quality of the supplier before making a contract. And agree on 
standards and procedures, tools and project plan. You need more agreement upfront.” 
- HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
On top of that, the initial liaison setup failed to connect effectively CarCo and SoftHouse 
operations. The offshore liaison NK left soon after the project started. BW proved not 
capable of establishing workable relationships with offshore management and team 
members. He did not pass on design guidelines and change requests from CarCo to India. 
This was found out rather late in the project after BW left (early 1997), and implied major 
setbacks for the CarCo and SoftHouse India Goldd teams. CarCo had made itself 
exclusively dependent on BW for connecting to SoftHouse India (Burt, 1992). Entrusting 
the key responsibility to this person appeared a wrong decision. We asked HH whether he 
had been or had felt responsible for the problems resulting from BW’s conduct. His reply 
was:  
 
“It wasn’t my responsibility to control that. [Question: Would you have liked that 
responsibility?] No. Absolutely not. Come on - you gotta trust the mechanism or you 
don’t. And when a company sells you on so many successful projects and mechanisms 
in place for quality control and ISO 9000, and 9001, whatever, then you don’t 
challenge their communication mechanisms. You trust the people that are there, that 
they are doing what they’re supposed to do. There is basically little safeguard against 
putting on delay. And the guy (BW - author) lied to us. It went both ways: he lied to 
the Indians, he lied to us. If you have such a person it is devastating.” - HH, CarCo-A-
3 
 
Early on in the project, CarCo - in particular the project champion HH - took a risk when 
they outsourced the project to SoftHouse. HH made himself dependent on a contractor that 
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seemed capable of contributing successfully to Goldd because of ISO certification and 
track records. On an operational level, however, the company lacked quality controls for 
operations in India and the connection to CarCo. This discrepancy surfaced late in the 
project. People from CarCo and to some extent SoftHouse started off with confidence in 
contributors’ good intentions and competence. They had little formal controls at their 
disposal.  
 
Contractually, CarCo had to approve certain deliverables in return for payments. This 
financial incentive might have worked in a situation where the vendor had extensive 
experience with offshore outsourcing and projects like Goldd. But for CarCo, it proved not 
a sufficient tool to ensure achievements. In Fall 1996, it became clear that SoftHouse India 
could not meet temporal and quality criteria indicated in the contract. Once CarCo - 
especially HH - started to realize the default, they started to look for control mechanisms. 
This seems a delayed response. HH admits that he was not sure how to handle SoftHouse 
at first: “I had not thought about how to control SoftHouse in the beginning, because I did 
not know what I was getting into” (HH, CarCo-A-2). We discuss here several modes 
CarCo adopted for controlling SoftHouse. 
 
 Controlling operations in India directly? 
What CarCo lacked in the first place was direct control over India operations. This was not 
an option for several reasons. First, the outsourcing relationship simply could not grant the 
customer control over vendor personnel. That would mix a hierarchical organizational 
form with the lateral, temporary nature of a contract (Bradach, 1997). HH postulates a 
clear vision on this topic. He considers SoftHouse a supplier with full responsibility for the 
contracted services.  
 
“My managerial impact [on SoftHouse India operations] is nothing. I have no 
managerial authority over these guys. They are a supplier to me. And I don't make a 
supplier's personnel decisions, I just want them to deliver a product. (…) If you 
compare that to a production supplier doing air-conditioning, all you ever see is the 
salesman and the engineer. The engineer to discuss technical details, the salesman to 
discuss the price. But you're not gonna be selecting the men on the line and interview 
them to make sure that he delivers quality. At the end of the day that's the supplier's 
problem.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
In fact, HH delegates part of his responsibility for Goldd work to another firm without 
loosing formally within the CarCo organization his own responsibility for overall project 
success. This makes his success with Goldd dependent upon an outside party without 
having extensive controls and management impact.  
 
Second, distance made remote involvement in day-to-day operations unfeasible. Even for 
their counterpart unit in the US, HH relied on JF and transnational CarCo management 
structure to control work there: “We don't have the capacity of managing a team of 20 
people 5000 miles away, that's impossible” (HH, CarCo-A-3). Similarly, HN mentions that 
without distance it would be easier to control SoftHouse accomplishments. CarCo would 
be more aware of for instance turnover in the Indian team: “There was never a real Goldd 
team in India. (…) If they would be here, we could see that, now we can't control them” 
(HN, CarCo-B-1).  
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Third, cultural diversity would exacerbate the challenge of managing a team in India. Even 
BJ - onshore liaison from the UK with extensive experience in India - does not take on that 
role. 
 
“I don't want to micromanage the team in India, that would be even more difficult 
because of cultural differences. BJ doesn’t do this either. Indians are very proud 
people, they want to be involved instead of controlled.” - HH, CarCo-A-2 
 
“(…) I do not want to micromanage what is happening in India. SPB and SM do the 
controlling in India.” - BJ, CarCo-H-1 
 
 Output control 
While direct control proved unfeasible, CarCo focused on outputs. In fact, this was the 
main mode for checking SoftHouse deliverables. HH points at the important role of regular 
meetings with the onshore liaison to receive outputs. He learned to do this in the Fall 1996 
when problems with deliveries became apparent for the first time: 
 
“To India we have outcome control on daily basis, a formal ‘prayer’- meeting every 
morning at 10:00 for an hour, an hour and a half. And that is a good way to check and 
ensure that things are going as they should. [I usually do not use] behavior control. 
(…) Now I know pretty much how to do it (for India): (1) Daily meeting, (2) Air 
concerns, (3) Look at results.” - HH, CarCo-A-2 
 
Output is not controlled on a person-specific basis. CarCo personnel does not check work 
from SoftHouse individuals, but only integrated work packages that are received through 
the onshore liaison.  
 
“(…) I have no specific assignment of controlling work from India, like work from SPB 
or SM. There is no direct control to a person. It is task specific, it depends on the 
subject who is controlling.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
The task of checking and testing deliverables is divided among CarCo Germany and US 
team members, depending on individuals’ workloads (CarCo-C-3).  
 
 Pressing the onshore liaison 
When SoftHouse did not perform according to expectations, pressure was increased on the 
onshore liaison. To CarCo he was the person responsible for SoftHouse’s performance, 
and for relaying expectations to Indian operations. This basic setup was maintained 
throughout the project, with initially BW, and later BJ and Indian team members. When 
SPB and MD from India were in Cologne, control was facilitated by their membership of 
the teams in Bangalore. In fact, they could maintain some form of peer/ team control even 
when working for some time from Europe.  
On the other hand, during the period that BW was still onshore liaison, his lateral role did 
not provide him with adequate control tools. As earlier indicated, he had only an advisory 
role towards India, and was not part of the formal hierarchy there. Besides, he lacked the 
skills and attitude to build up relationship and informal controls with Indians. BW’s 
control role was further limited by time pressure. Officially he was expected to check 
deliverables and give feedback to the Indian team before handing these over to the CarCo 
Cologne. In practice, he skipped these steps because of delayed Indian deliveries. This 
caused agitation in the German group (see AC’s log report September 1996). 
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At times, HH experienced the limits of being a customer representative in a contractual 
relationship versus someone’s project manager. He tried to dissuade BW from taking a 
month’s leave early 1997 (logs January 20 - 24, 1997). Later, HH disagreed with BJ on 
work division in Cologne. BJ wanted to assign responsibility for the comments database to 
AC, while CarCo did not like that idea (logs January 27 - 31, 1997). 
 
 Pressing vendor executives 
A final control mode was working through SoftHouse UK executives. HH contacted 
account management there to air concerns and increase pressure. He did that as a 
representative from the customer’s point of view. HH contacted SoftHouse’s UK office 
remotely and in person. He had informal conversations with executives there, and 
submitted on some occasions formal letters. One threat he could use was stopping the 
contract (AC logs October 21 - November 1, 1996). 
The threat was never materialized. It probably was not a wise thing to do, given extensive 
investments from both parties in the contracted project work. Still, UK executives got the 
message and used their intra-organizational position to press SoftHouse India. Contacts 
with executives in Bangalore enabled them to use the local hierarchy for impacting team 
performance (Figure 58).  
 
§ 10.3.4  Organizing for Distributed Collaboration 
In this section, we zoom in on organizational structure and communication processes in the 
multi-site Goldd project environment. We look at the seamless office between the CarCo 
teams in Detroit and Cologne. We then show how this setup was in stark contrast with the 
connection between these CarCo units and SoftHouse facilities in India. That relationship 
relied almost exclusively on a linking pins, one onshore and one offshore. The Goldd 
project was severely impacted when in succession the offshore liaisons left, and the 
onshore person could not handle his role as a central node. We conclude with changes that 
were made in the organizational setup, and alternatives that were suggested by 
interviewees.  
 
§ 10.3.4.1  Seamless Office: CarCo Germany and US  
 
“Well, the people in the US, we basically know very much what they do” - HH, CarCo-
A-3 
 
Collaboration between the Detroit and Cologne office did not come easily. People from the 
US had hardly worked with other cultures before Goldd. In Europe, people were getting 
used to CarCo’s regional integration process, but had not yet worked on a global scale. 
Initially, team members from both sides experienced the novelty of this situation as 
challenging, some even as ‘scary’ (CarCo-D-2). JF from Detroit describes her experience 
of working with the German team as “Difficult, we were doing this for the first time. We 
worked with different platforms, different media, etc.… And it took us time to learn” 
(CarCo-D-1). 
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Gradually, however, they built positive working relationships. This was helped in part by 
visits from some American team members to the Cologne office early 1996. Immersion in 
the German environment helped them understand the background of their counterparts, and 
it built relationships. This proved an effective ice breaker for the time when teams had to 
rely almost exclusively on electronic media like email, phone and videoconferencing to 
sustain contact across the Atlantic. JF explains: 
 
“I visited [CarCo] Germany 3 weeks before and 2 weeks after Carnival. And it helped 
me a lot!  The things that were not a part of the job, like the office environment, how 
people commute to their work, the area they live in. Knowing the background of 
people helps me understand how they think about the business. And besides that 
going to Cologne was also good for the work we did together. (…) Later they were 
more relaxing, they were more open after I had been there. I kick on it when HN sends 
me a joke. We really had to grow into it.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
From Germany, people echo these positive experiences. HN describes his initial 
experiences with the American team. At that time, he was responsible for integrating 
European requirements for the data model. These had to be integrated with the American 
expectations. To this end, HN met his US counterpart BM in Cologne. This meeting as 
well as the subsequent relationship turned out to be positive and successful: 
 
“I expected them (US team - author) to be different, but it wasn't with this team. (...) 
For example. I met BM for only one hour, I brought the European data model, he 
brought the North American data model. We talked about the data model and agreed 
on the merging and it was all very positive. How they work and how they think 
compares to us. Data model is good, it still is. (…) The working relationship with the 
US is good. Very good cooperation exists and I think that is rare on a distance. We 
understand each other, there is no conflict in the team. It is open and productive. (…) 
The data model for instance was a great success. Communication and thinking was 
very similar.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
People reinforced their US - German relationships overtime. After the visit to Cologne, HN 
and a few others went over to Detroit for Model Office 1 in Spring 1996. this counter-visit 
helped the Germans in turn to understand more of the US environment. HN gives some 
comments on his relationship with the US team, and its positive impact on the 
collaboration process (Gabarro, 1990). 
 
“I know the team personally. For data modeling the American team came to Cologne. I 
went to the US for Model Office 1 and for the data model/ justification. (…) It is much 
more efficient if you know the people.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
HN’s boss in Germany - HH - makes a similar observation. He praises the fact that teams 
from the US and Germany have good rapport, and counts it as one of his key achievements 
in the Goldd project. In his view, this positive climate is tied to people’s membership of 
the same organization. As a single social entity, CarCo provides a common (though 
physically distributed) environment. Members share practices and goal orientation. With 
others, like the vendor for Goldd, CarCo personnel cannot count on this similar 
background. Still, HH would have liked to see that. In fact he expected that it would 
happen, but he does not specify how it could have been achieved. 
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“I feel at home anywhere I go and there is [CarCo]. I mean there is a certain [CarCo] 
style of working. What I’m fairly proud of is that over the duration of the project, and it 
started in 1995, the [CarCo] team has kept an excellent working relationship with each 
other - HN, MB, JF, CS, DM and a couple of people on the sidelines like BM, SK both 
in the US, and their bosses, we have very very good working relationships. (…) We 
are all working towards the same goal really. I mean this is not even near the kind of 
issues we have with [SoftHouse]. And that’s the kind of thing I would have liked to see 
with [SoftHouse]. It just doesn’t happen” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
On a day-to-day level, good relationships between US and German team members 
facilitate remote contacting. People respond promptly to communication needs from 
counterparts. From HH’s angle, this implies that he does not have to revert to CarCo’s 
transnational management structures to get work done in the US. While that structure is 
available if need be, it is replaced in a sense by relationships.  
 
“[There is] absolutely a seamless office between US and Germany. I can phone them 
any time for any information, they phone me back immediately. I have no problem. I 
can't remember that I had a problem which required me to call their boss and say: 
“Hey, I have a problem please help me solving it.” It's always been solved on a 
working level. And I think that's a very good sign. It's not that their bosses don't know 
what's going on. We keep in contact and discuss maybe issues. But I have full support 
on all the levels and that's how it should be. In a company like this that is how it 
should be.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
With SoftHouse, many of these elements are not available. People are not part of the same 
organization, there is no international hierarchical structure, and relationships did not take 
off as well. 
 
Good contacts between the American and German teams does not mean that people have 
to collaborate on a detailed level. In fact, most interaction concerns planning of milestones 
and checking progress by a few key people from both sides. The contact across sites is thus 
somewhat channeled through these people as JF explains:  
 
“[Using liaisons:] This is definitely the case between Germany and the US. Everything 
goes through certain persons, like business is done by me and HN, and the data 
model is done by BM and MB (from Detroit and Cologne respectively - author).” - JF, 
CarCo-D-2 
 
Only on a few occasions was direct cooperation necessary. Like with the data model early 
1996, or testing activities early 1997. Often these tasks are planned and divided with 
members from both sides. Once the work has been done, people report back and integrate 
results.  
 
“[Direct, detailed cooperation between US and Germany] is not necessary. For 
instance on the setup we did it. For that I went over there on a detailed level. We do 
common testing, then we split up the tasks on testing, then we exchange the results in 
a daily meeting.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Good working relationships did not substitute entirely for formalized coordination modes 
as suggested in information processing theory (Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). 
Especially with distance, it remains important to adopt plans and standard operating 
procedures. In the Goldd case, planning and standards played an important role in 
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collaboration processes than spanned the sites in US and Germany. Earlier we referred to 
the common plan developed and owned by HH. In addition, JF points at the importance of 
rules and standards for coordinating work and ensuring consistency. Also, interfacing and 
ownership of particular processes or domains are exclusively assigned to certain 
individuals to ensure coherence in a polycontextual work environment.  
 
“It is very important to define standard procedures. You cannot just do things between 
two continents. Somehow all the documents you send get lost somewhere in the 
middle, in the ocean. In every area you need somebody to control the documents. One 
person has to have total knowledge about one area. Otherwise, things get lost and 
therefore the work does not get completed. (…) We need rules about last version 
control. That we do not use the same name twice, that the numbers are changed when 
the version is changed.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
§ 10.3.4.2  Minimally Coupled Contexts: CarCo and SoftHouse India  
 
“The problem might be that there is no direct contact.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
The connection between CarCo and SoftHouse was handled through liaisons. This 
established an additional node between CarCo and SoftHouse India as shown in Figure 52. 
Initially, BW and NK were supposed to connect the North American/ European contexts 
with India. After NK left - about a month into the operational phase of the project - BW 
tried to fulfill this role from Cologne. He was replaced early 1997 by BJ. At that time, 
Indian team members (MD and SPB) came alternately over to assist BJ with technical 
details. Throughout these phases, the basic tenet has been that exchanges were routed 
through the liaison(s).  
 
In Cologne, one of HN’s responsibilities was to help coordinate CarCo’s relationship with 
SoftHouse. In that role, his activities included “receiving documents/ handing over 
documents to onshore managers BW/ NK, BJ/ SPB.” He continues with the comment that 
“all contact goes through onshore managers” (CarCo-B-1). In a later interview, HN 
distinguishes between connecting to the US versus India. For both sites, key persons or 
interfaces are used. The difference is that the former relationship relies on remote, direct 
contact. For the latter, HN works with local liaisons who connect in turn with India. This 
implies an indirect setup: “We always work across sites with an interface. I will mostly 
talk to JF, and to India the contact is via BJ or MD” (CarCo-B-2). For India, he later 
repeats that “direct cooperation doesn't exist between India and Germany. We just work 
just via the channel” (CarCo-B-3).  
 
In a similar vein, HH stresses the role of liaised contact. Remote, direct collaboration 
hardly existed. If people were contacted in India, it mostly concerned the offshore project 
manager SM. On a team leader or even member level, noticeable exchanges did not occur.  
 
“In India with [SoftHouse] there are about three layers. One is the onshore project 
man, then there is the offshore project manager, then the offshore team leaders, and 
the teams. Our involvement of course was 100% with them (onshore project manager - 
author), about 25% with them (offshore project manager - author), about 5% with them 
(offshore team leaders - author). So every once in a while, the team leader had a 
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burning problem he came back to us and asked this question. But more often than that 
they did it “through”. When MD was here, all of that contact was handled through the 
onshore team.” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
HH points out that the original setup relied heavily on the relationship between BW and 
NK. Their rapport and common knowledge base would ensure seamless contact between 
Germany and India (Gabarro, 1990; Grant, 1996b). “The onshore manager here and the 
offshore manager over there would be a match-pair and talk to each other and know each 
other well. (...)” (CarCo-A-3).  
 
The setup discussed so far is summarized in Table 40. It shows from a high-level 
perspective how work flows are organized. The work flows are depicted as one-way, from 
the users in North America and Europe towards the team in India. Cells of the three IT 
teams are shaded. the US and German teams work with users in their region to integrate 
requirements on that level. They subsequently integrate these and pass them on to the 
onshore SoftHouse liaison (bottom row). From there, information is passed on to (initially) 
the offshore liaison, NK. When he left, his role was assumed by the offshore manager, SM.  
 
Table 40 - Overview of initial work flow setup (shown one-way) 
 
Site location: Company & 
Function: US Germany India 
 
CarCo Users 
 
 
Marketing users US 
 
 
Marketing users US 
 
 
 
CarCo IT 
 
MIS US  
 
 
 MIS Germany 
 
 
 
SoftHouse IT 
  
Liaison Germany  
 
 
 Liaison/ offshore 
manager India 
 
Team India 
 
The onshore liaison was reinforced when MD and SPB from the Indian team started to 
support the group in Cologne. They took on an important role there as a first connector to 
CarCo. MD explains that the team in India often lacked information from CarCo, 
especially when BW was still onshore. She perceived her role as learning the CarCo in 
order to help the team in Bangalore. Onshore presence helped her to accomplish this (Tyre 
& von Hippel, 1997). 
 
“I define what they (team in India - author) have to do. They don't have the complete 
information so I send it to them. (…) I am the liaison person. Somebody has to learn 
the [CarCo] process and that is me.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
The logic of indirect organizing 
Literature and the CarCo case suggest that indirect organizing is often used in distributed 
work environments, especially with offshore outsourcing (Meadows, 1996b; Millar, 1999). 
As the literature sources quoted there show, there are many concerns associated with 
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linking pin structures. We elaborate on these for the CarCo case later in this section. 
Before doing that, it seems appropriate to look at the logic of indirect organizing. In other 
words: What were the reasons for Goldd’s initial setup with linking pins instead of 
promoting direct contact across sites?  
Interviewees suggested a couple of factors that played a role: avoiding confusion, assumed 
low dependence and low uncertainty, bridging diverse contexts, capacity for remote 
contact, and difficulty to connect remotely. 
 
 Avoiding confusion 
A first reason for channeling communications exclusively through to India was the 
perceived need to avoid confusion. Between the US and Germany, interfaces were also 
used to add minimal structure to a remote collaborative relationship (CarCo-D-2). For the 
CarCo - SoftHouse interface, on offshore liaison was considered not enough. SoftHouse 
wanted to structure the channel closer to the customer, i.e., in Germany. This would 
facilitate work for both the CarCo and Indian sites. To CarCo, having an on-site liaison 
seemed easy since a vendor representative was working literally in their own office 
environment. The Indian team could feedback their questions and needs to the onshore 
liaison. This person, in turn, could work as a representative with the customer. He could 
also handle the reverse flow of questions and concerns from CarCo towards SoftHouse 
India. MB from the German CarCo team explains this reasoning tat underpinned in part the 
use of onshore liaisons: 
 
“Infrastructure was not the trigger for having no direct communications. It was to avoid 
that nobody knew what the status of a document was. Therefore BW was there, to 
avoid confusion at both sides. He had to make sure that the right documents were 
sent with the right version and that questions were answered. (…) An example of a 
standard process is that every document must go through the onshore manager.” - 
MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
 Assumed low dependence and low uncertainty 
A second motive lies in the assumption that work flows between CarCo and SoftHouse 
was only loosely coupled and quite well known. As an earlier showed, CarCo and 
SoftHouse underestimated both variables. First, they had too simplistic a perception of 
dependence. In their view, it concerned mainly identifying requirements (CarCo’s job), 
specifying the system (CarCo), building and programming Goldd (CarCo/ SoftHouse), and 
implementing it (CarCo/ SoftHouse). They considered dependence mostly unidirectional, 
when in reality it involved more complex, reciprocal work flows (Table 39). The following 
quote from HN illustrates the idea that work in India and at CarCo sites could be 
considered fairly independent: 
 
“Nobody in India is interested in work in the States on a detailed level as long as their 
work is not impacted. Then they have nothing to do with it on a very detailed level.” - 
HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Second, uncertainty and complexity of the system was underestimated. Our earlier section 
showed that the contract was very incomplete and not founded an a solid grasp of the 
Goldd system and project work. This implied that Indians needed far more information 
than could be delivered through documentation and the first prototype submitted by 
CarCo.  
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Combined, underestimation of dependence and uncertainty resulted in an organization 
setup that did not realistically reflect communication and coordination needs (Table 38). 
This led to risks and performance issues that undermined the success of Goldd. The second 
onshore liaison observed the lack of contact between CarCo and SoftHouse. He pointed 
out that one of his primary missions was to enhance exchange between the German and 
Indian teams, and even triple site contact with the US: 
 
“My tasks are to provide an environment in which you can proceed. And of course to 
make some procedures and take care of database control and change control. The 
most important task, however, is to make them talk to each other. I have to identify 
problems and create an environment in which they can be solved.” - BJ, CarCo-H-1 
 
 Bridging diverse contexts 
Third, it was necessary to bridge functionally diverse groups (Table 40). On the one hand, 
CarCo users in North America and Germany, totally focused on business. And on the other 
hand, the Indian teams that were staffed by technically oriented personnel, with little 
knowledge of business in general, let alone CarCo’s environment. Somewhere, a transition 
had to be made from the business to the IT side. Within the CarCo organization, this came 
quite naturally, as the M&SS units were routinely involved with user departments. It 
appeared more challenging to make this transition with an external vendor, SoftHouse. 
 
The initial concept was to absorb business knowledge close to the customer and avoid 
direct remote contact with the technical teams in India. To this end, BW and NK worked 
for months in the CarCo organization. Then, they would translate their expertise into a 
workable format for the IT professionals in Bangalore. In other words, people from outside 
the team in India would connect to the customer’s user contexts, and bring that back all the 
way to the Indian team. Apparently, this underestimated the difficulty of doing that. In 
fact, knowledge of CarCo requirements could not really be captured and transmitted in a 
sufficient manner. It was too complex and ill-defined for that method. Because of those 
properties, business knowledge was glued to CarCo sites (von Hippel, 1994). That is, it 
was interwoven with CarCo users, their local routines, and ‘thought world’ (Dougherty, 
1992).  
 
Absorbing and translating that knowledge for the Indian IT professionals could not rely on 
documented specifications or a prototype system. Rather, some of their own team members 
from Bangalore had to be immersed in the customer environment. These persons were well 
included in their home context, and could based on that elicit, select and transmit business 
knowledge in an effective and efficient manner. Quite late in the project, this need for 
direct contact of Indian team members became clear. It led to the decision to station MD or 
SPB in Germany, and to connect SPB also to the US site. This shifted the diversity 
transition point (i.e., between business and IT) closer to the business sites. Onshore, MD 
could operate in the CarCo environment as a literal representative of the Indian team.  
 
 “The knowledge/ skills are quite different (in India compared to the team in Germany - 
author). The difference is that the team in India is only a development team. They talk 
in code, and I am the interpreter.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
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With this setup, the remote contact between Germany and India became more 
homogeneous and therefore easier. After all, MD (and SPB) spoke the Indian team’s 
language. She had close relationships with the team members there, and could leverage on 
a common base of knowledge and experience (Gabarro, 1990; Grant, 1996b). In her 
analysis of an interview with SPB, AC makes a similar point:  
 
“Of course, originally, NK was supposed to be the information source in India. I think 
however that it is easier to communicate to the Indian team through an Indian team 
leader. Maybe next time have an Indian team leader available for the offshore-
management. It seems that the Indians are also very knowledgeable because they 
have good technical education. This would be cheaper too.” - AC, CarCo-E-3 
 
 Capacity for remote contact 
Fourth, the M&SS groups in Germany and the US lacked the resources to work directly 
with the offshore SoftHouse teams. HH expressed his expectation that SoftHouse would 
provide onshore resources to work with the offshore team. He did not consider it feasible 
to take on that role with his own group: 
 
“The way we'd like to see it is that SoftHouse is shielding by means of a liaisons here 
in Cologne. We don't have the capacity of managing a team of 20 people 5000 miles 
away, that's impossible.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
From the US, JF echoes this point. She would have preferred to have someone from India 
in the US. This would allow for direct, face-to-face collaboration. A member from the 
Indian team in Detroit could learn the ins and outs of CarCo, and easily pass it on to his 
peers back in India. This would be better than either trying to connect directly on a 
distance to the Bangalore teams. Or working through an independent onshore liaison like 
BW:  
 
“I think there should have been more people from [SoftHouse] involved. Too much was 
going though him (BW - author). It is too difficult to disseminate all the knowledge and 
pass it over to India. It might have been better to have somebody from India in the US 
to get the knowledge. There is not enough process in the US to see everything directly 
from India.” - JF, CarCo-D-1 
 
 Difficulty to connect remotely 
From a work flow dependence point of view, direct remote contact between CarCo teams 
and SoftHouse India could have been beneficial for the project. It would provide team 
members on both sides direct access to remote counterparts. They could have asked 
questions, and provided resources without anyone in between. However, in practice too 
many barriers existed between these communities. MB and HH list some of these, like 
multiple administrative layers, technical barriers, and language issues. Together, these 
factors increased the costs of remote contact, and discouraged direct contact (Kraut & 
Galegher, 1990). Instead, eventually Indian team members came over to CarCo to handle 
this connection. To them, these barriers hardly existed since they had been working daily 
in the Indian context.  
 
“First of all I would prefer direct communication, person-to-person. If that is not 
possible I like to call a person. (This because we do not have personal 
videoconferencing, this of course would be better) But this is difficult to India, because 
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of the lines: we have to call the satellite first, etc. And then for the connection to the 
person you want to talk to in India, they will pass you through several departments. So 
the need for direct communication is done via Profs, but the problem is that it is only 
one channel.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
HH perceived this issue as follows: 
 
“In India with [SoftHouse] there are about three layers. One is the onshore project 
man, then there is the offshore project manager, then the offshore team leaders, and 
the teams. Our involvement of course was 100% with them (onshore project manager - 
author), about 25% with them (offshore project manager - author), about 5% with them 
(offshore team leaders - author). So every once in a while, the team leader had a 
burning problem he came back to us and asked this question. But more often than that 
they did it "through". I mean when MD was here, all of that contact was handled 
through the onshore team. The team leaders don't speak English, they speak some 
dialect of English.” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
Together these factors contributed to Goldd project management’s decision to connect 
onshore and offshore sites indirectly, through BW, and later BJ and Indian representatives.  
 
§ 10.3.4.3  Interfacing Problems 
In this section we further explore the difficulties that arose in the Goldd project from Fall 
1996 onwards. We focus on the organization of the customer - vendor interface. From that 
point of view, we explore issues related to the way (remote) collaboration was setup (see 
Figure 52). After discussing general concerns, we pay specific attention to problems 
associated with the way BW operated in the next section.  
 
The original project setup relied on two liaisons, one onshore and one offshore, to learn 
CarCo requirements and bridge the customer context with the vendor teams in Bangalore. 
Problems started when the offshore liaison - NK - left the project soon after work started in 
India. Co-investigator AC aptly remarked that NK’s departure affected the chained 
communications setup between CarCo and SoftHouse. To her surprise, CarCo seemed not 
aware or interested in this event. This could have reflected HH’s attitude towards 
SoftHouse. He emphasized their lateral relationship with little reciprocal involvement on 
an operational level. As a vendor, SoftHouse was responsible for delivering services. He 
did not consider it his responsibility to exert influence over their operations.  
 
“NK did not become the offshore manager as [SoftHouse] had no money left in their 
budget to pay him (HN: “He was an expensive guy, maybe even more expensive than 
BW”). I do not understand that [CarCo] (as far as I know) did not protest when he 
went: if he would have been in India, a lot of problems could have been avoided. One 
major link in the chain was gone!  Maybe it would have benefited CarCo more if they 
had paid NK to stay. But I do not have information why he has gone.” - AC, CarCo-E-3 
 
HN explains that when NK left, BW had no counterpart in India through which he could 
liaise with the teams there (Figure 53). He could not leverage on the relationship he had 
built with NK when to worked on the bid and requirements phase of the Gold project. 
Without NK, BW would have to transfer knowledge remotely to people he did not know.  
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“The original plan was that there would be two managers: NK and BW. They were at 
[CarCo] for 6 months and learned everything. But NK left India after 4 weeks. NK 
never transferred knowledge to the Indian team. BW had no counterpart in India that 
“spoke the same language”. He had to start building the knowledge from here, and 
that is difficult if not impossible. That's what SPB says: “We never know anything 
since NK has left.” I don't believe him though. And you do not know what would have 
happened if he had been there.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
To AC’s surprise, CarCo did not react to this event. Considering the importance of NK’s 
role, she suggests more proactive involvement of CarCo in SoftHouse’s strategy. Probably 
this did not match HH’s perception of the outsourcing relationship as a hands-off contract. 
As earlier quoted, he compared the outsourcing of Goldd work with a firm supplying air-
condition equipment for a car. Little reciprocal involvement would be needed in his view 
to make this successful. And the same would apply here.  
 
“NK did not become the offshore manager. [I think the project leader changed more 
times] as [SoftHouse] had no money left in their budget to pay him (HN: "He was an 
expensive guy, maybe even more expensive than BW"). I do not understand that 
[CarCo] (as I know) did not protest when he went: if he had been in India, a lot of 
problems could have been avoided. One major link in the chain was gone!  Maybe it 
would have benefited [CarCo] more if they would have paid NK to stay. But I do not 
have information why he has gone.” - AC, CarCo-E-3 
 
Even after things did not work out in the Goldd project, HN insist that the original 
philosophy underlying the project setup remains valid (Figure 52). He points at conditions 
for making it successful. In particular, he emphasizes the relationship between the onshore 
and offshore person. They should have common collaborative experience and good 
rapport.  
 
“The theory is OK, from the theory you need to have these two guys, the onshore and 
offshore project manager. But they need to be experienced, they need to know each 
other, to have to have experience let’s say several years of experience working with 
each other so that they really know each other and they should have experience in the 
sense that they to have done it several times. Then it works out. I mean if these guys 
really communicate with each other I don’t see any problems.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
As things turned out, there was little opportunity to leverage upon the relationship between 
BW and NK. This was unfortunate as much had been invested from both CarCo and 
SoftHouse side. NK’s departure had a strong impact on the teams in Bangalore. The chain 
or ‘lifeline’ towards CarCo had been interrupted, leaving the teams with little information 
when they needed it most. In terms of Table 39, flow 1a now stopped in Germany. This 
information and knowledge link was of vital importance. It provided the agent with insight 
in the principal’s needs and preferences. Early Fall 1996, the situation was that everyone 
was looking at the Indian teams to develop the Goldd system using documentation and the 
first PC-based prototype. Yet they lacked that critical information link. It was only when 
MD and SPB came over that information exchange between onshore and offshore 
improved. MD explains:  
 
“(…) It took us several months to find out what they wanted. The documented work 
specifications give only an overview, but no details. BW did not give proper 
information. It is much better now that I am here, somebody needs to be on-site.” - 
CarCo-F-1 
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SPB shares this point of view. He confirms that in Fall 1996 the Indian teams were cut off 
from sufficient information on the customer’s expectations. They relied on BW in Cologne 
for this important task, but hardly knew him. 
 
"In the beginning it happened that we had days without work, because there was no 
information to work with. (…) But the core model has been done now, and we have 
less work, that is why the team is getting smaller. At the beginning we did not know 
what the user wanted, and it is better to talk directly to the user to know what is better 
for them.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
SPB appreciated direct contact with users during the second Model Office in Detroit, 
December 1996. Afterwards, on his way back, he stayed for some time in Cologne. AC 
took the opportunity to talk to him about his experience in the Goldd project. SPB 
explained that communications to India are always routed through BW and offshore 
managers. Whilst he worked in India, he hardly talked directly to BW in Cologne. Only 
when BW was in India did SPB have an opportunity to meet directly without local 
administrative layers in between. The moment AC started to talk about the multi-node 
communication mode between CarCo and India, SPB recognized the issues he had been 
struggling with. He indicated the difficulty of tying onshore and offshore project workers 
in such an indirect manner. AC reflects on the interview in December 1996: 
 
"All communication to India goes through BW. BW talks to SM (Offshore Project 
Manager, see Table 32 - author) who is more on the Oracle side of the team. On very 
rare occasions does BW communicate directly with SPB. This would happen if there 
are very specific issues with screen design and such. This would happen on the 
phone. When BW was in India, SPB also had the opportunity to talk to him. (…) All 
other communication is done through SM, via profs (e-mail), fax and phone. Before 
information reaches the team it goes through SM and through the team leader. I asked 
him what he thought about the communication lines as they exist: all communication 
through BW. SPM seemed a little indignant, he got immediately exited about the 
issue. It was clear that he thought it was troublesome and difficult to communicate in 
such a way.” - AC, CarCo-E-1 
 
SPB points at the disadvantages of having chained communication lines, see Figure 52 and 
Table 40. It is like the telephone game metaphor used in Meadows’ (1996) research, and 
described in the theory section. The larger the number of nodes in a communication chain, 
the more likely misinterpretation becomes. Each person receives and relays in his own 
way, leading in the end to a distorted message that is to some extent disconnected from the 
original communication intent.  
 
“After the Model Office (number 2 in Detroit, December 1996) I know what the users 
want. When the information goes from the users to JF, to HN, to BW, to us, it can get 
distorted or diluted. When one person in the link has not understood what the user 
meant, it will show in the product. Errors in understanding will be passed down the 
link.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1  
 
Cutting through this ineffective process requires direct contact with the source of 
requirements information - the users. For that reason, SPB considered the Detroit meeting 
very valuable. As AC noted, “SPB was extremely happy with the opportunity that he got to 
meet the users, and to get first hand information” (CarCo-E-1).  
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On top of the general problem of routing communications through a chain of liaisons, a 
specific problem arose in the relationship between US and India. In isolation, the US and 
Indian teams worked on tasks associated with the database design and data conversion. At 
some point in early 1997, the US team was preparing data conversion. They loaded data 
and discovered that database rules worked completely different from the way they 
expected. This was because both teams had different perceptions of how the database rules 
were supposed to work. In fact, they had ignored or underestimated dependencies between 
the US and Indian teams in this phase. In a much earlier phase, people from both sides 
should have talked about reciprocal expectations.  
 
“Parallel to that (testing - author) they (M&SS US team - author) completed the 
conversion. And they started with implementing the batch environment. During the 
testing we identified that the core Sales and P&A functionality is not properly designed 
into the system. So they didn’t talk to each other. They do a conversion in the States, 
you have database and a database design. And they do a conversion from the old 
system to the new database. So they load data in, then they expected that the Indian 
rules on that data work as the same as they thought it should work when they did the 
conversion. But they never talked to each other and that didn’t work, especially not in 
that area. So when you load these conversion data it was right in their understanding, 
but the Indians had a completely different understanding. (…) So they have to redo 
the conversion, do some rework on the conversion. And the Indians have to do 
something as well. Both have to adjust to a common concept which is now in place for 
that area.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
§ 10.3.4.4  BW’s Role and Mode of Operating
64
 
 
“Too much was going though him (BW - author). It is too difficult to disseminate all the 
knowledge and pass it over to India.” - JF, CarCo-D-1 
 
“(…) the guy (BW - author) lied to us. It went both ways: he lied to the Indians, he lied 
to us. If you have such a person it is devastating.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
With little doubt, BW assumed a challenging role in the Goldd project. He had the main 
responsibility for coordination of work between CarCo and SoftHouse India, without being 
part of either company’s formal hierarchies. We explore some facets of his role and the 
way he operated in the Goldd project. The section is based on resources from BW, and 
employees from SoftHouse and CarCo. We start with information from his own hand, and 
continue with views from CarCo employees.  
 
BW is an independent IT consultant. He was contracted for Goldd from 1995 onwards, and 
left the project in early 1997. In his own Curriculum Vitae (version of October 2000), BW 
represents his experience in the CarCo project as follows: 
 
                                                 
64 This section is based on perspectives from SoftHouse, and in particular CarCo 
employees. It may contain very personalized views on actors and events. These are only 
included for providing insight in BW’s functioning.  
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“Global Off-shore Project Manager - [CarCo]. Initial 3 months extended to 15 months 
(Nov 95 - Jan 97). Reporting to the Sales Director of a software house (SoftHouse - 
author), and responsible for preparing the bid for the development of a major new 
Global, multi-language database system. BW prepared the bid documentation, costed 
the project with the assistance of another analyst working for [SoftHouse] on-site, and 
won the contract for [SoftHouse]. He carried out requirements analysis in the USA and 
Canada with design work in Cologne, with all programming in Bangalore, India. The 
project team of 35 were based in Bangalore, India where BW worked from time to time 
to prepare the team, set up quality plans, explain system functionality, carry out RAD 
development sessions, whilst visiting North America to liaise with users. An Indian 
project manager then took over on day-to-day team management whilst BW returned 
to carry out further analysis, change control and user presentation work in Europe, 
USA and Canada.” - BW, CarCo-G-3  
 
BW was involved in the pro-contractual phase. He prepared the bid documentation with 
NK, and helped SoftHouse win CarCo’s contract for outsourcing portions of the Goldd 
project work. The second paragraph refers to the operational phase. NK’s brief role 
offshore is not mentioned. BW depicts several roles he played for the Indian team, 
suggesting to some extent as if he assumed management responsibility there. (See phrase: 
“An Indian project manager then took over on day-to-day team management” CarCo-G-3). 
In BW’s view, he combined these activities for the Indian team with roles oriented towards 
CarCo users and IT staff.  
 
Whilst working in Cologne, AC asked BW to fill out a semi-structured interview form. At 
that time BW had left the project and was back in the UK. One section of the form asked 
interviewees to fill out whom they communicate with during a regular work week. A 
number of subsequent questions are then asked, listed in the top row of Table 41. Column 
2 shows the main topic of a collaborative relationship. For the third column, interviewees 
could indicate which communication mechanisms they used. A range of options was 
provided (like face-to-face, mail, fax, videoconferencing etc), including an open, ‘other’ 
option. Column 4 refers to the frequency of communications, i.e., number of times a week/ 
day/ month. The final right column shows results from the question: “What do you 
communicate about?” We analyze BW’s table below. 
 
Table 41 - BW communication patterns 
 
Person you 
work with 
Issue you work 
on 
Communication you 
use 
Frequency Communication topic 
Face-to-face meetings 2x a week 
E-mail Occasionally  
AC 
(Germany) 
Progress 
tracking 
Other: leaving notes 
on desk 
Occasionally 
Reporting progress/ 
clarifications 
HH 
(Germany) 
Management 
issues 
Face-to-face meetings Daily Delays to project 
schedules (!) 
HN 
(Germany) 
Technical 
architecture 
Face-to-face meetings Daily Design issues 
MB 
(Germany) 
Data design Face-to-face meetings 2x a week Data model design 
detailed issues 
Phone 2x a week BM (US) Database 
design Videoconference 1x a week 
Data model design 
detailed issues 
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  E-mail 3x a week  
Phone 2x a week 
Videoconference 1x a week 
JF (US) User issues 
E-mail 5x a week 
User design & User 
acceptance testing 
issues 
Source: CarCo-G-1 
 
Table 41 gives an indication of BW’s communication pattern in the Goldd project. It 
summarizes his experience for the period Fall - Winter 1996, and early 1997. The table is 
not complete: it does not include BW’s interactions with SoftHouse India or UK personnel. 
The reason for this is not known. From the table, it becomes apparent that BW maintained 
an extensive network of contacts on quite diverse topics. He had a desk in the office 
environment of the German CarCo team for Goldd. The communication patterns can be 
distinguished in technical and non-technical topics. On the non-technical side, he 
interacted with AC and HH in Germany on project and process management issues. (Note 
for HH the exclamation mark in the ‘communication topic’ column. It indicates BW’s 
difficulty of dealing with HH. BW was the first in line to be hard pressed for SoftHouse 
delays and poor quality.) With JF in the US he discussed issues concerning the North 
American user base. On the technical side, he worked with HN on Goldd’s architecture 
and high level design. Some interaction occurred with MB (Cologne) and BM (Detroit) for 
the data model and database design.  
 
Unfeasibility 
After NK left the Goldd project, BW represented the sole link between the CarCo teams in 
Germany and the US, and the Indian SoftHouse group. He mediated all work flow and 
information links as shown in Table 39. Another way to look at this is to focus on the 
variety of activity areas. BW connected people working on similar facets of Goldd on the 
CarCo and SoftHouse side. To pursue this perspective, we can use the task areas identified 
by BW in Table 41, second column from left. The 3 non-technical and 2 technical areas are 
mapped for the CarCo and SoftHouse context in Figure 59.  
 
 
Figure 59 - Connecting contexts with varied activities 
 
Project management
Progress management
User issues
Data model and database
Technical architecture
On-shore 
liaison
Project management
Progress management
User issues
Data model and database
Technical architecture
CarCo context SoftHouse context
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One of BW’s challenges was to work on so many different topic areas. Some activities 
were minimally coupled, like planning. As earlier elaborated, CarCo and SoftHouse 
worked with their own planning process, and coordinated only on major milestones. The 
same applies to progress management. For technical areas, people had to pursue closer 
integration. The reason is that development work for the Goldd system and implementation 
process was divided between CarCo and SoftHouse. The outsourcing strategy was based 
on an agency relationship. This delegated part of the Goldd development and 
implementation work to SoftHouse (Eisenhardt, 1989a). In turn, delegation and work 
division resulted in multiple dependencies and flows between the two CarCo teams and 
SoftHouse Bangalore operations (Litterer, 1965), as shown in (Table 39).  
 
Unfortunately, it seems that some dependencies and flows were underestimated, and 
therefore under-coordinated. An example of this is the assignment of an exclusive 
channeling role to one person as onshore liaison. The unfeasibility of this setup is echoed 
by AC and JF. AC comments in her logs that BJ was hired from January 1997 onwards to 
provide some relief for BW: 
 
“In January BW went to India again to discuss all open issues. BJ, a new [SoftHouse] 
manager, accompanied BW to India. [SoftHouse] hired BJ because the work BW was 
doing was too much for one person to handle.” - AC, CarCo-K-2  
 
JF remarks that a multi-person interface was needed between her company and SoftHouse. 
For the US, on-site involvement of Indian personnel would have helped in her view. This 
would have facilitated the requirements knowledge flow from CarCo towards the Indian 
teams: 
 
“I think there should have been more people from [SoftHouse] involved. Too much was 
going though him (BW - author). It is too difficult to disseminate all the knowledge and 
pass it over to India. It might have been better to have somebody from India in the US 
to get the knowledge. There is not enough process in the US to see everything directly 
from India.” - JF, CarCo-D-1 
 
BW faced the challenge of a very comprehensive job: he had to channel and add some 
value to extensive cross-context information processing needs in multiple areas. But that 
was not his only problem as the next section discusses.  
 
Mode of operating 
To CarCo, BW was the primary person considered responsible for SoftHouse deliverables. 
Yet within the latter organization, BW’s role was difficult. He did not have a hierarchical 
position vis-à-vis the Indian team. What remained was a lateral, consulting role. He 
provided the Indian team with vital information, and represented the team’s needs in 
Germany. In this setup, he needed good rapport with the Indian team. This would ensure 
some commonality of goals, and efficiency of communications. The latter need was even 
more important because of distance and time zone differences.  
 
In reality, however, BW did not handle his position in an effective manner. He seemed to 
assume that he could take on a hierarchical role, especially when visiting the Indian team 
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onsite in Bangalore. He also seemed unaware of the Indians’ culture and possible 
sensitivities. Combined, this led to a situation where the Indian project workers did not 
accept BW as person and in his role as onshore liaison. Obviously, given BW’s 
challenging role, this created considerable problems for himself, the Goldd project, and 
ultimately HH as project champion. HH shares his view on BW’s mode of operating. His 
perception is probably based in part on discussions with Indian liaisons (SPB and/ or MD) 
whilst they were in Cologne. 
 
“BW wasn’t able to understand what people were doing in India. (…) He had been 
there but I think it he was just not that person. He had no authority relationship to 
India. What I picked up is from both NK and BW is they hated him (BW - author). He 
came in like … (…) “You do this, you do that. No questions”. That doesn't work. They 
are very proud, they are mature people, they want to be respected. MD doesn't want 
to be tossed around. That's how they felt being treated.  
BJ tries to be different. I think he is. That doesn't mean that people don't need to be 
beaten up every once in a while because they are not doing as well as they should. 
But it's the way you do that. BW was a gigantic mistake.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
HN stresses that BW did not have a hierarchical role in either the SoftHouse India or 
CarCo organization. In fact, he was independent of the two, and could only attempt to 
liaise from a lateral position. He would have to rely on his content knowledge, 
professionalism, and indispensable position for the two groups (Burt, 1993). From a 
cultural point of view, BW would need extensive insight in the Indian community in order 
to connect as a Westerner. All the more since he would pay only a few visits to the teams 
in Bangalore, and would have to rely on electronic media for the remaining time. Instead 
of realizing these organizational and cultural parameters, BW adopted a quasi boss attitude 
towards the Indian operations. This was of course not well received.  
 
Change requests 
Over Fall 1996, CarCo users came up with numerous small changes that affected the data 
model. Many of these were quite small, like changing the font size of a screen. The 
usefulness of these change requests is not certain. BJ mentioned to AC and the author that 
many of them were unnecessary, or sometimes contradicted earlier requests (log January 
27 - 31, 1997). The requests increased information processing needs from CarCo to the 
Indian SoftHouse team. They created possibly also reverse communication needs for 
clarification. For some reason, BW did not handle the requests well. It seems that he 
basically did not communicate them to India. BW’s lack of rapport with the Indian team 
could have played a role here. Once people found out, a sudden flooding of requests hit the 
Indian team as HH explains:  
 
“We discovered in the wake of the change of the project managers (BJ replacing BW - 
author) that a very high number of data model changes had been withheld from the 
Indian team. They didn't even know about it. So they didn't know the impact and when 
it hit them it turned out to be 700 detail changes. It went as far spelling errors and 
changing field size types. Fairly basic things: something that when it happens you just 
do it and nobody bothers about it. But if you park them, if you tank them, and then 
bombard someone, it's disastrous. They did a very good job recovering from that. That 
was because there was a communication breakdown, quite a severe one between the 
onshore and the offshore team. It just didn't get through, it was held here and never 
went to India.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
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MD was in India when the huge volume of requests was passed on to then team there. She 
mentions that the event affected team motivation strongly. The complexity and internal 
dependencies of the Goldd system implied that changes had ramified impacts, causing a 
major work load.  
 
“The changes. We had close to 800 data model changes and it almost brought the 
team down. Everybody was very affected by it. The changes in the data model would 
dribble through to the front end.” - MD, CarCo-F-1
65
 
 
On top of the change requests, HH indicates that BW did not communicate CarCo design 
standards to SoftHouse India. This should have been done early in the project. 
Unfortunately, it had never been done and was discovered in a very late phase of the 
project:  
 
“We just found out another one. We had discussed some early design standards and 
they were not followed. We discovered that they hadn't even been sent to India. And 
it's disastrous. So we're still suffering from some very early communication issues.” - 
HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
An important question is of course why no one was aware of BW’s omission. In a sense, 
SoftHouse should have operated quality control measures and additional links in order to 
avoid exclusive dependence on BW (Burt, 1993). On the other hand, HH was considered 
responsible for the overall Goldd project. Yet he did not feel a need for control measures 
from his side. According to him, CarCo selected SoftHouse based on criteria like ISO 
certification and a successful track record. Basically he trusted the company from then on 
to contribute the contracted performance (which was in fact ill-specified). HH also did not 
count on the possibility that BW would operate in the manner described above. In his 
perception, BW lied to his group and the SoftHouse team in India.  
 
“It wasn’t my responsibility to control that. [Question: Would you have liked that 
responsibility?] No. Absolutely not. Come on - you gotta trust the mechanism or you 
don’t. And when a company sells you on so many successful projects and mechanisms 
in place for quality control and ISO 9000, and 9001, whatever, then you don’t 
challenge their communication mechanisms. You trust the people that are there, that 
they are doing what they’re supposed to do. There is basically little safeguard against 
putting on delay. And the guy (BW - author) lied to us. It went both ways: he lied to 
the Indians, he lied to us. If you have such a person it is devastating.” - HH, CarCo-A-
3 
 
HH comments that professionals working in a geographically distributed projects need 
strong skills in areas like communication, planning, and collaboration. In his view, BW 
showed major deficiencies in these areas.  
 
“Communication skills I think are very high on the list of important skills in globally 
distributed settings. Then planning skills, and interpersonal skills going in both 
directions. Now the fact that BW lied to us both ways shows me that he had some 
                                                 
65 In an earlier quote, HH mentions 700 changes. We do not know the correct, exact 
number.  
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major deficiency, which made every effort too high. You can't survive with that at the 
end of the day, people find you out. (…) We discovered it after he left. He basically 
escaped. He went on vacation. We didn't want him to come back. It was a very 
carefully planned vacation.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Over Fall 1996, pressure built on BW to perform. For this, he depended entirely on the 
Indian team, yet he was not capable of building an effective working relationship with 
them. At the same time, it seems that BW’s role in general would have required the 
proverbial sheep with 5 legs (CarCo-D-1). Unfortunately, he did not realize and/ or 
communicate this general unfeasibility. In addition, he was not aware of his seemingly lack 
of social skills. All this resulted in a tense situation, primarily in Germany, with spill-over 
effects to the Indian team and US CarCo group. Between December 1996 and early 1997 
BW decided to leave the project after having tried unsuccessfully to get another position in 
Goldd.  
 
§ 10.3.4.5  Changes and Alternatives 
 
“First we have an interface between onshore and offshore: SM (offshore project 
manager - author) and BJ (onshore liaison - author). Also MD (onshore liaison-
author), she handles the technical things, BJ the business side. Second, we have an 
interface between here and the US: HH and MD with JF in the US. At this moment CS 
also has direct contact with India for data load issues, that is easier and better.” - HN, 
CarCo-B-2 
 
Over the Fall 1996, CarCo and SoftHouse started to realize that their initial organizational 
setup for Goldd required some modification. In this section, we discuss some of these 
changes. Interviewees also suggested upon reflection different ways of doing things. We 
include these ideas to gain a better understanding of workable organization modes for 
distributed temporary systems. All in all, we discovered the following changes and 
alternatives in the CarCo Goldd case. First, the onshore liaison role in Germany was 
extended from a single person to two persons. Second, JF made a suggestion to have a 
liaising SoftHouse representative not only in Germany but also at least for some time in 
the US. Third, triple site direct contact was initiated, including SoftHouse India, and the 
CarCo sites in the US and Germany. Fourth, interviewees mentioned the importance of 
homogeneous connections across sites, so that people can work with a knowledgeable 
counterpart. Fifth and finally, people proposed visits from CarCo personnel to the Indian 
site. The section concludes with a comparative analysis of these strategies.  
 
Reinforced on-shore liaising in Germany 
 
 “I would want to have a different balance of people right from the very beginning, 
more senior Indian people who would participate in the prototyping and the functional 
analysis.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
A first change strategy affected the liaison role in onshore, in Germany. BW fulfilled this 
position from the operational start in 1996 onwards, after having worked on the SoftHouse 
bid and requirements analysis since 1995. The onshore liaison was expected to channel 
communications between the CarCo and SoftHouse India groups. The person in this role 
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would have an exclusive linking pin role and ensure orderliness of cross-context 
exchanges. His linking pin position was expected to facilitate interfacing between CarCo 
and SoftHouse. Being stationed onshore, the person would pick up knowledge on the 
CarCo environment and pass it on to the offshore SoftHouse team. Conversely, he would 
receive SoftHouse deliverables and check these before handing them over to CarCo 
representatives. He would collaborate with an offshore liaison stationed in India. This 
counterpart person was supposed to work on a day-to-day basis with the Indian team and 
simultaneously connect to the onshore liaison. 
 
A things turned out, this setup did not quite work. NK left the project, leaving to BW the 
task of connecting directly to the team in India whilst working from Germany. This job 
proved unfeasible. On a general level, it would be close to impossible for anyone to handle 
the diverse and comprehensive information processing needs between CarCo and 
SoftHouse. On a personal level, BW’s outlook and attitude hindered his effective 
functioning as liaison. As the situation became more and more untenable, several change 
strategies were implemented. It is not clear whether these were based on a clear awareness 
of the situation people were getting into, or reflect a more an improvised, ad hoc response. 
We focus here more on outcomes, and not the problem solving cycles themselves. itself.  
 
The outcomes were that BW was replaced by BJ. In addition, MD or SPB from the Indian 
team alternatingly supported him in Cologne. We expand here first of all on BJ’s more of 
operating and differences with BW. We then look at the role of the Indian liaisons, and the 
importance of having them onshore.  
 
 BJ instead of BW 
BJ is a more senior IT consultant than BW. He entered the Goldd project in the week of 
January 20-24, 1997 (CarCo-K-1). From his first impressions of the Goldd situation, he 
started to realize the extensive reciprocal communications needs between CarCo and 
SoftHouse. In April 1997, he mentioned in an interview with AC:  
 
“Talking, communication is very important, between India and Germany we need 
communication back and forth.” - BJ, CarCo-H-1 
 
He was also aware of his role as a liaison. Presumably, BJ knew that he could fulfill the 
role of exclusive linking pin as originally envisioned. In fact, he tried to maneuver himself 
somewhat out of that role. He started to promote more direct contact between Germany 
and India, and also triple site with the US included. This approach moved the project away 
from the initial setup with chained communications as depicted in Figure 52 and Figure 53.  
 
Instead, a communications structure emerged that better fitted the reality of the Goldd 
project: a distributed work environment where one company with operations in India 
developed a novel, complex system for a customer company with two main sites in 
Germany and US. The uncertainty and dependencies associated with this situation 
triggered multiple work and information flows throughout the successive project stages. BJ 
realized the communication needs and his inability to channel these as an exclusive linking 
pin. He initiated a reinforced liaison capability onshore by inviting Indian team members 
Figure 54. He also promoted direct interactions between Germany and India, and US if 
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need be (Figure 55). Together, these measures enhanced cross-site processing capabilities 
and problem solving. They also lifted some of the burden resting on the onshore liaison 
role (Burt, 1993).  
 
“My tasks are to provide an environment in which you can proceed. And of course to 
make some procedures and take care of database control and change control. The 
most important task, however, is to make them talk to each other. I have to identify 
problems and create an environment in which they can be solved.” - BJ, CarCo-H-1 
 
BJ thus changed the communication structure of Goldd. As a person, he also operated in a 
more effective manner than his predecessor. He showed more respect and emotional 
intelligence in dealing with the Indian team. BJ was an English consultant who had worked 
more extensively with Indian organizations than BW. He seemed more aware of the fact 
that he had no formal, hierarchical role in the Indian SoftHouse organization. Still, without 
that basis, he found ways to achieve productive collaboration with this team. 
 
 Indian onshore liaisons 
The German team met for the first time a team member from SoftHouse India (SPB) 
during Model Office 2 in Detroit, December 1996. Afterwards, SPB stopped over at 
Cologne for further discussions with the project leader and CarCo team members. He 
returned to Cologne in February 1997 to assist BJ. MD - also a senior member of the 
Indian team - replaced him in March 1997. There were several reasons for stationing 
Indian team members in Cologne. First, the offshore team still lacked business knowledge 
relevant to the Goldd project. In terms of Table 39, the offshore team was in the agent’s 
position. A primary need in that role in knowing what the principal wants (see flow 1a in 
Table 39). Early 1997, they still experienced the aftereffects of BW’s ineffective role 
fulfillment during Fall 1996. Someone would have to acquire that knowledge and pass it 
on to the offshore team. It seemed that BJ was not in a position to take on that role, in part 
because he had joined the project in a late stage. For cost reasons, sending over a couple of 
Indian team members proved unfeasible.  
Second, BJ’s core competencies included primarily handling some of the non-technical 
processes, see Figure 59. He emphasized cross-site communications but lacked insight in 
Goldd design and functionality (AC logs January 20 - 24, 1997). 
 
Apparently, interfacing between CarCo and SoftHouse encompasses a variety of areas. A 
single liaison would need knowledge and capacities along multiple corresponding 
dimensions to add value. This person would thus embody the multiple facets of the CarCo 
- SoftHouse relationship. One could apply Ashby’s (1968) law of requisite variety with 
some modification. According to Ashby, a system would need to reflect the variety of its 
environment in order to survive (Ashby, 1968). We can transpose this notion to a 
polycontextual setting that comprises multi-system. Analogously, these systems need to 
reflect to some extent the variety of their counterparts to enable fruitful collaboration. 
When systems are not directly connected, the interfacing person needs fulfill that role. He 
handles the multiple dimensions (i.e., variety) of a relationship between two or more 
contexts. Figure 59 illustrates this for the Goldd case.  
 
In practice, it seems unlikely that a single liaison would be capable of handling this 
responsibility. Earlier, when BW was onshore liaison, issues emerged in the 
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communications areas, not the technical ones per se. With BJ, a reverse situation emerged. 
Though he improved communications and management, he lacked a solid technical 
background. For this reason, his exercising of the onshore liaison role was incomplete. 
This was one of the motivations for onshore Indian presence, in addition to problem of 
business knowledge transfer. HH explains: 
 
“We had two problems. One was the lack of business understanding (of the Indian 
team - author). The other one was that we needed some technical support and some 
meaningful interface between the Indian team and here. And BJ not being a technical 
man and not having been involved in the project beforehand needed some assistance. 
I think that is the primary reason why SPB and MD came here.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Compared to Figure 59 a new setup was created as depicted in Figure 60. BW is shown as 
onshore liaison A, handling mainly nontechnical dimensions of the CarCo - SoftHouse 
interfacing. The B liaison is added and refers to one of the Indian team members working 
onshore on technical issues alongside BW.  
 
 
Figure 60 - Connecting contexts with varied activities: enhanced liaison role 
 
The new setup boasts the variety and obviously capacity of SoftHouse’s onshore presence. 
MD points out that she has a very important role as representative of the offshore team. On 
the one hand, she has the advantage of onshore inclusion in the CarCo context. This allows 
her to acquire directly knowledge pertaining to CarCo requirements and expectations (Tyre 
& von Hippel, 1997). On the other hand, she is part of the team in India. Having some 
history of shared collaboration means that the offshore team accepts her as a senior 
member. Other than BW or even BJ, she is part of the offshore community. She shares 
their goals and needs, and knows how to work with them (Gabarro, 1990; Grant, 1996b; 
Schein, 1992). In a sense, MD (and SPB) remain virtually part of the Indian team while 
having the luxury of co-presence with CarCo personnel. This appears a strong combination 
as MD explains: 
 
“I define what they (team in India - author) have to do. They don't have the complete 
information so I send it to them. (…) I am the liaison person. Somebody has to learn 
the [CarCo] process and that is me. (…) SM, SPB and I are the direct contact points 
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for the team. SPB in Germany and I in India or the other way around to do the 
coordination between the two countries.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
In this role, SPB and MD worked for the first time on structuring collaboration processes 
between CarCo and SoftHouse. So far, little standards and rules had been elaborated for 
this interface. Somehow, nobody felt the responsibility for this area. Even at local sites, 
standards and formalization played a minimal role as MB points out: 
 
“As this is a pathfinder project for [CarCo], there are a number of firsts: first 
outsourcing, first global, first client/ server. There are no standards. We have to find 
our own path and rules from day to day. The standards change from day to day. (…) 
The roles are not stable. I have never seen written work specifications. One commits 
to this, one commits to that.” - MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
Between the Goldd sites, even basic guidelines for communications were lacking. This 
added to the complexity of cross-site interactions and caused sometimes irritation as one 
German team member describes:  
 
“We use Word documents with questions, and everybody answers in different kinds 
(even colors) of font. It goes back and forth; at the end it gets very confusing.” - MB, 
CarCo-C-3 
 
From the Indian side, MD confirms the modest role of standards, especially for 
collaboration with CarCo:  
 
“We do have internal standards. (…) I am sure that there are rules that I follow, but I 
would not know what they are. [CarCo] has not set rules to follow, except that a 
document should have a header etc. We do have internal [SoftHouse] rules like with 
every delivery there should be a delivery note.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
From February 1997 onwards, onshore presence of MD or SPB put them in a position to 
improve this situation. They enhanced the structure of exchanges between the onshore and 
offshore teams: 
 
“At this moment we are fixing rules for collaboration with CarCo, because before we 
never had a point of contact. Now we have MD and me.” - SPB, CarCo-E-2  
 
As a side effect, MD and SPB brought the Indian team closer to the German CarCo group. 
Their onsite presence greatly facilitated direct contact with everybody onshore: HH, HN, 
and MB. To illustrate this, Table 42 gives an overview of MD’s communication patterns 
when she worked onshore in Germany, in March 1997. She focused on technical liaising 
between the Indian SoftHouse and German CarCo teams. As far as India is concerned, she 
collaborated very closely with SPB. (In fact, very much like BW and NK should have 
collaborated in the initial setup.)  
 
Interestingly, the onshore presence of an Indian team member led to more direct remote 
communications then with a non-Indian liaison like BW or BJ. These people were 
independent consultants and did not have the social, cultural and organizational situation 
awareness that comes from prolonged inclusion in the Indian context. As an illustration, 
AC comments on one of her interviews with SPB. He explained that when BW worked 
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onshore, contacts were almost exclusively routed through the offshore project manager SM 
and team leaders. Direct contact happened only during BW’s visits to India: 
 
"All communication to India goes through BW. BW talks to SM who is more on the 
Oracle side of the team. On very rare occasions does BW communicate directly with 
SPB. This would happen if there are very specific issues with screen design and such. 
This would happen on the phone. When BW was in India, SPB also had the 
opportunity to talk to him. (…) All other communication is done through SM, via profs 
(e-mail), fax and phone. Before information reaches the team it goes through SM and 
through the team leader. I asked him what he thought about the communication lines 
as they exist: all communication through BW. SPM seemed a little indignant, he got 
immediately exited about the issue. It was clear that he thought it was troublesome 
and difficult to communicate in such a way.” - AC, CarCo-E-1 
 
With an Indian onshore liaison, things were different. Familiarity of that person with the 
Bangalore context facilitated remote contact. As the second row of Table 42 shows, MD 
worked at times directly with programmers, and not exclusively through the offshore 
project manager SM.  
 
Table 42 - MD communication patterns 
 
Person you work with Issue you work on Communication you use 
SPB (India) On everything Profs: 10 a day, call when urgent (1 
every two days on average) 
2 programmers (India) Workflow, Sales and P&A codes 
(data model and functionality) 
All communication is done by SM’s 
profs, but we do speak directly on 
the phone 
HH (Germany) Data model changes and CCAR Talk, daily prayer meeting 
HN (Germany) Data model, functionality and 
screen design 
Talk, forward mails 
MB (Germany) Data model Talk, forward mails 
Source: CarCo-F-1 
 
While onshore, MD collaborated with key German CarCo staff - HH, HN, and MB (Table 
42). These communications consisted of face-to-face talks, emails, and meetings. They 
focused on data model issues, functionality and procedures for handling certain change 
requests (CCAR). Onsite presence of MD or SPB changed communication patterns. It 
promoted direct contact between them and a range of local people in Germany. This is 
comparable to BW’s visits SoftHouse India (AC, CarCo-E-1). During these trips, BW met 
SPB and other local team leaders and team members. Whilst in Germany, he would not 
contact these people directly.  
 
Having MD or SPB onshore triggered other communications effects too. Since these 
liaisons knew people at the counterpart site, they enabled direct remote contact too. That is, 
communications that are not channeled through liaisons. With SPB in Cologne, for 
instance, German CarCo team members would work directly with team leaders in India.  
 
 “I worked more and more with SPB when he was here. And also through audio 
conference we have direct contact with the coordinators of the team in India. The first 
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approach was that we had an onshore and an offshore manager, NK and BW. The 
advice was then: all official things through managers. (…)  
Infrastructure was not the trigger for having no direct communications. It was to avoid 
that nobody knew what the status of a document was. Therefore BW was there, to 
avoid confusion at both sides. He had to make sure that the right documents were 
sent with the right version and that questions were answered.” - MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
This did not happen when BW was onshore liaison, and also not with BJ. As it seems, 
Indian onshore liaisons reduced to some extent indirect routing of communications 
offshore. MD and SPB could leverage on their collaborative history in the Indian team. 
This simplified remote communications and avoided the confusion people were seemingly 
afraid of. The role of the offshore contact person seems therefore less relevant.  
 
AC and HN further expand on the advantage of having both onshore and offshore liaisons 
from the Indian team. According to them, the background of these people would facilitate 
communications. It would also increase acceptance of the liaison by the Indian team, since 
they would be part of the hierarchy there and probably hold senior positions.  
 
“As far as I understand, it would be better for the Indians to have an Indian project 
manager here (onshore in Germany - author). That would be better for them, easier 
for them, they would listen more, communication would be better” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
“Of course, originally, NK was supposed to be the information source in India. I think 
however that it is easier to communicate to the Indian team through an Indian team 
leader. Maybe next time they could have an Indian team leader available for the 
offshore-management. It seems that the Indians are also very knowledgeable because 
they have good technical education. This would be cheaper too.” - AC, CarCo-E-3 
 
SoftHouse liaison in US 
Indian involvement in onshore liaising could have been extended to the US too. From JF’s 
angle, information processing between US and India relied on too many nodes. More 
specifically, she observed that too much emphasis was placed on the SoftHouse liaison in 
Germany. This single person in the original setup had at least two disadvantages. First, he 
was not physically located in the US, from where most requirements originated. This made 
his awareness of the US situation more difficult (Tyre & von Hippel, 1997), all the more 
since requirements remained quite fluid throughout the Goldd project. Second, he was 
alone, responsible for liaising between India and both US and German client sites.  
 
“I think there should have been more people from [SoftHouse] involved. Too much was 
going though him [BW]. It is too difficult to disseminate all the knowledge and pass it 
over to India. It might have been better to have somebody from India in the US to get 
the knowledge. There is not enough processing capacity in the US to see everything 
directly from India.” - JF, CarCo-D-1 
 
JF points out that BW’s position in Germany proved unfeasible. According to her, direct 
contact between her team and India would also not be possible since her group lacks the 
experience and capacity to do so. An alternative scenario would have been to station one or 
more Indian liaisons in the US, working directly with their counterparts in Bangalore 
(Figure 61). This would be similar to the situation that emerged in Germany with SPB and 
MD. This onsite representative could benefit from on the one hand his background which 
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facilitated direct remote contact. On the other hand, he could easily connect on-site to the 
US team and users.  
 
 
Figure 61 - Alternative communications diagram (CarCo US proposal) 
 
 
Triple site direct synchronous contact: Collocated and remote 
A third direction of change was the increasing role of triple site direct contact. We refer to 
synchronous communications that included people from the three operational teams: 
CarCo US, CarCo Germany, and SoftHouse India. We discuss in this section two forms of 
this interaction mode: collocated and remote.  
 
 Collocated triple site direct contact  
The first opportunity for direct contact between the three teams was Model Office 2 in 
Detroit, December 1996. From India, SPB traveled to the US, joining BW and HH from 
the German team. For SPB, it was the first opportunity to meet CarCo IT counterparts and 
North American users in person. We describe his experience here in detail. Next, we pay 
attention to a second moment of triple site, collocated contact, i.e., the Sales & PA code 
taskforce that was setup in Spring 1997.  
In December 1996, AC talked extensively with SPB during his stay-over in Germany after 
Model Office 2. SPB greatly appreciated the opportunity to talk directly with users and 
CarCo IT personnel, instead of receiving information through BW and offshore liaisons. 
On-site presence in Detroit boosted his insight in CarCo requirements and expectations.  
 
“I understand a lot more after the Model Office, there is no comparison between what I 
knew then and what I know now. The data model helped us understand quite a lot 
about the business, as it was also logical. With the data model we understood a lot, 
about 70 - 75%. But the more important thing to know is what the user wants, and that 
is the most difficult and the most critical thing to understand. They do not ask so 
much: they just want a product that is like the former one, or much better. They only 
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want it to be user-friendly as they have to work with it everyday. The user wants 
something easy, he wants to be able to access certain screens in one step, at the 
most 2 steps. That is what we are going to try to develop now.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
Before the Model Office meeting, SPB and his peers worked mainly with documentation 
they received from BW. This reflected BW’s explicitated interpretation of CarCo 
requirements based on his involvement with the company since the inception of the Goldd 
project. Figure 62 illustrates the setup in a simplified format. During Act 1, system 
analysts (BW and CarCo IT staff) work on site 1 with users. Their communications result 
in knowledge of user requirements. They explicitate this understanding in documentation 
and ship that to the offshore team in site 2 for the second Act - programming. 
 
 
Figure 62 - Transfer of requirements knowledge across sites (1/ 2) 
 
This mode of knowledge transfer presented two disadvantages to the Indian team. First, it 
reflected someone else’s (BW) interpretation as each node in the link between US/ 
Germany and India added a potential bias:  
 
“After the Model Office (number 2 in Detroit, December 1996) I know what the users 
want. When the information goes from the users to JF, to HN, to BW, to us, it can get 
distorted or diluted. When one person in the link has not understood what the user 
meant, it will show in the product. Errors in understanding will be passed down the 
link.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1  
 
And secondly, the Indian team had to rely mainly on documentation. This textual 
communication mode transmits less cues than of instance instead BW telling them directly 
in person (Daft & Lewin, 1984). Documented information does have some value as a 
boundary object (Star & Griesemer, 1989). But it may not suffice for distributed work 
settings characterized by novel cross-site workflows and lack of collaborative history. 
Consequently, as far as the Goldd case is concerned, the team pulled BW and indirectly the 
CarCo teams for more information: “They wanted things in writing more than we would be 
able to deliver easily” (CarCo-A-3).  
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The combined effect of the setup depicted in Figure 62 was that the Indian teams lacked 
insight into CarCo requirements. The documented information they received was not 
enough to mentally envision what the Goldd system should look like. AC reports: 
 
“I also know why the deliveries were late: the Indians had enough information but they 
just didn't know were to start, they had no idea at all what the users wanted exactly. 
They seemed to be pretty confused about what was to be delivered.” - AC, CarCo-E-3 
 
For SPB, the Model Office was the first opportunity to ‘jump’ over the liaisons and talk 
directly with users. This enhanced his view on CarCo needs, something he could not 
achieve apparently through documented specifications from someone else. An added 
advantage was that he could share his insights back in Bangalore with the team there. 
Transfer of requirements knowledge thus remained a human-to-human process, instead of 
relying on intermediate explicitations. SPB explains: 
 
 “The Model Office helped a lot. Now we know WHY they want things in a certain way. 
I will share this information with the team and it will make us much more confident 
about what we are doing. The Model Office has helped me see the concept behind the 
screens, the business. What the users want is a usable product, it has to be user-
friendly. It is much easier to know what somebody wants when communicating person 
to person.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
Figure 63 depicts this new setup which can be contrasted with Figure 62. In Act 1, the 
programming team representative (SPB) works with users onsite in Detroit to elicit 
requirements. He then returns physically to the team in Bangalore (Act 2) and 
communicates interpersonally his expertise (early 1997).  
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Figure 63 - Transfer of requirements knowledge across sites (2/ 2) 
 
Looking back, people realized that direct contact with representatives from all the sites 
should have been done much earlier. When describing her interview with SPB in 
December 1996, AC noticed that he would have liked to participate in the first Model 
Office session, back in Spring 1996.  
 
“SPB seems to sigh, as if this would be the ideal solution. Of course, it is already too 
late to built in new business practices in the program. So I ask him if it is not too late 
already to see the users. SPB agrees that it is very late to see the users, it would 
have been better if he would have been there at the first Model Office.” - AC, CarCo-
E-1 
 
Similarly, HH recognized the importance of Indian participation in earlier requirements 
analysis and prototyping sessions. In his perception, having senior representatives from 
Bangalore would have facilitated knowledge transfer and subsequent remote collaboration. 
Rather than depending on consultants hired from outside (BW, NK, BJ), a more direct 
form of collaboration would have been feasible and probably more successful. 
 
“I would want to have a different balance of people right from the very beginning, more 
senior Indian people who would participate in the prototyping and the functional 
analysis. We went to the US for two and a half weeks to review the prototype (Model 
Office 1 in Spring 1996 - author). At that time it would have been very very helpful to 
have the Indians to be with us here (Germany - author) and in the US. ” - HH, CarCo-
A-3 
 
Site 1
Programming team
representative
Users
Communication Knowledge
Site 2
Programming team
representative
Act 1
Act 2
Communication Knowledge
Programming team
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A second instance of collocated collaboration was a taskforce that was setup for 
redesigning Sales & PA code functionality in early 1997. This part of the Goldd system 
should have been designed jointly by professionals from CarCo US and SoftHouse India. 
However, lack of interaction between these groups led to a situation where each held a 
different understanding of this piece of functionality. People did not realize their 
dependence and failed to coordinate their efforts. This disconnection surfaced rather late, 
in the stage when the US team prepared the conversion. We represent here HN’s 
perspective. 
 
“During the testing we identified that the core Sales and P&A functionality was not 
properly designed into the system. They (CarCo US and SoftHouse India) didn't talk to 
each other. They do a conversion in the States, you have a database and a database 
design. And they do a conversion from the old system in the new database. So they 
load data in, then they expected that the Indian rules on that data work the same as 
they thought it should work when they did the conversion. But they never talked to 
each other and that didn't work, especially not in that area. So when you load these 
conversion data it was right in their understanding, but the Indians had a completely 
different understanding.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Initially, people tried to resolve the issue remotely. In Germany, HN worked with 
colleagues and users, trying to understand the Sales and P&A code concept and 
requirements. As things turned out, the topic was too complex for HN to solve on his own. 
People held very diverse perceptions that appeared difficult to integrate (Dougherty, 1992; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967b). All the more given the fact that HN had to liaise in part 
remotely with users and IT staff. Eventually, people involved in the Sales and P&A code 
problem decided to form a taskforce, and meet face-to-face in Detroit. 
 
“We prepared the document here (in Germany - author), tried to come to a conclusion 
and agreement with the users. So we had about two weeks regular almost daily 
meetings. First we started with documents, I started trying to understand what they 
needed, what is Sales and P&A code at all, what do they require, what is their current 
business practice. And then I tried to specify that, document it, and communicate it. I 
had a lot of questions, and I tried to get answers to these questions by reading. But 
that didn't work out, it was always: “But we have this and this case, and this and this 
exception to the rule”. And then we decided we have to make a separate task force on 
that issue.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
HN traveled to the US and met with US IT staff and users. He also had the opportunity to 
look into the current old systems in use there. This was not possible from Cologne. From 
SoftHouse, the offshore project manager and a team leader joined the taskforce. Interactive 
face-to-face discussion clarified people’s perceptions. It helped forge an acceptable 
common understanding that was used for subsequent adjustments in the US and India. The 
US CarCo team adapted conversion procedures, and in India results from the meeting were 
incorporated in new deliveries.  
 
“So I prepared my understanding of it as much as I could, went over there (Detroit - 
author), and discussed it with users. (…)The meeting in Detroit was in May (1997 - 
author). The Indians came also to Detroit, 2 of them: SM came and VA (team leader - 
author). SM is the offshore project manager and VA the system, he is developer. I 
stayed there 10 days. (…) I looked into the current system run, how it works, 
discussed it with the Indians, which was when we agreed on the final concept, which 
has been implemented just now. (…) So they have to redo the conversion, do some 
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rework on the conversion. And the Indians have to do something as well. Both have to 
adjust to a common concept which is now in place for that area. (…) We expect next 
week the first delivery based on that discussion.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
 Remote triple site direct contact 
When BJ started as the new onshore liaison, he recognized the value of direct contact 
amongst representatives from the three sites. This meant a considerable departure from the 
initial communications setup. Instead of arranging communications as a chain from the US 
via Germany towards India, BJ promoted a triangular setup. (Compare Figure 52, Figure 
53, and Figure 54 with Figure 55). BJ thus overruled the first concept from HH and 
SoftHouse.  
 
From a technical point of view, only audio conferencing proved feasible. 
Videoconferencing facilities were available between the CarCo US and Germany units, but 
not with India. In February and March 1997, a number of triple site conference calls were 
setup. At that time, MD had arrived in Germany. She joined the meeting there, as did JF 
from Detroit (AC log March 1997). Afterwards, MD praised the added value of triple site 
conference calls. To her, it meant direct contact with Goldd IT staff from remote sites. This 
clarified CarCo expectations, and facilitated work for the offshore team. Direct contact 
boosts information flows towards that team, and encourages interactions to clarify these 
(see also flow 1a and 1b in Table 39).  
 
“One of our achievements is the three-continent-conversations. A lot of things have 
been clarified that way. Direct communication with the customer is required to know 
what they want.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
Direct homogeneous contacts across sites  
A fourth modification was direct contact between professionals from different sites, 
working on similar areas. The original Goldd organization setup relied on linking pins 
between sites. Only on a major task and milestone level did sites coordinate their work. 
The assumption was that local teams had their own share of the project, and could work 
fairly independent from the other Goldd sites. This applied in particular for the relationship 
between CarCo and SoftHouse.  
According to the project leader, minimal dependence existed between the firms, as if there 
were an almost classical transaction (Macneil, 1978). His earlier quoted metaphor of the 
air-conditioning supplier and car manufacturer illustrates this perception. Similarly, one 
senior project members of the German CarCo team asserts that local tasks have little 
impact on work accomplished at other sites. This assumed limited dependence warrants 
minimal cross-site contact on a detailed level. Like for India and US, HN mentions: 
 
“Nobody in India is interested in work in the States on a detailed level as long as their 
work is not impacted. Then they have nothing to do with it on a very detailed level.” - 
HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Direct cooperation between India and Germany also relies almost exclusively on liaisons: 
“Cooperation between India and Germany is just via the channel” (CarCo-B-3). And for 
the US and Germany sites, HN indicates: “(…) Direct, detailed cooperation between US 
and Germany is not necessary. For instance on the setup we did it. For that I went over 
there to work on a detailed level” (CarCo-B-3). Many times, people switched to face-to-
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face meetings with site representatives to resolve issues that have an impact on other 
locations. These are exceptions to regular collaboration that took mostly place on a 
milestone level, and relied on remote exchanges.  
 
 Direct contact US - India 
Over the first months of 1997, direct contact between the US and India became more than 
an exception. In the wake of BW’s departure, people realized that CarCo standards had not 
been communicated to the offshore team. Also, lack of coordination between the US and 
India resulted in problems with data loading and the conversion process. (Goldd was to be 
implemented first in the US.) Given the time pressure on the project, this led to more direct 
communications between these groups and reduced the coordinating role of the German 
site.  
 
HN explains that direct US - India collaboration concerned CarCo standards, and became 
especially relevant for resolving data loading issues.  
 
“Let's say for certain technical issues like the tool we are going to use there is direct 
communication on a detailed level. What are the [CarCo] standards, what are the 
[CarCo] guidelines, then there is technical advice (from CarCo to SoftHouse - author). 
For this we should or sometimes do communicate directly. And that has improved over 
the recent weeks or months. There is some direct communication going on between 
India and some [CarCo] experts in the States. For instance on the database design, 
physical standards, or setup. There is some direct contact going on on specific issues, 
if certain things are technical issues. Another example would be between India and 
[CarCo] US on the data conversion. They do the data conversion, they load the data 
onto the server in the States and send it to India and then they all of a sudden they 
can’t load it in India. They can't start testing the data. And then they (SoftHouse India 
- author) feedback directly to them (CarCo US - author) which issues they identify 
when they try to load the data, and then they (CarCo US - author) say: “OK the data is 
wrong or the index, or the database format is wrong”.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Direct contact had its advantages. Going through the onshore CarCo group and SoftHouse 
liaison means an additional layer of people who have to understand an issue, and must 
relay that to the next party in the chain. In an interview in April 1997, HN identifies both 
the regular communication patterns (with linking pins), and the case for direct 
communications between US and India.  
 
“First we have an interface between onshore and offshore: SM (offshore project 
manager - author) and BJ (onshore liaison - author). Also MD (onshore liaison-
author), she handles the technical things, BJ the business side. Second, we have an 
interface between here and the US: HH and MD with JF in the US. At this moment CS 
also has direct contact with India for data load issues, that is easier and better.” - HN, 
CarCo-B-2 
 
The quote suggests that direct contact is ‘easier and better’ at times. Skipping liaisons 
speeds up collaboration between experts working on similar issues, like here the database 
design. In the next subsection, we elaborate on HN’s suggestions to base a distributed 
project organization on direct communications instead of Goldd’s indirect contact.  
 
 Direct homogeneous contacts across sites as an alternative design strategy 
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A key reason for using liaisons was to avoid confusion in the Goldd project, in particular 
concerning the CarCo - SoftHouse interface. The project presented contributors with a 
number of ‘first’: first time outsourcing, first time offshore collaboration, first time client/ 
server technology and so on. This meant that people had little common experience and 
understanding to leverage upon. They lacked standards and similarity in their ways of 
working. On top of that, the project itself was so new to them that it lacked ex ante 
structure. People held unrealistic expectations and hardly defined the project in advance 
(CarCo-B-3, CarCo-G-1).  
 
This increased the likelihood of confusion, and motivated a ‘sealing’ strategy. CarCo and 
SoftHouse operated as two independent entities, exclusively linked through liaisons. 
Communications between these entities had to go through gatekeepers, both ways: 
 
“I check data from US, double check if the information is in line with what is agreed, 
check it with what we think is common understanding. It has occurred that somebody 
sent a file that was not in line, that created confusion. So all documents that are sent 
(from the US - author) are checked in Cologne. Or they are sent to India and .cc to the 
rest, just to make sure.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
“Infrastructure was not the trigger for having no direct communications. It was to avoid 
that nobody knew what the status of a document was. Therefore BW was there, to 
avoid confusion at both sides. He had to make sure that the right documents were 
sent with the right version and that questions were answered. (…) An example of a 
standard process is that every document must go through the onshore manager.” - 
MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
This channeling did not adequately address the confusion problem. It did not solve the lack 
of structure on a site and meta-site level, but merely added an administrative layer. A more 
fundamental issue was the fact that people did not define and divide work in a clear 
manner, and connect back to their remote counterparts. They also did not establish rapport 
across the CarCo - SoftHouse organizational boundary. From HN’s angle, task uncertainty 
and time pressure led to a rushed approach that lacked attention for processes and details. 
Absence of a priori project definition and relationship building limited transparency of 
local work accomplishments to counterpart sites. A case in point are some of HH’s 
remarks that show his lack of insight in SoftHouse operations: 
 
“I have never been involved in selecting any of the team, or managing the team, even 
knowing the names. Basically I didn't care too much. The question is should I have 
cared more than I did? I don't know. (…) If I know more than what is the value added 
of knowing that. And if I know less, how much more can I concentrate on value added 
things? I don't know, I can't say that. (…) What they (SoftHouse - author) use (for 
planning - author) I don't know, they present me with a Microsoft project work plan 
every once in a while, but whether they have any other tools, I don't know.” - HH, 
CarCo-A-3 
 
The lack of structure, transparency and relationships complicated direct connections. It 
made seem indirect collaboration attractive since no one would have to deal with the 
unknown. In turn, the liaised contact did not encourage people to deal with the lack of 
structure and connectivity. They seemed all right within their own context, somehow 
hoping that things would fall in place. One aspect of this was the lack of specialization. 
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Locally and remotely, it was often not clear who was responsible for which area of Goldd. 
This made direct remote contact more difficult, and therefore less likely.  
 
“[Something] which I would change is that you do the prototyping more on an area 
basis. You need to have some experts on every side (German and Indian site - 
author), also in India specialized in certain business areas. You can’t expect that 
everyone is the expert in every piece of the system. You have to break that somehow 
down into functional areas and assign people to these areas. So he is the expert for 
Sales and P&A code, he is the expert for database design, he is the expert for 
Marketing & Advertising, he is the expert for Workflow & Security, and so on.  
That did not happen. It was full scale, full functionality, everyone doing a little bit 
everywhere. No clear focus. There was not enough time to focus in each of these 
areas. So you connect on a very general broad basis some requirements, but you 
don’t have the time to really specify, or come to the details, analyze in detail what is 
needed.” - HN, CarCo-B-3
66
  
 
As a follow-up to this concern, HN elaborated on an alternative setup that would resolve 
the issues mentioned above, and in fact reduce the need for liaisons. Along these lines, HN 
would prefer local specialization combined with remote homogeneous connectivity. People 
would focus clearly on a task area, process or subsystem like those mentioned in Figure 59. 
As the next step, they would tie back to their counterparts, resulting in multiple expert-to-
expert connections across sites (Figure 64) 
 
 
Figure 64 - Connecting contexts with varied activities: direct contact 
 
According to HN, direct contact becomes possible when combined with specialization and 
homogeneous cross-site connections. He points at a sequential process setup that would be 
more effective than the one adopted in Goldd. It would rely on face-to-face meetings of 
                                                 
66 The situation described here could relate to the informal operation mode of SoftHouse 
India as elaborated in a later section on cross-cultural differences. Indians seem to 
advocate role specialization and task assignment that are less strict than Germans prefer.  
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area representatives from different sites, following a phase of intense local preparation. 
After the collocated meeting, people would walk away with a understanding of a particular 
area and work package. They could elaborate that in a minimally coupled manner.  
 
“There should be direct contact between the experts from different sites. When you go 
for that approach and say: “OK we look just at the Sales and P&A, we just look into 
workflow today,” then all the people involved in that should come together in one 
place from week to week, prepare the design for that area and then you go through it 
with the users, with the programmer, with the business analyst. And then you design it 
and that's on paper, then they split apart and do their job. And then the programmer 
and the business analyst have contact on this area. That would be more effective.” - 
HN, CarCo-B-3  
 
Alternatively, specialists in each area could work in parallel. They would connect with 
their remote counterparts, so that multiple distributed expert communities can elaborate on 
their work area. However, as HN was quick to point out, this would require similar variety 
across sites (Ashby, 1968). That is, each site would need a portfolio of people specializing 
in different areas: 
 
“Or you could be doing several models in parallel: one working on Marketing 
Advertising, one on Workflow, one on Sales and P&A, and then work out a plan which 
allows them to do that in parallel. But that needs more people on our side as well. 
Because you need one expert for each of these areas, but there are certainly ways to 
organize that if you want that.” - HN, CarCo-B-3  
 
Compared to the Goldd setup, this would change the role and organization of the CarCo 
sites, both in the US and Germany. CarCo would have to take on a more active role instead 
of depending on SoftHouse team members from India coming onshore in Germany and 
perhaps the US. They would, however, build more intra-organizational competence that 
would be relevant for other projects and Goldd support.  
 
CarCo representatives to Indian site  
A final proposal emphasizes CarCo’s involvement with SoftHouse. Their onshore 
personnel could work in more or less temporary positions with the offshore team, and tie 
back to the US and European CarCo organization. This approach was also mentioned in 
Meadows’ (1996: 109) research as the following quotes suggest: 
 
 “Having on-site designers transfer to off-site is enormously helpful” (Manager, 
Finance Co. #1; Manager, Finance Co. #3) 
 “Major lessons learned: get the on-site coordinator over here early on to train our off-
site project members in functionality” (Manager, Finance Co. #2 Project) 
 “What really helps with a shared way of talking and doing things is having on-site 
people come back off-site” (Manager, Computer Co. #3 Project) 
 
In the Goldd project, some interviewees mentioned this option. They indicated that 
knowledge transfer from CarCo to SoftHouse did not have to rely on SoftHouse liaisons 
and representatives coming over to CarCo. Instead, key CarCo people could visit the 
offshore team and update them on the client’s expectations and requirements:  
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“How about business knowledge transfer. We assumed that it could be done by 2 
managers. Maybe it can be improved by sending a [CarCo] manager instead or in 
parallel with the offshore manager, to provide a general vision of the system in 1 or 2 
weeks.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
CarCo staff could bring their context to Bangalore and take care of the offshore - onshore 
linkage. This could make sense as far as knowledge transfer and supervision of work 
accomplishment in India is concerned. However, according to HN, it would conflict with 
the SoftHouse local hierarchy in India. CarCo representatives there would have no formal 
saying in local processes. To do otherwise would undermine the lateral contract situation. 
 
“Maybe offshore/ onshore managers of [CarCo] would be better. But they (SoftHouse - 
author) would not accept that in this situation.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
Conclusion: Comparing the Strategies 
This section discussed changes and alternatives to the initial setup of the Goldd project. 
We elaborated on five strategies as shown in the left column of Table 43. These can be 
compared in several ways. First of all, the involvement of CarCo and SoftHouse in the 
organizational setup. Early on, CarCo focused mainly on its own operations, with little 
attention for SoftHouse management and teams. SoftHouse invested in visits and onshore 
liaisons to tie their Bangalore team to the client organization. Gradually this setup was 
adjusted.  
 
The first strategy as shown in Table 43 reinforced SoftHouse’s involvement with CarCo. 
BW was replaced by a person with stronger project management and communication 
skills, BJ. In addition, MD or SPB assisted BJ onshore with technical details. The second 
proposal - SoftHouse liaison to US - further extends the notion that SoftHouse must 
connect closely with their own personnel to CarCo contexts. The balance shifts to a more 
equal distribution of involvement with the third strategy. Representatives from the 
different sites collaborate - face-to-face to remotely - as peers in a single global project 
environment. In the same vein, the fourth proposal reinforces direct collaboration across 
sites along lines of specialization. The final strategy shifts the responsibility for the CarCo 
- SoftHouse interface to the former. CarCo would handle inter-organizational 
communication links and enable the offshore team. From a governance point of view, this 
strategy could conflict with SoftHouse’s autonomy. It could imply that CarCo determines 
to some extent SoftHouse operations which is not common in a lateral, contractual 
relationship (Bradach, 1997). In practice, CarCo was very hesitant to get involved with 
SoftHouse India. They rather preferred to rely on liaisons. Later in the project, they moved 
towards a more equally divided responsibility for cross-site collaborative processes.  
 454
Table 43 - Organizing for distributed collaboration: changes & alternatives (1/ 2) 
 
Relative involvement CarCo and SoftHouse  
Changes and alternatives: SoftHouse liaisons 
to CarCo sites 
Direct 
homogeneous 
contact 
CarCo liaisons to 
SoftHouse site 
1. Reinforced on-shore 
liaising in Germany 
 
BJ and SPB/ MD 
onshore 
  
2. SoftHouse liaison in US 
 
Extended 
SoftHouse 
involvement 
  
3. Triple site direct 
synchronous contact: 
collocated and remote 
 Equivalent 
collaborative 
involvement 
 
4. Direct homogeneous 
contacts across sites 
 Similarity of local 
expert variety 
 
 
5. CarCo representatives to 
Indian site 
  CarCo involvement 
with offshore team 
and on-/ offshore 
liaising 
 
A second framing of the strategies is reflected in Table 44 (comparable in setup with Table 
28). This matrix combines two dimensions. First, in the column, direct versus indirect 
collaboration from an organizational perspective. Direct contact means that people connect 
to counterparts without having to go through liaisons. Liaised contact implies the opposite: 
reliance on a middle man for communications with someone from another site. Second, the 
rows demarcate collocated interactions versus remote ones. The latter depend on electronic 
media.  
The rows are divided in transparent and light gray cells. The transparent ones show the 
original setup of collaborative relationships in the Goldd project. With reference to cell A, 
CarCo Germany and the SoftHouse onshore liaison (BW) communicated mostly in a 
collocated setting in Cologne, without interference of others. In the same cell, one can 
group local collaborative relationship for CarCo US and Germany, and SoftHouse.  
Since most local communications are direct, cell B does not contain a relationship.  
Cell C refers to remote communications between two or more persons without liaisons 
involved. This applied to the US team that communicated sometimes directly with BW, 
depicted with (1). It also includes interactions between the German and American CarCo 
groups, in particular between JF, HH, and HN. A final relationship in this cell concerns the 
onshore liaison and offshore SoftHouse personnel.  
Cell D encompasses liaised contacts across sites. This applies to the CarCo US team when 
they did not work directly with BW but through HH or HN in Cologne, see (2). CarCo US 
and Germany connected to the SoftHouse offshore teams through a liaison.  
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Table 44 - Organizing for distributed collaboration: changes & alternatives (2/ 2) 
 
 Direct contact Liaised contact 
A. Initial setup: 
 CarCo Germany - SoftHouse 
onshore liaison Germany 
 CarCo Germany local team 
 CarCo US local team 
 SoftHouse India local team 
B. (N.A.) Face-to-face, 
collocated 
collaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Changes & alternatives: 
1. Reinforced on-shore liaising in 
Germany: connect to local team 
2. SoftHouse liaison in US: connect to 
local team 
3. Triple site direct synchronous 
contact: collocated  
4. CarCo & SoftHouse direct 
homogeneous contacts across sites: 
collocated  
5. CarCo representatives to Indian site: 
connect to local team 
B. (N.A.) 
C. Initial setup: 
 CarCo US - SoftHouse onshore 
liaison Germany (1) 
 CarCo Germany - CarCo US 
 Onshore liaison Germany - 
SoftHouse offshore India 
D. Initial setup: 
 CarCo US - onshore liaison 
Germany (2) 
 CarCo US and Germany - 
offshore India 
Remote, 
electronically 
mediated 
collaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Changes & alternatives: 
1. Reinforced on-shore liaising in 
Germany: connect to offshore team 
2. SoftHouse liaison in US: connect to 
offshore team 
3. Triple site direct synchronous 
contact: remote 
4. CarCo & SoftHouse direct 
homogeneous contacts across sites: 
remote 
5. CarCo representatives to Indian site: 
connect to onshore groups 
D. Changes & alternatives: 
1. Reinforced on-shore liaising in 
Germany: CarCo US and Germany - 
offshore India 
2. SoftHouse liaison in US: CarCo US - 
offshore India 
5. CarCo representatives to Indian site: 
offshore India - CarCo US and 
Germany  
 
The gray cells contain the changes and alternatives. The first strategy indicates 
strengthening of the onshore liaison role in Cologne. This leads to stronger onshore 
collaboration with the German CarCo team (cell A). It promotes interaction between the 
onshore liaisons and the offshore teams (cell B). And it helps coordination between the 
offshore team and the American and German CarCo teams (cell D).  
The second strategy is a suggestion to station an onshore liaison in Detroit too. This person 
would connect directly to the local US group (cell A) and the offshore team (cell C). 
Indirectly, he would facilitate collaboration between the US and the offshore team (cell D).  
Strategies 3 and 4 promote direct contact in the form of local meetings (cell A), and remote 
exchanges (cell C).  
The fifth strategy posts a CarCo liaison in India, working locally with the offshore team 
(cell A). This person would tie back directly to CarCo personnel in Germany and the US 
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(cell C), and accomplish integration between the offshore team and CarCo US and 
Germany (cell D).  
 
On a meta level, two main strategy patterns can be distinguished. First, the extensive 
(proposed) use of liaisons. Strategies 1 and 2 suggest a stronger role for SoftHouse in 
Germany and the US. The fifth strategy also relies on liaising, but this time with a central 
role for CarCo to assist SoftHouse offshore personnel. The use of liaisons represents a 
complex organization form. It means that the liaison works locally with a group (cell A), 
and remotely with his base team (cell C). This way, he connects the two units indirectly 
(cell D).  
 
A second strategy pattern concerns direct contact, both locally and remote (strategies 3 and 
4). It meant an extension of the original communications setup, especially in the sense of 
inter-organizational contact. Formerly, direct contact was reserved for the local teams at 
the various sites, and only in Germany between the client and vendor. Direct contact seems 
much simpler than the liaison approach in that at least one party less is involved. This 
limited complexity can be traced in Table 44. Strategies 3 and 4 impact only one cell (A or 
B) if the local or remote versions are considered separately.  
 
Overall, liaised contact modes remained a preferred approach in the Goldd project, 
deserving reinforcement (strategy 1), extension to the US (strategy 2), and a possible role 
for CarCo vis-à-vis the offshore team (strategy 5). On top of that, direct contact introduced 
a new approach as far as the interface between the two companies is involved (strategies 3 
and 4). Drivers behind this adaptation include time pressure, dependencies between CarCo 
and SoftHouse teams, and the complexity of issues relevant to these teams. 
Underestimation of the latter two factors may have contributed to the delayed introduction 
of direct contact modes between CarCo and SoftHouse. 
 
§ 10.3.5  Development Methodology 
For the Goldd project, CarCo adopted a prototyping or Rapid Application Development 
(RAD) methodology. This approach utilizes multiple meetings between users and IT 
development staff to gradually understand, build and improve a new system (Beynon-
Davies et al., 1999). In the RAD development process, visualizing and development tools 
play a central role (Karsten et al., 1999). Compared to the traditional waterfall 
methodology, less emphasis is placed on documented specifications. Coordination 
processes between users and IT, and amongst IT development rely more on interpersonal 
exchanges than documentation (Van de Ven et al., 1976).  
 
In the case of Goldd, interviewees mentioned various reasons for choosing a RAD instead 
of waterfall methodology. HH explains that users could not imagine what Goldd would 
look like if they had only written specifications. Consequently, they would not put their 
signature under such a document. This necessitated in a sense the use of a prototyping 
approach: 
 
“The problem starts with our users. They would not, and I found that many times, read 
a specification and put their signature under it. Because they wouldn’t understand it. 
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They have not the grasp that requires them to imagine something that’s on paper and 
how it would work. So you’re almost bound to have a prototype, and then collect the 
comments, and go ahead with that.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
HN was one of the key persons from CarCo working on the first prototype of Goldd in 
Spring 1996. In his view, prototyping has become a tradition at CarCo mostly to facilitate 
interaction with users. With RAD tools, IT development staff can visualize and 
demonstrate the system-in-the-making. Users can interact with the quasi-system and assess 
whether it matches their needs. Capturing that process in written specifications seems far 
more cumbersome: 
 
“We use RAD because it is more or less a tradition at [CarCo]. With writing 
specifications, inquiries are made and then programmed, but the specifications will not 
be in line with what has been programmed. RAD implies avoiding the mess of 
specifications. I think it is a more effective development approach. (…) The 
prototyping exercise was correct. Specification writing would not have been the right 
approach. Draft screens and such are easier for communication with the user.” - HN, 
CarCo-B-1 
 
RAD methodologies make the interaction process between users and IT smoother. This 
applies not only during the initial stage that is aimed at getting a first draft of the system. 
RAD tools facilitate also subsequent modifications to the prototype, almost real-time 
during feedback sessions:  
 
“The question is whether you can do it by specifications. I don't think you can do it by 
specifications, it would be very hard. If you try to setup a specification, try to agree 
and communicate that specification to everyone, that's almost impossible. I mean you 
need to do that onsite (during RAD sessions - author), explain it, put some pictures, 
explain it. The disadvantage of specifications is that you do it on a paper base. When 
you do it in a prototype approach you can be sure that it is directly somehow 
implemented, you see the result much more quicker.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
For Goldd, the development process was punctuated by three feedback sessions: Model 
Office 1, 2, and 3. The prototype for the first session was developed by a CarCo in-house 
IT team and presented in Detroit in Spring 1996. At that time, CarCo and SoftHouse were 
working on a contract to outsource programming and some development work. From the 
vendor, people were not operationally involved in the requirements analysis process that 
culminated in the first prototype. Nor did they participate in Model Office 1. Once the 
contract was settled, the offshore team received the prototype and data model. It was 
expected that these resources help them understand CarCo business requirements. The 
offshore team would have to develop the real Goldd system by the end of 1996 for Model 
Office 2. Feedback from that session would be incorporated over the first months of 1997, 
so that the next version of the system would be presented during the final Model Office 3. 
From there the system would be readied for launch in North America in summer 1997. HN 
explains this setup: 
 
“It was a prototype approach and the assumption was that doing these Model Offices 
would be sufficient for the Indians to do the knowledge transfer from the user side, 
from the business requirements to the programmers in India. That was the 
assumption. Based on that we did a prototype on a PC (…) that was presented to the 
users. First of all just as a demo version, then later on we went ahead to watch their 
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feedback and reaction to that. That was the kind of development approach which was 
chosen to do it. In that sense it was planned that we have two Model Office sessions, 
we do the first prototype on the PC, then we go ahead with two Model Office sessions 
and then we receive the final product and test it and evaluate it and improve it and 
launch it.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
In MB’s mind, the Model Office sessions offered the opportunity to connect the various 
stakeholders in Goldd: users, and development and programming staff. During the 
meetings, the system would be presented, commented, and possibly modified to please 
users.  
 
“We would always have a Model Office because you never have users, system 
coordinator and development at the same site. You need a mechanic like MO to log 
comments, and to present the prototype. It is important to get feedback from the users 
about the requirements. And in this case we had a second and third approach.” - MB, 
CarCo-C-3 
 
§ 10.3.5.1  Model Office 1 
The first Model Office session with the PC-based prototype was successful from a user 
point of view. They liked the GUI and could try out the system as if it were a real system. 
Compared to the 1970s systems they had been using so far, the mock-up meant a major 
leap forward:  
 
“The first Model Office with the prototype was a major change for the business 
partners because they had a very different system before. Before the Model Office 
they had a hard time visualizing” - JF, CarCo-D-1 
 
From an IT point of view, the prototype was little more than a minimal demo version. It 
did not have any processing behind the screens. Nor was it the product of solid 
requirements analysis. Its key role was to show users a concept that they could comment 
on. At some later point, detailed requirements studies would be needed to structure the 
system itself.  
 
“I mean that was never a real prototype what we did. It was more or less a 
presentation where people are allowed to comment, but it was not a systematic 
approach to build the functionality of the system. They (users - author) viewed some 
screens and said: “OK can we have a button there that does this and that?” And: “Can 
we have a field there which that should look this way?” But there was never a real 
analysis of the business processes behind that and how these processes were 
interlinked.” - HN, CarCo-B-3. 
 
Looking back, the project leader made another observation on Model Office 1. He realized 
that offshore representatives did not participate in the preceding development process or 
the session itself. This would have built their understanding of CarCo expectations, and 
reduce the need for ex post transfer of knowledge from onshore to offshore.  
 
“We went to the US for two and a half weeks to review the prototype (Model Office 1 
in Spring 1996 - author). At that time it would have been very very helpful to have the 
Indians to be with us here (Germany - author) and in the US.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
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Indians themselves agree with this point. In a reflection on her interview with SPB, AC 
comments that “SPB agrees that it is very late to see the users, it would have been better if 
he had been there at the first Model Office” (CarCo-E-1). If he had a chance to redo the 
project, HH would have changed this aspect of the Model Office 1 phase. He would have 
liked senior members from the vendor’s offshore operations to join in the analysis phase 
and feedback meeting.  
 
“I would want to have a different balance of people right from the very beginning, more 
senior Indian people who would participate in the prototyping and the functional 
analysis.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
These people could have functioned as the ears and eyes of the offshore team, and update 
them upon returning. This would have reduced the pressure on the onshore liaison, BW. 
 
§ 10.3.5.2  Remote Knowledge Transfer and Collaboration 
 
“Due to RAD there is no formal documentation.” - SPB, CarCo-E-2 
 
After Model Office 1, the weight of the Goldd project shifted from CarCo to SoftHouse. 
The offshore team received the prototype and data model and were responsible for 
completing Goldd before December 1996. In between, CarCo expected them to make 
regular deliveries. The offshore team was linked to the customer through an onshore and 
(for a brief time) an offshore liaison, BW and NK. They needed that link to gain more 
understanding of the CarCo context than the abovementioned resources could offer. Also, 
intermediate change requests could be relayed to the team. As work started in Bangalore, 
the liaison link did not work as intended. With NK leaving the project, BW’s role became 
even more pivotal than it had been. He had to collaborate closely with the offshore team to 
meet their information needs, yet he hardly knew these people. A related problem was that 
information flows from CarCo users or IT to the offshore team went over many links. This 
caused delays and increased the risk of misunderstanding. Afterwards, SPB recognized this 
problem: 
 
“When the information goes from the users to JF, to HN, to BW, to us, it can get 
distorted or diluted. When one person in the link has not understood what the user 
meant, it will show in the product. Errors in understanding will be passed down the 
link.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1  
 
In fact, the offshore team had to work mainly from the prototype and data model as 
submitted by CarCo. The importance of these resources is stressed by MD and SPB:  
 
“The prototype a standard between India and CarCo. It was a standard we followed, 
and everything else was built according to the prototype.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
“The data model helped us understand quite a lot about the business, as it was also 
logical. With the data model we understood a lot, about 70 - 75%.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
The value attached to the prototype did not match its quality and depth. As HN mentioned, 
it was only intended as a minimal visual demo system for users during Model Office 1. 
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The ‘system’ lacked a solid foundation in business process analysis and modeling. What 
happened was that the technically competent offshore team lacked business insight. All 
they could do was trying to develop a reasonable system based on the resources available 
to them. The first results - delivered in September 1996 - did not please CarCo. It was late 
and merely an enhancement of the PC-based demo as HN reports: 
 
“They (offshore team - author) made an approach which was quite on the software of 
the system. I mean it was more a presentation prototype than a functional prototype. 
The emphasis was always: “Do we have all the screens, do they look nice and do we 
see information on it?” But that is not a system. So the real back-end of it, the 
functions and the business rules which are run behind the surface were not evaluated 
or analyzed in detail enough in order to make the system launchable in the 
production.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
In fact, the offshore team was not in the position to gain a solid grasp of requirements. The 
preparatory phase - Spring 1996 - did not help them enough. On the one hand, efforts of 
BW and NK during that period did not materialize as NK had left the project. HN’s own 
work as delivered through the prototype was not intended to fully equip the vendor team. 
The offshore group also did not receive strong support from BW during the Summer and 
Fall 1996. What they needed was an area-based, detailed analysis of CarCo requirements. 
This would fill in their gaps of business knowledge, and it would complement the work 
accomplished so far. Such specialized analysis did not happen. The offshore group worked 
in parallel on various aspects of the Goldd system. Their approach was somewhat 
unstructured and mainly based on local oral processes (see later section on cross-cultural 
topics). All this complicated coordination with the onshore liaison and the customer. Upon 
reflection, HN would have preferred a different setup. He emphasized the need for experts 
on both sides, carefully elaborating pieces of the Goldd system.  
 
“[Something] which I would change is that you do the prototyping more on an area 
basis. You need to have some experts on every side (German and Indian site - 
author), also in India specialized in certain business areas. You can’t expect that 
everyone is the expert in every piece of the system. You have to break that somehow 
down into functional areas and assign people to these areas. So he is the expert for 
Sales and P&A code, he is the expert for database design, he is the expert for 
Marketing & Advertising, he is the expert for Workflow & Security, and so on. That did 
not happen. It was full scale, full functionality, everyone doing a little bit everywhere. 
No clear focus. There was not enough time to focus in each of these areas. So you 
connect on a very general broad basis some requirements, but you don’t have the 
time to really specify, or come to the details, analyze in detail what is needed.” - HN, 
CarCo-B-3 
 
Adding to these operational concerns were more fundamental factors that made successful 
development hardly possible. From the side of CarCo, the complexity of the system was 
underestimated (CarCo-B-3). This led to unrealistic expectations of key project variables 
like scope, processes, and inputs. Management pushed for quick results that appeared 
unfeasible to attain.  
  
“At the end the argument was always we want to quickly launch something. Quality is 
second priority. But at the end you see how long it takes. You end up with a lot of 
embarrassment, and conflicts which don't help. You must start doing it well from the 
very beginning, to say: “OK this is what it takes”. You must have a realistic evaluation 
of the complexity.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
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Outsourcing in such a situation affects the vendor too. In their eagerness to win the Goldd 
contract, SoftHouse agreed with fixed budget and timing while the development work was 
incompletely specified. Along the way, this fueled discussions on parties’ intentions, 
expectations and interpretations: 
 
“The fixed price and given time without specifying functionality caused aggravation 
throughout the team. If any idea was raised the answer would be: “This was not in the 
bid document, this was not included in the price”. I am not opposed to fixed price as 
such, but fixed price in phases. I.e. fixed price for the prototype, fixed price for the 
reviewing the prototype, etc.… Fixed price over the whole project gives no room for 
prototyping. There was endless fighting about what was in the bid, sometimes based 
on either misunderstandings (you can interpret a document in 100 ways) or wordings. 
With the prototype approach, there were endless discussions. Fixed price and 
prototyping is a contradiction in itself. The bid document was unrealistic with the 
whole process” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
§ 10.3.5.3  Model Office 2: Co-presence of Key Stakeholders 
The second Model Office in Detroit, December 1996 presented the system developed over 
the preceding Fall. Despite considerable difficulties, users could try out a version that had 
made considerable progress since the PC-based prototype as HN explains: 
 
“Second Model Office was more orientated on Sales and P&A code. I didn't attend it. It 
was more in depth. During the first Model Office they (users - author) have seen the 
prototype on the PC. That was just really a prototype, just an idea, a conceptual 
approach. Then they have seen the first product in December (...). We focused on the 
core functionality: how do you setup a location, how do you set up a dealer, how do 
you assign Sales and P&A codes. This core system was presented in December.” - 
HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
One disadvantage of the session was that the IT group could not implement changes real-
time. This would have compressed subsequent feedback loops. Absence of this capability 
meant that the change requests had to be passed on the offshore team for incorporation in 
the next version of the system: “During the Model Office a real prototyping tool would 
have worked better if we could have made changes immediately and showed them” (JF, 
CarCo-D-1).  
 
For the offshore vendor team, Model Office 2 made all the difference. Even though it was 
rather late, they had for the first time access to users in the US and CarCo personnel 
contributing to the Goldd project. SPB joined the session as representative. For the first 
time, he was not depended on the remote liaison link with BW. The opportunity deepened 
his insights in user expectations: 
 
“After the Model Office I know what the users want. (…) The Model Office helped a lot. 
Now we know WHY they want things in a certain way. I will share this information with 
the team and it will make us much more confident about what we are doing. The 
Model Office has helped me see the concept behind the screens, the business. What 
the users want is a usable product, it has to be user-friendly. It is much easier to know 
what somebody wants when communicating person to person.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
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§ 10.3.5.4  Final Stage and Reflections 
 
“What I’m saying is that the match of prototype and offshore - I’m doubting that from 
where I am now.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Over Spring 1997, it became clear that the development process would be further delayed. 
Design of the Sales and P&A code functionality needed more elaborate requirements 
analysis. In addition, the American and Indian teams had failed to coordinate standards for 
the database design. This postponed data loading and conversion in the US that was 
required for the launch there.  
 
Reflecting on the project, one can observe that the Goldd teams used RAD in a different 
way than commonly proposed. We use Figure 65 to explore these differences, and some of 
the issues that emerged. The light gray areas have been modified from the figure in the 
theory section to highlight specifics pertaining to the Goldd case.  
 
 
Figure 65 - RAD in the Goldd project 
 
A first distinction is that the team involved in the prototype for Model Office 1 was not the 
programming team. The former group included CarCo IT staff members like HH and HN. 
The latter was an offshore vendor team. The task of elaborating the initial design and 
programming Goldd was outsourced to that team.  
Second, the assignment of this task to another team implied a division of work that created 
interdependencies. The original agency relationship between CarCo users and their own 
M&SS group became more complicated. In fact, the latter group initiated an additional 
agency relationship with SoftHouse (Figure 66). As a result, the offshore group became 
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very dependent upon the initial CarCo team - and of course the users as main principal - 
for requirements know-how.  
 
 
Figure 66 - Double agency relationship in the Goldd project 
 
Third, Goldd’s organizational setup did not reflect these information processing needs. 
Parties underestimated or ignored the fact that BW as onshore liaison could not cater on his 
own for the needs of the Bangalore team.  
Fourth, RAD trajectories rely on a number of cross-functional meetings like the Model 
Office sessions. In the case of Goldd, only two sessions were held. Model Office 3 
(abbreviated as MO 3) was skipped. HN did not consider that enough for a prototyping 
approach. He argues that more cycles were needed, and more direct communications 
between CarCo users/ IT and the offshore team. This did not happen, in part because of 
budgetary reasons. In his mind, contact between the onshore and offshore groups must be 
more frequent, direct and specialized. People on both sides would have to focus on a 
specific areas and tie back to their remote counterparts.  
 
“I would want prototyping, more cycles. It was wrong to have two cycles that's far too 
less. More prototyping on specific areas, not on the broad scale. Prototyping on a 
distance could work. But it implies that you do some more prototyping cycles, more 
than we did, not just three. And it needs some more traveling, more direct 
communication. You need traveling, and you need budget for that and that was not 
given.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
HN would have also preferred more extensive contact between the offshore team and users 
in an early stage. As things turned out, the SoftHouse team was involved in the Goldd 
project after the first Model Office. They met users in December 1996.  
 
“I would have liked more prototyping cycles, and more focus on in time (timing - 
author). The key issue that they (SoftHouse - author) missed was timing. We need 
more cycles and more work with the users before launch, now we will have to face 
issues in the production environment.” - HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
What HN suggests is an organization setup that matches information needs from the 
second agent, the offshore team. The actual collaboration patterns were shaped according 
to agency relationships (in part formalized like the contract between CarCo M&SS and 
SoftHouse). One can compare Figure 66 and Figure 52 to this end. This made sense from a 
governance point of view. Perhaps working with liaisons seemed convenient too. It 
avoided remote contact for the CarCo teams with a different partner. Only in a later stage 
did people realize the ineffectiveness of a setup that served none of the parties involved 
very well. The moved to a more direct contact mode that catered for parties knowledge 
needs and work flows (Table 39). 
First Agency 
Relationship
Principal
CarCo users
Agent
CarCo M&SS
Second Agency 
Relationship
Principal
CarCo M&SS
Agent
SoftHouse
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When looking back, HH and HN remained convinced that the initial setup could have 
worked. The chained contact between the onshore and offshore team could have relied on 
BW and NK if they had had a good working relationship and more experience.  
 
“The theory is OK, from the theory you need to have these two guys, the onshore and 
offshore project manager. But they need to be experienced, they need to know each 
other, to have to have experience let’s say several years of experience working with 
each other so that they really know each other and they should have experience in the 
sense that they to have done it several times. Then it works out. I mean if these guys 
really communicate with each other I don’t see any problems.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
“I think basically the idea is very good. (…) I think it would have been if we had had a 
different start. I think the start went wrong. We got off on the wrong foot. I think 
basically the two people who were supposed to transfer the knowledge to the Indians 
did not function for whatever reason.” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
At the same time, HH expresses concern on the combination of prototyping with offshore 
outsourcing. He recognized the fact that prototyping relies on close interaction between 
users and the IT development team. With a double agency relationship, the offshore vendor 
team must connect at least closely to the customer’s onshore IT group. However, distance 
and indirect contact between these two groups reduced their collaborative effectiveness 
(see Table 44). It also added to the work pressure on HH himself: 
 
“I question the value of matching an offshore development with a prototype approach. 
I think we'd have a better result if we can have the people sitting here or very close, 
and we could have a more interactive way of communicating. With a prototyping 
approach you need a project team to be onsite. Whenever there is a problem you can 
sit with them and solve it. (…) I mean the way it works now with basically one project 
manager (i.e., interviewee - author) who is also the technical front end, plus all the 
questions - it’s an overload.” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
§ 10.3.6  Face-to-face versus Remote, Electronically Mediated Collaboration 
 
“Face-to-face communication is always better” - SPB, CarCo-E-2 
 
Global projects like Goldd rely mostly on remote, electronically mediated 
communications. It would be too expensive to collocate representatives from different 
sites. Still, face-to-face meetings play an important role. This section explores situations 
and conditions that advocate co-presence interactions.  
 
The Goldd project worked with a tight budget. Perhaps CarCo executives could not 
allocate more money to the project. Or they underestimated the complexity and cross-site 
needs for interaction. In any case, HN explained that budget constraints constituted one of 
the key reasons for the limited number of Model Office sessions and few face-to-face 
meetings:  
 
“I would want prototyping, more cycles. It was wrong to have two cycles that's far too 
less. More prototyping on specific areas, not on the broad scale. Prototyping on a 
distance could work. But it implies that you do some more prototyping cycles, more 
than we did, not just three. And it needs some more traveling, more direct 
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communication. You need traveling, and you need budget for that and that was not 
given.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Budgetary factors played an important role in the decision to go ahead with Model Office 
2, in December 1996. HH would fly to Detroit to meet users and local M&SS people. The 
session was almost postponed because of late deliveries from the offshore team. This 
would complicate HH’s position. Corporate regulations stipulated very stringent conditions 
for traveling in December. Since HH had already obtained approval for his ticket to the 
US, he would have to cancel that flight and re-apply (AC log November 25 - 29, 1996). 
An overview of cross-site visits is provided in Table 45. The left hand column lists face-to-
face meetings over the period 1995 - Spring 1997. The other four columns show people 
involved in these meetings from Germany, UK (liaisons), US, and India (light gray cells). 
The columns also clarify where the meeting took place with a diamond symbol (). The 
first meetings involved BW and NK from SoftHouse. They started working with CarCo 
representatives in Germany and US to prepare the bid and project. Early 1996, JF and BM 
from Detroit visited Germany for the data model and screen layouts. Next, HH and HN 
went to Detroit for Model Office 1 in the Spring of that year. Over Fall 1996, BW met the 
offshore team in Bangalore. The second Model Office meeting in December 1996 was the 
first one involving representatives from all sites: HH, BW and SPB from India went to 
Detroit for meetings with JF, local M&SS personnel, and users. Afterwards, SPB visited 
Cologne on his way back to India. He returned early 1997 to Cologne as temporary 
onshore liaison, a role MD took over in March. In Spring 1997, a taskforce meeting was 
arranged in Detroit with HN (Germany), MD, SM and VA.  
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Table 45 - Face-to-face meetings in the Goldd project 
 
 
Event 
 
Germany 
UK onshore 
liaisons 
 
US 
 
India 
BW, NK visit 
CarCo sites 
Winter 1995, early 
1996 
 Meeting 
location 
Germany team 
BW, NK US team, users  
US delegation 
visit Cologne, 
early 1996 
 Meeting 
location 
Germany team 
 JF, BM  
Model Office 1, 
Detroit, Spring 
1996 
HH, HN   Meeting 
location 
US team, users 
 
BW visits offshore 
team Fall 1996 
 BW   Meeting 
location 
Offshore team 
Model Office 2, 
Detroit, Winter 
1996 
HH BW  Meeting 
location 
US team, users 
SPB 
SPB visits 
Cologne, Winter 
1996 
 Meeting 
location 
Germany team 
  SPB 
BW and BJ visit 
offshore team 
early 1997 
 BW, BJ   Meeting 
location 
Offshore team 
SPB, MD onshore 
liaisons Cologne, 
early 1997 
 Meeting 
location 
Germany team 
  SPB, MD 
Ad hoc taskforce 
visit Detroit, 
Spring 1997 
HN   Meeting 
location 
US team 
SM, VA, MD 
Totals: 7 times involved 
4 meetings 
4 times involved 5 times involved 
3 meetings 
6 times involved 
2 meetings 
 
The bottom row of Table 45 depicts how many times people were involved, and where the 
meetings took place. As coordinating site, Germany participated in the largest number of 
meetings and hosted also its majority. Representatives from the offshore team joined rather 
late in the meetings. Their first visit outside Bangalore was the second Model Office in 
December 1996, the first and only meeting that included representatives from all sites. 
Overall, the impression exists the number of visits was rather low as HN points out: 
  
“We rarely had site visits. I visited the US twice for Model Office sessions. SPB visited 
the US once for the Model Office. JF and BM came to Germany for the database and 
the screen layouts.” - HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
We explore for the different sites why people wanted to meet face-to-face, and how these 
meetings are related to remote, electronically mediated exchanges.  
 
§ 10.3.6.1  CarCo Germany Perspective 
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In HH’s experience as overall project leader, distance had a profound impact on his 
management relationship with the team in Detroit. He explained that the distance to the US 
sites makes it impossible to manage people there like he would to with local subordinates. 
In fact, he depends very much on their autonomy, motivation and capabilities (Perin, 
1991). Only a self reliant team can work effectively on its own, without needing too much 
remote communications, visits and management involvement.  
 
“[With distance] It is even more important that you have good people, mature people, 
motivated people in the other country 5000 miles and six time zones away. It is even 
more important. I don't have to talk to JF on a day-to-day basis. She knows the plan, it 
has been reconciled with her and she makes sure that it's executed. But if she wasn't 
as strong as she is, I'd have one hell of a problem. If she'd be here I could kick her 
around every day. Not that I would, but it is the right kind of people, who do the right 
kind of jobs, you can always do these things - they almost run automatically. It cannot 
fail. But if you get the wrong kind of people, then no matter how good you plan it you 
gonna fail.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Distance to his subordinates in Detroit implies that he does not control their work 
extensively. He relies on their own insight and drive to accomplish local task 
responsibilities. Trusting the team there to control their own work results from the good 
rapport and global management structure earlier described.  
 
“For the US the level of control is less. So there is more trust for them to self-control. I 
do not want to micromanage a team at 5000 miles distance.” - HH, CarCo-A-2 
 
HH ‘meets’ US representatives often electronically. On top of phone and email, they enjoy 
priority access to advanced videoconferencing equipment at both CarCo sites. Still, HH 
perceives limitations of electronic media, even something as rich and interactive as 
videoconferencing. In his mind, it is necessary to punctuate the remote contact pattern with 
site visits:  
 
“Videoconference we have it almost every day now. That's a good substitute but it 
only goes so far. I mean at the end of the day you need to be there every once in a 
while.” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
With regards to the offshore team, HH had preferred collaboration on-site. The current 
setup reduces the directness and interactivity of communications, and it lengthens problem 
solving cycles.  
 
“I question the value of matching an offshore development with a prototype approach. 
I think we'd have a better result if we can have the people sitting here or very close, 
and we could have a more interactive way of communicating. With a prototyping 
approach you need a project team to be onsite. Whenever there is a problem you can 
sit with them and solve it.” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
MB from the German team also asserts that distance to the offshore team makes 
communications more indirect. When BW was routing communications, he had never 
direct contact with offshore team leaders or team members like SPB. This changed when 
SPB came onsite: 
“I worked more and more with SPB when he was here. And also through audio 
conference we have direct contact with the coordinators of the team in India. The first 
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approach was that we had an onshore and an offshore manager, NK and BW. The 
advice was then: all official things through managers.” - MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
Global distributedness seems to reduce direct, verbal communications. People use email 
exchanges rather than contacting their counterparts ad hoc on the phone or 
videoconference. 
 
“If everybody were here at [CarCo] Germany, all with the same culture, language etc, 
we would have no videoconferencing and less email. More RAD and more verbal 
communication.” - MB, CarCo-C-2 
 
Somehow, distance increases the risk of confusion. It leads to a more asynchronous way of 
working, and requires more effort. Electronic media offer a limited range of 
communication capability. They may allow for textual, audio or visual exchanges but not 
as rich and interactive as to face-to-face meetings:  
 
“There is so much controlling because the only medium is telephone and profs. With 
telephone you cannot see words and profs is only one way. When discussing face-to-
face, with a PC or pen and pencil and you can draw a diagram and make them see 
what you mean, or you can use the tool immediately instead of waiting for reports from 
the tool. That would work easier.” - MB, CarCo-C-3. 
 
Electronic media encourage asynchronous exchange patterns as compared to collocated 
meetings. In addition, people may have different ways of using them, like frequency and 
formatting. All this increases the risk of misunderstanding and confusion. It demands a 
formal and possibly more indirect approach to communication patterns. Problems of 
remote exchanges also intensify control processes and the need for feedback loops.  
 
“There would definitely be less control if the US team were here, the same applies for 
India as well. We use Word documents with questions, and everybody answers in 
different kinds (even colors) of font. It goes back and forth; at the end it gets very 
confusing. Or we would have that somebody would sent answers back without 
reference number. When working face-to-face you can have the answers and the 
questions in the same conversation.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
In a face-to-face meeting, feedback are self-evident. People use verbal and nonverbal cues 
to indicate their understanding of a sender’s point. With remote contact, this is not the 
case, especially not with asynchronous media like vmail or email. People must pay more 
deliberate attention to feedback loops, e.g., by confirming receipt of a message (Meadows, 
1996b). In the case of Goldd, team members had to use the profs email system instead of 
ftp do exchange files. Unfortunately, profs did not offer suitable functionality to support 
feedback messaging. This complicated remote file exchange:  
 
“With remote communication in general it is very important to get a note back from the 
receiver with: “I have understood,” or with “I have received”. This did not work very 
well with profs and we would sent files several times. With ftp you would not have this 
problem.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
MB indicates that he prefers face-to-face to remote interactions. He cites the visit of US 
representatives to Cologne, early 1996. During these meetings, people could bring up and 
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discuss issues immediately, without having to revert to the asynchronous back-and-forth 
process common to remote exchanges.  
 
“The two sessions when the Americans where here were very efficient, changes were 
made and documented immediately.” - MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
In one interview, MB ranked his preferences for interpersonal communications. 
Interestingly, this came quite close to the media richness scale of Daft and Macintosh 
(1981). In the first place, he prefers direct contact with someone, without having to use 
electronic media or liaisons. Next, he like to use direct phone calls. With India this 
appeared cumbersome because of technical hurdles and the organizational setup in 
Bangalore. Most exchanges relied on email, a medium that is in fact at the bottom of MB’s 
list in terms of preferences. 
 
“First of all I would prefer direct communication, person-to-person (i.e., face-to-face - 
author). If that is not possible I like to call a person. (This because we do not have 
personal videoconferencing, this of course would be better.) But this is difficult to 
India because of the lines (we have to call the satellite first, etc.), then the connection 
to the person you want in India, they will pass you through several departments etc. 
So the need for direct communication is done via Profs, but the problem is that it is 
only one channel.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
HN, MB’s peer in Cologne, noticed that remoteness cuts out many informal aspects of 
interpersonal collaboration. Compared to collocated office settings, people do not share 
information as often and as easily. They adapt to distributed work environments with more 
formal processes and meetings. Electronic media can sustain remote contact, but they 
require effort and conscious preparation: 
 
“Without the distance we would have more informal contacts, more informal 
information, there would be less focus on the formal meetings. Communication on 
paper is more difficult. For audio or video conferencing you need to be prepared so 
that everybody is at the same level.” - HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
Distance makes communications more challenging and time consuming. People are more 
likely to experience misunderstandings or hiatus. HN explains for his contacts with US 
counterparts:  
 
 “It’s not a major issue that they are in the US. It's delaying. And we need some time 
to understand. Sometimes there are misunderstandings or communications 
breakdowns.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
Under some conditions, these effects of distance make it necessary to meet face-to-face. 
This was the case when early 1997 it appeared that the design of Sales and P&A code 
functionality was not sound (see bottom event in Table 45). Lack of contact between the 
US and offshore teams resulted in different viewpoints and standards. The situation 
surfaced when the US team started preparing their data conversion: 
 
“During the testing we identified that the core Sales and P&A functionality is not 
properly designed into the system. They (CarCo US and SoftHouse India) didn't talk to 
each other. They do a conversion in the States, you have a database and a database 
design. And they do a conversion from the old system in the new database. So they 
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load data in, then they expected that the Indian rules on that data work the same as 
they thought it should work when they did the conversion. But they never talked to 
each other and that didn't work, especially not in that area. So when you load these 
conversion data it was right in their understanding, but the Indians had a completely 
different understanding.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Effort was made to solve the issue remotely. HN in Cologne took on a role as coordinator. 
He worked extensively with users and peers to understand the issue. In the end, however, 
the topic appeared too complex for this approach: 
 
“We prepared the document here (in Germany - author), tried to come to a conclusion 
and agreement with the users. So we had about two weeks regular almost daily 
meetings. First we started with documents, I started trying to understand what they 
needed, what is Sales and P&A code at all, what do they require, what is their current 
business practice. And then I tried to specify that, document it, and communicate it. I 
had a lot of questions, and I tried to get answers to these questions by reading. But 
that didn't work out, it was always: “But we have this and this case, and this and this 
exception to the rule”.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
Complexity basically forced the people involved to switch to a more intensified form of 
organization. They formed a taskforce and decided to meet face-to-face in Detroit. This 
enabled direct, interactive discussions including stakeholders from the US, Europe, and 
India. Onsite presence also provided HN with a closer look at the current North American 
system in Detroit. 
 
“And then we decided we have to make a separate task force on that issue. So I 
prepared my understanding of it as much as I could, went over there (Detroit - author), 
and discussed it with users. I looked into the current system run, how it works, 
discussed it with the Indians, which was when we agreed on the final concept, which 
has been implemented just now. (…) So they have to redo the conversion, do some 
rework on the conversion. And the Indians have to do something as well. Both have to 
adjust to a common concept which is now in place for that area. (…) We expect next 
week the first delivery based on that discussion. The meeting in Detroit was in May 
(1997 - author). The Indians came also to Detroit, 2 of them: SM came and VA (Team 
leader - author). SM is the offshore project manager and VA is responsible for some 
core functionality of the system, he is developer. I stayed there 10 days. MD went” - 
HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
§ 10.3.6.2  CarCo US Perspective 
From Detroit, JF pointed at the beneficial effects of on-site visits. Early 1996, she visited 
the Cologne team together with BM. Her immersion in that context generated a multitude 
of cues not available with remote contact. Understanding more of the German team’s 
background helped her frame exchanges when working on a distance (Meadows, 1996b). 
Simultaneously, she built good rapport with local personnel. This led to more relaxed, 
open communication lines between Detroit and Cologne (Gabarro, 1990).  
 
“I visited [CarCo] Germany 3 weeks before and 2 weeks after Carnival. And it helped 
me a lot!  The things that were not a part of the job, like the office environment, how 
people commute to their work, the area they live in. Knowing the background of 
people helps me understand how they think about the business. And besides that 
going to Cologne was also good for the work we did together. (…) Later they were 
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more relaxing, they were more open after I had been there. I kick on it when HN sends 
me a joke. We really had to grow into it.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
JF explained that presence at a site fosters awareness of that context (Tyre & von Hippel, 
1997). Just as she had to go visit Cologne to learn about the context there, she pointed at 
the fact that SoftHouse would not understand CarCo’s ways of working learning unless 
they were onsite. Only later in the project did SoftHouse realize that onsite presence of 
offshore team members was necessary to build cross-site know-how. They would not 
accomplish this as long as they relied on independent liaisons (BW) and/ or remote contact 
(offshore vis-à-vis US).  
 
“I think the biggest thing is learning the [CarCo] style of working. It is easier and you 
can work faster if you know how to get things done. I do not want to call it politics 
though. And [SoftHouse] will never learn the [CarCo] way, because you have to be 
there to learn it.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
The way Goldd was setup led to limited direct exchange between offshore and Detroit. AS 
JF mentioned: “Contact to India is not in my round of responsibility (…) I do not know so 
much about them because I had almost no contact with them” (CarCo-D-2). The two 
groups never connected their local understandings or a built common basis for 
collaboration as the Sales and P&A code issues revealed (Grant, 1996b). Consequently, 
coordination between the groups became very challenging, resulting in de-differentiation 
of work. In other words, tasks that would have been delegated to the offshore team came 
back because of coordination hurdles:  
 
“Some things that would be done offshore came back because of the difficulty to give 
information and explain. It would be as difficult to explain as it was doing it ourselves.” 
- JF, CarCo-D-1  
 
With Germany, JF noticed that distance has its pros and cons. On the one hand, it advances 
people’s skills to handle remote information exchange, like using ftp. The other side is that 
distance makes interactive discussions more cumbersome. With collocated meetings, 
people can bring in all the relevant documents and look at them. This practice is not 
possible when they work from different sites. In that case, they need local copies of the 
same resource. But even then, pointing to sections in the documents or changing them 
appears challenging: 
 
“Distance has good and bad effects. The good thing is that everybody learned how to 
transfer files, before this project we did not bother to do that. The bad thing is that it is 
much easier when a person is next door. If you are trying to explain something on the 
phone the difference is that you have no documents. You can set up a phone call and 
send the documents in advance, but always something will pop up that is not in the 
documents, and then you cannot draw it up.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
Counteracting these issues requires formalization. JF emphasizes the need for setting a 
priori standards to coordinate expectations at different sites. Ownership of particular 
documents and processes must be clearly assigned to individuals so that everybody knows 
whom to refer to.  
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“It is very important to define standard procedures. You cannot just do things between 
two continents. Somehow all the documents you send get lost somewhere in the 
middle, in the ocean. In every area you need somebody to control the documents. One 
person has to have total knowledge about one area. Otherwise, things get lost and 
therefore the work does not get completed.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
Contact between Detroit and Cologne became not only more formalized. It became also 
more channeled. Initially, the two teams held videoconferences with multiple staff 
members at both sites. This contributed to local awareness of progress on either side. A 
disadvantage was, however, that the meetings covered to many topics. JF urged to reduce 
the number of people participating in order to achieve more focus (AC report January 6 - 
17, 1997). According to AC, channeling exchanges leads to less involvement of team 
members not joining in the meetings. This requires additional communications at local 
sites after a teleconference.  
 
§ 10.3.6.3  SoftHouse India Perspective 
In their role as agents in Goldd, the offshore team they needed considerable knowledge on 
the principal’s (i.e., CarCo) expectations. They suffered from not having been involved in 
the first Model Office session. Subsequently, over Fall 1996, the team did not receive 
much help from the onshore liaison, BW. They had to rely mainly on documentation and 
the prototype itself. This proved not sufficient as MD explained in March 1997:  
 
“(…) It took us several months to find out what they wanted. The documented work 
specifications give only an overview, but no details. BW did not give proper 
information. It is much better now that I am here, somebody needs to be on-site.” - 
CarCo-F-1 
 
SPB makes a similar complaint. He points out that over Fall 1996, the offshore team 
lacked information on the customer’s requirements:  
 
“In the beginning it did happen that we had days without work, because there was no 
information to work with. (…) At the beginning we did not know what the user wanted, 
and it is better to talk directly to the user to know what is better for them.” - SPB, 
CarCo-E-1 
 
Goldd’s organizational setup with liaisons constrained communications between CarCo 
and the offshore team. It led not only to insufficient and delayed communications, but also 
distortions. People add their own perspective to information they are passing on. 
Eventually, the offshore team receives information that does not match the original 
intention of the first sender, like in a telephone game (see discussion of this metaphor in 
the theory section).  
 
“When the information goes from the users to JF, to HN, to BW, to us, it can get 
distorted or diluted. When one person in the link has not understood what the user 
meant, it will show in the product. Errors in understanding will be passed down the 
link.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1  
 
Indirect communications through BW complicated the offshore team’s work. They 
depended on multiple nodes before information reached them from the customer. 
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Communication backwards was even more burdensome. Interestingly, when BW visited 
the unit in Bangalore, he communicated more directly with leaders and members of the 
team. Somehow, his onsite presence encouraged more ramified networking then when he 
worked in Cologne. AC reports in her debrief of an interview with SPB: 
 
“All communication to India goes through BW. BW talks to SM (Offshore Project 
Manager, see Table 32 - author) who is more on the Oracle side of the team. On very 
rare occasions does BW communicate directly with SPB. This would happen if there 
are very specific issues with screen design and such. This would happen on the 
phone. When BW was in India, SPB also had the opportunity to talk to him. (…)  
All other communication is done through SM, via profs (e-mail), fax and phone. Before 
information reaches the team it goes through SM and through the team leader. I asked 
him what he thought about the communication lines as they exist: all communication 
through BW. SPM seemed a little indignant, he got immediately exited about the 
issue. It was clear that he thought it was troublesome and difficult to communicate in 
such a way.” - AC, CarCo-E-1 
 
The initial Goldd setup confined back and forth communications between CarCo users and 
the offshore team. It quasi simplified their relationship to a one-way flow of explicit, 
documented information that would reveal user expectations. In reality, the relationship 
was more reciprocal and should have been organized accordingly. Users and programmers 
have unique knowledge domains that must be fused for an effective final product. Users 
bring in their current practices and business knowledge, while programmers contribute 
technical expertise and experience from other projects. They can suggest novel ways of 
setting up the application (see flows 1a and 1b in Table 39). In other words, the flows 
between these two groups was more reciprocal than sequential (Van de Ven et al., 1976). It 
was also more uncertain in the literal sense that multiple alternatives existed for the Goldd 
functionality. Unfortunately, the people setting up the project were not aware of this 
situation. They held a simplified view of the project, which complicated the offshore 
team’s job.  
 
“Users do things because they are used to do things, they have certain practices out 
of habit. The user does not know why he does certain things, he only knows that he 
has been doing it this way always. Programmers have a more global overview and 
they can ask users why they do things in a certain way. And often programmers can 
propose an easier way of doing things, the user would not think of the easier solution.” 
- SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
SPB’s participation in Model Office 2 obviated the offshore team’s inability to reach users, 
albeit in a late phase of the project. His onsite presence facilitated direct, face-to-face 
discussions with key stakeholders: HH from Germany, North American users, and the US 
Goldd team. These interactions boosted his insight in the customer’s ‘thought worlds’ 
(Dougherty, 1992) in a way earlier provided resources could not accomplish: 
 
“I understand a lot more after the Model Office, there is no comparison between what I 
knew then and what I know now. The data model helped us understand quite a lot 
about the business, as it was also logical. With the data model we understood a lot, 
about 70 - 75%. But the more important thing to know is what the user wants, and that 
is the most difficult and the most critical thing to understand. They do not ask so 
much: they just want a product that is like the former one, or much better. They only 
want it to be user-friendly as they have to work with it everyday. The user wants 
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something easy, he wants to be able to access certain screens in one step, at the 
most 2 steps. That is what we are going to try to develop now.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
Face-to-face discussions provided SPB with background knowledge, similar to the effect 
of JF’s visit to Cologne early 1996. Transmitting this type and depth of know-how had not 
been possible on a distance, especially not with BW in between: 
 
“After the Model Office I know what the users want. (…) The Model Office helped a lot. 
Now we know WHY they want things in a certain way. I will share this information with 
the team and it will make us much more confident about what we are doing. The 
Model Office has helped me see the concept behind the screens, the business. What 
the users want is a usable product, it has to be user-friendly. It is much easier to know 
what somebody wants when communicating person to person.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
After this onsite experience, SPB commented: “Face-to-face communication is always 
better” ( CarCo-E-2). As a substitute for co-presence, he preferred direct, rich 
communications like videoconferencing can provide. “It would have been better if we had 
videoconferencing to Germany, because that works better. Audio conferencing is not really 
communication” (CarCo-E-2). SPB’s comments are similar to what MB indicated earlier 
in this section. We can frame this perception with Table 44. Both team members 
emphasize direct contact between two or more persons across sites. Preferably, they 
communicate face-to-face with a remote counterpart (cell A). As an alternative, 
electronically mediated contact would work (cell C). This must be as interactive and rich 
as possible. 
 
After her interview with SPB (CarCo-E-1), AC logged some reflections. She observed that 
face-to-face contact improved rapport between people from different sites. This fostered 
their understanding and willingness when collaborating remotely (Gabarro, 1990).  
 
“I think it was a very, very wise decision to bring SPB to the US and to Germany. 
Before he came, I think both teams had a very vague notion about “some Indians, who 
are programming”, knowing nothing about them. I think that this does not improve the 
communication between the teams, as you tend to have less respect for somebody if 
you do not know him. You probably do not want to go through all the effort of 
explaining somebody something if you do not know who he is. After SPB’s visit, to me 
at least, things seemed a lot clearer. SPB was just a friendly guy, he had a lot of 
knowledge about the program and seemed very willing to work for the product. 
Knowing whom you are talking to makes you a lot friendlier, I think. SPB was also very 
happy to see the users and to hear things for the users first hand.” - AC, CarCo-E-3 
 
According to AC, face-to-face meetings have an important role at the beginning of a global 
project. People need some form of collocated introduction to know whom they will be 
working with. As MB mentioned earlier, such an event took place between the American 
and German team, but not with SoftHouse team members (CarCo-C-3). From AC’s angle, 
it may not be feasible to have all members from all sites meet. But al least representatives 
should meet directly to build a minimal network across sites. Others could connect to their 
local representative in case they have questions on the way remote counterparts operate.  
 
“It (…) seems to be important that the team members meet at least once, do some 
trivial things together, just to get to know each other. This would be more expensive of 
course, but it does improve communication a lot. The best would be for all teams to 
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meet, but a representative of the different teams would also work. That if there is a 
question like, what do the Americans mean with this, somebody can explain. So it is 
important for the people who communicate (key representatives per site - author) to 
know each other and for every team that at least one person can understand why the 
other team thinks this way.” - AC, CarCo-E-3 
 
According to AC, representatives from sites A, B, and C know each other from collocated 
kick-off meetings. They sustain cross-site connections and assist local personnel when 
working remotely. With reference to Table 44, this implies that direct, face-to-face contact 
provides a foundation for communications in distributed projects (cell A). Afterwards, 
people can either sustain direct remote contact, e.g., between the representatives (cell C). 
Or representatives can leverage on their social capital and function as liaisons between 
local personnel and remote counterparts (cell D).  
 
§ 10.3.7  Experiencing Technology  
Information Technology played a vital role in the Goldd project. People used IT for local 
processes and to connect across sites. They relied on IT resources to develop the Goldd 
system. This section points at special issues people experienced in the Goldd project. It 
looks at remote connectivity and development resources. As an aside, the case refers to a 
project in the period 1996 - 1997. In the mean time, technical advances may have altered 
many of the issues described here. 
 
§ 10.3.7.1  Remote Connectivity  
The German and American sites benefited from CarCo’s global IT infrastructure. They had 
access to shared servers, and used for instance a calendar system that allowed each site to 
see exactly people’s appointments at the other site (CarCo-H-2). Goldd team members had 
priority access to videoconferencing facilities in Detroit and Cologne. They could place 
conference calls from people’s desk phones with high quality connections. Both sites had 
access to ftp and PROFS for email.  
 
A technical connectivity issue between US and Germany concerned remote server access 
speed. From Cologne team members had to access a server in Detroit to get data for 
testing. This took considerable time (AC log February 3 - 28, 1997). Also, the German 
team did not have access to the old CDDB and CIS systems in the US. When HN had to 
elaborate issues surrounding the Sales and P&A functionality, he had to fly over to Detroit 
to take a look at the systems (HN, CarCo-B-3).  
 
Between CarCo and SoftHouse, technical infrastructure did not work as smoothly. Setting 
up basic things like a phone connection from Germany to India required considerable 
patience. As MB describes, they had to call first a satellite and take a number of 
subsequent steps: 
 
“First of all I would prefer direct communication, person-to-person. If that is not 
possible I like to call a person. (This because we do not have personal 
videoconferencing, this of course would be better) But this is difficult to India, because 
of the lines: we have to call the satellite first, etc.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
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Once a line was setup, people suffered from noisiness and interruptions. This caused 
irritation for the caller in Germany, as well as for people in adjacent cubicles who could 
overhear literally people screaming on the phone (AC log January 20-24, 1997). People 
used mainly email for exchanges with India. It took quite some effort to get the SoftHouse 
offshore team on PROFS. For some reason, they could not use ftp, so large files were sent 
back and forth with PROFS. Unfortunately, facilities in India were not prepared for these 
volumes as MB explained: 
 
“With remote communication in general it is very important to get a note back from the 
receiver with: “I have understood,” or with “I have received”. This did not work very 
well with profs and we would sent files several times. With ftp you would not have this 
problem. (…) I heard today that ftp is not possible to [SoftHouse]. I don't know if it is 
because of [SoftHouse] policy or [CarCo] policy. We have zip files of many 
megabytes, and Profs doesn't work very well with these big volumes. And the disk 
space of the profs accounts in India are insufficient.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
§ 10.3.7.2  Development Resources 
Apart from remote connectivity, people used a variety of development resources. These 
included office applications, and applications for change management, design and database 
management. HN comments on some of these resources that were used at the different 
sites: 
 
“The CASE tool for changes to the data model is a standard. And in general Office 
Applications like Excel and Access are standards. You will not notice that until 
somebody uses a different standard.” - HN, (CarCo-B-3) 
 
Installing a common infrastructure appeared challenging at times, in particular for 
SoftHouse. This applied to data modeling tools (IEF and ER-WIN), and basic things like 
operating and email systems:  
 
“[CarCo] has a variety of tools (IEF/ ER-Win) that India does not have. For example, 
India had to get ER-Win to overcome problems. They have no mainframe, no Windows 
95, there were difficulties with getting PROFS.” - HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
Solving these issues took a long time. In February 1997, MB still complained about 
incompatible infrastructures: 
 
“Between offshore and onshore we still suffer from compatibility with software 
(Microsoft Access). And sending files with profs; we have ftp transfer, they don't” - 
MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
On top of this, the offshore team had its own share of problems with development 
software. They struggled with bugs in Oracle and Designer 2000 (CarCo-K-1). 
 
§ 10.3.8  Time Zone Differences and Asynchronous Availability 
Time zone differences a-synchronize working hours in multi-site projects. In the Goldd 
project, three sites were involved, each in a different zone (see Table 33 or Table 46). 
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CarCo joined the project with one site in Cologne, Germany in UTC +1, and one in 
Detroit, USA, UTC -5. SoftHouse’s main site was in Bangalore India, UTC +5½. 
Asynchronicity can also be attributed to different local patterns of holidays and days off. 
We elaborate here on some project members’ experience with time differences and 
asynchronous availability. The section is grouped around three interfaces: US - Germany, 
Germany - India, and US - India.  
 
§ 10.3.8.1  US - Germany 
Between Detroit (UTC -5) and Cologne (UTC +1) people experience a 6 hours difference 
(Table 33 or Table 46). The overlap occurs during afternoons in Cologne and mornings 
in Detroit. With an extended working day from 8:00 until 19:00 at both sites, people have a 
6 hours window. More conservative days from say 9:00 until 17:00 reduce the window to 2 
hours.  
 
In an interview with HN, he emphasized two effects of the 6 hours time difference. First, it 
extends working days. If people worked at the same site, they would have a single slot of 
about 8 hours per day. Now, they experience a stretched period of time. Second, HN 
mentions that synchronous contact must be planned around the window with Detroit, i.e., 
afternoon in Germany: 
 
“Time zone are positive because we have a 16 hours working day. It means that we 
always have to plan after lunch for contact.” - HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
Conversely, JF from Detroit keeps her mornings open for exchanges with Cologne and 
accommodates her local responsibilities accordingly:  
 
“I always have to keep the mornings open for communications with Europe, and 
schedule my other meetings in the afternoon.” - JF, CarCo-D-1 
 
While she must adapt her schedule, JF appreciates the fact that outside the window 
German colleagues will not contact her (i.e., during her afternoon when Germans have 
gone home). 
  
“The good thing is that you do not get bothered by the other team on times that they 
are not working. It gives a break. Time difference between US and Germany is not a 
big problem. ” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
Apart from time differences, at least one instance occurred when synchronous contact was 
desirable but not possible. This happened when the German team took a Christmas break, 
but the Americans and Indians continued work on the Goldd project. In the US, data 
conversion and loading had to be prepared for testing and implementation. For this job 
they had to collaborate with the German team that had a central coordinating role (AC log 
December 16 - 27, 1996). As this event shows, opportunities for synchronous contact 
depend not only on time differences, but also on local holidays, customs and priorities.  
 
§ 10.3.8.2  Germany - India 
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Interfacing between Germany and India was mainly the vendor’s responsibility. With an 
extended working day from 8:00 until 19:00 in Germany and India, people have a window 
of 8 hours. More limited working days from 9:00 until 17:00 leave a window of 4 hours. 
SoftHouse’s onshore liaison had to work frequently with offshore leaders and team 
members. Input from Germany and the US was often needed for work processes in India. 
The offshore team had to check on CarCo expectations before they could proceed. Time 
differences combined with the organizational setup sometimes frustrated these processes. 
This depended on the moment German and/ or American input was needed. SPB reports on 
issues arising in India late at night that were relayed to Germany and needed input from 
Detroit: 
 
“When we send problems to Germany late at night (Bangalore time, i.e., afternoon in 
Germany) and they have to consult with the Americans, it goes around for a day. The 
team members do not really realize that, they get annoyed when they don't get an 
answer quickly.” - SPB, CarCo-E-2 
 
The workflow delay can be analyzed with Table 46.67 Suppose it is Day 1 (shown instead 
of 8:00) in Bangalore. Late in the evening, people contact Germany (also Day 1) for 
assistance or information. BW or BJ as onshore liaison are asked to talk with local CarCo 
team members or directly with JF in the US (Day 1). When these people start working on 
the issue, it is probably getting too late in India to continue the job. They must leave the 
office in Bangalore and wait until the morning of Day 2. This process interruption causes 
delays for the offshore team in India.  
 
                                                 
67 Although the site in India is UTC +5.5, we use UTC +5 for practical reasons. CC stands 
for CarCo, SH for SoftHouse. 
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Drivers of these delays include, first of all, dependencies and task uncertainty. That is, 
local task accomplishment is embedded in cross-site work- and information flows. Second, 
time differences reduce opportunities for real-time contact. For instance, at some point it is 
too late for the Indian team to continue work even when they receive the requested inputs 
from Germany within a reasonable time. Third, liaised organizing contributes to delays. 
Each node may add time to task processing. In the case described in SPB’s quote, direct 
contact between India and the US could have accelerated problem solving cycles. Now, 
with Germany’s role as an exclusive gateway between US and India, people depended on 
an additional node with its own capacity and priorities.  
 
MD mentions positive aspects of the limited time overlap between India and Germany. In 
her position as onshore liaison, she explains that working days are stretched. During her 
afternoon and evening in Germany, she can elaborate on questions from Bangalore (e.g., 
Day 1 in Table 46). On Day 2 in India, the offshore team picks up outputs from her job and 
continues while she is off.  
 
“The positive thing about time difference is that it saves work time, it is like working in 
two shifts. I find out things while they are sleeping and they will work when I am 
sleeping” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
A precondition for this advantageous use of time zone difference is that people depend 
only for inputs and outputs on other sites, not for the process. If there are urgent process 
dependencies during for instance MD’s afternoon, she must interrupt that job (like the 
situation SPB explained in the preceding quote). 
 
§ 10.3.8.3  US - India 
Interactive collaboration between Detroit and Bangalore appeared problematic in the 
Goldd project. Between Detroit in UTC -5, and Bangalore in UTC +5½ a time gap exists 
of 10½ hours (Daylight Saving Time not applied). With DST, Detroit changes to UTC -4 
so that the gap is 9½ hours. Extended working day from 8:00 until 19:00 at both sites, 
allow for just a 2 hours window. More conservative days from 9:00 until 17:00 eliminate 
real-time exchange opportunities. In example of that situation occurred when BW was in 
India late September. When he needed to contact US counterparts from there, he simply 
was unable to do so because of the time gap. As a consequence, people have to rely on 
asynchronous media like vmail and email (AC log September 30 - October 4, 1996). 
The problem is echoed by JF from Detroit. For real time contact, Indians would have to 
stay in the office rather late, or Americans would have to come in early in the morning (see 
Table 46). The minimal overlap causes delays when quick resource input is needed from 
the US to India. During for instance Day 1 in Bangalore (Table 46), Indians must wait until 
Americans start their Day 1. This implies a long delay when remote resource needs arise in 
India in the morning. But even when they surface during the afternoon in Bangalore, it is 
getting too late there to wait on inputs from the US. Most likely, communications will be 
asynchronous. That is, the offshore team submits a request, and must wait until their Day 2 
(Table 46) to continue work with inputs prepared during Day 1 in the US. It can only be 
hoped that tasks are sufficiently structured that no additional clarification loops are needed. 
This would stretch problem solving cycles of even simple tasks to days. 
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“Time difference between US and India is too big. They have to stay until very late to 
be able to talk on the phone. And sometimes they cannot get things from me until their 
following day.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
 
§ 10.3.9  Diverse Cultures and Ways of Working
68
 
The Goldd project brought together people from different corners of the world with 
different backgrounds. On the CarCo side, IT professionals and users with North American 
and European outlooks collaborated for the first time. SoftHouse joined the project with 
UK management and consultants (BW, NK, and BJ), and staff in India. We describe and 
analyze here how people experienced interactions in this diverse environment. Diversity 
presented itself in multiple ways: education, experience, language usage, ways of working, 
and expectations. It relates to different categorization levels (Krauss & Fussell, 1990): 
individual backgrounds, corporate culture, and geographical areas (nations or regions). The 
section is based on the viewpoints of people from sites involved in the Goldd project. 
Starting with CarCo Germany and US personnel, we move on to SoftHouse liaisons and 
Indian team members. The section concludes with a brief reflection. 
 
§ 10.3.9.1  CarCo Germany Perspective 
The Goldd project leader in Germany has built a lifetime career in the European CarCo 
organization. His strong identification with the firm is reflected in a statement he made in 
one of the discussion for this research. When he was talking about the organization, and 
differences in national culture, he mentioned that he felt a CarCo man first, and German 
second (CarCo-A-5). In other words, his being part of a national culture was subordinated 
to his role as a CarCo employee. Identification with his employer resulted from working 
for many years at European CarCo sites. This way, he got to know the CarCo organization 
and became committed to its success:  
 
 “I have worked with many [CarCo] people elsewhere, in England, I have visited most 
of the major national sales organization in all the European countries. I've been to all 
of them. The working relationship with these people although they may be culturally 
diverse has always been good. I feel at home anywhere I go and there is [CarCo]. I 
mean there is a certain [CarCo] style of working.” - HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
Familiarity with CarCo facilitated first time collaboration with US counterparts from 
M&SS. HH’s role is part of a CarCo management network that spans the globe. Within 
that formal structure, he helped establish positive working relationships between his 
German team and the one in Detroit:  
                                                 
68 This section reflects interviewees’ perspective on cultural diversity in the Goldd project. 
It may contain very subjective views that generalize and stereotype categories, groups or 
individuals. These are described here for research purposes only, and are not endorsed by 
the author in any way. It should be noted that the author is Dutch and brings a North-
Western European perspective to this research.  
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“What I’m fairly proud of is that over the duration of the project, and it started in 1995, 
the [CarCo] team has kept an excellent working relationship with each other - HN, MB, 
JF, CS, DM and a couple of people on the sidelines like BM, SK both in the US, and 
their bosses, we have very very good working relationships.” - HH, CarCo-A-3  
 
To HH’s surprise, this good rapport did not extend to SoftHouse. In his opinion, SoftHouse 
has a corporate culture that differs from CarCo. He would have liked interpersonal 
connections with them, but for some reason that was never materialized. As a wild idea, he 
observes that collaboration with a CarCo unit in India would have had a better chance of 
success.  
 
“I mean this (the good working relationships with US counterparts, see previous quote 
- author) is not even near the kind of issues we have with SoftHouse. And that's the 
kind of thing I would have liked to see with SoftHouse. It just doesn't happen. (…) 
They are different, they have a different corporate culture. (…) If we had a [CarCo] 
team in India (instead of SoftHouse - author) I think it would work quite well.” - HH, 
CarCo-A-3 
 
One of the reasons the contact with SoftHouse ‘just didn’t happen’ could have been the 
organizational setup. CarCo did not deal with SoftHouse India directly but via liaisons 
onshore in Cologne. They never had the opportunity to develop relationships until much 
later in the project when MD or SPB came onshore. In turn, this channeled interaction 
pattern was rooted to some extent in cultural differences. Early on in the bidding process, 
HH met representatives from SoftHouse India in the UK office. Connecting to these people 
did not work quite well, because of cultural differences and possibly their culture shock. 
Consequently, HH preferred to do business with the UK office and have them handle 
contact with operations in Bangalore. UK liaisons would act as a buffer between the US 
and German CarCo people, and the SoftHouse staff in India (Figure 67).  
 
 
 
Figure 67 - Liaisons as cultural bridges 
 
 
Looking back, he regretted this decision and would have preferred direct collaboration 
with the Indian office. Even with cultural differences to deal with, direct contact would 
have been a better options because of dependencies between the CarCo and SoftHouse 
teams.  
 
“[SoftHouse] has an outlet here in England. The problem was that in the beginning we 
had a meeting with a couple of people from [SoftHouse] India and they didn't come 
across very well. In hindsight they were probably under culture shock. We should have 
German/ US context
UK liaisons as conversion layer
Indian context
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had them anyway, we would probably have made a better choice. But such is life.” - 
HH, CarCo-A-3 
 
With the group in the US, good working relationships were built from early visits onwards. 
Still, cultural differences remained, like the way people address each other:  
 
“In Germany the hierarchical distance means more than in the US. You would notice it 
in the way we address each other. If we talk English it would be ‘M’ (first name of MB - 
author) and ‘you’. In German it would be ‘Sie’ (polite form of addressing - author) and 
‘Herr B’ (means in English: ‘Sir B’, where B refers to MB’s surname - author). That 
does not mean that they have more respect: JF (from US - author) respects me the 
same way HN (from Germany - author) does.” - HH, CarCo-A-2 
 
As HH notes, German practices differ from American ones. While people may have the 
same intentions and meanings, they use different protocols to connect. This demands 
adaptation in the form of multiple interaction modes. Within the German site, people retain 
German ways of interpersonal collaboration. Once they connect to the American site, they 
adapt to a more international or American mode. Apparently, given the good working 
relationships, the German team was aware of their own unique protocols compared with 
American expectations. They had learnt to switching protocols depending on the people 
and contexts they communicated with. 
 
HN, senior team member in Cologne, observed several dimensions along which people 
participating in Goldd differed:  
 
“We all speak different languages, although we all speak English, it is very different. 
Besides, we have different educations and different experiences. (…) We do have a 
[CarCo] culture. (…) We don't have the same training. (…) We have the same 
products and the same knowledge, but not for this product, probably the learning on 
the job is the same. There is a big gap between [CarCo] US and [CarCo] Germany and 
India, also in skills.” - HN, CarCo-B-2 
 
On a corporate level, he differentiated between CarCo and SoftHouse. From his angle, 
CarCo has a strong organizational culture across its international sites, something 
SoftHouse did not seem to have (CarCo-B-2). When asked whether people in the Goldd 
project act and think in a similar manner, he made a distinction between Germany and US 
on the one hand, and India on the other hand: “In the US and Germany, people do think the 
same, in India not (at all!)” (CarCo-B-2). In HN’s experience, working modes differed 
between Germany and India. Gradually, the German CarCo team started to work directly 
with Indians (Figure 54). SPB came in December 1996 to Germany, and returned for a 
period in February 1997. In March 1997, MD took on his role as technical liaison. During 
this phase, Germans and Indians experienced more directly each other’s culture. Before 
that, BW had bridged the diverse contexts (Figure 67).  
 
One of the differences between the way Germans and Indians work is that the former 
prefer sequential, linear processes. For instance, first planning and then execution. Or 
someone needs input from another person for his task, he should wait until he receives an 
answer. To Indians, these steps were considered more intermingled. This caused friction 
with the German team. 
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“The Indians make no differentiation between planning and executing. Maybe it is a 
culture thing, maybe it is training. This week we had something like this again. The 
test results were send to India and we got some questions back. When we sent the 
answers back we found out that they already had started programming and that they 
couldn't change it because they already had programmed it. Maybe it's a 
management/ organizational issue. The team now consists of 18 people. 18 people 
need strong management. They don't have a leader. [SM is the project leader] Before 
SM we had RG. RG was sent away because the data model did not come. Now we 
have SM and the software doesn't come.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
Upon reflection, HN was not sure whether collaborative tensions should be attributed to 
cultural differences or the way SoftHouse India operated as an organization. He explained 
that leadership in the Indian team seemed wanting. Not only because they worked with a 
group of around 18 people. But also because many team members were just graduates from 
technical studies and working on their first job. They missed experience with planning, 
standards and interpersonal collaboration. This gap impacted local performance and the 
way they interacted with onshore personnel.  
 
“I think it is not a cultural problem, it is more or less an experience problem. They 
(SoftHouse India employees - author) are simply hired from the university. It is maybe 
their first or second job, when you do not have much experience, working in larger 
projects, maybe also not in working in a group, as a group. So they are individuals, 
have good knowledge in technical skills, as individuals, but I think the gap is the 
organization, the procedures, the standards, the working together, how do we 
approach a project. They do not have experience in that area and that’s causing major 
problems.” - HN, CarCo-B-3 
 
MB was responsible for data modeling in the German team. As far as the kick-off phase of 
Goldd is concerned, he was surprised that the Indian partner was hardly introduced. The 
setup with liaisons meant that the onshore - offshore contact was always mediated, so that 
no relationships were built like with the US team. 
 
“In the project we have not been given time to get information about India. We only 
have time for the project. From the company there is no intention, like: “We have a 
new strategy “outsourcing”, your partner is in India and we will give an introduction. 
We did have something with the American colleagues when they were in Cologne, a 
social event, dinner together. It could be helpful to do the same with partner.” - MB, 
CarCo-C-3 
 
Like HN, he had observed differences between German and Indian codes of conduct. 
Indians, he asserted, are used to less direct interpersonal exchanges. When they cannot or 
do not want to do something, they will hesitate to mention that. Instead of telling someone 
directly, they may ask additional questions. This is probably perceived from their side as 
politeness. Germans, on the other hand, appreciate discussions that reflect someone’s 
interests and capabilities in a more straightforward manner. This implies a stronger 
connection between what people communicate and what they really think or expect. To 
them, the Indian approach was not perceived as politeness but rather as lacking 
transparency. They perceived it as less effective and efficient, which in turn caused 
friction.  
 
“The difference I think is in the national culture. We don't act the same due to [CarCo] 
culture, but to “Western” culture. Until three years ago, we didn't know [CarCo] US. 
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Global was European. The main difference is the national culture. Like BJ said, 
Indians never say “No”. They will never tell you that they can't do something. Like I 
have never seen SPB disagree with HN. I would like to see him disagree. I would like 
to see them tell that. For us it is different: SPB came with all the knowledge about 
workflow and security and we would say: “No”, in an arrogant way. The Indians will 
come back with questions, because they cannot do it or because they do not like it.” - 
MB, CarCo-C-1 
 
MB observed this difference with Indians, not Americans. Based on his experience, he 
suggests that Western (including Europe and US) and Eastern (e.g., India) cultures differ. 
This applies in particular to the linkage between what people think and what they 
communicate. He relates these differences to national cultures, and not CarCo or 
SoftHouse organizational cultures:  
 
“[CarCo] culture is not a common thing, at least not very important. For my experience 
it is more the national culture. We do not know what they are thinking in the Eastern 
countries because they all say "Yes”. Like the example with SPB. But it is dangerous 
to make common statements about them. You should be working in the Indian team 
like BJ to know.” - MB, CarCo-C-3 
 
Another aspect of diversity is language. Although people use English as common 
language, they have their own version. Some may experience difficulty when English is 
not their mother tongue: “You must consider that we have British English and American 
English between [CarCo] and [SoftHouse]. We are not on the same language level as 
German is our native language” (CarCo-C-3). Upon reflection on his Goldd experience, 
MB says he would prefer working with people from Western cultures (CarCo-C-1). This 
would ensure commonality of people’s outlook and behaviors and smoothen (remote) 
collaboration (Grant, 1996b; Krauss & Fussell, 1990). 
 
§ 10.3.9.2  CarCo US Perspective 
From the US team, JF talked about her perspective on diversity in the Goldd project. It was 
her first opportunity to work with CarCo colleagues from Germany. After she joined the 
project, she worked for some time remotely with HH and HN. This appeared cumbersome 
as JF explains:  
 
“At the beginning there was a very big difference. I even thought it was scary, it did 
not know how long we could last working together. They are very rigid, very 
controlled.” - JF, CarCo-D-2  
 
Early 1996, face-to-face meetings in Cologne worked as ice breakers. As people from both 
sides got to know each other, they developed a more open collaborative style. For 
interactions with American team members, the Germans adapted in a sense their 
behavioral protocols. This was probably easier than the other way around:  
 
“Later they were more relaxing, they were more open after I had been there. I kick on 
it when HN sends me a joke. We really had to grow into it. Here in the US we do not 
have so much contact with other cultures. Over there (in Europe - author), it is easier 
to get into contact with other cultures. So we are not really used to other cultures. 
Maybe it is harder for everybody to work with us. But the US is more open, jovial. 
Joking on the side helps us to get the work done.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
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On a corporate level, JF claims that CarCo has distinct culture: “There is a definitely a 
[CarCo] culture. As for [SoftHouse], I haven't had any contact, I would not know what 
their culture would be” (CarCo-D-2). CarCo sites across the world display some form of 
similar mode of conduct. This provides a common background that facilitates international 
collaboration. According to JF, the corporate culture is strongly tied to CarCo locations. 
For people from outside - like SoftHouse - it is hardly possible to understand and learn the 
‘CarCo style of working’. A consequence of CarCo’s unicity is that collaboration with 
external partners is less efficient (Williamson, 1975). Still, outsourcing may be necessary 
because CarCo needs external knowledge or considers partnering financially attractive. 
 
“The [CarCo] culture is the same worldwide. This depends a little bit on recruitment, 
but not much. A lot of people who work here are agency people, and they work here 1 
or two years and are gone again. (…) I think the biggest thing is learning the [CarCo] 
style of working. It is easier and you can work faster if you know how to get things 
done. I do not want to call it politics though. And [SoftHouse] will never learn the 
[CarCo] way, because you have to be there to learn it.” - JF, CarCo-D-2 
 
§ 10.3.9.3  SoftHouse Liaison Perspective 
The SoftHouse liaisons were independent IT consultants with experience in international 
projects. They were hired by SoftHouse UK and had a British background. In the case of 
BW, this led to conflicts with the Indian team members in Bangalore. As earlier described, 
BW did not fully realize his role as consultant - not boss - to the Indian SoftHouse 
organization. He did not handle team members there respectfully, as SPB and MD reported 
to HH and HN.69  
 
“BW and NK were hired by [SoftHouse] UK, they had never seen [SoftHouse] India, 
they had probably never been in India. The British - Indian culture: they were fighting 
each other. The Indian team would say that they are independent, they won't listen. 
They are annoyed by someone there telling them what to do. (…) Indians are very 
proud, they don't want outside advice.” - HN, CarCo-B-1 
 
BJ operated with more respect and cross-cultural awareness. He mentioned that people 
from the various Goldd sites operate in a different manner: “All three have a different 
mind-set. The US is more laid back, the Germans want to do everything according to the 
book or the plan, the English are more parochial (because of empire)” (CarCo-H-1). 
According to him, SoftHouse did not really have a corporate culture. The organization is 
rather built up from independent local or regional units.  
 
On a practical level, BJ had to deal with remote telephone conversations with the offshore 
leaders in Bangalore. This appeared challenging at times, but only in part because of the 
technology: “The problems we encounter with the telephone, that is a cultural thing” 
(CarCo-H-1). In her logs, AC describes two events that illustrated these differences. The 
                                                 
69 This quote is from a German CarCo team member. It is used in this section on the 
liaison’s perspective since data from BW does not cover the point made here for obvious 
reasons. 
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first one took place late January 1997 after BJ had just arrived in Cologne (AC log January 
20-24, 1997). It took BJ a long time to reach his contact person in India. Related to that, BJ 
and people in India seemed to hold different views on what constitutes a normal telephone 
conversation. This returns in the description of the second event, the triple site audio 
conference in March 1997 (AC logs March 1997).Confusion on both sides seems the result 
of different norms and expectations. People try to connect but operate according to 
dissimilar protocols. These concern for instance speed and timing of talking, and planning 
and preparation of synchronous communication moments. BJ explained that working with 
Indians is difficult for people from Europe and the US if they do not know about the 
particularities of that culture (CarCo-H-2). Even with his extensive experience, this 
remained challenging.  
 
§ 10.3.9.4  SoftHouse India Perspective 
The Indian perspective is represented through interviews with SPB and MD while they 
were in Cologne. When talking with SPB, he seemed aware of cultural differences with the 
German and American teams. He did not attribute these to people’s national cultures, and 
not their organization: “Corporate culture is not a key factor. We work in the same way but 
differences are caused by national culture” (CarCo-E-2).  
 
SPB elaborates on the way his site in India operations. He explains that oral instructions 
and interactions have an important role in Indian office culture, at least as important as 
documentation:  
 
“In India oral instructions are used much more. Oral instructions are as important as 
written ones. We do not need a prove that we have told somebody something. If we 
accept an oral instruction, it is logical that we are committed to it. I do not have to 
prove that I am committed in writing. The good thing about oral communication is that 
you have a good product fast. The bad thing is that you do not have a global overview. 
For example Sales and P&A codes. Only some people really work with that. With oral 
instruction you only do justice to the one who says what, not to the others who do not 
say something.” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
As long as BW operated as linking pin in Germany, Indians could maintain their way of 
working. Their team was in a sense shielded from the Germans. This changed after BW 
left.70 BJ replaced him early 1997 and needed assistance for liaising on technical areas. 
When he received help from SPB and MD, it was for the first time that German and Indian 
team members connected directly. They started to notice that people were used to vastly 
different ways of collaborating. As SPB’s quote suggests, Indians were used to oral 
instructions. They did not attach much value to ex ante planning and formalizing work 
commitments. Once SPB worked directly with Germans in Cologne, he could compare this 
mode with the way Germans worked, and comment on pros and cons of each style: 
 
“If you have it on paper you can see why other people may also have importance in 
the subject. With documents it is more clear, you have more overview. You can put all 
                                                 
70 Probably, bridging cultural diversity added to the stressfulness of BW’s role.  
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the papers on your desk and have an overview and analyze. But with documents you 
can delay the work. When you get an oral instruction you can carry it out immediately, 
without thinking about other aspects. This can be ‘dangerous’ as you do not see the 
overview. And you tend to forget part of it, when you have an oral instruction.” - SPB, 
CarCo-E-1 
 
Formalization and documentation of work processes has advantages, like providing an 
overview. But it can also slow down work flows compared to the Indian way. Differences 
surfaced also in the way meetings are organized and conducted. In the Indian SoftHouse 
team, organization of meetings is ad hoc. People do not stick too strictly to starting times. 
This was in stark contrast with the way things worked in Germany. From SPB’s Indian 
perspective, Germans consider scheduled meetings almost sacred. They must take place 
even if there is little reason for doing so, and people must be there sharply on time.  
 
“For example, in Germany they will hold a meeting at three and everybody is there 
sharp at three, although there is nothing to talk about and no agenda. If you come one 
minute late that is not good. We are not as timely as the Germans, 15:00 = 15:00.” - 
SPB, CarCo-E-2  
 
According to SPB, Germans value a procedural, systematic mode of working. Expectations 
are laid down in documents, like workflow schemes, plannings and worksheets. These 
documents take on a pivotal role in collaborative and managerial processes. Indian customs 
are almost diametrically opposed to this. They prefer less ex ante structuring of processes 
and rely on oral instructions.  
 
“In Germany it is not the results that matters but the procedures. Germans want 
everything systematic according to the book, no matter how long it may take. India 
works quicker but less systematic. (…) We do have results, but maybe because of the 
less systematic way we work there is no appreciation. (…) For example we don't see 
the need to give everybody a worksheet with what they have to do, we just tell them 
what to do and most of the time they do it.” - SPB, CarCo-E-2  
 
Based on his experience, SPB considers Germans extremely structured and methodical, 
more than Americans: “The Germans are more methodical than the Americans, the Indians 
are less methodical than the Americans” (CarCo-E-2). Given the contrasts depicted here, 
an intriguing question is how people deal with them when they must connect without a 
liaison. According to SPB, the German and Indian must somehow adopt a middle course: 
“We have to meet in the middle of the German and the Indian team” (CarCo-E-2). In 
practice, the Indian teams adapted to some extent to the more formal, structured German 
way. Internally, they continued utilizing oral instructions. But for instance audio 
conferencing meetings with Germany are planned instead of held spontaneously. Similarly, 
task commitments are documented as far as Germans or Americans are concerned.  
 
“In India, formerly we held spontaneous meetings, now we work more with agenda's 
like for example for the audio conference with Germany.” - SPB, CarCo-E-2 
 
“In the team they still do not work with written commitments, only the team leader 
does the written part, for the Westerners. If somebody does not understand a certain 
task, somebody else will do that work. The team leader gives everybody the work he 
can handle. It seemed that programmers can even have a say in that, however this is 
somewhat restricted as some programmers prefer to do only the easy work and others 
prefer to do only the challenging work. Most of the work was separated into business 
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parts and 1 person would do one specific core-area. Like dealer, search screen, 
individual, owner, etc ...” - SPB, CarCo-E-1 
 
Within their own team, Indians sustained their own customs. On top of that, they 
developed a sort of adaptive layer when dealing directly with Germans, either remotely or 
face-to-face in Germany. This is illustrated in Figure 68. The German and Indian contexts 
are no longer bridged by a separate liaison, like earlier with BW (Figure 67). As a 
substitute for that, Indians partially modify local operations to facilitate connectivity to the 
German or American contexts.  
 
 
Figure 68 - Direct cross-cultural contact with unilateral adaptation 
 
Reasons for unilateral instead of bilateral adaptation are not clear. It could be that 
SoftHouse as vendor has to adapt to their customer’s expectations. More generally 
speaking, researchers have claimed that remote collaboration demands a more formal 
interaction mode (Meadows, 1996b; Millar, 1999). It would probably work better to adopt 
formalizing practices in India than to expect CarCo sites to get used to informal, oral 
processes.  
 
Like the Germans, SPB noticed some impact of linguistic diversity in the Goldd project. 
This relates to people’s idiosyncratic use of the English language. Slight nuance 
differences trigger additional information loops for clarification: 
 
“Occasionally we have problems with the language, but this is not a major factor. 
Once for example to SM (Offshore Project Manager - author) wrote that he had doubts 
about the program. BW noticed that he did not mean doubts, but that he meant some 
small questions. Usually language misunderstandings are solved easily.” - SPB, 
CarCo-E-1 
 
Like SPB, MD elaborates on the way people collaborate in SoftHouse’s Goldd team in 
Bangalore, India. She explains that people work extended working days and appreciate a 
relaxed, fun-filled atmosphere.  
 
“We do a lot of overtime work, but this is only for the software branch, only at 
[SoftHouse]. Indians are hard workers, they work on Saturdays and also on Sundays. 
But that is not really a problem because most of us are young and unmarried, and 
they do not have anything to do on Sundays. (…) We have a lot more fun (probably 
compared to the German site where MD works at the time of the interview - author). 
Each person of the team brings something to eat and we fight about it, we sing, we 
listen to the radio and we get the work done. And teasing is a big thing too, they are 
teasing all the time.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
She point out that hierarchical ties and role definitions are not defined in a very strict 
manner. Control processes rely on team work rather than pre-defined managerial reporting.  
 
“Nobody controls me ... VA? (team leader) (…) Yes maybe to VA. No, I report to SM. 
The hierarchy is not very fixed, it is all very informal.” - MD, CarCo-F-1  
German/ US context
Indian adaptive layer 
for Germany/ US
Indian context
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MD notices that this style contrasts with CarCo Germany and to some extent the American 
team. Germans expect people to adhere to rules and agreements. For instance, SoftHouse 
deliveries should contain a header and arrive sharply on time. To Indians, this required 
adaptation: 
 
“If we are in an emergency, we would sent a document without a header, but the 
Germans will not even look at that. Like we have a delivery at 9 AM, and BW is still 
trying to download at 9 AM that is not good. Everything has to be sharp, 9:05 AM is 
not good. We never made a delivery to the Americans, but I think they are not as strict 
as the Germans.” - MD, CarCo-F-1 
 
§ 10.3.9.5  Reflection 
From the kick-off phase of Goldd onward, CarCo teams in the US and Germany 
collaborated directly. They experienced each others’ differences and learnt to deal with 
these. Collocated meetings supported this process. Between the German and Indian teams, 
the initial setup with liaisons covered cultural differences. This changed when a transition 
took place towards more direct contact. Striking differences surfaced, centered around the 
role of formalization, documentation, and planning. Table 47 attempts to give an overview 
of the three teams’ way of working based on available data. The rows shows - as far as 
possible - people’s perception of other sites. From an American and Indian point of view, 
Germans operate very methodical. Germans on the other hand are confused and sometimes 
irritated by Indians’ hesitance to “tell things like they are”, especially when something is 
unfeasible.  
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Table 47 - Cultural diversity and perceptions in the Goldd project 
 
 
German perspective 
 
 
 
Normal 
 
N.A. 
Confusing, lacking 
transparency, 
disconnected with 
reality, ineffective/ -
efficient 
 
American perspective 
 
 
 
Rigid, controlled 
 
Normal 
 
N.A. 
 
Indian perspective 
 
 
 
Strict, linear 
 
Less formal than 
Germans 
 
Normal 
 German way of 
collaborating: 
 
Linear processes, “tell it 
like it is”, strong 
management, planning, 
formalization and 
documentation, 
methodical 
American way of 
collaborating: 
 
Jovial, relaxed, less 
formal and compared 
to Germans 
Indian way of 
collaborating: 
 
Oral instructions, ad 
hoc processes, 
politeness, hesitant to 
“tell it like it is” 
 
Bridging cultural diversity seemed to proceed quite well between the American and 
German teams. People developed good working relationships. This was possibly helped by 
their membership of the same organization, and the limited differences between American 
and German culture (both are considered examples of Western, North Atlantic culture). It 
seems that Germans adopted a more relaxed style when dealing with Americans.  
With India, things were more difficult. People started to connect directly rather late in the 
project. More fundamental differences seemed to exist along various dimensions. This 
induced Indians to adapt a more German or perhaps Western oriented style when dealing 
with CarCo. The local teams in Bangalore did not change internal modes of interaction. 
 
The CarCo case is concluded and cross-analyzed with the DiskCo case in Chapter 11  . 
 492
 
PART 4  INTEGRATIVE ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this part, we bring together results from our empirical and theoretical work. We 
concluded the latter with a framed analysis of current literature. Our empirical studies were 
analyzed from an interpretive point of view. We intend to bring these results one step 
further in a positivist sense (Lee, 1991). To this end, the next chapters connects the case 
studies to our initial conceptual lens. This answers our research questions and points at 
areas where we complement current research. The chapter starts with an extended 
conceptual lens that reflects these areas. It offers a more complete and relevant mode for 
analyzing the impact of global distributedness on coordination and control processes. The 
part concludes with a chapter that condenses insights from the preceding chapter, and 
translates these into a practitioner-oriented format.  
 
Chapter 11  Integrative Framing of Case Studies 
 
In the first part of this thesis we related the empirical section to the following research 
questions: 
 
3a. What is the impact of global distributedness on the way people coordinate and 
control their work in global software projects? 
 
and  
 
3b. How does global distributedness impact the way people coordinate and control 
their work in global software projects? 
 
The first sub question refers to ways in which global distributedness impacts coordination 
and control processes. The second one focuses more on the process by which this impact 
materializes. In this chapter, we bring together theory and empirical research. We use the 
outcome of the theory section to frame results from our two case studies. This answers not 
only the two sub questions. It also shows where and how we can extend current literature. 
Our qualitative case study design was intended to include an exploratory element, i.e., 
seeking for new ways to look at the impact of global distributedness on collective action. 
This extension recurs throughout this chapter, that is structured as follows.  
 
First, we discuss three themes that exceeded the five gaps from our conceptual lens: 
perception and concepts versus realism; ex ante coordination and control mechanisms; and 
task urgency and criticality. The themes point at factors that made our explanation more 
complete, and helped us to better answer the research questions. They also extend literature 
- to our knowledge, current research had not paid explicit attention to them.  
Second, we pick up out discussion of the gaps - Geographical distance, time zone 
differences, cultural diversity, governance differences and infrastructural differences. 
Starting from the outcome of our literature study, we explore the empirical data in an 
integrative manner. Governance differences are discussed in the context of geographical 
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distance and cultural diversity. The latter section is broader than just differences or 
national or organizational culture. It includes lingual issues and operational diversity.  
 
Based on the integrative analysis, we extended our conceptual lens as depicted in Figure 69 
(compare with the original version in Figure 37). The dotted boxes show two of the themes 
that we have included - perception and concepts versus realism; and ex ante coordination 
and control mechanisms. The former impacts task contingencies. For instance, people may 
underestimate task dependence and uncertainty (CarCo case). It also changes coordination 
and control mechanisms. People’s understanding of a project influences their portfolio 
choice. The second theme also relates to task contingencies and portfolios. Prior 
collaboration reduces task uncertainty (DiskCo case). It also impacts how people 
coordinate and control. For instance, working relationship foster goal congruence and 
reduce the necessity of control (Gabarro, 1990). Finally, the conceptual lens includes a 
new task contingency: task urgency and criticality. We found that these factors impacted 
communication modes in the DiskCo and CarCo case.  
 
 
Figure 69 - Conceptual lens (an extension of Figure 37) 
 
Ex ante coordination 
& control mechanisms
Perception & concepts 
versus realism
Portfolio of 
Coordination mechanisms
Portfolio of 
Control mechanisms
Gaps:
-Geographic distance
-Time zone differences
-Governance 
-Culture
-Infrastructure
Contingencies:
-Differentiation & interdependence
-Uncertainty
-Observability
-Work unit size
-Complexity
-Functional differences
-Goal incongruence
Global distributedness
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§ 11.1  Themes 
 
In this section we present three themes that complement the gaps. They seemed 
indispensable for understanding coordination and control processes in the two case studies. 
A first theme concerns discrepancy between people’s perception or concept of a project, 
i.e., their ex ante approach. And on the other hand, what we refer to as realism - people’s 
day-to-day experience once the project has started. Discrepancy between these two imply 
for instance that a project plan underestimates learning curves (DiskCo). Or 
communications structure do not match information processing needs (CarCo case). We 
assess consequences of discrepancies and adaptation modes, to our knowledge one of the 
first times in literature. A second theme pays attention to ex ante coordination and control 
mechanisms. People leveraged on various forms of collaborative experience, 
organizational practices, and other advantages. Especially for the DiskCo case, this 
compensated to a large extent for the challenges of remote collaboration during the project. 
The final theme - task urgency and criticality - constitutes an additional task contingency 
that explain communication patterns and media usage in a dispersed project. 
 
§ 11.1.1  Perception and Concepts versus Realism
71
 
Information Systems projects are known for their complexity. They often involve 
advanced technologies that demand novel approaches to coordination and project 
management (Brooks, 1997; Kraut & Streeter, 1995). For this reason, it is estimated that 
the majority of IS projects is late, and exceeds budgets. Task uncertainty obviates a 
realistic assessment of resources, activities and timing (Nidumolu, 1995). It necessitates 
interpersonal coordination mechanisms that consume time and other resources in unknown 
quantities. we observed this phenomenon in our case studies. They confronted us with 
discrepancy between on the one hand people’s assumptions and estimates, and on the other 
hand ‘what it really took’. Inexeperiencedness of project participants may have contributed 
to a rosy picture of activities (somehow, not an overestimation). Anticipation of a project 
was often drive by short time horizons and tight budgets. This led to commitments that 
could not be met. Once people were en route, a more realistic perspective began to dawn 
that required adjustment of key project parameters. We assess the role and impact of this 
phenomenon in the context of the two dispersed projects (see also Figure 69).  
 
 
DiskCo 
In the late 1990s, DiskCo was confronted like many firms with the Y2K problem. Before 
mid 1999, they had to modify or replace their existing MANMAN infrastructure. Company 
executives decided to roll out Oracle across their dispersed sites. A common source code 
underlined their transition towards globally standardized processes. The case study shows 
                                                 
71 ‘Realism’ is used in this section as inter-subjective understanding. That is, the 
reseacher’s interpretation of empirical data from multiple interviewees. ‘Perception’ and 
‘concepts’ refer to the mindset of individuals and groups. We focus here in particular on 
situations where realism and perception/ concepts seem to deviate.  
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that the project’s deadline of mid 1999 confronted people with an aggressive schedule in 
the Far East. Some conversions were almost organized in parallel. Executives in the US 
and Singapore underestimated the fact that Far East operations differed from earlier US 
conversions. The large volume required modification of know-how build around smaller 
R&D facilities in the US. This lengthened learning curves for the first Far East 
implementations. People also underestimated the unique requirements of some sites in 
China and Malaysia. Government regulations impacted local applications that required 
special interfaces to Oracle. The VP IT from Singapore site A maintained regular contact 
with people involved in local implementations. This way, he picked up their concerns and 
contacted his boss to request changes to the original plan. It appeared that the investment 
of somewhat more time on Singapore’s first implementation accelerated subsequent 
projects. This was not realized in advance, but resulted from monitoring actual projects and 
adjusting initial perceptions.  
 
 
CarCo 
More serious discrepancies emerged in the CarCo case. Interviewees repeatedly stressed 
that management underestimated the project and lacked realism. Like with DiskCo, the 
Goldd project started with an aggressive schedule. Its low budget left little room for cross 
site visits and connecting technologies, even though people faced several ‘firsts’, like first 
time offshore outsourcing, first time US - Germany collaboration, first time to work with 
client/ server technology, and so forth. Goldd’s organizational setup relied on liaisons to 
handle all contacts between offshore and onshore. It was assumed that knowledge could be 
transferred as a temporary one-way flow from onshore to offshore through these persons 
and with the help of minimal documentation. This underestimated the fact that offshore 
personnel was not familiar with customer requirements, and could offer suggestions to 
CarCo users. To make things worse, SoftHouse had agreed on a contract with fixed budget 
and planning. This contrasted with their lack of insight in what it would take to design and 
deliver the Goldd system. Likewise, the CarCo project manager perceived the relationship 
with SoftHouse in a simplistic manner. He rushed into the project without carefully 
considering the vendor and establishing inter-organizational ties. Assuming little 
dependence and uncertainty, the manager basically ignored the offshore team. He did not 
put control mechanisms in place since he trusted the vendor’s ISO certification and track 
records.  
 
As things turned out, Goldd was not a simple system, consisting of some functionality 
around a database. The project manager found his job too much for a single person to 
handle. The onshore - offshore chain lacked the capacity to support reciprocal knowledge 
exchange. This dried up resources for the Indian team and made their job hardly feasible. 
Especially since they were not involved in the analysis phase. When their deliveries were 
late and below par, the companies struggled with the almost classical contract that did not 
match the nature of the project work. The unrealistic setup increased tensions, both within 
the two organizations and between them.  
Makeshift measures were taken, like increasing pressure on the liaison and SoftHouse UK 
management. The CarCo project manager implemented daily output controls. This 
compensated for his blindly trusting the onshore liaison and ignoring the offshore group. 
Gradually, the communication structure was changed. An Indian offshore team member 
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joined in the second prototyping feedback session. Later, he reinforced the onshore liaison. 
This promoted more extensive and direct contact. It altered the interface funneling between 
CarCo and SoftHouse.  
 
Looking back, people proposed several modifications to the original setup. They had 
wanted more formalization, controls and face-to-face contact (i.e., traveling). Interviewees 
aired concern on the low budget and rapid kick off phase. They realized the complexity of 
the system. This would justify common planning and extensive communications needs 
between the offshore team and CarCo staff. The liaison role in Germany seemed not 
realistic. And offshore staff should have been involved much earlier and more directly in 
the analysis phase. All this showed the inappropriateness of initial perceptions of the 
projects, and the concept for organizing (remote) collaboration. It lacked realism. 
 
§ 11.1.2  Ex Ante Coordination and Control Mechanisms 
While working on the DiskCo and CarCo case, it became apparent that ex ante 
coordination and control mechanisms played an important role during the project. With ‘ex 
ante’ we mean the period preceding the project, even before any planning or business 
analysis. It is an example of a temporal - or perhaps process - perspective on coordination 
and control mechanisms that is starting to receive more attention (Bardram, 2000).  
In our initial conceptual lens, we did not yet realize and include these mechanisms. Like 
most researchers, we adopted a variance theory perspective that does not consider the 
impact of time on coordination and control processes (Mohr, 1982). The case studies 
convinced us to modify that stance. In fact, looking back, however, we did find a few hints 
in Meadows’ 1996) work. Her interviewees (Indian vendor personnel) stressed the 
importance of having been in the US on prior occasions. They indicated that past 
opportunities of immersion enhanced people’s ability to interact with US counterparts. 
Interviewees did not refer to working relationships per se, but a generic know-how 
pertaining to the US context (Meadows, 1996b: 87, 109).  
 
DiskCo 
In the case of DiskCo, we found that ex ante coordination and control mechanisms defined 
collaborative processes during the Oracle project. We went back to the work of some 
scholars with an eye for this temporal dimension. This informed our subsequent analysis of 
the DiskCo and CarCo case.  
Several forms of ex ante mechanisms can be distinguished. We framed these using the 
integrative perspective on coordination mechanisms that was proposed in the theory 
section. First, work-based coordination mechanisms include ex ante standards and norms 
(NASA, 1999), and experience with a collaborative task (Carlson & Zmud, 1999). Second, 
we related coordination by organization design to Williamson’s (1981) organizational 
advantage. Before starting on a project, people may have collaborated for some time in the 
same organizational context. They have become familiar with idiosyncratic customs like 
norms, protocols, and control approaches (Moran & Ghoshal, 1996; Williamson, 1981). 
Third, in the area of technology-based coordination, Carlson and Zmud (1999) mentioned 
that people’s ex ante proficiency with an electronic communication medium determines the 
richness of their experience at a later point of time. Fourth, inter-personal coordination 
mechanisms refer to common knowledge bases (Grant, 1996b; Krauss & Fussell, 1990) 
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and working relationships (Gabarro, 1990). Common knowledge in areas like language and 
specialized task domains “enhance the efficiency and intensity of communication” (Grant, 
1996b). Working relationships result from collaborative experiences. They lead to mutual 
orientation and communication efficiency (Bryman et al., 1987; Gabarro, 1990).  
In sum, ex ante mechanisms of various forms substitute for coordination and control 
efforts during accomplishment of a project. They economize collaborative processes in the 
sense that less effort is needed for achieving coherent collective action. 
 
With the Oracle project, DiskCo took on a very novel task that had to completed in a short 
time frame. Without ex ante mechanisms, this would have demanded excessive 
information processing. It may even have been impossible. Yet DiskCo had several 
advantages as an international firm. They had already a sophisticated infrastructure in 
place, with remote server access, Lotus Notes groupware, and a corporate intranet. People 
were used to a network of lease lines that supported remote communications. They had 
worked together locally and across sites on earlier IT projects. This had established a 
common application and hardware infrastructure (even though applications were locally 
customized). Turnover in the Far East was low; many people worked for years at DiskCo 
and established bonds with peers moving up the career ladder. They knew who does what 
at which site, and were familiar with common norms and expectations. The VP IT 
reinforced this advantage by selecting only seasoned DiskCo staff for the Oracle project 
teams. All this made (remote) collaboration very easy. Even though the project itself posed 
a major challenge, people did not have to pay much attention to the (dispersed) 
collaborative process itself.  
 
CarCo 
People involved in the Goldd project were not in the same position. We discuss the internal 
CarCo and SoftHouse organization, and after that interfacing between the companies. 
Within the CarCo organization, transnational collaboration existed on a managerial level. 
A sort of buddy network had emerged similar to DiskCo. But to staff it was the first time 
that they collaborated across the Atlantic. They had to establish rapport for the first time, 
though some form of corporate culture facilitated this process. Technically speaking, an 
international IT infrastructure existed but without DiskCo’s sophistication and 
commonality (e.g., no groupware).  
 
SoftHouse India consisted mainly of recent technical graduates with little collaborative 
experience. The company itself did not enforce extensive standardization and quality 
control processes, although they were somehow ISO certified. The vendor could not rely 
on earlier developed off-the-shelves modules, and had limited technical resources at its 
disposal - IT development tools, mainframe, telecommunications connections to Europe 
and US.  
 
To CarCo’s Goldd teams, offshore outsourcing was a first-time event. They did not have 
experience with remote partners and inter-organizational collaboration. Relationships 
between the companies did not exist, nor did they have advanced tele-collaboration 
technology in place. CarCo relied heavily on SoftHouse’s expertise in different areas - 
organization, communications, and technology. Many of Goldd’s technology were 
completely new to them. As things turned out, CarCo and SoftHouse rushed into the 
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project without realizing their lack of ex ante mechanisms. Instead of investing in mutual 
understanding and resources, they relied on a liaison as exclusive interface.  
 
Summarizing, we state that ex ante coordination and control mechanisms help us to 
understand the Oracle and Goldd project in a more complete manner. They reduce task 
uncertainty and novelty. People can rely on existing relationships, routines, and 
technology. This brings a self explanatory coherence to a project that frees up resources to 
focus on unknown facets. Ex ante mechanisms may also foster realism. Confronted with a 
novel task, people may assess more precisely what it takes, and adapt accordingly. Figure 
69 captures these impacts with three arrows that start from the box with ex ante 
coordination and control mechanisms.  
 
§ 11.1.3  Task Urgency and Criticality 
One of the new findings in our case studies is the impact of task urgency and criticality. 
Under these conditions, people modified their contact and communication patterns. This 
related to geographical distance and time zone differences. We included the constructs as 
another form of task contingencies, see Figure 69. In this section we explore their role in 
the DiskCo and CarCo case.  
 
DiskCo 
DiskCo’s Oracle conversions were temporarily constrained by the Y2K problem. Mid 
1999 Oracle had to be up and running since the existing systems would no longer operate 
normally. This increased pressure. It increased the challenge of implementing the system 
that was completely new to the DiskCo organization. On top of that, Oracle expertise was 
in the US since the first implementations had taken place there. Pulling that know-how to 
the Far East required dealing with geographical distance and considerable time zone 
differences.  
Management in the Far East responded by getting closely involved in the implementation 
process. They closely monitored resource availability, learning processes and work 
progress. Regular, frequent communications ensured their up-to-date awareness. Managers 
- in particular the VP IT - visited site during critical phases. These included normally 
project kick off and the period around the go-live date. On-site presence facilitated rapid 
response and intervention. During the first implementations in the Far East, US experts 
stayed stand-by in their private time.  
The urgency of conversions encouraged proactive communications across sites. People 
updated others with new insights. They kept peers and management informed on their 
absence and provided private, mobile or other alternative contact information. Urgency and 
criticality promoted transition towards richer, more synchronous media like telephone or 
face-to-face contact. Under such conditions, people also tended to communicate more 
directly. For instance IT talking to users at another site without going through local IT 
counterparts. With US sites, time zone differences necessitated adaptation of working 
hours on either site to setup a call or attend to burning emails. People there were expected 
to synchronize their priorities with Far East sites, i.e., stay available. Interdependence and 
task urgency do not tolerate goal incongruence.  
 
CarCo 
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At first sight, CarCo’s outsourcing strategy placed most time pressure on the vendor. They 
were expected to complete the system in subsequent deliverables over Fall 1996. When the 
offshore teams could not meet deadlines, it set off a chain reaction. Model Office 2 was 
almost postponed, the third one was skipped altogether. This affected CarCo IT and users. 
For the US team it affected their schedule since their sites were slated for the first 
implementations.  
Task urgency impacted media choice. When MD worked onshore, she would call SPB 
instead of using email (Table 42). Time zone differences exacerbated the impact of task 
criticality. Indian teams would send over requests to Germany. From there problem solving 
could take days if the US team had to be consulted. For urgent cases, direct contact 
between US and Indian was unfeasible. This delayed problem solving (AC, CarCo-K-1).  
 
§ 11.2  Gaps 
 
Our conceptual lens distinguishes five gaps: geographical distance, time zone differences, 
cultural diversity, governance differences and infrastructural differences. Our theory 
review offers a starting point for exploring their impact on coordination and control 
processes. From there, we integrate our findings from the DiskCo and CarCo case. This 
shows where our empirical findings overlap with current literature, and where they offer 
new insights. In order to avoid redundancy, governance differences are discussed together 
with the first gap, geographical distance, and to some extent the cultural diversity gap.  
 
 
§ 11.2.1  Geographical Distance and Governance Differences 
In this section we discuss the impact of distance on coordination and control processes. We 
combine findings from the theory section with empirical case study data. Geographical 
distance is first of all related to the choice between face-to-face versus remote 
communications, and the use of electronic media. Second, we look at the organization of 
distributed collaboration. This topic is closely intertwined with governance differences, 
especially for the CarCo case. The gap refers to diversity between organizations or 
organizational units that operate in different countries. It is incorporated in this section on 
geographical distance to avoid overlap. Governance differences surface also in other sub 
sections here, and the one on cultural diversity. Third, we assess learning in a dispersed 
environment, and the role of documentation and technology as knowledge transfer 
mechanisms. The fourth and fifth sections explore how people plan, manage, and control 
geographically distributed projects. In particular for the CarCo case we explore how 
governance differences are dealt with. The final section assesses the adoption and use of 
development methodologies in a dispersed work environment. 
 
§ 11.2.1.1  Face-to-face versus Remote, Electronically Mediated Collaboration 
Geographical dispersion constitutes a special form of polycontextuality. It means that 
people work not only in different activity settings, but that these are physically separated 
such that frequent face-to-face meetings are unfeasible. In the theory section, we 
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investigated the impact of geographical dispersion on coordination and control patterns. 
We found that according to expectations distance reduces the frequency and richness of 
interpersonal contact. Inclusion in another context comes less naturally. Consequently, 
people are less aware of what is going on in another context. Transferring knowledge from 
one context to another one appears burdensome. Compared to a collocated office, people 
need to spend more time and effort to understand and accomplish tasks. All this would not 
matter if people worked independently. Yet global projects bring together participants 
from dispersed settings who are expected to coordinate their contributions as if they were 
worked collocated.  
Bringing coherence in this situation requires deliberate attention to cross-site connectivity. 
Mechanisms include electronically mediated contact, liaisons, on-site visits, and boundary 
objects (e.g., shared documentation). For many of these, people depend on technology. It 
offers on the one hand remote contact opportunities, and novel communication modes like 
cc-ing and broadcasting. On the other hand, electronic communications lack the multi-
modality, richness and sometimes interactivity of face-to-face contact. People share less 
freely and are not likely to build meaningful working relationships solely based on remote 
contact. At the same time, they require effort in terms of planning and preparing 
synchronous exchanges, or translating meaning into textual format. Researchers found that 
people need special skills and behaviors for effectively using electronic media. They must 
be capable of working on their own, and tend to work more formally. Remote contact has 
its limitations. Establishing the contours of a novel project benefits from collocated 
meetings, as do some tasks that demand complex interpersonal exchanges. This suggests a 
mix and match pattern of visits and remoteness. We continue this section with assessing 
the impact of dispersion in the DiskCo and CarCo case.  
 
DiskCo 
DiskCo’s Oracle project involved sites in the US and Far East region. Within the DiskCo 
organization, Singapore site A and Malaysia site A worked with US counterparts to learn 
from them and receive assistance. They passed on their expertise to sites in China, 
Malaysia and Japan. Singapore site A staff also worked temporarily with SysCo staff in 
India. We discuss here for these relationships how geographical distributedness impacted 
collaboration processes, and how people experienced technology for remote exchanges.  
 
 Singapore site A/ Malaysia site A and US sites 
Singapore site A (core team) and Malaysia site A (data conversion team) were the main 
point of contact for US experts. IT staff and key users from these Far East sites connected 
to their American counterpart to benefit from their experience. Because of the distance, 
people communicated mostly electronically. At the same time, face-to-face contact was 
considered vital. IT executives from around the world flew in to DiskCo’s HQ on a regular 
basis to discuss mutual concerns and policies. On a staff level, people appreciated face-to-
face visits for various reasons. Without having met their US colleague counterpart, people 
sometimes felt ignored. Apparently, remote exchanges (mostly email) made less of an 
impression. Face-to-face meetings on the other hand fostered informal conversations on a 
broader range of topics. When being on-site in the US, people were meeting a wide 
network of people. They appreciated collocated meetings because of their 
comprehensiveness and interactivity. Documents could be shown and discussed on the spot 
instead of exchanging multiple emails with attachments. This saved effort, in particular for 
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novel tasks or situations where people faced differences between local ways of working. 
Afterwards, meetings paid off: they smoothened and enriched remote conversations 
(Carlson & Zmud, 1999).  
 
 Singapore site A and Far East sites 
For communications within the Far East region, people from Singapore site A echoed the 
advantages of collocated communications. They could perceive more cues and therefore 
communicate more precisely. It was also easier to explain and clarify topics. People 
engaged in interlocked exchange loops that accelerated problem solving. Co-presence 
facilitated understanding of someone’s background. Subsequently, this made it easier for 
people to support their counterpart remotely, e.g., Singapore site A supporting someone in 
China. They could imagine and anticipate the context of their peer’s issues. Somehow, 
electronic media did not allow for a complete rendering of a local context. They required 
more effort in terms of interpretation and representation. In order to compensate for these 
properties, people had to communicate frequently, and learn to present their point in a clear 
manner. Remote collaboration thus consumed more time and effort, especially when 
people were using asynchronous media. People developed a more systematic, compressed 
way of collaborating. This reduced uncertainty and communications volume.  
Ideally, people had established rapport before the start of a project (see ex ante 
mechanisms in Figure 69). Such relationships increased the usefulness of electronic media, 
and thus decreased dependence on them. Visits played only a role in case of demanding 
collaborative situations, i.e., tasks characterized by complexity, novelty, or diversity. Or 
large groups of people that needed training. Without ex ante rapport, people preferred 
visits to establish a minimal level of mutual awareness.  
 
 Malaysia site A and Far East sites 
DiskCo staff from Malaysia site A was responsible not only for local implementations, but 
also for supporting data conversions at Far East sites. They experienced a difference 
between remote and collocated collaboration. On a distance, exchanges did not happen as 
naturally as they would at their own site. The risk was that people were less aware of what 
was going on at other sites while their activities were closely connected. They had to work 
in a tight schedule with often shared resources. To avoid unknown issues, people needed to 
invest more deliberately in updating their remote counterparts and receiving updates. At 
some point, people considered cross-site visits important to talk more extensively with 
colleagues and have a look at the local IT environment. This could be at the beginning of a 
project to understand a unique local situation, or during critical phases like around the go-
live date. Remote contact would not cater for the multitude of cues needed at that moment. 
People also preferred co-presence for larger meetings and those that included participants 
with different functional backgrounds. The same applies for support. Core team members 
indicated several advantages of having support personnel on-site instead of connecting to 
Singapore site A. Remote problem solving tends to take longer and demand more effort. 
People must launch more formally a request for assistance, instead of walking into a local 
office. Compared with Singapore site A, on-site staff was more naturally included in 
operations at Malaysia site A. It was easier for them to identify with a local problem 
situation. Besides, local support was their only job while Singapore site A was juggling 
priorities to support multiple sites.  
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 Singapore site A and SysCo India 
The core team in Singapore site A hired SysCo from India for assistance on development 
work early in the Oracle project. At the beginning of such an outsourcing relationships, 
DiskCo wanted vendor staff to come on-site. This facilitated them getting acquainted with 
the relevant DiskCo context - the local staff, company standards, requirements and IT 
infrastructure. Temporary on-site immersion established knowledge bases or socio-
cognitive capital. This reduced novelty and uncertainty, and thus dependence on 
interactions with Singapore site A staff. From then onwards, it seemed feasible to make the 
transition towards remote support. Still, support from India was not without problems. 
Even with remote network access, DiskCo staff experienced electronic media as 
constraining. They missed the multi-modality of face-to-face interaction, where they could 
provide a comprehensive explanation with diagrams and other resources. On a distance, 
they had to spend more time and effort to convey their problem. This correlated with the 
experiencedness of their programmer counterpart in India.  
 
Using electronic media 
Electronic media convey representations. People entrust their message to technical devices 
for subsequent processing and dissemination. Some media allow them to talk (phone, 
audio- an videoconferencing). Others demand less natural input, i.e., translation into 
textual or graphical format (email, documentation). By definition, electronic 
representations substitute imperfectly for face-to-face interpersonal exchanges. Yet often 
technology comprise the only feasible means for sustaining remote connectivity. It may 
even offer novel modes of communicating like broadcasting and cc-ing72 (Markus, 1994). 
We assess here how people experienced and used various forms of electronic media.  
 
 Phone calls and e-mail - Email provides anytime, anyplace exchange capabilities in 
document format. It does not disturb people on the receiving end, nor demand their 
real-time availability. Email supports replication of a message at little effort. DiskCo 
staff used email lists for connecting people with similar interests or professional 
involvement. They broadcasted and put people on cc to ensure information symmetry. 
The medium has its limitations too. Email is ‘lean’ in that it captures and transmits 
limited cues. This lack of communication quality boosts the volume of exchanges 
when complex or novel topics are discussed. For critical tasks, people suffer from 
their dependence on delayed feedback loops. They would prefer instantaneous contact, 
but this is sometimes not possible because of time zone differences. DiskCo staff 
developed an adapted communication mode by blending properties of email and 
phone calls (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). They submitted documents electronically to 
fuel and economize subsequent tele-conversations.  
 
 Audio- and videoconferencing - Audio conferencing connected simultaneously 
multiple parties, independent of their location. This fostered exchange between 
                                                 
72 Email applications offer the option to send a copy of an email message to someone else. 
This is referred to as ‘copy conform’ or ‘cc-ing’. 
 
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dispersed experts and problem owners. Lack of visual contact limited the number of 
people to avoid identification and coordination problems.  
Videoconferencing was not available at all DiskCo locations, nor was it very popular. 
The infrastructure lacked speed and synchronization of audio and visual signals. It 
could not capture and represent large numbers of actors. People missed document 
exchange and drawing capabilities as part of simulated face-to-face encounters. They 
had to reserve rooms in advance and spend considerable time preparing the meeting. 
Somehow, videoconferencing does not contribute much to establishing first-time 
rapport (Abel, 1990). For prolonged meetings, it appeared too tiresome. Taken 
together, people preferred alternative media like teleconference calls. 
 
 Multi-media: multi-faceted representation - Interviewees explained that they liked 
the multi-modality and richness of co-presence exchanges. In a limited time span, they 
could talk, look at each other, draw, show documents, simulate applications, and so 
forth. Most electronic media support only certain facets of such complex exchanges. 
Their lack of richness and/ or interactivity constrains the completeness of remote 
representations. People quoted the combination of NetMeeting and teleconferencing as 
an example of multi-modal communications for a limited number of people. They 
could interactively talk and work on the same application.  
 
 Factors contributing to the use of electronic media - DiskCo staff learned to cope 
with the properties and constraints of electronic media. First, they emphasized the 
important of working relationships. Knowing remote counterparts made it easier to 
determine whom to connect to. It lowered the threshold to electronic communications, 
and made these in fact less necessary. Relationships eliminated to a great extent meta-
communications (Watzlawick et al., 1967). They made it easier to digest a partner’s 
mediated communicative behaviors (Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Gabarro, 1990).  
Second, electronic contact benefited from common knowledge. That is, when both 
partners had a solid background in the area of their collective activity. This enabled 
them to focus on novel aspects instead of clarifying basics (Grant, 1996b).  
Third, remote exchanges demanded careful preparation, and explicitness. A remote 
counterpart may not be aware of someone’s issue and concerns. Or have difficulty 
understanding them because of their unique nature. He needs comprehensive 
information to imagine the context and urgency of an issue. People drafted 
comprehensive emails and structured their requests extensively to ensure 
completeness of their counterpart’s response.  
Fourth, DiskCo management stressed the importance of regular communications. 
They had frequent tele-meetings with subordinates, e.g., the VP IT and his directors in 
China and Malaysia. In addition, subordinates were expected to push information on 
local project progress. This way, management remained aware of progress at the 
various sites (Kurland & Egan, 1999). On a management and staff level, people held 
regular meetings to exchange experiences. This applied in particular to the kick off 
phase of a project, and subsequent critical phases, like around the go-live date. 
Regularity compensated for the loss of frequent, low-threshold contact that seemed 
easier to achieve within a single context (DiskCorp-D-1).  
Fifth, with asynchronous media, people missed the instantaneous feedback loops that 
characterize face-to-face and phone conversations. They depended on the receiver’s 
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willingness and ability to reply within reasonable time. Occasionally, the receiver had 
other priorities and left a message unanswered for some period of time. This increased 
tension when people worked under time pressure. They preferred a brief note that 
indicated at least when the receiver could help out.  
Finally, proactive communication attitudes were considered important. Dispersion 
lowers the frequency and extensiveness of exchanges. People are less aware of what is 
going on at remote site compared with their local setting. They may not know what 
expertise is available at different locations. On top of that, contexts change with 
people getting different roles, new projects coming out, and changes to standard 
practices. Handling such uncertainty in a dispersed environment called for proactive 
attitudes in two ways. People pushed information on changes in their work 
environment to others affected by this. Often this concerned dispersed communities of 
people with similar roles at different sites. They used distribution lists and the 
corporate intranet. At the same time, people with an issues were expected to connect 
to peers and pull relevant expertise.  
 
CarCo 
In the Goldd case, budgets for traveling were very tight, especially on the side of CarCo. 
US delegates visited Germany once. Conversely, German CarCo staff flew to Detroit for 
two prototyping feedback sessions (instead of the originally intended 3). And one team 
member crossed the Atlantic for discussing a complex issue with Americans and staff from 
SoftHouse India. Onshore liaisons flew on a couple of occasions to India. We investigate 
here for CarCo and SoftHouse respectively how people experienced and handled distance 
as compared to collocation.  
 
 CarCo perspective 
Interviewees from CarCo mentioned the loss of informal, frequent contact when working 
remotely. Remoteness constrained interpersonal contact. It made micro management from 
Germany to the US impossible. The team in Detroit worked on their own while updating 
the project manager in Germany. People tended to communicate more task oriented and in 
a structured manner than locally. Between the US and Germany, explicit agreements were 
made for document exchange and ownership. Like DiskCo interviewees explained, on a 
distance people cannot achieve the comprehensive modality of face-to-face meetings. 
CarCo staff indicated that remote conversations required more preparation and protocol. 
Remote communications lacked interactivity. Endless back and forth emails replace real-
time conversations. Cross-site interactions usually involved only a few people. It was not 
as ramified as in a local situation with large meetings. Those maintaining remote contact 
were responsible for updating local peers to avoid asymmetrical distribution of 
information. Occasional face-to-face contact was deemed vital for sustaining rapport. 
 
Indirect organizing played an even larger role between onshore and offshore. The Goldd 
project suffered initially from the impact of both distance and indirectness. Fear for 
confusion led to an exclusive channeling of interactions through the SoftHouse liaison in 
Germany. Direct contact between CarCo staff and offshore team members was assumed to 
make it difficult to assess the status of processes and documents. Remote communications 
were not only indirect but suffered from a limited range of available media too. People 
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used mainly fax and email. SoftHouse India did not have videoconferencing facilities, and 
(satellite) phone lines were noisy. 
As things turned out, funneling of communications led to insufficient contact. People were 
not aware of some meta-site dependencies and design standards. Later in the project, 
Indian team members came alternatingly onshore to strengthen the liaison role. This made 
the communication pattern more direct. The new liaison would work closer with CarCo 
personnel onshore and facilitate direct contact with his peers back in India. Looking back, 
the project manager had preferred onshore presence of the Indian team, or at least earlier 
onsite liaisons from that group. The prototyping approach called for strong interactions 
between the three IT groups (US, Germany and India), as well as more feedback sessions 
with users in Europe and US. 
 
 SoftHouse perspective 
From the angle of SoftHouse India personnel, distance impeded knowledge flows between 
sites. They could not talk face-to-face to CarCo users and IT, nor have a look at their 
current infrastructure. CarCo requirements were to some extent reflected in the data mode 
and PC-based prototype. But distance was not the only problem. Added to this was the 
indirect communications setup in the Goldd project. Taken together, CarCo and offshore 
vendor personnel did not establish relationships (Meadows, 1996b). They could not 
leverage on the relationship advantages like mutual commitment and knowledge, and 
communication efficiency (Carlson & Zmud, 1999; Gabarro, 1990). Quite late in the 
project did some vendor staff meet with CarCo staff. Their status as representatives 
included the responsibility for updating peers in Bangalore. Before that time, offshore team 
members depended on local team leaders and the onshore liaison to relay requests and pass 
on knowledge. This multi-node chain lacked speed, capacity and richness. To make things 
worse, the onshore - offshore link relied mostly on textual communications and some 
documentation. It could not convey CarCo expectations in a comprehensive manner and 
lacked interactivity. People assumed that know-how would flow only one-way to India, yet 
offshore experts could have made suggestions to CarCo users. They did so when meeting 
for the Model Office 2 in Detroit but that was late in the project. 
 
§ 11.2.1.2  Organizing for Distributed Collaboration 
Most studies on dispersed collaboration focus on student experiments (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner, 1998), relationships between managers and teleworkers (Kurland & Egan, 1999), 
and offshore outsourcing relationships (Meadows, 1996b; Millar, 1999). They focus on 
communications issues and remote interactions between a limited number of actors. Our 
studies seek to complement these findings. We explore not only how people communicate, 
but also why they communicate and how interactions are organized in a dispersed 
environment. In other words, we investigate interdependencies and communications 
structures in the DiskCo and CarCo case. 
 
DiskCo 
Interdependence has been a central notion in organization studies since some of the earliest 
scientists like Smith (Smith, 1793), Gulick (Gulick, 1937), and Barnard (Barnard, 1938). 
They pointed at the advantages of dividing work and assigning it to specialists, instead of 
single actors performing a complete process. Work division promoted efficiency and large 
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scale organizing. It had also made actors interdependent - they needed coordination to 
maintain overall coherence. Relying on systems theory, Thompson (1967) was among the 
first to point at several forms of dependence: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal. Van de 
Ven (1976) later added reciprocal interdependence. A group around Malone and Crowston 
expanded this work to some extent (Crowston, 1997; Malone et al., 1999). They suggested 
various forms and combinations of dependencies between actors, resources, and activities. 
In our study on DiskCo’s Oracle work, we found dependencies recognized in literature and 
a few others that often related to geographical dispersion. We briefly elaborate on these 
with an emphasis on information and knowledge flows. Next, we discuss how DiskCo 
handled them. 
 
First, interdependence existed between users and IT. This cross-functional relationship was 
reciprocal. The new system created uncertainty for users. They had to switch from 
MANMAN to Oracle without any knowledge to start from. This triggered knowledge 
flows from IT (and key users) to users. Conversely, IT had to model business processes. 
They pulled information from users and possibly suggested efficiency improvements to 
existing practices. Second, rolling out a single new resources like Oracle created 
dependencies among the different plants. We refer to this as standardization or 
commonality interdependence. People had similar issues and depended on the first site that 
solved these. Third, deploying a single source code leaded to a situation where any 
modification affected all other sites. This adaptation processes - or resource modification 
interdependence - needed coordination on a meta site level. Fourth, the sequentially 
arranged conversion scheme endowed sites asymmetrically with experience. Plants later in 
the pipeline depended on know-how from earlier projects. This would suggest a unilateral 
flows from experts to novices. Yet it was a reciprocal form of dependence: experts (in the 
US, later Singapore site A) could not automatically anticipate the novices’ situation (in 
China, Malaysia) because it usually differed from theirs. Finally, Singapore site A and 
Malaysia site A took on a central role in the Far East region. They supported other sites as 
a central resource. This resulted not only in assistance dependence, but also resource 
sharing dependence. Several sites pulled from the same central resources with scarce 
capacity.  
 
DiskCo developed several modes for handling the various forms of dependencies. We 
discuss these for different relationships partly here and partly in following sections.  
First, asymmetric knowledge existed between early implementors in the US and those in 
the Far East. This was resolved by local Oracle training and consultancy, thus reducing 
cross-site dependencies. Far East representatives were sent to the US to experience 
conversions first hand. Americans came over to the Far East to train their local 
counterparts. A recurrent principle is that people transfer knowledge as homogeneously as 
possible, especially on a distance. Singaporean key users in Finance would connect to 
American key users in Finance, and so forth. Commonality of functional background made 
it easier to learn something new (Grant, 1996b). Similarly, less familiarity of an expert 
with a student’s background hampered the knowledge transfer process. (For instance 
generic Oracle training on HR modules for key users in Finance.) Far East staff also 
received documentation on US implementations. This represented process 
recommendations and known issues.  
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Second, people from Singapore site A and the data conversion team in Malaysia site A 
assisted other Far East sites with their Oracle conversions. These two sites were considered 
expertise centers after having pulled in know-how from the US. Relationships between the 
two sites and other implementation plants were reciprocal: local sites depended on the 
know-how and resources from these two sites, while they had to provide information on 
local processes and infrastructure. Because of the distance, it was important that local sites 
could work as autonomously as possible. It would be challenging to have them rely 
completely on the central sites for resource inputs, problem solving and control processes. 
The extent of remote dependence correlated with local availability of resources and 
strength of the IT group. Local Malaysian groups (other than the data conversion team) 
could attend generic training there, but this was not available in China. The Chinese group 
was also less experienced than the Malaysians. Together, this made them very dependent 
on the central sites. Since obtaining a visa was difficult for the Chinese, people had to fly 
in for training and support. In all cases, documentation played an important role to convey 
standard procedures and known problems. Through Lotus Notes people had access to up-
to-date information from any location. This reduced dependence on remote interpersonal 
contact across sites.  
Third and finally, the Oracle project increased mutual dependence between user and IT 
groups at each plant. Users needed assistance with the new system, while IT had to elicit 
requirements for customization. Contact between IT and the various departments was 
funneled through key users. Managers assigned one seasoned staff member of their 
department to that role. That person received extensive Oracle training and worked closely 
with IT. Their strength was bilateral inclusion, standing with one leg in their own 
department, and the other one in the cross-functional core team. Key users participated in 
an internationally dispersed community of DiskCo colleagues with similar roles at other 
sites. Their homogeneous background and interests facilitated remote knowledge sharing 
(Goodman & Darr, 1998). Locally, key users absorbed Oracle know-how from IT and 
external training. They translated this into customized training for users from their 
department. To IT, they were representatives who passed on requirements and feedback. 
Key users assisted IT throughout the conversion trajectory. 
 
We now expand on the setup of cross-functional dependencies in a dispersed organization. 
DiskCo’s approach avoided remote communications across functional boundaries. They 
reserved that grosso modo for people working in the same area - Finance, Distribution, IT 
and so forth. When Finance key user from Singapore talked to a Finance key user in the 
US or China, they were ‘on the same wave length’ (SKL, DiskCo-L-1). Using 
homogeneous for remote contact made it easier to deal with the constraints of distant 
communications and possibly time zone differences. Specialists from dispersed locations 
were connected to create multiple homogeneous contact networks. Locally they would 
connect across departments. Taken together, this eliminated the need for remote cross-
functional communications. When key users in say China were confronted with a local 
problem, they would either connect to their counterparts in Singapore, or discuss it locally 
with IT. If need be, that IT group could liaise with Singapore IT and from there to the US. 
Conversely, Singapore IT would connect to local key users as representatives of user 
communities. Alternatively, they would talk to local IT groups who could connect to their 
user departments. Either route had its advantages and avoided crossing functional and 
geographical boundaries at the same time. On the one hand, Singapore key users were 
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considered central experts for the Far East region. They connected on a daily basis to their 
remote counterparts. On top of these dispersed homogeneous communities, there was the 
local advantage. Local IT were very familiar with their onsite user departments (CPW, 
DiskCo-A-3).  
 
CarCo 
In the Goldd project, CarCo outsourced development of the new dealer database system to 
vendor SoftHouse UK. That company subcontracted the project via a holding structure to 
SoftHouse offshore presence in India. Contractually, the offshore team worked for 
SoftHouse UK, that company worked for CarCo as represented by the Goldd project leader 
HH. Ultimately, the system was destined for CarCo users in the US, Europe, and later 
elsewhere. Initially, the operational setup reflected this governance model. CarCo’s M&SS 
units in Detroit and Cologne connected to North American and European users for 
requirements analysis. The German M&SS unit represented CarCo to SoftHouse. It 
interfaced with the vendor through an onshore liaison installed by their UK office. That 
person in turn liaised with offshore operations. We elaborate on collaboration within the 
CarCo organization, between the Detroit and Cologne teams. After a similar approach to 
SoftHouse, we expand on interfacing between the customer and vendor firm. 
 
 CarCo IT in Detroit and Cologne 
The CarCo M&SS IT organization compares to some extent to DiskCo Far East. Both 
operated multi-site in an integrated transnational management structure. Local units in 
Detroit and Cologne units supported similar business operations although their IT 
infrastructure at the start of Goldd differed substantially. For remote contact, they used 
phone calls, email, ftp, and videoconferencing. People could share servers, and run shared 
calendar applications. They did not have more sophisticated tools like Lotus Notes. Like 
DiskCo, remote contacts coincided with content role specialization at both sides, e.g., data 
model experts from Detroit and Cologne would connect. For managerial and planning 
issues, JF and HH or HN maintained close contact as site representatives.  
Many Goldd members in Detroit and Cologne had been with CarCo for a long time. Their 
being part of the same company promoted goal congruence and relationships. Though 
people had not collaborated across the Atlantic before Goldd, people built rapport after 
cross-site visits. They liked to collaborate remotely. Relationships fostered a positive 
working climate and efficient, responsive interactions.  
 
 SoftHouse 
The vendor company seemed a less coherent organization, with more turnover. The UK 
office acquired new contracts and employed people to interface between customers and 
offshore. For CarCo, they hired independent consultants who were not familiar with India 
or SoftHouse’s presence there. On would work in Cologne, the other one offshore. Their 
relationship was supposed to facilitate remote contact. Locally, they were expected to 
make the connection to respectively CarCo and the vendor’s offshore Goldd team. Things 
did not work out that way, as the offshore person left. 
 
In India, the IT labor market was highly volatile just before the end of the millennium. 
People switched projects and companies as they gained experience. At SoftHouse they 
worked in an informal atmosphere and made long working days. The onshore liaison did 
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not know anyone in India, nor was he familiar with their way of working. He was not part 
of the same corporate unit and did not have a formal position of authority vis-à-vis the 
offshore team leaders or members. He took on a somewhat authoritarian role when visiting 
India. This eliminated relational ties as a remaining option for effective remote 
collaboration.  
 
 CarCo - SoftHouse interface 
In the original setup, the onshore liaison funneled all communications between customer 
and vendor. This included all relevant areas in the project: business requirements, project 
management, and technical topics. Liaised contact was supposed to avoid confusion 
between onshore and offshore. At first sight, it smoothened outsourcing to a firm with a 
very different cultural and operational background. The British onshore liaison would in a 
sense shield off offshore operations. He constituted an additional layer between CarCo and 
the offshore teams. This seemed convenient for the customer, but it complicated the 
onshore - Indian connection. The offshore team had not been involved in earlier analysis 
activities. They knew CarCo users nor IT nor any requirements. There was a huge 
knowledge vacuum there. After the offshore liaison left, they leaned heavily on the 
onshore liaison to complement minimal resources like the PC-based prototype and data 
model. Meanwhile, CarCo fed the liaison with an ongoing stream of change requests and 
design standards. They also started to grill him when first deliverables were late and below 
par. Yet he had little tools to make things happen in India, neither through remote contact 
nor through local buddies. His exclusive liaison role left structural holes between CarCo 
and SoftHouse. They dependent exclusively on a person expected to handle the full variety 
and volume of customer - vendor communications. Ultimately, this was a risk for HH as 
project champion. He should have maintained redundant ties with offshore operations, like 
the VP IT from DiskCo.  
Things improved when SoftHouse replaced the onshore person with a more seasoned 
consultant and a representative from the Indian team for technical areas. This expanded the 
interface and moved SoftHouse closer to CarCo. To the Indian liaison, remote contact was 
not really a challenge. He was well included in the offshore team and knew all ins and 
outs. As a senior expert, he was respected and accepted by the offshore team. At the same 
time, his onshore presence facilitated face-to-face contact with CarCo team members 
without having to go through layers. This boosted interactions and knowledge flows, also 
with CarCo US. Similarly to the DiskCo case, remote contact can flourish but it demands a 
basis. That is some form of inclusion and familiarity. In this case, HH preferred an Indian 
onshore manager who could - even on a distance - easily identify with the Indian offshore 
team. Similarity of background would facilitate remote connections.  
 
§ 11.2.1.3  Learning, Documentation and Technology 
In the theory section we discussed some studies on the use of groupware in distributed 
work environments (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996; Majchrzak et al., 2000a). Scholars found 
that this technology structures workflows. It demands entry of data to represent 
collaborative processes in an explicit manner. The system played a less central role than 
originally envisaged. It could not function as an exclusive collaborative platform. Instead, 
groupware funneled only some aspects of work processes. It functioned as a sort of 
dynamic documentation system that captured and disseminated information for dispersed 
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actors (Goodman & Darr, 1998). People also limited the role of groupware to avoid 
excessive transparency of work progress to management (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996). 
In this section, we explore groupware in a broader context. We expand on the preceding 
section with a focus on learning modes and documentation. Technology is considered in 
the form of Lotus Notes and corporate intranet.  
 
DiskCo 
The Oracle project at DiskCo required extensive learning processes. The organization was 
not used to a common IT infrastructure or technology as sophisticated as  
Oracle ERP. In order to deal with this knowledge vacuum, DiskCo deployed a number of 
strategies that are discussed here. Their application was time pressed because of the Y2K 
problem.  
First, the VP IT stressed the importance of training. He had reserved a considerable budget 
to prepare IT and key users for the implementation process, and to ready users for using 
the new system. People mentioned that training should be as close as possible to their 
situation. Instead of external training, they preferred customized help from DiskCo staff 
who had been included in the same organizational context and therefore spoke the same 
language. The VP IT stressed training that was direct and immersive. He did not want 
people to represent their department and pass on their interpretation of what they had 
learnt. At the same time, key users played a pivotal role as knowledge brokers for their 
department. He achieved immersiveness by letting people come over to a site where Oracle 
was up and running for on-the-job training. Distance learning was reserved for small scale 
instructions on basic functionality. Over time, knowledge transfer became more effective. 
Staff from Singapore site A distilled useful content and reframed that for people involved 
in subsequent conversions.  
Second, DiskCo enforced SDLC as standard corporate development methodology. They 
made electronic prescriptions and document templates available. These were used for the 
Oracle implementation process and customization requests.  
Third, a knowledge database made expertise worldwide accessible in an impersonal 
manner. Lotus Notes supported dispersed representation of known issues and problem 
solving steps. Categorization of entries supported multiple angles to look at information. 
Management expected subordinates to enter relevant insights into the system.  
Fourth, experience with early implementations was captured in a sort of standard operating 
procedures. Documents, checklists and templates reflected best practices. Their use 
compressed learning curves, especially when local situations differed minimally from the 
default. Documentation reduced local uncertainty and thus dependence on central support 
sites - Singapore site A and the data conversion team from Malaysia site A. It formalized 
and economized interactions with these sites.  
Finally, users and IT had a separate database for bringing up issues they encountered 
during the conversion trajectory. The issues database contained functionality for managing 
the problem solving process, and contributing from anywhere in the world. Problem 
owners usually looked first at the database before they contact peers. Even when they 
could not find relevant information, they preferred to circumvent the environment that was 
transparent to management (Ciborra & Patriotta, 1996).  
To conclude, groupware - in this case Lotus Notes - enhanced the role of impersonal 
knowledge exchange mechanisms (Van de Ven et al., 1976). It made documented expertise 
accessible for dispersed use and contributions. The environment was limited to technical 
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know-how that could be represented in brief descriptions. Its added value depended on 
people’s willingness - with some hierarchical pressure - and capability to participate in this 
electronic documentation environment. They had to have a common interest and basis. 
That is, people needed ex ante knowledge to locate and fit in database information. Their 
contexts (local IT environment, business processes) should not differ too much from the 
ones underpinning the represented expertise in Lotus Notes (Goodman & Darr, 1998). If 
these basic conditions were not met, people reverted to on-site meetings. This facilitated 
interpersonal encounters to build the common knowledge bases described above. It also 
enabled people to look at resources available at another site - like a new Oracle setup or 
unique local systems - and interact with these. 
 
CarCo 
CarCo’s outsourcing strategy resulted in reciprocal dependencies with the vendor 
company. With a focus on learning, a first interdependence concerned SoftHouse’s 
technical expertise. The company was hired for expertise in areas like workflow processes 
and client/ server technology. Their staff would complement CarCo’s inexperiencedness 
with advanced technology. In practice, little opportunity existed to materialize these goals 
(JF, CarCo-D-1). Somehow, the project manager was aware or capable to connect his 
organization to vendor staff and tap into their knowledge reservoir. This could be traced to 
the combination of distance (CarCo Cologne/ Detroit versus SoftHouse India), and the 
indirect organization structure. With all communications funneled through liaisons, a 
ramified network of multiple ties could not emerge. The same factors constrained the 
second learning process - from offshore staff. As recent technical graduates, SoftHouse 
personnel had little insight in business operations, let alone a company from the US and 
Europe. They received limited information from the onshore liaison. Consequently, 
offshore staff relied strongly on the data model and PC-based prototype. These resources, 
however, were intended nor capable of functioning as almost exclusive boundary objects. 
This undermined the offshore vendor’s role as agent in an unstructured agency 
relationship. A third learning process concerned education of users alongside 
implementation of Goldd system. Our research did not cover that period. To conclude, one 
would expect strong connectivity between offshore vendor personnel and CarCo IT and 
users. These parties engaged in an unstructured collaborative activity with several 
reciprocal learning dependencies. The indirect mode of organizing constrained and 
lengthened these processes. Quite late in the project, things improved when an offshore 
representative attended the second Model Office and met with users and IT staff from 
CarCo. These interactions boosted his insight in CarCo requirements, and gave him the 
opportunity to share his expertise. Upon reflection, representatives from the offshore team 
should have been involved much earlier to cater for reciprocal onshore - offshore 
dependencies.  
 
§ 11.2.1.4  Planning, Managing and Managerial Control 
Earlier studies found that distance disconnects a manager from his subordinates. He 
communicates less frequently, hindering his awareness of work progress and constraints. 
Rapport between manager and subordinates seemed challenging to build (Kurland & Egan, 
1999; Staples, 1997). In response, managers stressed the importance of selecting capable 
and trustworthy subordinates. They initiated a rhythm of formal contact moments, and 
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relied on an explicit control process. With regular intervals, subordinates were expected 
hand over deliverables. Sometimes, a local representative of the manager complemented 
his role. These findings applied to teleworking situations (Perin, 1991; Sia et al., 1998). 
We extend them to dispersed temporary systems for the DiskCo and CarCo case.  
 
DiskCo 
At DiskCo, the VP IT in Singapore site A supervised the Far East Oracle conversions with 
the exception of Thailand. Compared to earlier IT projects, the Oracle implementation was 
larger, more cross-functional and time-pressed. This changed his role. Meta-site 
management became important to ensure adherence to the overall plan and coordinate 
cross-site resource dependencies. The VP IT took on a very engaged role to stay tuned 
with progress at the various sites. This awareness helped him identify and adjust for 
bottlenecks.  
The Oracle conversion emphasized for the first time commonality and impacted mission-
critical business processes. His approach to this challenge combined centralized control 
and support with decentralized responsibility. While the VP IT remained responsible for 
the overall region, local IT directors were fully in charge at their sites. Micromanaging 
local conversions from Singapore site A appeared unfeasible. It would multiply 
dependencies and communications between Singapore site A and the various sites in the 
region. At the same time, local autonomy was complemented with centralized control and 
resources. The VP IT expected and enforced his IT directors to report at a very regular and 
frequent pace. He talked with them remotely, and sometimes with a number of them 
through teleconferencing. He flew in during the kick off phase and at critical stages to 
meet with them and connect broadly to managers from user departments. This provided a 
multi-perspective view and solid awareness of local progress. Unlike the CarCo project 
manager, he did not make himself dependent on a single channel - his IT directors. Local 
IT directors were supported extensively with centralized resources, i.e., the core team in 
Singapore site A. They received training, advice, and templates to setup their own 
conversion project.  
 
Rolling out a standardized application like Oracle is likely to meet with resistance. Users 
and IT had been used to their own version of the MANMAN system for years. All this had 
to change in a short period of time. Within the IT function, the VP IT could fall back on his 
relationships with the IT upper management echelon. The CIO at US HQ knew him from 
his time as expatriate VP in Singapore. With regards to his subordinates, the VP IT used 
his hierarchical position for centralized resource allocation across sites. It enabled him to 
convince subordinates in Singapore site A, and his directors elsewhere. Independent of the 
Oracle project he had been working with his IT directors for years, with standard practices 
like performance appraisal. As local representatives, these directors were supposed to sell 
the project internally to their staff. If need be, management referred to executives at US 
HQ who had formally kicked off the plan. Users were approached in various manners. The 
VP IT climbed the ranks at DiskCo together with many buddies in other functional 
departments. He leveraged that relational network to sell the project and receive 
commitment. From there, VP’s and directors would convince subordinates within their 
function of Oracle’s usefulness. Again, the VP IT could ultimately exert pressure by 
pointing at top management commitment - up to the CEO at US HQ. The VP IT also 
organized kick off meetings at every site to sell the project personally to IT and users. Goal 
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congruence amongst executive and managerial ranks dripped down to staff levels. People 
knew the importance of the project to their bosses, and this increased their willingness to 
participate. This made it much easier for IT staff to work with users. Still, resistance 
emerged at times. The VP IT personally flew in around the go-live date to support IT staff. 
All in all, the VP IT leveraged on organizational advantages like hierarchy, existing control 
structures and relationships (Bradach, 1997; Williamson, 1981).  
In the US, a global master plan had been developed that indicated for each site when 
generic steps were to be completed. Regional centers like Singapore site A were expected 
to fill in details together with local sites. This was not accomplished in a satisfactory 
manner. Interviewees indicated that a more fine-tuned plan should have removed 
uncertainty in an earlier stage. In a dispersed temporary system, this is important for 
reducing remote dependencies and communications. Such an environment called for 
formalized communication patterns to coordinate the large numbers of actors involved at 
various points. People needed more ex ante predictability, somewhat like a construction 
project (Bryman et al., 1987). This meant a departure from the past where people relied on 
more informal connections and worked less interdependently across sites. 
 
CarCo 
The situation in the CarCo Goldd project was more complicated, mostly because of 
offshore outsourcing. Approaching it from the top, the global project manager (HH) 
stressed his overall responsibility. Within the CarCo organization, a structure similar to 
DiskCo facilitated this role. Formal reporting relationships across sites was very common. 
Managers participated in a buddy network that enabled their responsibility for remote staff. 
For Goldd, the project leader knew someone with a similar role in Detroit. They had a 
common boss in the UK. The US team could fall back on that local person for issues like 
sick/ leave. They were not micromanaged from Cologne. That appeared unfeasible, just 
like DiskCo’s VP IT refrained from operational responsibility at remote sites. Goldd’s 
manager used simple GANTT charts to plan his German and American team in a 
integrated manner.  
Offshore outsourcing complicated HH’s job. Retaining overall responsibility, he engaged 
in a lateral relationship with SoftHouse UK. This company subcontracted to offshore 
operations. The contract with this company was incomplete and lacked realism according 
to CarCo subordinates and SoftHouse staff. With respect to offshore operations, HH 
initially took a completely hands-off approach. Onshore and offshore activities were 
minimally coordinated. Planning remained on a milestone level, lacking 
comprehensiveness and a log term scope. HH trusted the companies track record and ISO 
certification. Between onshore and offshore, liaison handled communications. He made 
himself dependent on SoftHouse’s assumed professionalism in technical and 
organizational areas. Still, he was ultimately responsible for Goldd’s success.  
The first deliverables from India did not promise much good. The offshore team could not 
work well with the onshore liaison and lacked know-how on CarCo requirements. HH’s 
minimal involvement and exclusive dependence on the onshore liaison left him unaware of 
delays and miscommunications between onshore and offshore (Burt, 1993). Only when 
SoftHouse fell short did he increase pressure on the onshore liaison and the UK office. His 
contract-based threats eventually led UK management to leverage upon their hierarchical 
influence on Indian management. Pressure on the offshore team to deliver increased as 
both UK and Indian management monitored their performance closely. HH setup daily 
 514
‘prayer’ meetings to monitor progress, mainly through output controls (Kurland & Egan, 
1999). The onshore liaison was replaced by a person with more offshore experience and a 
representative from the Indian team. This improved connections between onshore and 
offshore and led to a more integrated planning approach. 
 
§ 11.2.1.5  Control 
 
In the theory section we discussed research on control in geographical dispersed work 
environments. Current research focuses in particular on teleworking. There, distance 
impacts the relationship between manager and subordinates who work at home or 
elsewhere (Perin, 1991; Wiesenfeld et al., 1998). Some scholars explored control in 
offshore outsourcing relationships (Meadows, 1996b). They found that distance deprives 
someone in a controller role of information on a controllee’s performance. To reduce this 
tension, controllees had to push information at a regular pace (Meadows, 1996b: 107, 104). 
Distance results in asymmetric insight in work progress. It makes it also harder for 
controller and controllee to build rapport, and ensure accomplishments through 
interpersonal contact. Researchers suggested that people structure work processes in a 
more explicit manner. They stressed input to reduce controllee dependence, and output 
control that consist of observable deliverables like a report. Instead of process control in 
the sense of behavioral observation, people monitor progress at regular intervals. We 
assess here control of dispersed actors in the case of DiskCo and CarCo. This extends what 
has been noted in the previous section on managerial control.  
 
DiskCo 
In the Far East region, DiskCo’s turnover rate was quite low. Many people built their 
careers for years in the organization. The stability of the firm’s workforce guaranteed 
socialization in corporate norms and rules. People knew organizational expectations and 
built rapport with peers. The VP IT reinforced this embedded control mode for the Oracle 
project by selecting only seasoned participants from the existing organization. The project 
increased his dependence on IT directors at remote sites whom he could not oversee in the 
traditional sense (Perin, 1991). In addition to this ex ante control mode, he visited each site 
at least during the kick phase, and around the turn live date. At that time, he would meet 
with his local IT director and people from user departments. He connected broadly to a 
plant’s organization to ensure intimate awareness of work progress. While working from 
Singapore, he frequently called his directors and expected them to leave him regularly a 
message. The VP IT did not micromanage regional site from Singapore site A. He tightly 
controlled his managers there, who in turn would ensure local performance. In a sense, 
controls between the VP IT and his IT directors can be characterized as a mixture of 
relational control, hierarchical structure, and self control. The VP IT trusted them, but 
because of the project’s criticality, he also kept a finger on the pulse.  
The VP IT could not use hierarchical control for directors from user departments. In these 
cases, he leveraged upon his interpersonal relationship with these people. They had 
climbed the DiskCo career ladder in parallel and formed a sort of buddy network. Control 
on a managerial level promoted goal congruence throughout the organization. This 
facilitated on a staff level lateral control processes across functional areas. For instance, IT 
team members from the core team at Singapore site A met little resistance from users at 
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their own site or elsewhere. The VP IT had paved the way. Sometimes IT staff emphasized 
formal control through documentation to avoid situations where users denied earlier 
requests.  
DiskCo ensured control in the sense of consistency through documentation, templates and 
methodology like SDLC. Lotus Notes supported this process by making standards 
documentation available to every site. The application also represented problem solving 
processes such that these became transparent across DiskCo’s hierarchical layers (Ciborra 
& Patriotta, 1996). Finally, multi-site implementation of a single source code required 
change control procedures. Modifications were structured in several phases and controlled 
by means of an automated tool (CCC/ Harvest), and broadcasting communications.  
 
CarCo 
The Goldd project brought together people from two organizations, scattered over sites in 
the US, Germany, UK and India. A myriad of control structures ensured performance in 
this dispersed work environment. We discuss first control processes for CarCo and 
SoftHouse separately, and finish with the interface between the two companies.  
 
 CarCo US and Germany  
In Detroit, JF took on a coordinating role for the group of people involved in Goldd 
(Figure 51). She worked fairly autonomously from her boss. Within the Goldd team, 
people collaborated in a lateral mode without very fixed controller/ controllee roles. In 
Cologne, HH was formally the boss from the small Goldd group there. He relied mostly on 
self control (people’s own motivation and professionalism), and sometimes output control. 
His subordinates alternated control roles for certain tasks like testing.  
HH combined his local managerial role with responsibility for the overall Goldd project. 
As far as the CarCo Detroit was concerned, HH could not observe and interact with them 
like he would with his local team. Yet he had various control modes at his disposal. 
Basically, JF was a seasoned professional and needed little instructions or monitoring. Her 
being part of the same organization and M&SS group promoted goal congruence. In 
addition, HH became officially her boss some time into the project. Above that, CarCo’s 
management structure relevant to Goldd was globally integrated. HH reported to the same 
boss as management at JF’s site. Lateral relationships in the form of a sort buddy network 
across the Atlantic complemented this hierarchical setup. On a lateral staff level, 
interviewees stressed peer control between Cologne and Detroit. This compensated for the 
fact that distance constrained remote collaboration and thus increased the risk of 
misunderstanding. 
 
 SoftHouse UK and India 
SoftHouse offshore operations in India operated in an informal fashion, see also a later 
section on diversity. A group of mostly recent technical graduates collaborated in a lateral 
mode without much hierarchical direction or formal rules. People moved in and out of this 
team depending on work pressure and their external interests.  
SoftHouse UK stationed liaisons onshore and (for a brief period of time) offshore. These 
independent professional consultants were minimally controlled. The onshore liaison did 
not have formal authority in India, although BW tried unsuccessfully to assume such a 
role. His official role was more of an advisor. On a managerial level, UK executives did 
 516
have an impact on offshore management. Pressed by CarCo, they exerted this influence 
when first deliveries from India were below par. 
 
 CarCo - SoftHouse interface 
The contract closed for Goldd between CarCo and SoftHouse was incomplete. It did not 
specify in details the output and delivery process. At the same time, it stipulated a fixed 
budget and time frame. As CarCo representative, HH was minimally involved with 
SoftHouse. He obviously did not have hierarchical controls in this lateral relationship, and 
trusted vendor’s track record and ISO certification. Over Fall 1996, his lack of controls 
backfired. Deliveries did not meet expectations. Gradually, HH tightened controls on the 
vendor. Initially he pressed the onshore liaison, but when that did not work out, he reverted 
to the contractual relationship with SoftHouse UK. Executives there responded by 
increasing pressure on offshore management. This triggered their internal control 
structures and resulted in performance improvements. In addition, HH assumed more 
direct output control by means of daily ‘prayer’ meetings with the onshore liaison. This 
regular pacing resembled the approach of the VP IT from DiskCo, and findings from 
Kurland and Egan (1999). The onshore liaison role was reinforced with the arrival of a 
representative from the Indian team early 1997. That person could tie back to the offshore 
team, and leverage on his senior position there. Sometimes, HH and the onshore liaison 
(BW, BJ) felt the constraints of a lateral relationship when they their interests did not 
coincide. For instance, HH tried to discourage BW’s holiday early 1997, and BJ did an 
attempt to assign administrative duties to AC. Overall, outsourcing made CarCo laterally 
dependent on a (remote) vendor firm, while HH retained final responsibility for the project. 
He did not have the advantage of control structures within a multinational firm (Edström & 
Galbraith, 1977; Williamson, 1981). His productive relationship with the Detroit team, and 
DiskCo’s example seem to confirm this.  
 
§ 11.2.1.6  Development Methodology 
Few researchers have yet focused on software development methodologies in a 
geographically dispersed project. Interviewees from offshore vendors in India commented 
in Meadows’ (1996) study on the usefulness of prototyping. It made the software visible in 
an early stage, and thus facilitated communications with remote end users and IT staff. 
Some of their concerns included the lack of participation of offshore vendor personnel in 
the requirements analysis phase. More generally speaking, they missed know-how on the 
customer’s business and requirements. This made them very dependent on the customer’s 
onshore organization for a continuous flow of information. Preferably, offshore staff 
should be involved directly in the early stages of the project to build up requirements 
knowledge.  
 
DiskCo 
Development methodology was not key to DiskCo’s Oracle project. They did use 
methodologies for implementing the application and handling small customization 
requests. Initially, this was Oracle’s Application Implementation Method (AIM). This was 
replaced by a modified version of Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC). On the 
corporate intranet, an internal Software Process Engineering Group (SPEG) posted 
descriptions and document templates. This helped local IT groups structure their projects 
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according to corporate standards. DiskCo thus promoted consistency of its dispersed IT 
development efforts and facilitated cross-site exchanges.  
 
CarCo 
CarCo adopted a prototyping approach for the Goldd project. It was a tradition at the 
company, and seemed necessary since users refused to sign specifications that they could 
not understand. Another concern with a waterfall type of approach was that it would take 
too long. For some reason, there was a lot of time pressure on Goldd. Prototyping would 
encourage interaction with users. They could visualize the system and provide feedback to 
the development team during three Model Office sessions. In practice, the offshore 
developers were not included in the first session, and only two sessions were held in total 
before system launch. Distance was one of the drivers behind the low number of feedback 
meetings. The complexity of Goldd was underestimated. It was considered simply some 
functionality around a dealer information database.  
Development of the system was outsourced to tap into low cost expertise form India. The 
contract with SoftHouse stipulated a fixed budget and time scale. The experience normally 
required for meeting these parameters was not available in the SoftHouse organization. 
Outsourcing led to a sort of dual agency relationship setup, where offshore teams worked 
for CarCo M&SS, and that unit worked for several user departments. The communications 
setup matched this governance model but not information processing needs. CarCo 
communications were funneled to an onshore liaison who was expected to connect to on 
offshore counterpart, and from there to SoftHouse India operations. The liaisons were 
temporarily immersed in the CarCo organization. SoftHouse expected them to pass on their 
know-how to the offshore teams, one stationed onshore and one offshore. This remote 
human-to-human chain did not work. The offshore liaison left, and the remaining onshore 
person could not establish rapport with offshore personnel because of distance and his lack 
of socio-cultural skills. To make things worse, people could not fall back on impersonal 
coordination mechanisms like formalization and documentation (Van de Ven et al., 1976). 
Both played a minor role in the project because of the prototyping methodology. The 
onshore liaison faced the impossible task of channeling communications on a variety of 
technical and nontechnical areas between the two companies. To CarCo, he was 
considered responsible for SoftHouse performance. Yet within the vendor organization he 
had only a lateral role with little formal influence on offshore operations. This put more 
pressure on him than he could handle - after a few months he dropped out. Things 
improved when he was replaced by someone with more offshore experience and a 
representative from the Indian team for technical topics. This enhanced the onshore liaison 
role in terms of variety and processing capacity. In addition, more direct contact between 
CarCo and offshore was promoted to alleviate the liaison role (Burt, 1992).  
 
At the start of Goldd, CarCo IT staff completed a first minimal requirements analysis. It 
was intended to develop a PC-based prototype that provided users with a minimal concept 
of what the system could look like. Since SoftHouse offshore staff was not involved in that 
phase, the prototype became a central boundary object to them - a role it was never 
intended to play (Karsten et al., 1999; Star & Griesemer, 1989). They attempted to develop 
Goldd based on the prototype and the data model, but never analyzed CarCo requirements 
in detail. Later on, this necessitated formation of a task force with representatives from US, 
Germany and India to redo the design of Sales and P&A code functionality. Upon 
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reflection, risks associated with the prototyping approach had materialized in the project: 
lack of systematic analysis, documentation and a structured development process (Beynon-
Davies et al., 1999). It seemed that the offshore team did not assign specialists to zoom in 
on particular areas. They worked in an informal manner on various parts of the system. 
This complicated contact with the customer’s IT group. From that side, people basically 
did not (want to) know who did what in the offshore team. Multiple specialist-to-specialist 
contacts were not established like in the DiskCo case. As far as users are concerned, the 
liaised onshore - offshore link did not leave room for Indian staff to learn form users and 
provide suggestions with their extensive IT expertise. Only in a later phase did an Indian 
team member participate in the second (and last) prototyping session. For the first time, he 
had direct access to users without liaison layers and distance in between. This boosted his 
learning process and added value to the users. It matched the underlying agency 
relationship between users as key principal, and the offshore team as main agent. Looking 
back, the project leader had preferred involvement of senior Indians much earlier in the 
project, and Indian team members onshore. This would promote interaction with IT staff 
there, and simplify contacts with IT and users in Detroit.  
 
§ 11.2.2  Time Zone Differences 
In the theory section, we found that time zone differences constrain synchronous 
exchanges between sites. To sustain connectivity, people use asynchronous media like 
email, voice mail and documentation. A property of these media is not only their 
asynchronicity, i.e., lack of interaction. Some of them are also ‘lean’, most notably email 
and documentation (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). These communication formats rely on 
translation of an intended message into a textual format. Asynchronicity and leanness 
hinder the accomplishment of certain collaborative tasks that demand interpersonal 
interaction. When people embark on novel tasks, or activities with uncertain facets, they 
may need rich (multiple cues) and interactive adjustment cycles to coordinate their work 
(Mintzberg, 1979).  
From prior research, we found several ways in which people respond to the above 
situation. They put more effort into updating counterparts and scheduling synchronous 
meetings. Local planning and priorities may be adapted to meet other sites’ demands. 
When working asynchronously, people draft comprehensive messages. They make their 
point explicit to avoid redundant feedback loops that delay problem solving.  
 
DiskCo 
In the case of DiskCo, time zones played a role between Far East and the US, and to some 
extent between Singapore and SysCo’s site in India. It was also challenging to arrange for 
triple site meetings with participants from Far East, US and Europe. Between Far East and 
US sites, different zones constrained or eliminated real time windows when normal 
working hours were sustained. This led to almost exclusive use of email and document 
exchange. Yet actual communication needs demanded different communication patterns. 
Oracle posed a novel application environment to Far East staff, they had many questions 
for their US counterparts. At the same time, US staff was not familiar with Far East that 
differed in volume. On top of this, people worked under time pressure because of the Y2K 
problem.  
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With this novelty, unknown diversity, and pressure, scholars suggest direct face-to-face 
contact, or at least rich, interactive media (Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Galbraith, 1973). 
Unavailability of such opportunities delayed problem solving. On the one hand, time zone 
differences promoted use of a medium that could not support extensive information 
processing needs. Even when people would exchange messages almost real time (e.g., 
instant messaging or chatting), they would need substantial back and fort loops to build 
mutual understanding and solve issues. Now, time zones further stretched these cycles. 
Asynchronicity of working days postponed replies, that often concerned requests for 
further clarification. With critical deadlines to meet, this increased pressure on Far East 
staff.  
People sketched two response patterns to deal with this situation, both in line with earlier 
research. First, they stretched asynchronous media. They included in their emails 
information on the background of their requests as well as examples. This reduced 
uncertainty for their counterpart, and hopefully would eliminate some clarification loops. 
Some people further facilitated their counterpart’s job by formatting their requests bullet-
wise, almost like a form. Exchanges thus became more comprehensive, channeled, and 
structured. Second, people adapted working hours and priorities to meet their remote 
partner’s demands. They created artificial windows for phone calls and teleconferences by 
calling from home or stretching their working day at the beginning and/ or end. During 
critical phases around a conversion, people would stay stand-by like physicians or 
emergency workers. Tele-conversations required planning efforts and preparation to 
enhance their added value. Synchronous meetings across three continents (Far East, US, 
Europe) underlined the importance of preparation and adaptation. Their added value was 
that people could bring up and discuss issues with all parties involved, instead of 
organizing multiple smaller meetings. This compensated the inconvenience and effort 
associated with triple site audio conferences.  
 
CarCo 
The Goldd project at CarCo confronted participants with reasonable time differences 
between respectively US East Coast and Germany, and Germany and India. With normal 
working hours, people could not connect real time between US East Coast and India. 
People experienced another form of synchronicity during the Christmas holiday of 1996. 
While the US and Indian teams continued work, the German team took a break. This 
interrupted and thus delayed cross-site problem solving cycles in which American and 
German team members should have joined.  
In the relationship between the American and German team, people found that time zone 
differences stretched their working day. They adapted their schedule to dedicate time 
during the window to their counterpart. Arranging for synchronous meetings cost 
deliberate attention and effort (Kraut & Galegher, 1990).  
Between US and India, no synchronous communications were possible. This necessitates 
use of asynchronous media and postponed on some occasions the resolution of urgent 
issues. Besides, exchanges were supposed to flow through the German site and not 
directly. This implied that when Indians brought up an issue, it was processed in Germany 
and relayed to the US. Combined with time zone differences, any interruption in this chain 
caused major delays and annoyed the Indian team.  
 
 520
§ 11.2.3  Diversity: Differences in Culture, Operations, Function, and Language  
In the theory section, we proposed cultural differences as one of the gaps to conceptualize 
the impact of global distributedness. Our view relied not so much on dimensions of 
cultural diversity (e.g. power distance, masculinity/ femininity, Hofstede, 1991), but rather 
on socio-cognitive and information processing approaches. This perspective has been 
applied in studies on communications (Krauss & Fussell, 1990), and cross-functional 
interdependencies (Dougherty, 1992). These scholars assert that inclusion in a certain 
context or community shapes people’s behavioral and thought processes in a unique 
manner. This surfaces when they collaborate with others without that common knowledge 
base. In that case, some form of additional information processing is required to counteract 
nonoverlapping interpretation schemes. In a geographically dispersed setting, diversity is 
more likely. At the same time, mutual awareness becomes challenging because of the 
mediated (lean) nature of communications. Coping mechanisms include face-to-face visits 
and selection of staff with prior cross-cultural experience. From this angle, we assess the 
DiskCo and CarCo case.  
 
DiskCo 
The DiskCo case suggested a broader outlook on cultural diversity. People experienced not 
only differences related to their national culture, but also different operations, cross-
functional dependencies, and lingual issues. We discuss these four dimensions in 
succession. First, in our study on the Oracle project, we encountered directly or indirectly 
people from China, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan and the US. Participants from the first 
three countries experienced little diversity. Most Singaporeans have Chinese ancestors and 
feel cultural and lingual (Mandarin) familiarity with peers from mainland China. Between 
Singapore/ Malaysia and the US, people noticed their diverse background, reflected in 
their ways of working and frame of reference. Some people from Singapore/ Malaysia had 
already built insight in US culture before the Oracle project. They had visited US 
counterparts, or worked for an American expatriate manager (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). 
Even then, cultural diversity increased information processing needs, in conjunction with 
the novelty of the Oracle project. People engaged in extensive discussions to explain their 
point of view, while trying to empathize with their counterpart’s outlook. In another vein, 
the Singaporean team worked for the first time with Japanese IT staff and key users. From 
their angle, Japanese came across as very polite and formal. The VP IT in Singapore 
decided on a very gradual process of mutual collocated introductions to build reciprocal 
knowledge and rapport.  
 
Second, collocated played also an important role in bridging functional diversity. In the 
Oracle project, key users from various departments worked closely with local IT staff to 
learn, adapt and implement the Oracle application. These interdepartmental 
communications were mostly handled on-site. Rich and interactive sessions were held to 
connect people from different contexts. Remote contact was reserved for intra-functional 
exchanges, like between IT staff in China and Singapore, or data conversion specialists in 
the US and Malaysia. The mediated nature of remote contact promoted homogeneous 
connections, i.e., between professionals specialized in the same area. This reduced 
information processing needs.  
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Third, operations in the US differed from those in the Far East. They were focused on 
R&D, whereas Far East plants manufactured high volumes. After the initial 
implementations in the US, professionals there were supposed to assist their Asian 
colleagues. They assumed that their experience could be applied directly to the Asian 
context. This was not the case because of the volume difference, and local government 
regulations in China and Malaysia. For staff from Singapore, it appeared challenging to 
convey the unique nature of their operations to US counterparts, and obtain their 
acceptance. People were heavily focused on commonality of business processes and 
minimizing customizations to the Oracle application. Extensive discussions were needed to 
clarify diverse perceptions and seeming goal incongruence. This was complicated by the 
limited time window between Singapore and US sites that necessitated predominantly 
email exchanges. Diversity of operations also played a role between Singapore and 
Malaysia because of unique local customizations. Experts in Singapore run the risk of 
giving advice that did not match the Malaysian situation, but was based on their assumed 
understanding of that context. Instead of remote contact, staff from Malaysia preferred to 
visit Singapore to explain in person their IT infrastructure, and to look on-site at the novel 
Oracle environment. On some occasions, plants operated in a very similar manner, e.g., 
drive plants in China and Malaysia. This homogeneity reduced uncertainty and information 
processing needs. Once a plant of a certain type was converted, others could benefit from 
that know-how (Goodman & Darr, 1998). They could apply an optimized process that 
incorporated lessons from the first conversion. In other cases (e.g., US - Singapore), 
diversity made local lessons less relevant. People had to go back to basic assumptions in 
order to identify, understand and somehow work around dissimilarities.  
 
Fourth, language played a role on some occasions. Some Chinese and Japanese staff 
members were not comfortable with English, especially orally. Chinese staff had difficulty 
to understand during phone conversations a DiskCo staff member in Singapore with an 
Indian background and accent. Similar issues occurred when Singaporean staff contacted 
vendor staff in India. Bad quality phone lines combined with the Indian accent made 
remote collaboration more arduous.  
People adopted various modes to handle lingual issues. Singaporean staff members with a 
Chinese background could switch to Mandarin as an alternative for English. In other cases, 
people switched from phone to written media (email). This delayed problem solving when 
issues were at stake that demanded a richer and more interactive connection. The VP IT 
emphasized personnel selection as a tool for ensuring English proficiency among staff in 
China (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1998). 
 
CarCo 
The Goldd project connected CarCo sites in the US and Germany with vendor presence in 
the UK and India. We apply here the four dimensions distinguished for DiskCo. First, we 
elaborate on national culture, as applied to CarCo, SoftHouse, and the interfacing between 
these companies. Within the CarCo organization, the teams from Detroit and Cologne 
observed the diversity of their cultural background. Especially American staff found 
Germans rigid, inflexible and formal in their approach. After a cumbersome remote start, 
the Americans’ visit to Germany worked as an ice-breaker. Immersion in their context 
extended appreciation of the German team’s background. Conversely, German staff 
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adopted a somewhat American or international style when dealing with their US 
colleagues.  
Within the SoftHouse organization, units in the UK and India were involved in the Goldd 
project. The UK unit stationed an onshore liaison in Germany. That person - BW - was 
supposed to work with offshore Indian staff. His cultural insensitivity and disrespect for 
the local organizational setup in India led to a communications breakdown, and lack of 
coordination between onshore and offshore. Oral communications appeared challenging 
between the offshore team and BW’s successor in Germany, BJ. This complicated onshore 
- offshore contact and led to what can be referred to as under-coordination: a lack of 
insight in and adaptation of dispersed, interdependent activities.  
Initial contacts between CarCo and SoftHouse representatives from India suggested 
substantial diversity in the eyes of the German project manager. He preferred consultants 
from the UK office to liaise between his group and the offshore team in India. Their 
supposed familiarity with both Indian and continental European culture would smoothen 
onshore - offshore exchanges. This came at a price, though. It meant that staff from CarCo 
and SoftHouse were never introduced to each other. They did not meet face-to-face or 
electronically. Much later in the project, people started to realize that liaised organizing 
hampered the collaborative capacity between onshore and offshore. They experienced 
difficult months of misinterpretations, delays, and tensions that could be traced to the 
combination of indirect contact and challenging interdependent activities. Having people 
from a third culture ‘in between’ seemed to complicate the cultural transition process. 
Towards the end of the project, Indian team members were stationed onshore to assist the 
British liaison. This promoted mutual understanding and rapport between CarCo and 
SoftHouse India staff. Looking back, people had preferred direct contact, and possibly 
(temporary) collocation right from the start. This way, they could have dealt with cultural 
diversity upfront, and smoothened subsequent collaborative processes.  
 
Second, Goldd was a dispersed IS development project that required many types or areas 
of activities. These ranged from very technical ones like designing data conversion rules, 
to areas that focused on business and organizational issues, e.g., requirements analysis. 
Each site in the project was somehow involved in these different areas. There was a 
difference, however, in the way people involved in certain topic areas connected across 
sites. The German and US site adopted an approach that resembled the DiskCo case. 
Locally, people would specialize in a certain task area, and connect with remote 
counterparts with a similar responsibility. Thus, multiple homogeneous communities 
emerged around for instance the data model, business requirements, and project planning. 
With India, communications on the various topics were funneled through the onshore 
liaison. This proved too much, both in quantity and requisite variety. For that reason, the 
onshore liaison was assisted by an Indian team member to handle technical issues between 
onshore and offshore.  
 
A third dimension of diversity concerned ways of working. People at CarCo sites - though 
geographically dispersed - mentioned a common way of working that was part of their 
corporate culture. Apart from some initial differences, this paved remote collaboration 
processes. By contrast, SoftHouse India and CarCo worked in strikingly different manners. 
In India, people were used to an informal organizational setup and communication mode. 
They relied mostly on oral instructions instead of planning and documentation. Sequencing 
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of tasks was considered in a less linear, step-wise mode than people were used to in 
Germany. Besides, many Indian staff members came straight from the university after 
earning a technical degree. They had little knowledge on business practices and 
collaboration in a project environment. Indians found Germans and to some extent 
Americans quite formal. They had a hard time accepting that delivery times and meeting 
schedules were strictly adhered to. All this led to negative attributions, misunderstanding 
and mutual reproaches. Later in the project, the Indian team modified their local mode of 
operating to some extent to the ‘Westerners’. They created an adaptive layer of 
formalization and documentation to meet CarCo expectations, while retaining internally 
their traditional customs. Ideally, they would have liked to ‘meet in the middle’, i.e. 
adaptation on the side of ‘Westerners’ and ‘Indian’, but this never materialized. 
 
Fourth, English was used as common language like in the DiskCo case. Proficiency played 
a role here too. Except for the Americans and British, English was not people’s mother 
language. For this group, international communications cost them more effort and they 
could not express themselves as precisely as they would like to. This lack of nuance led 
sometimes to confusion or misunderstanding. 
 
§ 11.2.4  Infrastructural Differences 
Prior research identified infrastructural differences in client - vendor relationships. Both 
companies had their own IT environments that appeared challenging to connect. In order to 
decrease the costs (in a broad sense) of remote collaboration, firms invested in 
counteracting the impact of infrastructural incompatibility. Vendor staff was included in 
the customer’s telephone system and network environment. Both firms standardized their 
infrastructures and set up common databases to facilitate information flows across their 
organizational boundaries.  
 
DiskCo 
In the case of DiskCo, people enjoyed an advanced infrastructure that spanned the 
company’s global site. They had access to lease lines that eliminated variable costs of 
telecommunications in exchange for a fixed fee. This encouraged frequent and extensive 
phone contact amongst participants in a dispersed project like the Oracle implementation. 
(Sometimes, people even overused the phone according to one interviewee.) At times, 
however, lease line capacity fell short because of under capacity and time differences. 
Between Far East and the US, remote telecommunications traffic tended to peak during the 
limited window. This made it difficult to ensure availability of a telephone line. In 
response, people switched to emails (Far East - US). Or they arranged face-to-face 
meetings, especially for prolonged communications needs with multiple actors involved 
(Singapore - China).  
Remote server access was slow at times. This put an emphasis on local availability of 
resources, like the testing environment for Oracle development tasks. Since DiskCo 
adopted a single source code, a multi-site server environment was setup with replication 
and change control mechanisms. Slow system access meant that for critical activities 
within the Far East region, people preferred to meet on-site for training and support. 
At the beginning of the Oracle implementations in the Far East, DiskCo received support 
from SysCo in India. This vendor has been a long-term partner of DiskCo. For that reason, 
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DiskCo has setup hardware and network infrastructure at their site in India to facilitate 
remote involvement. When calling to India from Singapore, people experienced noisy 
telephone lines. This hampered remote contact, especially in combination with the accent 
of some Indian staff members.  
 
CarCo 
For the Goldd project, we distinguish between CarCo’s US and Germany site, contact 
between Germany and India, and triple site connections. The US and Germany site had 
remote server access. They used ftp for file exchange, and basic applications like email and 
calendar sharing. The main Goldd server was located in Detroit. German project staff 
accessed this server to pull data for testing. Like in the case of DiskCo, access speed from 
Cologne to Detroit was slow, delaying testing activities. Another problem was that the old 
systems that were to be replaced in the US were only available there. For requirement 
analysis, German and Indian staff needed access to these systems. They had to pay a visit 
to Detroit to this end.  
More serious infrastructural issues existed between Germany and India. Telephone 
connections were noisy and cumbersome to setup via satellite. On top of that, phone 
conversations were routed through multiple administrative layers in India. This further 
discouraged phone calls. In fact, remote contact relied mainly on email and fax. At 
SoftHouse India, people did not have ftp, so people were using email to transfer files. 
Unfortunately, accounts in India could not handle the considerable size of these. The 
vendor also did not have Windows 95 and mainframe systems. They had difficulty 
obtaining the data modeling tool that CarCo used.  
Across the three sites (US, Germany, India), people used different development resources, 
like data modeling tools. Some of these were not available in India or hard to come by. 
Triple site audio conferencing was attempted a few times, but videoconferencing was 
unfeasible.  
 
All in all, infrastructural differences include incompatibility of resources, absence of 
resources, and slow or low quality remote connections. These factors increase efforts 
associated with remote collaboration (Kraut & Galegher, 1990). People must invest 
resources in work-around solutions, and may need more frequent face-to-face meetings. 
Ideally, they would like better performance on dimensions like costs, speed, and quality of 
remote connectivity. This implies replication of resources (to reduce remote traffic), fast 
high-speed connections, and commonality of IT infrastructures.  
 525
 
Chapter 12  Implications for Practitioners 
 
“I travel for two reasons (from India to US - author). One is to be in touch with my 
teams over there, and second is to be in touch with customers. All my customers are 
in the US and there is a distance problem. 10,000 is a long way to be in touch with 
customers. So I travel there and use the opportunity to meet up with customers, 
existing customers as well as potential customers (...)” - Director of Aditi, a software 
company in India
73
 
 
Practitioners constitute one of the important audiences of this study. This section distills 
lessons from our theoretical and empirical work. It is dedicated in the first place to 
managers of global software projects. The chapter describes issues people may encounter 
under conditions resembling those studied here. Pointing at issues, we ask questions and 
offer suggestions to avoid or handle problem situations. The chapter follows closely the 
setup of the research. It is prescriptive, but above all realistic to ensure its usefulness. 
Advice is offered in a condensed format; the preceding chapters provide background 
information if need be. We start with three themes and elaborate then on a number of gaps: 
geographical distance and governance differences; time zone differences; diversity in 
various forms; and infrastructural differences.  
 
§ 12.1  Themes 
 
We start off with three themes that capture basics of managing a globally dispersed 
software projects: perception and concepts versus realism; ex ante coordination and control 
mechanisms; and task urgency and criticality. 
 
§ 12.1.1  Perception and Concepts versus Realism 
Realism is a critical starting point for global projects but difficult to achieve. People have 
incomplete information and misconceptions because the project confronts them with many 
new factors - the team members, locations, technology, processes and resources. 
Underestimation is far more costly in this environments than in local projects. It can take 
many forms - planning that is too tight, budgets that are too low, participants who lack 
experience, and too simplistic a perspective on the complexity and interdependencies of a 
project. Underestimation leads to an unfeasible project setup. Sooner or later, people will 
realize that they cannot make it with the existing setup. These tensions are 
counterproductive. They can be avoided in several ways: use multiple sources to assess the 
difficulty of a project and the quality of resources; maintain close connections with a 
variety of people inside and outside the project; formalize regular meetings to receive 
automatic updates on what is really going on; do not rely exclusively on liaisons for 
connections to important stakeholders; visit sites to talk directly with people. 
 
                                                 
73 Quote from research by Dr. Millar et al, see for instance (Millar, 1998, 1999). Used by 
kind permission. 
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§ 12.1.2  Ex Ante Coordination and Control Mechanisms 
It is important to know what ‘capital’ people bring as individuals and as a group. It can 
take many forms: Do people know each other? Do they speak a reasonable level of 
English? Are they used to international projects, other cultures? Do you know this vendor? 
What is their track record? How can you be sure of that? How is technology? Are 
infrastructures well connected and similar? Are people comfortable with teleconferences, 
videoconferences, groupware, intranet and application sharing? 
 
Capital reduces communications needs and investments at the start of a project. It makes 
(remote) collaboration more efficient and fun. Once you know how ‘rich’ you are, compare 
that with your realistic perspective on the project itself. Can you leverage on the capital? 
Do you need more capital? Is there a mismatch?  
 
You may want to select people and companies such that you have a maximum amount of 
capital. This applies in particular to challenging, time-pressed tasks - you can clearly do 
without worries about basic collaboration issues in these circumstances. If the capital is not 
available, make a realistic estimate of what it takes. Invest accordingly - the sooner, the 
better.  
 
§ 12.1.3  Task Urgency and Criticality 
[This section is only relevant for managers of high-pressure global projects, e.g., those that 
are mission critical to a company, time-pressed, and/ or very complex] Invest time upfront 
to achieve common understanding of the project situation. Pull and push information 
almost constantly so that everybody knows how things are progressing. Avoid remote 
contact - invest in face-to-face meetings, preferably at the start of a project. Arrange for 
direct communications (no liaisons) at least for key personnel at different sites. Assess the 
impact of time zones. Do people need to adapt working hours, remain on stand-by? Make 
sure people have contact information so that they know at any moment whom to contact 
and how.  
 
§ 12.2  Gaps 
 
Gaps refer to the differences and diversity that exist between sites involved in a global 
project. It can take several forms: geographical distance and governance differences; time 
zone differences; diversity; and differences of infrastructure. Subsequently we expand on 
these here.  
 
§ 12.2.1  Geographical Distance and Governance Differences 
Geographical distance of people involved in the same project challenges many 
assumptions underlying the traditional office environment. It cuts out informal 
conversations, and the easiness of meeting people face-to-face and sharing resources. 
Related to this is the fact that people work in different organizational units. Or in different 
firms if a project is (partially) outsourced. Contributors to a project may not fall under the 
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same management structure and have their unique ways of working. Still, someone is 
responsible for a coherent end result. We assess several topics that help to accomplish this.  
 
§ 12.2.1.1  Face-to-face versus Remote, Electronically Mediated Collaboration 
When people work at different sites, they do not see each other. They may see each other 
during occasional visits, but contacts must rely on electronic media like phone, 
videoconferencing, email and groupware. This makes cross-site exchanges more rare and 
task-oriented. People tend to connect for a specific purpose. Electronic media offer limited 
richness and interactivity. They usually provide only a few modalities of communications 
(voice with phone or documents with email and groupware). Media require more effort 
than communicating with someone in the same room. People must convert their message 
into an email text, they must scan documents, submit these as separate attachments. And 
with audio/ videoconferencing they must work harder to imagine their counterpart.  
 
One can deal with these issues in several ways. First, face-to-face meetings, perhaps as 
kick off, help people establish rapport. They can obviate the constraints of geographical 
dispersion. Second, expect people to update you and their remote counterparts on a regular, 
frequent basis. Force informal communications by arranging for regular remote 
conversations (phone or videoconferencing). Expect people to push relevant information to 
others. Make this as easy and comfortable as possible. Help them develop remote 
communication skills. They must get more done with less richness and interactivity, e.g., 
craft comprehensive emails, be as clear as possible. We expand on these skills and 
attitudes in the next section.  
 
§ 12.2.1.2  Using Electronic Media 
Phone and email are probably among the most common electronic media. They must be 
used with consideration. The phone is great if people know each other and master English. 
Email allows for broadcasting messages and comprehensive documentation, perhaps in 
preparation for real-time conversations. It makes it easy to cc people and work across time 
zones. At the same time, email is a lean medium and asynchronous. It does not convey 
much about a person’s mood, priorities and expectations. This delays the accomplishment 
of tasks that are complicated, urgent, or novel to those involved. People must invest effort 
in explaining a topic, and make explicit what they want another person to contribute.  
Audio conferencing is very useful for connecting people at different sites whose input or 
involvement may be needed. Its effectiveness depends on people’s familiarity with other 
participants and the topic under consideration. Not too many people can join in one 
session, this makes it difficult to maintain overview. Videoconferencing infrastructure is 
not yet widely available with good quality (speed, synchronized signals, picture quality 
etc). It takes effort beforehand (preparing and sharing documentation), and during a 
meeting (who talks at what point, what protocol is used).  
Ideally, people with tasks that are connected across sites have multi-modal 
communications. They must be able to talk, share resources, and perhaps see each other, 
all in one session in with great ease of use and quality. This would mimic the properties of 
face-to-face contact as closely as possible.  
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Effective use of electronic media relies on several factors. People rely less on media if they 
know their counterpart and the task they are working on. They must get used to a more 
formal communication mode that demands more effort, explicitness, clarity, 
comprehensiveness and empathy. Enforce regularity of interactions, stress quick response 
times to requests from remote sites. Expect people to feedback their understanding to avoid 
misunderstanding. They must communicate proactively - push information to remote 
peers, hunt for know-how they need to get their job done. Rely on electronic environments 
like groupware, intranet or web-based services to promote cross-site awareness. 
Communicate who is responsible for what, who knows what, and how people can be 
reached. Foster direct contact between people with interdependent tasks, i.e., do not have 
them go (only) through liaisons. Invest in cross-site visits for early and critical phases of a 
project, and also when people face a task that is particularly challenging. Do not 
underestimate dependencies across sites, and task complexity. Check regularly with local 
and remote staff to get a feel for feasibility.  
 
§ 12.2.1.3  Organizing for Distributed Collaboration 
Make an assessment of dependencies in the project as early as possible - they drive 
collaboration processes. Dependencies could concern knowledge (vendor staff must know 
requirements, people need to know what their peers do, they must be trained on a novel 
system or tool), activities (workflows across sites or locally), and resources (people need 
access to legacy systems, version control issues). Share insight in dependencies; 
brainstorm on ways to deal with them. Remote dependencies within the same area are 
usually not really a problem. People on both sides are for instance experts in Finance, so 
they know each other’s background and have shared knowledge. Focus heavily on 
dependencies that cross not only sites but also expertise areas. It is very difficult for people 
to work remotely with a counterpart who lives in a different ‘thought world’ (Dougherty, 
1992). They would have to exchange a lot of background information before zooming in 
on their common task. Invest in face-to-face contact, or route communications through 
local peers specialized in the same area as the remote counterpart. In other words: a user in 
Finance at site 1 connects to IT staff at site 2 in one of three ways: (1) face-to-face, (2) 
through IT at site 1, or (3) through a Finance expert at site 2. The key is that remote contact 
is as homogeneous as possible, i.e., involving people with the same background. 
 
Be careful with liaisons who funnel communications between sites. It may seem 
comfortable and ‘clean’ in that it avoids multiple confusing links across sites. Yet you may 
become too dependent on their functioning and interpretations. Never use a liaison who is 
new to people at both sides. He should be part of at least one context. The task may 
overburden liaisons: it may exceed their capacity and encompass too many different areas 
of a project. Broaden the liaison role to 2 or more people, and complement it with direct 
contact. Especially for people with site crossing activities, foster reciprocal visits so that 
people build rapport instead of communicating always through other persons.  
 
§ 12.2.1.4  Learning, Documentation and Technology: Managing by Representation 
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After you made an assessment of knowledge needs, develop a training plan. Rely on local 
resources and documentation. This economizes on visits and remote interpersonal 
communications. Encourage immersive, on-site training if people really need it. Check 
how comfortable they are with a new area/ tool/ task. Test them if they have to use a new 
system.  
Reduce dependence on persons. This can be achieved through documentation. Reducing 
dependence on individuals is important in the case of turn over and in order to economize 
on cross-site communications. This reduces the impact of time zone differences. Promote 
explicitness of work processes, expectations and outputs. Implement a common 
methodology with extensive documentation to promote consistency across sites. Enforce a 
policy of making knowledge explicit and sharing it through groupware and documentation. 
Representation of work processes and resources makes it easier to manage and share across 
sites (Haeckel & Nolan, 1993). It reduces dependence on individuals and (remote) 
interpersonal exchanges. One important tip, however: do not try to use documentation for 
dealing with people’s fundamental unfamiliarity with project activities. If they do not 
understand how their job fits in the project, they need rich connections and interpersonal 
communications. The same applies for cross-functional or cross-specialization 
dependencies (Electronic) documentation is inappropriate in these circumstances. It only 
works when people have a common background and firm grasp of the overall project 
activity context. Typically, start with human-to-human connections, and then move 
gradually to document enabled contact, i.e., human-to-documentation-to-human.  
 
§ 12.2.1.5  Planning, Managing and Managerial Control 
As a manager, keep connecting to people. It is challenging to remain aware of what is 
going on at different sites. Setup up regular meetings, connect to individuals, visit sites at a 
regular pace. The more challenging and mission-critical a project is, the closer you must 
get involved. Leverage on your hierarchical position, a firm’s transnational management 
structure and your relationships. Network extensively to foster connections within the 
project and with your environment. The latter may include top management, management 
from other functions and locations, but also customers, and firms providing critical 
resources like telecommunications, packaged applications, and development tools. Monitor 
goal incongruence (in outsourcing relationships or across organizational units), and 
resistance to a new system (users). Handle this on a relational, contractual or hierarchical 
basis. Backup your local or remote staff to ensure their positive working climate.  
People often do not know what to expect. Sell the project to them, plan it as extensively as 
possible and share that widely. Improve the plan, add details, and promote transparency of 
what is going on, where people are, and where they are heading.  
Control extensively. Do not rely on common sense or single individuals. Instead, get a 
complete picture. Talk to vendor staff, to their customers, to users, to your boss, others’ 
bosses. Never assume that things will be OK, that ‘no news is good news’. Maintain a 
regular communication pattern within your project and with key stakeholders outside. Do 
not save on traveling since face-to-face contact and immersion in a local context provides 
the best information. Promote formal deliverables, standards and checks. Be as explicit as 
possible on what you expect and how people can accomplish their job. Assign 
responsibilities formally and check reality against that yardstick. Monitor constantly so 
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that people can never blame you for not being clear or providing the resources they 
needed.  
 
§ 12.2.1.6  Control 
Set up a self-controlling environment. Select people with competence and a professional 
will to succeed on their own. Control more extensively and formally than in a collocated 
setting. There is a greater risk of misunderstanding, misalignment and incompatible 
priorities. Work as much as possible with people you trust and with firms you know. 
Avoid mismatches between people’s experience and the demands of their job. Use a 
combination of interpersonal rapport, formal hierarchy, and contractual stipulations. 
Encourage peer control, and self control in local teams. In a collocated group people tend 
to work more informally. They meet often and know each other well; they are quite well 
aware of what is going on. Do not try to replicate that to remote contacts. It is usually 
unfeasible. People need more formal role assignments, more explicit process 
representations and expectations. Control processes tend to become more formal, based on 
documentation. Vary control tightness with task criticality, and people’s competence and 
goal congruence. Pay attention to basics like resource ownership, and version control of 
documents or application builds.  
 
§ 12.2.1.7  Development Methodology 
Software development is embedded in a complex relationship between users and IT 
personnel. These groups have asymmetrical knowledge bases and become mutually 
dependent. Users know their business environment and to some extent their current 
system. IT staff brings in technical expertise. Fusing these knowledge domains underpins 
successful development. Commonly people prefer prototyping over requirements 
specification. It facilitates interaction with users through multiple feedback sessions. 
Geographical dispersion may hinder this process. With users at one site and IT somewhere 
else, people must cross distance and their functional diversity at the same time. This is 
unfeasible, especially not in early project phases. It is necessary to have IT representatives 
close to the users. These persons must be well included in their remote IT team to facilitate 
remote contact.  
 
§ 12.2.2  Time Zone Differences 
In a global project, people may work in different time zones. This reduces the period they 
can work synchronously. People must invest more effort into planning conference calls, 
especially when more than 2 sites are involved. Time zone differences lead to increased 
use of asynchronous media like email, fax and voicemail. These media lack richness and 
interactivity. They require effort in the sense that people must put their thoughts and 
questions into documented format. If they work on complicated or novel collaborative 
tasks, this leads to tensions and delays. One email may trigger more questions and a deluge 
of subsequent messages. Forced asynchronicity of communications is a problem with 
urgent tasks that demand instantaneous attention from someone at another site. 
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Handling the impact of time zone differences relies on several approaches. Build in buffers 
for delays. Usually time zones stretch (remote) problem solving. Reduce dependence on 
synchronous interpersonal contact. Invest in documentation technologies like groupware 
and intranet. Learn people to stretch the effectiveness of lean media like email. They must 
be able to craft comprehensive emails that leave little room for interpretation. Reduce the 
email snow-balling effect - arrange for a multi-site conference call for issues that need 
interactive discussions. Check people’s willingness to adapt working hours. It enlarges 
their window with other sites and promotes use of real-time media. One may consider 
arranging workflows such that they follow the sun. Do not underestimate what it takes to 
achieve smooth hand-overs. Like with relay-racing, people must be ready for time-pressed 
transitions. They must understand their local tasks and what remote counterparts do. They 
must have all required resources available. 
 
§ 12.2.3  Diversity: Differences in Culture, Operations, Function, and Language 
Diversity is more likely in a global project and also harder to deal with than locally. It is 
only a problem when people are interdependent. Understanding dependencies across sites 
is a prerequisite for dealing with diversity in an effective manner. Diversity is to some 
extent a knowledge gap. It may take many forms: differences in national culture, 
organizational culture (practices), cross-functionality, and language. We give suggestions 
for these areas. A key rule is: make remote contacts as homogeneously as possible. This 
facilitates dealing with distance and electronic media.  
Select and connect people with experience related to their remote counterparts. If someone 
in India has been to the US, involve him in maintaining contact with American 
counterparts. Task dependence may require connections between people with different 
cultural backgrounds. Make a trade-off between the pros and cons of direct 
communications (i.e., without interpreter in between). On the one hand, people must invest 
in cross-cultural awareness (without doubt through face-to-face encounters). But this pays 
off later on: once people have built rapport, they collaborate more effectively. Make these 
investments for people with prolonged remote contacts that concern mission-critical tasks. 
Plan for gradually building cross-cultural ties. Realize that connecting two or more sites 
with different cultures requires local adaptation. On top of their local way of working, 
people must develop additional skills and attitudes for site-crossing exchanges. Collocated 
kick off meetings seem indispensable as ice breakers. These should involve at least a few 
representatives from each site. Think about who adapts to whom. The best thing is that 
each side gets to know more about the other side. This avoids overtaxing on group. 
Bridge cross-functional dependencies on-site. Do not expect people to work with remote 
counterparts who have different functional backgrounds. Either have them visit each other, 
or work through local people who speak the language of the remote person.  
Operations in site 1 and 2 may differ, perhaps without people being aware of it. Identify 
these differences - i.e., knowledge gaps - as early as possible. In fact, this must be 
accomplished through cross-site visits. Diversity and distance bite.  
Select and train people with site-crossing responsibilities in such a manner that they master 
a common language, usually English. Whenever English is a second language for people, 
they feel less comfortable. Their expression lacks precision and requires more effort. They 
may prefer written exchanges over oral communications.  
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§ 12.2.4  Infrastructural Differences 
A common and well-connected IT infrastructure is crucial to a multi-site software project. 
Plan considerable time for identifying gaps. Some firms setup up permanent lease line 
connections. This eliminates variable costs of calls promotes communications. Check on 
bandwidth, speed, and quality of telecommunications service. Ensure capacity of lease 
lines, servers, local computers to handle (large) files, documentation and remote 
communications traffic. Identify peak hours for cross-site calls, especially with time zone 
differences. To what extent do people need access to a remote server, and inclusion in a 
company’s telephone system? Sometimes one site must know more about resources at 
another location. Can they visit? Is simulation possible? Are development tools similar 
across sites? What purchases are necessary? Invest not only in commonality and 
compatibility of technology, but also skills. What is the current level of skills and 
competencies? Where are gaps? Who must be trained on what technology how 
extensively? Check people’s resistance to use novel technology and invest as early as 
possible in their appreciation of advanced tools. 
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PART 5  DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” - Albert Einstein 
 
Scholars have found that global distributedness impacts coordination and control modes. In 
this study we intended to enhance insight in this process. The next chapters discusses our 
research journey in this light. We then revert to the demarcations of our study and discuss 
its limitations. The section concludes with suggestions for future research. 
 
Chapter 13  Discussion 
 
The geographical scope of collective human endeavors has expanded over the past 
centuries. Introduction of advanced traveling and telecommunications technologies have 
accelerated this process in recent years. Advanced economies rely on workflows, supply 
chains and projects that span multiple sites. From a business point of view, successful 
performance of these dispersed structures is a necessity. It defines firms’ efficiency and 
abilities of innovation, and therefore their competitive edge. On an operational level, 
however, geographical dispersion creates novel challenges. Distance eliminates many of 
the dynamics of collocation. By creating geographical and time separation, distance creates 
impediments to communication. Furthermore, people cannot take for granted that their 
peers, customers or bosses understand their customs and protocols. Dispersion connects a 
more diverse network of actors. It enforces reconsideration of assumptions; this implies 
that communications become more elaborate and explicit to complement the limited nature 
of representations.  
 
We have focused on these challenges in the context of global software projects. These have 
become one of the most prevalent types of distributed temporary systems. A number of 
reports have indicated what issues people experience when they make the transition from 
local towards globally distributed IS projects. The objective of this research is to 
understand the impact of global distributedness on software projects. Specifically, our 
research conceives the consequences of global dispersion in terms of its impacts on 
coordination and control processes in these projects. These processes are considered 
pivotal to project management. Our initial research questions focus on coordination and 
control modes. Next, we assess the nature of global dispersion and the way it impacts 
coordination and control processes in software projects.  
 
Research approach 
The empirical problem and research questions drive the design of our inquiry. We 
combined theory development with empirical research. For both areas and their connection 
to the overall research questions we adopted methodologies to enhance transparency, 
traceability and overall coordination. 
Theory development concerns the review and integration of current research. We adopted a 
structured approach that takes into account the current stage of theory development in our 
topic area and the research objectives.  
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As an initial step, we traced the history of coordination and control concepts all the way 
back to the earliest scholars in management to gain an understanding of the area. Results 
from this undertaking were theoretically integrated with recent lines of thought on 
coordination and control processes: distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1991), collective mind 
(Crowston & Kammerer, 1998), semi-structure (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) and High 
Reliability Organizations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). The structure of this integration 
process followed a contingency theory thinking approach. It resulted in integrative 
frameworks for coordination and control modes. Next it linked the two concepts of 
coordination and control.  
As the next step, we explored current research applicable to temporary systems that are 
polycontextual and geographically distributed. Relying on our knowledge base in 
coordination and control theory, we framed this review according to the objectives of our 
study. This second literature review encompassed areas like polycontextuality, electronic 
media use, groupware and teleworking. Probably for the first time, we analyzed these 
concepts on an integrative level. We came up with gaps that refine the concept of global 
distributedness. These include geographical distance, time zone differences, governance 
differences, cultural diversity and differences in IT infrastructures. We developed an initial 
version of a conceptual lens. Then, we revisited the literature to analyze the impact of 
gaps. This literature framing leveraged our first review on coordination and control. It 
resulted in an initial understanding that became a starting point for empirical work. 
 
Empirical research complemented the theory development work. Using our conceptual 
lens, we conducted two qualitative case studies on real-life projects. The case studies 
generated data and insights that confirmed and expanded our initial understanding. We 
followed Lee’s (1991) proposal for combining interpretive and positivist analysis as one of 
the few empirical studies to date. We devised a method for applying his principles to 
multiple case studies, thus extending Lee’s (1991) approach and literature on cross-case 
analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Our interpretive analysis was strongly 
driven by qualitative data, similar to our literature reviews and reinterpretation (Meadows, 
1996b). At the same time, we kept the overall focus of our study as a guideline.  
 
An integrative chapter connected results from the case studies with our theory 
development work. This revealed extensions to our initial understanding. We finally 
translated the results from our study into practitioner-oriented prescriptions, one of the 
target audiences of this work. 
 
Findings 
This research study delivered results that contribute to our objective. On the one hand, we 
found with our conceptual lens that gaps have multiple ways of impacting coordination and 
control processes. On the other hand, the study revealed new themes that extend our initial 
understanding as summarized in Figure 69. Both categories of findings are discussed here.  
 
Impact of gaps 
Our study assessed how the gaps (distance, time zone differences, cultural differences, 
governance gaps, and infrastructural differences) change collaboration patterns. First, we 
found that geographical distance separates people and cuts out informal exchanges. 
Connection and reciprocal awareness come less naturally. Electronic tools provide a 
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linkage for transmitting representations of reality. But mediated communications require 
more effort and lack the richness, multi-modality and interaction of face-to-face meetings. 
These still remain important for building relationships and understanding of a collective 
task, especially when it is a novel task like requirements analysis. The success of remote 
contact depends on people’s proactive attitude and regular contact patterns. Explicit 
(documented) communications on expectations and actions compensate for limited 
interpersonal exchanges. People’s prior relationship and common knowledge base enrich 
electronic contact.  
 
We connected the governance gap to distance since their impacts appeared closely related. 
Remote collaboration across organizational boundaries adds to the complexity of dispersed 
projects. Each organization brings its unique set of expectations and way of working. This 
requires additional bridging effort. The risk is that teams on both sides are minimally 
connected, and fail to bridge their diverse thought worlds. Under these conditions, trying to 
accomplish challenging collective activities reflects unawareness of underlying 
coordination problems, and appears a recipe for failure.  
 
People prefer communications with remote counterparts to have a similar background, 
vocabulary, and training. This ameliorates problems associated with remote contact. As a 
consequence, cross-functional dependencies require similar functional variety at the 
dispersed sites. People connect within their relatively homogeneous dispersed functional 
community, while solving cross-functional issues locally. Sometimes, people try to 
connect a polycontextual project through liaisons. This increases project risk since it 
depends on the functioning of one or a few pivotal individuals. These linking pins often 
add little value to a project, and are likely to become bottlenecks.  
 
Remoteness enhances the need for explicit awareness of knowledge and information 
dependence. This appears a novel area in coordination theory. These dependencies could 
be like agency relationships between the users and developers in IS development. Or, they 
could be a form of pooled dependence on standardized knowledge applicable to multiple 
cloned implementations of a standardized IS like ERP. Moreover, there could be sequential 
and incremental development and flow of these pooled standards between subsequent 
implementations. Knowledge transfer is achieved by a mixture of impersonal digital 
boundary objects (requirements documentation, implementation standards and procedures), 
and personal contact. It is beneficial for contacts across sites to be as direct and 
homogeneous as possible. Directness is especially vital for transferring novel insights, like 
at the start of a project. Homogeneity means leveraging on a common base of expertise, 
e.g., a key user in Finance at one site connects to someone with the same role in a different 
place. Turnover or late involvement of people undermines a shared cognitive 
infrastructure, despite impersonal boundary objects.  
 
Distance changes managerial processes of communicating, planning and controlling. 
Managers maintain a regular pace of contact with remote subordinates, contributors and 
stakeholders. They avoid an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ situation where they lack insight in 
progress at remote sites. It appears unfeasible to micro-manage subordinates on a distance. 
Instead, managers build relationships through visits. They reduce uncertainty in their 
dispersed project by sustaining multiple contact linkages and outlining plans that are as 
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comprehensive as possible. They use a multinational’s hierarchy to exert local control. In 
the case of outsourcing, relationships between executives foster remote collaboration on an 
operational level.  
 
Control processes in a distributed project rely strongly on an individual’s local 
responsibility. Selection and pre-project socialization thus become essential. It appears 
challenging to monitor progress at a remote site since communications are less intense. A 
shift occurs towards a more formalized way of working where people share detailed 
activity outlines. This facilitates comparison with actual progress. IS support this control 
mode in the form of workflow systems and groupware. If need be, a multinational’s 
hierarchical structure compensates for a manager’s loss of cross-site controls. Control in 
remote outsourcing relationships requires more explicitness and formalization than 
collocated projects. Frequently, eager vendors sign incomplete contracts for complex IS 
projects. Their underestimation leads to situations that lack both task clarity and 
relationships across firms (Ouchi & Johnson, 1978). These projects are characterized by 
conflicts, delays, budget overruns and (expensive) ad hoc measures. 
 
With respect to application development, distance complicates the use of prototyping. This 
approach centers on interaction between developers and users. In a dispersed project, these 
groups cannot meet frequently and they miss rich face-to-face discussions. Liaisons 
between the vendor team and users further constrain inter-group exchanges. Lack of 
knowledge transfer and mind melting have a negative impact on the quality and timeliness 
of system development. Consequently, development and implementation methodologies 
take on a pivotal role in dispersed projects. They provide structure in a setting that lacks 
communication opportunities available to collocated projects. Additionally, mediating 
technologies like intranet and groupware push the same information to scattered team 
members. 
 
Second, time zone differences force a shift towards asynchronous communications media 
like email and vmail. This conflicts with situations that demand urgent attention or 
increased information processing (like novel tasks, diversity, and intense task 
dependencies). In the latter case, asynchronous media often lead to endless chains of 
messages with requests for clarification. This causes considerable delays and tensions. 
People respond by adapting their working hours, or communicating in a more formalized, 
comprehensive manner to avoid feedback questions.  
 
Third, our empirical work suggests that the impact of diversity is not limited to cultural 
differences. Other forms include differences in operations (R&D versus mass volume 
manufacturing), function (IT versus various user departments), and language (English 
versus localized versions of English or other languages like Chinese and Japanese). We 
elaborate here on these forms of diversity.  
People bridged cultural differences by adding an adaptive layer to their unique local way 
of working. This process benefited from international experience, and working locally with 
expatriate managers. First time connections across cultural gaps require collocated 
meetings as ice breakers. An alternative is to rely on liaisons to connect culturally diverse 
groups. This seems convenient but it limits inter-group relationship building and 
information processing capacity.  
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Operational differences cause misunderstanding on both sides, and make lessons learnt at 
one location less relevant for others. Extensive communications are required to clarify 
different viewpoints and enhance local heedfulness to operations at another site. People 
adapt their local way of working or develop a hybrid mode of operations. These efforts 
delay projects, especially when people face time zone differences and (have to) use 
asynchronous media.  
Cross-functional communication appears challenging on a distance. Connecting different 
thought worlds requires elaborate explanations that would benefit from face-to-face 
discussions. In order to avoid remote contacts across functions, connections were 
established between people with similar roles (IT - IT, inventory - inventory). Requests 
that involve another function are either solved locally, or through homogeneous 
connections across sites. This leverages common knowledge bases on both sides and 
simplifies remote contact.  
 
English seems to emerge as a world language, and individuals’ proficiency in this area has 
become a selection criterion for global projects. For many, however, communicating in 
English remains challenging. They do not catch nuances and jokes, and are not 
comfortable with oral exchanges (especially with bad telephone connections). These 
people prefer documented exchanges (email) instead of phone calls. Such adaptations 
make remote contact less efficient and effective. 
 
Fourth, global projects would be unfeasible without technologies that move people and 
physical resources, or information (air travel and IT). In terms of the last category, people 
suffered from incompatibility of IT resources (different development tools), absence of IT 
resources at some sites, and slow or low quality remote connections (server access, 
telephone lines to some countries). This constrained remote collaboration and delayed 
projects. Upfront investment in commonality and appropriate infrastructures is required. 
Technology should become a reliable resource that underpins seamless interactions and 
enables people to focus on the job at hand.  
 
Additional findings 
In addition to the impact of gaps, we found other themes that help us understand 
coordination and control of global software projects. First, the very nature of projects 
implies that tasks are novel and incompletely understood. People’s perception of their 
collective task and the impact of gaps often does not map to the enfolding reality of a 
project. This gap between perception and ‘realism’ often takes the form of underestimation 
of task complexity, intricacy of technology, and challenges of interpersonal collaboration. 
Underestimation leads to a project setup that does not do justice to the complexity of 
distributed collaboration. People experience tensions of unfeasible work demands. 
Eventually, those responsible for the project must adjust their thinking to the reality of a 
project. This adaptation process includes ad hoc measures. It complicates and delays a 
project. Looking back, people prefer realism and comprehensive plans as early in the 
project as possible. This reduces distributed information processing and adaptation needs.  
 
Second, just looking at a project does not reveal its problems in sufficient detail. People 
mentioned the importance of what we refer to as ex ante coordination and control 
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mechanisms. They emphasized the importance of ex ante global IT infrastructures, 
knowledge of project-related topics, interpersonal contacts, and international experience 
from earlier projects. Lack of ex ante mechanisms occurs when teams within a 
multinational organization connect for the first time, or companies outsource to a novel 
partner. In these cases, the initial project phase requires extensive investments in 
coordination and control mechanisms before the ‘real’ project work can start. Failure to do 
so (possibly caused by underestimating the impact and severity of the gaps), spreads out 
these costs over subsequent project phases. This may cause mismatch of expectations, and 
result in tensions and delays.  
 
A final new finding was the role of task urgency and criticality. Global IT projects play a 
vital role in today’s business strategy.74 This translates into strong pressure on the work 
floor level to deliver, and leads to several adaptation patterns in global projects to deal with 
tensions. Management monitors more closely daily or weekly progress. They cannot afford 
to delegate this involvement. Project members work more proactively. They keep each 
other informed on their activity schedules to economize collaboration processes. People 
use more interactive, richer media to solve problems in a short time span. They connect 
more directly to circumvent dependence on liaisons or hierarchical layers.  
 
Contributions 
These findings answer our research questions and bear relevance to practitioners and 
academics. We translated these findings into prescriptions for the first group. These 
provide them with a resource that extends existing resources. We assume that our study is 
more comprehensive, better structured, and more theory-informed than others’ work so far. 
The quality of the underlying research work ensures insights that connect professionals’ 
struggles with global software projects with state-of-the art academic thinking. Out of this 
symbiosis, we hope that insights and recommendations emerge with that offer sustainable 
usefulness.  
 
Our contribution to the academic community takes several forms. First, we integrated 
coordination and control theory as separate fields of study, and moved on by integrating 
the two. We looked at contributions in organization sciences over the past century and 
identified four categories of coordination mechanisms: work-based coordination, 
coordination by organization design, inter-personal coordination, and technology-based 
coordination. A matrix was developed for identifying control mechanisms. Its first 
dimension is controllers, including hierarchical supervision, co-workers (clan), technology, 
self, contractual party, and third party. The second dimension concerns the object of 
control processes, i.e., input, transformation process, and outputs.  
Coordination and control processes are closely intertwined. For instance, coordinating 
plans and procedures support control in the form of comparing actual accomplishments 
with those intended. Another link between the two constructs is the existence of 
contingencies that drive coordination and control modes. Our literature study identified the 
following ones: interdependence, uncertainty, observability, complexity, work unit size, 
                                                 
74 A unique example was the Y2K problem. 
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and functional diversity. For each of these, we outlined their impact on coordination and 
control processes. Scholars working on coordination and control problems may benefit 
from this work.  
Second, this contribution drove one of the most comprehensive literature studies to date on 
polycontextual, distributed collaboration. The second literature study maps this field for 
investigators and resulted in a summarizing conceptual lens. We propose gaps that exist 
between sites involved in a joint project, and affect collaborative processes. These are 
geographical distance, governance differences, time zone differences, cultural diversity, 
and infrastructural differences. Third, we conducted two in-depth qualitative case studies 
on global software projects. This is an important contribution to a field that has relied 
mostly on experiments, dispersed student projects, and research that is based on interviews 
with a few individuals in multiple companies.  
Fourth, the case studies are one of the few that combine interpretive with positivist 
approaches, as proposed by Lee (1991).  
Finally, our integrative analysis extends knowledge of coordination and control processes 
in dispersed software projects. We wanted to understand the impact of global 
distributedness on coordination and control processes. 
 
Researchers in the area of global software projects and adjacent fields can use these results 
as a starting point for further inquiry. 
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Chapter 14  Limitations and Future Research  
 
Like any research and human endeavor, our work has its limitations. These are discussed 
here and translated into opportunities for future research. The section is structured around 
the main dimensions of our study - its scope, theoretical basis, and empirical research 
methodology.  
 
Scope 
This research focused on temporary as main unit of analysis. It did not pay attention to 
more fine grained or larger scale phenomena. Future research could expand on individuals’ 
experience in dispersed work environments, or interpersonal relationships and the 
functioning of dispersed groups. Other options include investigation of workflows, 
processes and supply chains without temporal constraints.  
This research focuses on projects in the late 1990s. Anything before or after that time is not 
included and offers opportunities for inquiry. We looked at projects that were characterized 
by geographical dispersion and time zone differences. Others could exclude the time zone 
aspect by focusing on north-south dispersion (i.e., sites in North and South American in 
the same zone, or Africa and Europe).  
We looked at real-life software projects in a business context. This excludes those in other 
business sectors and industries, and also projects in a military or nonprofit environment. 
Real-life means that we did not conduct experiments, or worked on simulations like 
distributed virtual environments.  
Within our parameters we zoomed in on coordination and control processes. This 
perspective is multidisciplinary. It blends research from fields like economics, sociology, 
psychology, organization science, management of technology, and information systems 
research. An implication of this approach is that we cannot expand on a single discipline. 
The study leaves much work to be done for researchers within these areas. For instance, 
sociological research on dispersed groups, psychological studies on interpersonal 
relationships with minimal face-to-face contact, and research on communications and 
media use.  
 
Theory 
Our content focus on coordination and control suggested a number of research streams that 
were relevant to our research objectives. We refined our initial selection based on early 
empirical work. We also emphasized some degree of commonality across the approaches. 
That is, similarity of constructs and outlook in order to avoid a too diverse and unrelated 
base.  
Within the broad contours of coordination and control, future research could rely on a 
subset of our theory selection, or adopt other theories. For instance, exchange theory, 
activity theory, network theory, work in the area of human computer interactions, and 
human factors research. Other researchers may want to explore new venues that are more 
technical (Dertouzos, 1999), operational or philosophical. Anthropological and cross-
cultural angles could contribute to our understanding of how people with diverse 
backgrounds adapt in dispersed work environments. Communication and cognitive 
approaches could reveal the role of meaning, representation and inclusion.  
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Empirical research methodology 
A third area of limitation and opportunity concerns empirical research. Our qualitative 
investigation of two case studies has its flaws. We could not immerse ourselves for months 
in these environments to enhance our insights in the contexts. We could not collect an 
infinite amount of documentation or conduct multiple interviews over prolonged periods of 
time. We faced constraints related to resources and the geographical dispersion of our 
research object.  
The cases’ description is limited, it serves mainly to fuel theory development. Other 
researchers may like more substance there, or conversely prefer a more positivist approach. 
Case studies enable replication logic as a form of generalization. More case studies would 
have contributed to this notion.  
Our unit of analysis was the temporary system. As indicated, one could choose a more 
detailed framing (e.g., individuals, relationships, what happens at a single site), or explore 
topics that are external to a project, like how it relates to an organizational context and 
business environment (Ancona, 1992).  
The empirical of our research relied on extensive theoretical baggage. This may have 
biased the researcher during data collection and analysis. Certainly, very interesting 
opportunities exist for grounded theory approaches.  
Our focus on coordination and control appeared quite inclusive. The constructs invited a 
broad perspective on how people collaborate, manage and communicate. We maintained 
this scope for its internal coherence, and the chances of collecting interesting data. Future 
research could zoom in on sub-dimensions, like only communications or only managerial 
relationships.  
The temporal perspective of our work was retrospective and longitudinal where possible 
(CarCo case). Data collection for the DiskCo case was compressed to a 2 weeks period. 
For CarCo the author visited one site, but worked with an onsite participant-observer.  
Sites from our cases were located in North America, Europe, India and the Pacific region. 
Future research should extend this to regions like South America, Africa, and Eastern 
Europe.  
Finally, the case study methodology advances theory in a front-runner role (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). It offers opportunities for describing, exploring and explaining. At the same time, 
the methodology lacks some of the qualities of alternative approaches. Case studies in 
organization science do not match the intricate immersion in research sites that is common 
to ethnographic approaches. Case researchers cannot control their research object in the 
sense of an experimental setup. Unlike survey research, case studies cannot be statistically 
generalized to a larger population. In short, future research can conduct more extensive 
case study research, and complement that with alternative empirical methodologies. This is 
indispensable for advancing our understanding of geographically dispersed collective 
action. Our study is merely a link in an ongoing process of understanding and managing 
collective action that includes people from across the globe. Their positive and productive 
collaboration is what ultimately counts. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The geographical scope of collective human endeavors has expanded over the past 
centuries. Introduction of advanced traveling and telecommunications technologies have 
accelerated this process in recent years. Today’s technologically advanced economies rely 
on workflows, supply chains and projects that span multiple sites. From a strategic point of 
view, successful performance of these dispersed structures is a necessity. It defines firms’ 
efficiency and innovativeness, and therefore their competitive edge. On an operational 
level, however, geographical dispersion creates novel challenges. Distance eliminates 
many of the dynamics of collocation. By creating geographical and time separation, it 
creates impediments to communication. People rely on technology to mediate 
representations. Furthermore, they cannot take for granted that their peers, customers or 
bosses understand customs and protocols that are specific to a local site or organization. 
Dispersion thus connects a more diverse network of actors. It enforces reconsideration of 
assumptions.  
 
We have focused on these challenges in the context of global software projects. These have 
become one of the most prevalent types of distributed temporary systems. Numerous 
reports have surfaced issues people experience when making the transition from local 
towards globally distributed IS projects. Our objective is to better understand the impact of 
global distributedness on software projects. Specifically, our research conceives the 
consequences of global dispersion in terms of its impacts on coordination and control 
processes in these projects. These processes are considered pivotal to project management. 
Our initial research questions focus on coordination and control modes. Next, we assess 
the nature of global dispersion and the way it impacts coordination and control processes 
in software projects.  
 
Research approach 
The empirical problem and research questions drive the design of our inquiry. We 
combined theory development with empirical research. For both areas and their connection 
to the overall research questions we adopted methodologies to enhance transparency, 
traceability and overall coordination. 
Theory development concerns the review and integration of current research. We adopted a 
structured approach that takes into account the current stage of theory development in our 
topic area and the research objectives.  
As an initial step, we traced the history of coordination and control concepts all the way 
back to the earliest scholars in management to gain an understanding of the area. Results 
from this undertaking were theoretically integrated with recent lines of thought on 
coordination and control processes: distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1991), collective mind 
(Crowston & Kammerer, 1998), semi-structure (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) and High 
Reliability Organizations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). The structure of this integration 
process followed a contingency theory thinking approach. It resulted in integrative 
frameworks for coordination and control modes. Next it linked the two concepts of 
coordination and control.  
As the next step, we explored current research applicable to temporary systems that are 
polycontextual and geographically distributed. Relying on our knowledge base in 
coordination and control theory, we framed this review according to the objectives of our 
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study. This second literature review encompassed areas like polycontextuality, electronic 
media use, groupware and teleworking. Probably for the first time, we analyzed these 
concepts on an integrative level. We came up with gaps that refine the concept of global 
distributedness. These include geographical distance, time zone differences, governance 
differences, cultural diversity and differences in IT infrastructures. We developed an initial 
version of a conceptual lens. Then, we revisited the literature to analyze the impact of 
gaps. This literature framing leveraged our first review on coordination and control. It 
resulted in an initial understanding that became a starting point for empirical work. 
 
Empirical research complemented the theory development work. Using our conceptual 
lens, we conducted two qualitative case studies on real-life projects. The case studies 
generated data and insights that confirmed and expanded our initial understanding. We 
followed Lee’s (1991) proposal for combining interpretive and positivist analysis as one of 
the few empirical studies to date. We devised a method for applying his principles to 
multiple case studies, thus extending Lee’s (1991) approach and literature on cross-case 
analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). Our interpretive analysis was strongly 
driven by qualitative data, similar to our literature reviews and reinterpretation (Meadows, 
1996b). At the same time, we kept the overall focus of our study as a guideline.  
 
An integrative chapter connected results from the case studies with our theory 
development work. This revealed extensions to our initial understanding. We finally 
translated the results from our study into practitioner-oriented prescriptions, one of the 
target audiences of this work. 
 
Findings 
This research study delivered results that contribute to our objective. On the one hand, we 
found with our conceptual lens that gaps have multiple ways of impacting coordination and 
control processes. On the other hand, the study revealed new themes that extend our initial 
understanding. Both categories of findings are discussed here.  
 
 Impact of gaps 
Our study assessed how the gaps change collaboration patterns. First, we found that 
geographical distance separates people and cuts out informal exchanges. Connection and 
reciprocal awareness come less naturally. Electronic tools provide a linkage for 
transmitting representations of reality. But mediated communications require more effort 
and lack the richness, multi-modality and interactivity of face-to-face meetings. These still 
remain important for building relationships and understanding of a collective task, 
especially when it is a novel task like requirements analysis. The success of remote contact 
depends on people’s proactive attitude and regular contact patterns. Explicit (documented) 
communications on expectations and actions compensate for limited interpersonal 
exchanges. People’s prior relationship and common knowledge base enrich electronic 
contact.  
 
We connected the governance gap to distance since their impacts appeared closely related. 
Remote collaboration across organizational boundaries adds to the complexity of dispersed 
projects. Each organization brings its unique set of expectations and way of working. This 
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requires additional bridging effort. The risk is that teams on both sides are minimally 
connected, and fail to bridge their diverse thought worlds.  
 
People prefer communications with remote counterparts having a similar background, 
vocabulary, and training. This ameliorates problems associated with remote contact. As a 
consequence, cross-functional dependencies require similar functional variety at the 
dispersed sites. People connect within their relatively homogeneous dispersed functional 
community, while solving cross-functional issues locally. Sometimes, people try to 
connect a polycontextual project through liaisons. This increases project risk since it 
depends on the functioning of one or a few pivotal individuals. These linking pins often 
add little value to a project, and are likely to become bottlenecks.  
 
Remoteness enhances the need for explicit awareness of knowledge and information 
dependence. These dependencies could be like agency relationships between the users and 
developers in IS development. Or, they could be a form of pooled dependence on 
standardized knowledge applicable to multiple cloned implementations of a standardized 
IS like ERP.  
 
Distance changes managerial processes of communicating, planning and controlling. 
Managers maintain a regular pace of contact with remote subordinates, contributors and 
stakeholders. Micro-managing on a distance appears unfeasible. Instead, managers build 
relationships through visits. They reduce uncertainty in their dispersed project by 
sustaining multiple linkages and outlining plans that are as comprehensive as possible. 
They use a multinational’s hierarchy to exert local control. In the case of outsourcing, 
relationships between executives foster remote collaboration on an operational level.  
 
Control processes in a distributed project rely strongly on individual’s local responsibility. 
Selection and pre-project socialization thus become essential. It appears challenging to 
monitor progress at a remote site since communications are less intense. A shift occurs 
towards a more formalized way of working where people share detailed activity outlines. 
IS support this control mode in the form of workflow systems and groupware. Control in 
remote outsourcing relationships requires more explicitness and formalization than 
collocated projects. Often, eager vendors sign incomplete contracts for complex IS 
projects. Their underestimation leads to situations that lack both task clarity and 
relationships across firms (Ouchi & Johnson, 1978). These projects are characterized by 
conflicts, delays, budget overruns and (expensive) ad hoc measures. 
 
With respect to application development, distance complicates the use of prototyping. This 
approach centers on interaction between developers and users. In a dispersed project, these 
groups cannot meet frequently and they miss rich face-to-face discussions. Liaisons 
between the vendor team and users further constrain inter-group exchanges. Lack of 
knowledge transfer and mind melting have a negative impact on the quality and timeliness 
of system development. Consequently, development and implementation methodologies 
take on a pivotal role in dispersed projects.  
 
Second, time zone differences force a shift towards asynchronous communications media 
like email and vmail. This conflicts with situations that demand urgent attention or 
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increased information processing (like novel tasks, diversity, and intense task 
dependencies). In the latter case, asynchronous media often lead to endless chains of 
messages with requests for clarification. This causes considerable delays and tensions. 
People respond by adapting their working hours, or communicating in a more formalized, 
comprehensive manner to avoid feedback questions.  
 
Third, our empirical work suggests that the impact of diversity is not limited to cultural 
differences. Other forms include differences in operations (R&D versus mass volume 
manufacturing), function (IT versus various user departments), and language (English 
versus localized versions of English or other languages like Chinese and Japanese). We 
elaborate here on these forms of diversity.  
People bridged cultural differences by adding an adaptive layer to their unique local way 
of working. This process benefited from international experience, and working locally with 
expatriate managers. First time connections across cultural gaps require collocated 
meetings as ice breakers. An alternative is to rely on liaisons to connect culturally diverse 
groups. This seems convenient but it limits inter-group relationship building and 
information processing capacity.  
 
Operational differences cause misunderstanding on both sides, and make lessons learnt at 
one location less relevant for others. Extensive communications are required to clarify 
different viewpoints and enhance local heedfulness to operations at another site. People 
adapt their local way of working or develop a hybrid mode of operations. These efforts 
delay projects, especially when people face time zone differences and (have to) use 
asynchronous media.  
Cross-functional communication appears challenging on a distance. In order to avoid 
remote contacts across functions, connections were established between people with 
similar roles (IT - IT, inventory - inventory). Requests that involve another function are 
either solved locally, or through homogeneous connections across sites.  
 
English seems to emerge as a world language, and individuals’ proficiency in this area has 
become a selection criterion for global projects. For many, however, communicating in 
English remains challenging. They do not catch nuances and jokes, and are not 
comfortable with oral exchanges (especially with bad telephone connections). These 
people prefer documented exchanges (email) instead of phone calls. Such adaptations 
make remote contact less efficient and effective. 
 
Fourth, global projects would not be feasible without technologies that move people and 
physical resources, or information (air travel and IT). In terms of the last category, people 
suffered from incompatibility of IT resources (different development tools), absence of IT 
resources at some sites, and slow or low quality remote connections (server access, 
telephone lines to some countries). This constrained remote collaboration and delayed 
projects. Upfront investment in commonality and appropriate infrastructures is required. 
Technology should become a reliable resource that underpins seamless interactions and 
enables people to focus on the job at hand.  
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 Additional findings 
In addition to the impact of gaps, we found other themes that help us understand 
coordination and control of global software projects. First, the very nature of projects 
implies that tasks are novel and incompletely understood. People’s perception of their 
collective task and the impact of gaps often does not map to the enfolding reality of a 
project. This gap between perception and ‘realism’ often takes the form of underestimation 
of task complexity, intricacy of technology, and challenges of interpersonal collaboration. 
Underestimation leads to a project setup that does not do justice to the complexity of 
distributed collaboration. People experience tensions of unfeasible work demands. 
Eventually, those responsible for the project must adjust their thinking to the reality of a 
project. This adaptation process includes ad hoc measures. It complicates and delays a 
project. Looking back, people prefer realism and comprehensive plans as early in the 
project as possible. This reduces distributed information processing and adaptation needs.  
 
Second, just looking at a project does not reveal its problems in sufficient detail. People 
mentioned the importance of what we refer to as ex ante coordination and control 
mechanisms. They emphasized the importance of ex ante global IT infrastructures, 
knowledge of project-related topics, interpersonal contacts, and international experience 
from earlier projects. Lack of ex ante mechanisms occurs when teams within a 
multinational organization connect for the first time, or companies outsource to a novel 
partner. In these cases, the initial project phase requires extensive investments in 
coordination and control mechanisms before the ‘real’ project work can start. Failure to do 
so (possibly caused by underestimating the impact and severity of the gaps), spreads out 
these costs over subsequent project phases. This may cause mismatch of expectations, and 
result in tensions and delays.  
 
A final new finding was the role of task urgency and criticality. Global IT projects play a 
vital role in today’s business strategy. This translates into strong pressure on the work floor 
level to deliver, and leads to several adaptation patterns in global projects to deal with 
tensions. Management monitors more closely daily or weekly progress. They cannot afford 
to delegate this involvement. Project members work more proactively. They keep each 
other informed on their activity schedules to economize collaboration processes. People 
use more interactive, richer media to solve problems in a short time span. They connect 
more directly to circumvent dependence on liaisons or hierarchical layers.  
 
Contributions 
These findings answer our research questions and bear relevance to practitioners and 
academics. We translated these findings into prescriptions for the first group. These 
provide them with a resource that extends existing resources.  
 
Our contribution to the academic community takes several forms. First, we integrated 
coordination and control theory as separate fields of study, and moved on by integrating 
the two.  
Second, this contribution drove one of the most comprehensive literature studies to date on 
polycontextual, distributed collaboration. The second literature study maps this field for 
investigators and resulted in a summarizing conceptual lens.  
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Third, we conducted two in-depth qualitative case studies on global software projects. This 
is an important contribution to a field that has relied mostly on experiments, dispersed 
student projects, and research that is based on interviews with a few individuals in multiple 
companies.  
Fourth, the case studies are one of the few that combine interpretive with positivist 
approaches, as proposed by Lee (1991).  
Finally, our integrative analysis extends knowledge of coordination and control processes 
in dispersed software projects. We wanted to understand the impact of global 
distributedness on coordination and control processes. 
 
Researchers in the area of global software projects and adjacent fields can use these results 
as a starting point for further inquiry. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
Innovatie op technologisch terrein heeft de scope van intermenselijke 
samenwerkingsverbanden verbreed, met name vanaf begin jaren 1990. Bedrijven zijn in 
staat processen en projecten te organiseren waaraan mensen deelnemen vanuit meerdere 
locaties. Tegelijkertijd is na de initiële euforie duidelijk geworden dat de beschikbaarheid 
van geavanceerde informatie technologie (IT) nog niet betekent dat geografisch verspreide 
samenwerking succesvol verloopt. Mensen van verschillende locaties hebben vaak een 
minder gemeenschappelijke achtergrond in termen van cultuur, opleiding, ervaring, manier 
van werken en belevingswereld. Dit bemoeilijkt samenwerking, zeker als het om 
technologisch en/ of cognitief complex werk gaat.  
Wij hebben ons op deze problematiek gericht in het kader van internationaal verspreide 
software projecten. Dat wil zeggen projecten waarbij locaties in bijvoorbeeld Noord 
Amerika, West Europa en Zuidoost Azië betrokken zijn. Met name midden jaren 1990 
werden een groot aantal van dergelijke projecten opgestart voor het jaar 200 probleem, 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software implementaties en wat later electronic 
commerce projecten. Ons doel was om beter te begrijpen hoe coördinatie en controle 
processen beïnvloed worden door internationale verspreiding. Deze processen worden 
doorgaans van fundamenteel belang geacht voor samenwerking in projectverband. Een 
beter inzicht in deze problematiek wordt geacht te leiden tot meer succes bij het managen 
van internationale software projecten.  
Voor dit onderzoek zijn een aantal stappen gezet. Allereerst is uitgebreid gekeken naar 
organisatiekundige literatuur over coördinatie en controle. Een tweede literatuur onderzoek 
bouwde hierop voort en concentreerde zich meer specifiek op verspreide samenwerking in 
brede zin - telewerken, regionaal verspreide projecten, en internationale (software) 
projecten. De bevindingen van deze fase leidde tot een definitie van internationale 
verspreiding waarbij 5 ‘gaps’ werden onderscheiden: (1) afstand, (2) tijdzone verschillen, 
en diversiteit van (3) cultuur, (4) organisatievorm, en (5) infrastructuur. Daarnaast werd in 
een onderzoeksmodel samengevat op wat voor manier project coördinatie en controle 
processen veranderen ten gevolge van deze gaps. Dit onderzoeksmodel werd toegepast op 
een tweetal cases. Met een kwalitatieve onderzoeksopzet onderzochten wij hoe mensen in 
de praktijk internationale samenwerking in software projecten ervaren. Het eerste project 
betreft de implementatie van ERP in een aantal vestigingen in de Zuidoost Aziatische regio 
van een internationaal opslagmedia bedrijf. Bij de tweede case werd software ontwikkeld 
in India voor de Noord-Amerikaanse en Europese vestigingen van een multinationale 
autoproducent.  
 
Het bleek dat de ‘gaps’ op een aantal manieren de wijze van coördinatie en controle in 
dergelijke projecten beïnvloeden. (1) Afstand maakt het voor mensen lastiger om up-to-
date te blijven over voortgang op andere locaties. Aangezien project deelnemers niet op 
een makkelijke manier frequent bij kunnen praten (het koffie- of kopieerapparaat effect), 
moeten zij bewuster investeren in contacten met mensen op andere locaties. Dit geldt des 
te sterker als mensen nog nooit met elkaar hebben samengewerkt en als hun achtergronden 
verschillend zijn. (2) Tijd zone verschillen zorgen ervoor dat meer asynchrone media 
worden gebruikt zoals electronic mail en voice mail. Dit werkt vertragend op project 
voortgang als mensen nieuwe of moeilijke problemen moeten oplossen tussen de 
verschillende locaties. (3) Uit de cases bleek dat diversiteit niet alleen op cultureel vlak een 
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rol speelt, maar ook in de zin van taal verschillen, manieren van werken, en functionele 
achtergrond van project deelnemers (bijvoorbeeld de gebruikers versus IT). Diversiteit 
intensiveert met name de initiële fase van verspreide projecten. Organisaties moeten 
investeren in kennis van en begrip voor de ‘anderen’ die ook nog eens elders werken. Dit 
vergt een geleidelijke project opbouw om te voorkomen dat wederzijds onbegrip blijft en 
conflicten ontstaan. (4) Organisaties die over afstand samenwerken opereren vaak op een 
verschillende manier. Dit geldt met name voor outsourcing naar bijvoorbeeld een 
‘offshore’ partner in landen als India, Filippijnen en China. Voor project managers is het 
belangrijk goede contacten op te bouwen en in een zo vroeg mogelijk stadium afspraken te 
maken over de inrichting van de project organisatie. Contacten op een ‘werkvloer’ niveau 
moeten expliciet worden opgezet zodat mensen over afstand de weg kunnen vinden bij de 
partner organisatie. Een alternatief is om een liaison/ verbindingspersoon in te zetten die 
contacten tussen locaties verzorgt. Dit lijkt samenwerking te vergemakkelijken maar maakt 
tegelijkertijd interlokale samenwerking sterk afhankelijk van individuele competenties en 
capaciteiten. Dat laatste kan vertragend werken. (5) Verspreide projecten zijn kritiek 
afhankelijk van IT infrastructuur met voldoende snelheid, beschikbaarheid, homogeniteit, 
gevarieerdheid en capaciteit. Problemen waar organisaties mee kampen is dat verbindingen 
niet snel genoeg zijn. Ook kunnen er verschillen optreden tussen de IT omgevingen per 
project locatie in termen van beschikbaarheid, typen resources, capaciteit en standaarden. 
Deze factoren zorgen voor vertraging en irritatie.  
Naast deze bevindingen bleken een aantal gerelateerd thema’s te spelen. In de eerste plaats 
onderschatten mensen een aantal vitale project dimensies zoals taak complexiteit en 
afhankelijkheden van activiteiten. Dat betekent dat de inrichting van een project 
onrealistisch wordt: men is zich niet bewust van coördinatie en controle manieren die 
benodigd zijn in een bepaalde situatie. Later moet dan worden bijgestuurd waardoor 
vertraging optreedt.  
Ten tweede bleken ex ante coördinatie en controle manieren van groot belang te zijn. 
Verspreide coördinatie en controle worden vergemakkelijkt als mensen al hebben 
samengewerkt bij eerdere gelegenheden, of relevante en vergelijkbare ervaring hebben. 
Bijvoorbeeld iemand uit India die al projecten in de Verenigde Staten heeft uitgevoerd 
vindt het makkelijker om vervolgens een nieuw project vanuit India met andere 
Amerikaanse klanten te doen.  
In de derde plaats blijkt dat de tijdsdruk op projecten invloed uitoefent op de manier 
waarop coördinatie en controle plaatsvindt. Hoe urgenter en meer kritiek een project (fase) 
is, hoe meer medewerkers en management de nadruk moeten leggen op snelle respons tijd 
en grote betrokkenheid bij de relatie tussen hun werk en andermans activiteiten. Dit 
patroon wordt versterkt in internationaal verspreide projecten.  
Het onderzoek vertaalt inzichten op de genoemde terreinen naar aanbevelingen voor de 
praktijk, en sluit af met beperkingen en mogelijkheden voor vervolg onderzoek.  
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In the context of our research, Gary’s sculpture symbolizes the importance of bringing 
together people from diverse backgrounds. Connecting them in global projects cements 
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